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Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: Time-series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict

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Although the role of reciprocity in international cooperation is central to neoliberal institutionalism, empirical understanding of the concept remains weak. We analyze strategic response patterns—the use of reciprocity or inverse response (bullying)—in the Bosnia conflict from 1992 to 1995. We construct weekly time series of conflict and cooperation among the parties to the Bosnia war, using machine-coded events data. Time-series statistical analysis identifies several important patterns of strategic response, both reciprocal and inverse. These include bilateral responses, which are central to the concepts of reciprocity and evolution of cooperation, and triangular responses, which are central to the debates on containment versus accommodation in regional conflicts. Specifically, Serb forces displayed inverse triangular response, cooperating toward Bosnia after being punished by NATO. Outside powers displayed triangular reciprocity, increasing hostility toward Serb forces after Serbian attacks on the Bosnian government.

The role of reciprocity in international cooperation is central to neoliberal institutionalism. Theorists in this tradition argue that reciprocity can promote the evolution of cooperation in situations of mixed interest, such as prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod 1984). Because it does not depend on central authority, reciprocity as a strategy for cooperation seems well suited to the "anarchic" realm of international relations, where (as even neoliberals grant) states operate autonomously in pursuit of self-interest (Axelrod and Keohane 1986, Keohane 1986a).

Yet, our empirical understanding of this central theoretical concept remains weak. Evidence regarding the existence and nature of international reciprocity is still largely limited to a few cases of great-power relations (mostly involving the United States and the Soviet Union) and is contentious.[1] Furthermore, theoretical insights from formal models have proven difficult to apply in the real-world international conflicts that occupy both empirical researchers and policymakers (see Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 1991). David Baldwin (1993, 22), in his edited volume on the neorealist-neoliberal debate, concludes:

> The most important research need is better understanding of the conditions that promote or inhibit international cooperation. The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism has generated at least six hypotheses worthy of more research and testing. The first concerns the strategy of reciprocity. Both the theoretical and practical conditions under which such strategies promote cooperation deserve attention.

Systematic testing of the role of reciprocity in international cooperation requires attention to three interconnected elements largely ignored by neoliberal theorists to date. First, in the post–Cold-War era, international cooperation hinges on the great-power management of regional conflicts more often than on the evolution of cooperation between two relatively equal parties, such as the Cold-War superpowers.[2] Yet, although managing regional conflicts has come to preoccupy policymakers, it has received less attention from scholars of international cooperation.

Second, in the context of managing regional conflicts, the concept of reciprocity must include triangular responses: Outside actions toward a regional power aim to influence that power's behavior toward other regional targets. For example, although Saddam Hussein's behavior toward the Western powers in 1990 presented some problems (notably taking hostages), the main task for great powers was changing his behavior toward Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These triangular aspects of reciprocity have not been studied adequately in the theoretical and empirical literature, which has focused on bilateral reciprocity.[3]

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[1] Even in the highly studied area of superpower arms races, empirical research has produced no consensus, whether from statistical analyses or case studies (George, Farley, and Dallin 1988; Patchen 1991). The dearth of systematic empirical work on reciprocity persists, moreover, seventeen years after Zinnes (1980) noted in her presidential address to the International Studies Association the contradictory results of empirical studies of reciprocity as one of three major "puzzles" facing the field of international relations.

[2] U.S.–Soviet relations provided the exemplary case of the problem of inducing mutual cooperation in a mixed relationship with a rival or potential rival of roughly equal power (e.g., Axelrod 1984, vii). As U.S. policy toward China is now debated in a similar framework (see Goldstein 1995), this problem clearly did not end with the Cold War, but it is no longer so central.

[3] Triangular responses among great powers also can occur (Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 1991), but triangularity is even more important in regional conflicts because the relationships of local parties are overlaid with the possible actions of outside powers. Triangular relationships also are possible among local parties in a regional conflict—such as Serbian, Croatian, and government forces

Third, in these triangular response relationships, the concept of reciprocity must be paired with its opposite, inverse response—which Hirshleifer and Coll (1988) in a game-theoretic context call a "bully" strategy. Inverse response, or taking advantage of cooperative actions but cooperating in response to hostile ones, is thought to characterize aggressive states, such as Nazi Germany in the late 1930s or Iraq in the 1990s. Yet, the concept has received scant attention to date in either the formal or empirical research on international cooperation.

Policymakers pay great attention to how particular states respond to actions, reciprocally or inversely, since the two types of response call for opposite strategies in managing relations with those states. Toward states that reciprocate, appropriate policies are "soft-line," using cooperative initiatives to promote future mutual cooperation. These soft-line policies underlie strategies of accommodation (or engagement). By contrast, appropriate policies toward states that respond inversely are "hard-line," using hostile initiatives to induce cooperation from an aggressive, opportunistic state, that is, a strategy of containment.[4]

A state may not follow the same response pattern triangularly as bilaterally. Thus, in analyzing the potentials for eliciting international cooperation in regional conflicts, both theoretical and policy concerns call for attention to the full range of response types—triangular along with bilateral responses, and inverse along with reciprocal responses. Several specific patterns of triangular response are of special interest.

Triangular response by a regional actor occurs when the actor changes its behavior toward another regional actor in response to the recent behaviors of an outside power. This response can be either reciprocal or inverse. If the regional actor responds with triangular reciprocity, it will increase cooperation toward a neighbor in response to cooperation from an outside power (and decrease cooperation in response to hostility). In this case, the outside power would best follow a strategy of accommodation and employ cooperative initiatives to induce local cooperation.

By contrast, if the regional actor uses triangular bully (inverse) responses, it will cooperate more toward its neighbor in response to the hostile actions of an outside power (and become more hostile toward its neighbor in response to the cooperation of an outside power). In this case, outside powers would best follow a containment strategy, using hostile initiatives to induce local cooperation.

For their part, outside powers may respond to local actions by using triangular reciprocity. This means that the outside power varies its behavior toward a regional actor in direct proportion to the regional actor's recent behavior toward another regional actor. The outside power would thus punish a regional actor's local misdeeds and reward its local good deeds. Such a response is consistent with the management of the conflict by either containment (if combined with hostile initiatives in expectation of an inverse triangular response by the regional actor) or accommodation (if combined with cooperative initiatives in expectation of a reciprocal triangular response).[5]

Intervention to manage a regional conflict may engender a collective goods problem among the outside powers who pay for the intervention. Some neoliberal theorists have suggested that the presence of a hegemonic state in the international system can help solve such problems. If so, then a hegemonic country—possibly including the United States in the 1990s—might play a distinctive role in the management of regional conflict.

HYPOTHESES AND MODEL

Our research aimed to assess empirically whether these various patterns of strategic response actually exist in the interactions that make up a real-world regional conflict—the war in Bosnia. In order to infer patterns of response by actors to the behaviors of other actors, we used time-series statistical analysis. We converted the actions of each actor toward each other actor into long weekly time series representing net cooperation (weighted cooperative actions minus weighted hostile actions), then analyzed how each actor's behavior correlates with the other actors' recent past behaviors, taking into account the first actor's own recent behavior. For example, do recent past actions by the international community help explain present actions by the Serbian forces toward the Bosnian government? By looking at thousands of large and small actions as they played out over time, we can draw general inferences about response patterns such as reciprocity and bullying (inverse response) in both their bilateral and triangular aspects.

Specifically, we wanted to know whether the bilateral reciprocity thought to characterize the "evolution of cooperation"—and/or the triangular responses which might characterize outside management of regional conflict—were actually present in the Bosnian case. We focused on the two most important dyads (with tests for omitted-variable bias): that of Serb forces and the international community (the United Nations and NATO members), and that of Serb forces and the Bosnian government.[6] We tested five hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 1 (BILATERAL RECIPROCITY): *The net cooperation of one actor toward another positively affects subsequent net cooperation by the second actor toward*

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in Bosnia—but our focus is on great-power actions toward one or more local parties with the goal of inducing cooperation among them.

[4] On soft- and hard-line policies, see Snyder and Diesing (1977, 298–303) and Jervis (1988, 326); Axelrod's (1984) "nice" resembles soft line. The distinction parallels Jervis's (1976, 78–82) classic "spiral" and "deterrence" models. Unfortunately for policymakers, no consensus exists regarding the particular states or circumstances to which each model applies. Most scholars agree that neither strategy works all the time (see Keohane 1986b, 3).

[5] In principle, an outside power could use inverse triangular response in reaction to the local actions of a state. But such responses are impractical and theoretically uninteresting.

[6] We later disaggregate the international community into U.S. and European actors to explore a possible hegemonic U.S. role in conflict management.

the first. (There are four actor-target pairs to test in the international-Serbian and Serbian-Bosnian dyads.)

HYPOTHESIS 2 (BILATERAL BULLYING): *The net cooperation of one actor toward another negatively (inversely) affects subsequent net cooperation by the second actor toward the first. (The same four actor-target pairs can be tested.)*

HYPOTHESIS 3 (TRIANGULAR RECIPROCITY BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY): *The net cooperation of the Serbian forces toward the Bosnian government positively affects subsequent net cooperation by the international community toward the Serbian forces.*

HYPOTHESIS 4 (TRIANGULAR RECIPROCITY BY SERBIAN FORCES): *The net cooperation of the international community toward Serbian forces positively affects subsequent net cooperation by Serbian forces toward the Bosnian government.*

HYPOTHESIS 5 (TRIANGULAR BULLYING BY SERBIAN FORCES): *The net cooperation of the international community toward Serbian forces negatively affects subsequent net cooperation by Serbian forces toward the Bosnian government.*[7]

To test these hypotheses we used a time-series model. Conceptually, our model derives from the vector autoregression (VAR) approach (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). That is, we defined each actor's behavior toward each other actor as a (time-series) variable, then regressed each one's behavior (at time t) on its own recent past behavior and the recent past behaviors of all the other variables in the system. Because the right-hand-side terms are identical for each equation (there is one equation per variable), the estimation uses ordinary least squares (OLS). Since we ultimately found that only one lagged term needed to be included for each independent variable, we were able to interpret the sign and significance of coefficients directly, largely bypassing the more controversial aspects of VAR. Although VAR proved useful for model specification, our actual model was a simple set of OLS equations regressing each time series on lagged terms for all time series:

Model 1:

$$SB_t = \beta_{10} + \beta_{11}SB_{t-1} + \beta_{12}BS_{t-1} + \beta_{13}IS_{t-1} + \beta_{14}SI_{t-1} + \epsilon_1;$$

$$BS_t = \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}SB_{t-1} + \beta_{22}BS_{t-1} + \beta_{23}IS_{t-1} + \beta_{24}SI_{t-1} + \epsilon_2;$$

$$IS_t = \beta_{30} + \beta_{31}SB_{t-1} + \beta_{32}BS_{t-1} + \beta_{33}IS_{t-1} + \beta_{34}SI_{t-1} + \epsilon_3;$$

$$SI_t = \beta_{40} + \beta_{41}SB_{t-1} + \beta_{42}BS_{t-1} + \beta_{43}IS_{t-1} + \beta_{44}SI_{t-1} + \epsilon_4;$$

where SB is Serb forces' level of net cooperation toward the Bosnian government; BS is the Bosnian government's level of net cooperation toward Serb forces; IS is the international community's level of net cooperation toward Serb forces; and SI is the Serb forces' level of net cooperation toward the international community.

In this model, the test for hypothesis 1 (bilateral reciprocity) is for the significance and positive sign of β_{12}, β_{21}, β_{34}, and/or β_{43}. The test for hypothesis 2 (bilateral bullying) is for significance and negative sign for any of the same four coefficients. The test for hypothesis 3 (triangular reciprocity by the international community) is for the significance and positive sign of β_{31}. The test for hypotheses 4 or 5 (triangular reciprocity or triangular bullying by Serb forces) is for the significance of β_{13}, with either positive or negative sign, respectively. This last coefficient provides the test of greatest interest in terms of both theoretical importance (triangular response by regional actors) and policy salience (appropriateness of accommodation versus containment).

COMPETING VIEWS OF THE CONFLICT

The war in Bosnia is an excellent case to test for several reasons. First, it matters greatly to policymakers, as it has become for better or worse a paradigm for the problem of regional conflict management in the post–Cold-War era.[8] Second, the complexity of the conflict and the repeated outside attempts to manage it provide numerous possibilities for triangular and bilateral response behaviors. Third, no consensus exists about the nature of the parties' response patterns or the appropriateness of various possible great-power intervention strategies.

The controversies about great-power policies toward the Bosnia conflict hinge on the question of reciprocal or inverse triangular response by Serb forces. Two schools of thought quickly emerged in Western capitals about the nature of the war and each called for different policy approaches. One school saw the war as a case of aggression against a UN member, which had a tradition of multiethnic tolerance, by ultranationalist forces using genocide as an instrument of territorial conquest. There were bad guys (the Serbian leadership) and good guys (the Bosnian government and society).[9] Because the assault on Bosnia struck at fundamental principles—genocide is evil and territorial integrity should be preserved—the war was a challenge to world order that required (both politically and morally) an effective response by the international community.[10] This aggressor-victim school of thought was supported by Bill Clinton when a candidate (and at times as president), Senator Robert Dole, a bipartisan majority in the U.S. Congress, the majority of the UN General Assembly, the Islamic Conference, and (not surprisingly) the Bosnian government.

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[7] In any particular test, either hypothesis 1 or 2 (or neither), but not both, can be true. The same applies to hypotheses 4 and 5.

[8] Bosnia received the largest UN peacekeeping force in history and the first use of force by the NATO alliance. As Woodward (1995, 2) notes, "by 1994 this conflict of little significance had emerged as the most challenging threat to existing norms and institutions that Western leaders faced."

[9] See, for example, Donia and Fine 1994, Malcolm 1994. Some variants focused on "the Bosnian Muslims." Croatia and Croatian forces play an ambiguous role, as aggressor or victim, depending on time and context.

The other school of thought saw Bosnia as a civil war among essentially equivalent actors, notwithstanding some power differences among them. There were no aggressors and victims but warring factions (or parties), with plenty of blame to go around.[11] Supporters of this view were more likely to accept ethnic nationalists on all sides as the legitimate political leaders,[12] to see autonomy for each ethnic group (even through territorial partition) as more important than preserving a multiethnic society, and to view conflict among the groups as the inevitable result of "ancient hatreds."[13] This school of thought was supported by presidents Bush and (sometimes) Clinton, the great powers on the UN Security Council (especially Russia), UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the European Union, and (not surprisingly) Serbia.

Although the two schools of thought differed in their views of the importance of Western intervention in Bosnia, their most fundamental difference concerned the nature of Serbian responses to international actions. As a result, they produced two mutually exclusive policy recommendations.[14] If the Serb forces were aggressive bullies, as members of the aggressor-victim school believed, then they would only cooperate toward Bosnia if confronted with force (hypothesis 5). One policy variant would have accomplished this by lifting the international arms embargo on Bosnia. A second variant would have used air strikes against Serb forces. In both cases, increased hostility toward the Serb forces was held to be the best option for inducing Serbian cooperation toward the Bosnian government. This is a containment strategy, responding to a regional bully in a triangular setting. (Some observers also expected Serb forces to cooperate *toward the international community* in response to international hostility, which would be a bilateral inverse response, as in hypothesis 2.)

According to the warring-factions school of thought, by contrast, the Serb forces were not bullies and would more likely respond to accommodation than containment. Lifting the arms embargo or using air strikes would increase Serbian hostility toward the Bosnian government (hypothesis 4) and probably toward the international community as well (hypothesis 1), leading to an upward spiral of violence in the region. The best policy was one of neutrality, mediation, and monitoring while using UN peacekeepers to try to deliver humanitarian aid to civilians. This policy generally prevailed among the great powers until September 1995.[15]

Both President Clinton and the UN Security Council showed ambivalence by advocating containment in words but accommodation in deeds. Hoffmann (1994) argues that in Bosnia, as in Ethiopia and Munich in the 1930s, "the international community made the mistake of simultaneously pursuing two incompatible policies—collective security against aggression, and a negotiated compromise between parties that were treated as morally equivalent."[16] Because the warring-factions and aggressor-victim schools rest on different assumptions about the specific response patterns of Serb forces (hypothesis 4 versus 5), our tests for triangular reciprocity and bullying can inform the debate.

METHODS

We used events data to examine the interactions of the actors in the Bosnia conflict. Events data are particularly well suited to the analysis of reciprocity and bullying since they are a systematic collection of interactions among the actors coded in a particular domain (Azar, Brody, and McClelland 1972). Many objections to past events data research center on coding inconsistencies and biases (Andriole and Hopple 1984, Laurance 1990). The costs of coding have also slowed the construction and extension of events data sets, at times leaving the data many years behind the evolving practice of international relations. These problems of event coding have been mitigated, however, through the use

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[10] To turn back Serbian aggression would cost something, but it could be done and was cheaper than setting a bad precedent that would encourage aggression and genocide elsewhere. For example, the *Washington Post* editorialized in May 1995: "Bosnia is not of direct strategic significance to the United States. But the final abandonment of Bosnia would rip at the threads of international order and harden a cruel post–Cold-War calculus based on the general perception of what aggressors can get away with."

[11] See Boyd (1995). For example, Jimmy Carter argued against taking sides in regional conflicts such as Bosnia: "In most cases, both sides are guilty of atrocities" (in Brinkley 1995, 96).

[12] We use the term "ethnic" for Bosnia's "national" groups since U.S. scholars refer to "ethnic conflict" in such cases. In Bosnia, however, the group differences hinge on religious background, not ancestry or language, which are both shared.

[13] See Kaplan 1993, Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1996. For example, President Clinton said after the February 1994 "marketplace massacre" in Sarajevo that "until those people get tired of killing each other, bad things will continue to happen." Woodward (1995, 285) notes: "Using arguments . . . that the hostilities were the result of ancient ethnic and religious hatreds . . . the West was again able to justify not deploying troops."

[14] In theory the two dimensions of interventionism-isolationism and of accommodation-containment need not be conflated. In practice only two poles of policy analysis emerged, since advocates of containment were also much more inclined toward intervention in some form. The two poles did not align on traditional political fault lines. Conservatives concerned about response to aggression and liberals concerned about human rights and genocide joined forces to support the aggressor-victim school and its containment policy. Isolationists, worried about costly overseas interventions, joined with multilateralists, worried about splitting the Atlantic alliance, to support the warring-factions school and its policy of accommodation.

[15] Even after the war ended, debate continued about the nature of Serbian responses—about whether strict enforcement of Dayton provisions against Serb forces (such as arresting indicted war criminals) would elicit Serbian compliance or provoke Serbian hostilities.

[16] The Security Council first defined the issue as aggression and territorial integrity. Resolution 752 (May 15, 1992) demands "that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . cease immediately," that states respect Bosnia's territorial integrity, and that irregular military forces in Bosnia be disbanded, withdrawn, or placed under Bosnian government control. Resolution 757 on May 30 followed suit. But by June the council had turned to humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and mediation.

TABLE 1. Event Count by Variable, January 1991–December 1995

Actor	Target	Variable Name	Number of Events
International (UN and NATO members)	Serbia and Serb forces	*IS*	2,969
Serbia and Serb forces	International (UN and NATO)	*SI*	1,699
Serbia and Serb forces	Bosnian government/army	*SB*	1,766
Bosnian government/army	Serbia and Serb forces	*BS*	1,091
International (UN and NATO)	Bosnian government/army	*IB*	2,228
Bosnian government/army	International (UN and NATO)	*BI*	993
Croatia and Croatian forces	International (UN and NATO)	*CI*	719
International (UN and NATO)	Croatia and Croatian forces	*IC*	1,114
Croatia and Croatian forces	Serbia and Serb forces	*CS*	958
Serbia and Serb forces	Croatia and Croatian forces	*SC*	820
Croatia and Croatian forces	Bosnian government/army	*CB*	634
Bosnian government/army	Croatia and Croatian forces	*BC*	627
Total			15,618

of machine-readable data sources and machine coding (Schrodt and Gerner 1994).

This study uses the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) software to generate events data for the Bosnia conflict (see Gerner et al. 1994; Schrodt 1995; Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle 1994; Schrodt and Gerner 1994).[17] In this study, as in past work using KEDS, lead sentences of Reuters News Service articles were coded.[18] Leads—the first sentence of an article—usually contain the "who did what to whom" information: For example, "Bosnian Serb forces began heavily bombarding the centre of the Moslem stronghold city Tuzla on Monday." A Lexis/Nexis search identified any article in 1991–95 whose lead contained any of the following word roots: Yugoslav, Bosnia, Serb, Croat, Sarajev.[19] The 38,837 potentially codable leads for 1991–95 were downloaded, cleaned, and placed in KEDS-compatible format; most duplicate stories were removed.

KEDS uses a "sparse parsing" technique to extract the subject, verb, and object in a sentence. It uses two dictionaries (one of verbs, one of actors) to perform pattern matching. KEDS recognizes pronouns (which it dereferences), conjunctions, and passive voice constructions, which it converts to active voice (Schrodt 1995). KEDS assigns a type (actor, verb, pronoun, etc.) to each word, which it matches in a dictionary. KEDS then pattern-matches each verb using the verb dictionary. A subject (source) and object (target) are determined. The source is usually the first actor in the lead, while the target is usually the first actor after the verb (Gerner et al. 1994).

The KEDS dictionaries are customized for a particular region or issue, initially through machine-assisted coding. When KEDS codes an event incorrectly, one or both of the dictionaries are modified to correct the miscoding. For example, KEDS correctly coded the following lead as a double event of "agreement," with Bosnian-Muslims and Croatians as both the target and source: "Bosnia's Moslem and Croat leaders, once allies against rebel Serbs but now sworn foes, have agreed safe passage for convoys carrying relief through central Bosnia." But the following partial lead was initially (with undeveloped dictionaries) coded as a UN meeting with Bosnians: "United Nations forces are to mediate the release of two Bosnian Croat commanders." After adding the actor phrase "Bosnian Croat" to reference Croatian forces, the event was coded as a meeting between the UN and Croatian forces. The following lead was miscoded, and no dictionary adjustments we made could correct the coding: "German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on Wednesday described a Russian statement accusing NATO of genocide against Bosnian Serbs as unacceptable." We monitored and updated the dictionaries until they achieved roughly 85–90% coding accuracy, equivalent to human coders (Gerner et al. 1994, 99–102).

Once the dictionaries were sufficiently stable, all the leads were machine-coded with no human intervention. A number of events were excluded because they could not be attributed to a specific actor. Others were excluded because either the actor or target was not one of the actors we studied (e.g., Greece, Russia, Hungary) or because actor and target were the same. Just over 15,000 events containing relevant actors were coded for 1991–95, as shown in Table 1.[20]

We used the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) coding scheme, which has 63 event codes—

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[17] The KEDS program and documentation are available on the Internet (http://www.ukans.edu/~keds).

[18] Reuters provides very dense coverage and tends to have less bias than other major wire services, such as UPI or Agence France Presse in terms of which events are and are not reported (Huxtable and Pevehouse 1996, Howell and Barnes 1993). The war in Bosnia is a particularly good source of events since it was so intensively and continuously reported by U.S. and international media; for example, it received more minutes of U.S. network news time in 1994 than any story except the O.J. Simpson trial (Tyndall Report 1995).

[19] Using roots ensured that words such as Yugoslavian, Bosnian, and Serbian would be found. The Lexis/Nexis search excluded any leads matching the criteria and containing the following roots: soccer, sport, Olympic, basketball. This reduced noise in the data, since Reuters combines news, sports, and human-interest stories in the same database.

[20] During crises, a particular event such as a military attack is often coded several times, but we do not consider this a serious problem since it simply means that added weight attaches to important events deemed worthy of repeated Reuters coverage.

such as diplomatic visits or economic sanctions (McClelland 1976). Each verb root and pattern is assigned a three-digit WEIS code, or a null code indicating that the event should not be recorded. We converted the ordinal WEIS codes to interval data using the Goldstein (1992) net-cooperation scale. The scale assigns a weighting (how friendly or hostile a type of action) to each WEIS event code, on a scale ranging from conflict (below zero) to cooperation (above zero). A given data point, for a discrete unit of time, represents a level of net cooperation (for a given actor toward a given target), which is the sum of all the cooperative events in that period (each times its weight) minus all the conflictual events (weighted).[21]

In converting coded events into such a time series, one must choose an appropriate level of temporal aggregation (Freeman 1990, Goldstein 1991). High levels of aggregation (such as quarterly or annual data) tend to swallow up important interaction effects. Since the events in Bosnia moved relatively fast, and to make sure the series captured the dynamics of the conflict, we looked at daily and weekly aggregations over the 1,379 days, or 197 weeks, from March 1992 to December 1995. In contrast to Goldstein and Freeman's (1990, 1991) monthly aggregated Cold-War data on strategic great-power interactions, the Bosnia war presents a string of rapid episodes with frequent twists and turns. The high density of the data can support a finely grained level of aggregation.

Daily data, however, had several disadvantages. First, the timing of events as reported by Reuters was not always accurate down to the day, and major events tended to be reported several times over several days in different leads. Second, the daily time series have many strings of zeroes (days when nothing was reported; nothing new happened), and we feared this data structure would introduce artificial correlation (possibly confusing, for example, autoregression with response to other actors). Finally, in specification tests to determine how many lagged terms to include (which are described shortly for the weekly data), we found that 18 daily lags of each variable should be included as explanatory variables in each equation, meaning that a model using daily data would have dozens or hundreds of right-hand coefficients. Since the responses were occurring over more than a week, we decided on weekly data aggregation (Sunday through Saturday).

The construction of our time series makes our analysis much more prone to Type II error (failing to detect a real relationship) than Type I error (detecting a relationship which does not really exist) for several reasons. First, like most events data, our series are "noisy," containing random error overlaid on the true data but few systematic biases. Such noise will produce inefficient estimates but not biased ones (Goldstein 1991). Second, the use of weekly rather than daily aggregation is similarly more likely to wash out significant coefficients for true relationships than to inflate the significance of phantom relationships. Weekly aggregation masks those very fast interactions that occur within a week; these interactions are reflected, therefore, only in the contemporaneous correlation of residuals from our model. Third, weekly data mean that each period analyzed had just a few dozen data points. All these considerations make the results as reported conservative—we are more confident that significant relationships really do exist than we are that nonsignificant relationships really do not exist. Thus, we occasionally discuss probability levels above the traditional significance standard of $p < .05$ in analyzing overall patterns of results across a variety of tests.

DATA VALIDITY AND TEMPORAL PHASES

In this section we will briefly review the history of the war with reference to graphs of our time series. Face validity tests, that is, examinations of these and other graphs to identify such known characteristics of the war as crises or cease-fires, convinced us that the event coding was working well. We also will describe and justify the potential break points, which will later be used to test coefficient stability through time. The placement of these possible break points, or delimiting phases of the war which may have particular response patterns, should reflect actual historical phases and changes so that the subsequent analysis captures changes in response patterns over time.

Figure 1 shows our four potential break points, that is, times at which we had reason, a priori, to think that strategies and patterns of response may have changed (we will test statistically whether they did).[22] At each point, great-power policymakers were reported to have agonized about whether and how to change policy toward Bosnia, typically in light of a dramatic failure of previous policy. The four points are the weeks ending 4/17/93, 2/12/94, 12/17/94, and 7/29/95 (hereafter, we drop the "week ending" designation, implied by a given date).

Figure 2 shows our weekly time series for the international-Serbian dyad; Figure 3 shows the Serbian-Bosnian dyad. The potential break points are also indicated. We will now describe each potential break point and the character of each phase between them, with reference to the time series in figures 2 and 3.

We begin our time series in the first week of March 1992 and, with allowance for several lags, begin the analysis with 3/28/92—just before the outbreak of war in earnest, which followed the international recognition of Bosnia on April 6. The early months of the war were very intense, with waves of territorial conquest and "ethnic cleansing" by Serb forces. In Figure 3 the time series drops accordingly (on the net-cooperation scale, intensified conflict drives the time series below zero). As the initial attacks let up, the conflict settled

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[21] Some researchers argue that the conflict and cooperation dimensions should not be combined; see discussions in Goldstein 1992, 370–4, and Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 41.

[22] Because the typical behaviors of Serb forces and of the Bosnian government seem to remain fairly constant throughout, whereas great-power and Croatian behavior switch dramatically at several points, we focused on these latter behaviors in defining potential break points.

FIGURE 1. Potential Break Points in the Bosnia Conflict


3/28/92
Start of War
4/17/93
End of Vance-Owen
2/12/94
Sarajevo Market Massacre
12/17/94
Bihac Crisis
7/29/95
Srebrenica
1/1/92
1/93
1/94
1/95
12/31/95
International recognition; War and "ethnic cleansing"
UNPROFOR
Vance-Owen plan
Diplomacy
Croatian-Bosnian war
"Safe areas"
Owen-Stoltenberg plan
Drift
Croatian-Bosnian federation
NATO threats, token strikes
Contact group
Threats
Carter ceasefire
Minor strikes
Hostages
O'Grady
Promises
Croatian-Bosnian offensive
Air strikes
Dayton
Force

into a somewhat less violent, ongoing war through spring 1993.

The international response during this first year was cautious, as reflected in the time series in Figure 2, which shows only modest levels of conflict in the international-Serbian dyad. President Bush was under pressure in an election year to focus on domestic issues, and European powers hoped that negotiations could bring about a settlement without a costly intervention. The UN Security Council authorized the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which pursued humanitarian assistance and mediation. The Vance-Owen Plan proposed a complex system of ten cantons for Bosnia. We characterize this period overall as "diplomacy."[23]

Our first potential break point, in *mid-April 1993*, is marked by several important changes. First, Croatian forces and the Bosnian government began fighting each other, creating a more complex, three-sided war. Second, the Vance-Owen plan was rejected by Serb forces, dashing international hopes for a diplomatic breakthrough. Third, President Clinton—who had favored supporting the Bosnian government with arms and air strikes—had recently abandoned that policy when faced with European resistance. Finally, the UN declared six Bosnian government-held cities to be "safe areas" where civilians (including many refugees) must not be attacked. Five were enclaves surrounded by Serb forces (Sarajevo, Gorazde, Bihac, Srebrenica, and Zepa). They would become the flashpoints in the war, as Serb forces tried to starve or shell them into surrender, the Bosnian government tried to break out militarily, and the great powers tried to decide where to draw an ever-shifting line for acceptable behavior.

During this period, we characterize the great powers' management of the conflict as "drift" following the failures of the various Western ideas for ending the war. The time series in Figure 2 continue to show little action in the international-Serbian dyad until late in the period. Meanwhile, the Croatian-Bosnian war created the possibility for occasional cooperation—though there was still mostly conflict—in the Bosnian-Serbian dyad, as reflected in Figure 3. Eventually, European and UN negotiators crafted the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which came close to the outright three-way partition of Bosnia that Serb forces demanded. Then, in early 1994, intense Serbian attacks on Sarajevo (shown as a negative spike in figures 2 and 3) caused the great powers once again to reevaluate their policies and begin to threaten air strikes.

The attacks on Sarajevo culminated in the shelling of a crowded marketplace in February 1994. We place our second potential break point here. Western policymakers seemed to draw a line at the fall of Sarajevo, and a NATO ultimatum was taken seriously by Serb forces, which backed off. NATO shot down four Serbian jets in February and, during the rest of 1994, carried out several token air strikes (with symbolic rather than military effect), which are visible in figures 2 and 3. The period after February 1994 also differed from the preceding period in that the Croatian-Bosnian war gave way to a federation (on paper, but a real ceasefire). Overall, we call the great-power strategy in this period one of "threats."

In early *December 1994*, the U.S. administration deliberately changed course away from NATO threats and pinprick air strikes, which seemed not to be working; these had not halted a Serbian attack on Bihac, and Serb forces had taken hundreds of UNPROFOR troops hostage (see Kelly 1994). President

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[23] These short-hand characterizations are for convenient reference and do not affect the actual analysis.

FIGURE 2. Net Cooperation in International-Serbian Dyad



Clinton shifted toward the European position, which favored accommodation to induce Serbian cooperation.[24] Critics called the new policy "appeasement" and invoked the lessons of the 1930s (Hoffmann 1994, Herblock 1994). Jimmy Carter met with leading Bosnian Serb nationalists—formerly shunned by U.S. leaders and soon to be indicted for war crimes—to arrange a winter cease-fire. The abrupt shift in policy at the height of the Bihac crisis is evident in Figure 2; the level of net cooperation by the international community toward the Serb forces jumped from the most negative level thus far to the most positive.

The winter cease-fire gave way in spring 1995 to renewed fighting, which culminated in a short-lived effort by NATO to revive the air strike option (bombing an ammunition dump near Sarajevo). But when Serb forces responded by again taking hundreds of European UNPROFOR troops hostage, the international community backed down from further use of force and did not even retaliate when Serb forces shot down a U.S. plane. Thus, although relations deteriorated in spring 1995, we call the period one of great-power "promises" overall.

This period ended in *July 1995* when Serb forces overran the "safe area" of Srebrenica and executed thousands of the inhabitants, a signal to the great powers that current policies again were not working. Shortly thereafter, Croatian forces routed rebel Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia, and a Croat-Bosnian offensive began to roll back Serb forces from territory in northwestern Bosnia. The U.S. Congress voted by a theoretically veto-proof majority to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. Then, three U.S. officials—friends of President Clinton—died trying to reach besieged Sarajevo. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR in failure loomed, and Clinton had earlier promised U.S. troops to assist in that task. All these events contributed to a major shift in great-power policy, which culminated in sustained NATO air strikes in September 1995 (the largest negative spike in Figure 2). These were followed by Croatian-Bosnian territorial gains, renewed negotiations, a cease-fire (early October), and the Dayton Agreement (November). We characterize the international policy in the post-Srebrenica period overall as one of "force." We close our time series with *December 1995*, as the UNPROFOR mission ended and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) mission began.

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[24] Administration officials signaled that the Bosnian government had lost the war and implied that a settlement could allow the Bosnian Serb forces to join their territories with Serbia.

FIGURE 3. Net Cooperation in Serbian-Bosnian Dyad



RESULTS

We spent most of our statistical effort on ruling out specification error in our model, since time-series statistics are especially vulnerable to such error. The first problem is the possibility of nonstationary time series. Tests showed stationarity and an absence of unit roots in each series (results are available from the authors on request; see Dickey and Fuller 1981, Hamilton 1994).

A second problem is omitted-variable bias. Plausibly, the omission of Croatian forces from our model would introduce such a bias. To test whether this was so, we estimated a model similar to Model 1, but with twelve equations and twelve independent variables in each, including all behaviors toward and by the Croatian forces.[25] We included two lagged terms (i.e., two weeks of past behavior) to reduce autocorrelation of errors, and we used an *F*-test to evaluate the joint significance of the two lagged terms for each independent variable. We estimated the model for March 1992 through December 1994, excluding the fast-moving major events of 1995 (the magnitude and possible instability of which, we feared, might wash out the effects of Croatian-related variables in earlier years).

Table 2 summarizes the results for the equations in which the four core variables of interest are dependent variables and are listed across the top. The four core independent variables are listed below, followed by the eight other variables in the model. The table shows that none of the noncore independent variables significantly affects the core variables. Therefore, we concluded that the Croatian forces could be dropped, and our model simplified to the four core variables, without introducing bias.

A third problem common to time-series analyses is omitted-lag bias. Including too few lagged terms may create serial correlation of error terms, with incorrect inferences about which variable is responsible for which effect (given contemporaneous correlations among the series, which is often the case). Including too many lagged terms will tend to reduce statistical power. Thus, we tested for the appropriate number to

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[25] Clearly, the model becomes rather complex in this four-actor version. And we could have added more complexity with the inclusion of Russia or the disaggregation of Bosnian Serb forces from Serbia proper. Russia and to a lesser extent others, such as Greece, Slovenia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, played independent roles in the Bosnia conflict (not part of our Euro-American "international community"). Yet, these roles were secondary to, and more sporadic than, the UN/NATO roles in conflict management.

TABLE 2. Tests for Exogeneity (Omitted Variables)

Independent Variables		Probability level ($p < \ldots$) of F-statistic Dependent Variable IS_t	SI_t	SB_t	BS_t
Core variables					
International toward Serb	$IS_{t-1,2}$	.39	.11	.23	.70
Serb toward International	$SI_{t-1,2}$	.27	.22	.002**	.60
Serb toward Bosnian	$SB_{t-1,2}$	.004**	.02*	.001***	.64
Bosnian toward Serb	$BS_{t-1,2}$	.79	.77	.39	.04*
Constant		.09	.001***	.001***	.001***
Other variables					
International toward Croat	$IC_{t-1,2}$	.17	.59	.30	.07
International toward Bosnian	$IB_{t-1,2}$	.39	.65	.79	.66
Serb toward Croat	$SC_{t-1,2}$	.16	.13	.08	.68
Croat toward International	$CI_{t-1,2}$	.42	.99	.75	.57
Croat toward Serb	$CS_{t-1,2}$	.51	.24	.16	.91
Croat toward Bosnian	$CB_{t-1,2}$	.57	.34	.11	.55
Bosnian toward International	$BI_{t-1,2}$	.66	.25	.62	.88
Bosnian toward Croat	$BC_{t-1,2}$	.74	.63	.15	.41
Durbin-Watson statistic		2.00	2.02	1.89	2.00

Note: Weekly data, 3/28/92–12/10/94. Number of weeks (N) = 142. Units are along net-cooperation scale. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Probability levels shown are for joint probability of two lags of independent variable.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

include, up to eight weekly lags.[26] No number of included lags performed significantly better than a model with just one lag. Thus, we could use Model 1, which explains each variable's behavior in a given week as a function of its own and the other variables' behavior the prior week. Needing only one lag, we can interpret coefficients straightforwardly without VAR methods.[27]

Fourth, analyses that pick a time frame to analyze arbitrarily (or based on data availability) may be misspecified if coefficients change during the course of that period. This is of special concern in a regional conflict in which patterns of behavior may plausibly change as actors learn and the war evolves. We tested for temporal stability of coefficients during March 1992 to December 1995, across the four potential break points defined above. These tests showed instability of coefficients across each of our four potential break points.[28] That is, the patterns of response in the Bosnia conflict differed significantly from one period to the next.

We found instability *within* the already short final period (July to December 1995), which included escalation, NATO air strikes, and then a cease-fire. Thus, we could not analyze the final period.[29] Furthermore, in the first period (3/92–4/93) no response coefficients in our model were significant, either because of data problems like sparser reporting in that period, or because actors were unresponsive to one another in the first year of the war. Thus, we will drop the first period from further discussion, leaving the middle three periods to analyze.

Model 1 was estimated separately for each of the three periods from 4/93 to 7/95. In only the last of these did the Bosnian government's behavior have any significant role either as cause or effect, so for the other two periods we used a simpler three-variable model (*SB*, *IS*, and *SI*).[30] Table 3 reports the response coefficients and their probability levels (as well as the constants and "self-driven" coefficients, which are theoretically uninteresting). The rows with coefficients that test for triangular responses—hypotheses 3 and 4/5—are marked by arrows at the left.

DISCUSSION

The results lend support to several of our hypotheses, although statistical significance is generally weak. First, with regard to hypothesis 1—bilateral reciprocity in the international-Serbian and Serbian-Bosnian dyads—we found little evidence of such responses in the first two periods.[31] In the promises period (12/94–7/95), however, there is evidence of bilateral reciprocity

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[26] Lag tests check for any significant difference in the explanatory power of two models—one with a smaller number of lagged terms included and one with a larger number. Weekly lag tests were performed for 3/92–12/94. The lag tests use a modified likelihood ratio test (see Sims 1980, 17–8). Results are available from the authors on request.

[27] Including only one lag may leave the model vulnerable to serial correlation of errors; Durbin-Watson statistics on several equations fell below 1.9 (as low as 1.4 in the worst case). Therefore, we checked key results for robustness against a model with two weekly lags included; Durbin-Watson statistics were improved, and results were substantively similar (though with less statistical power).

[28] Two models are compared, using the same ratio test as in the lag tests. One model includes two or more subperiods; the other model blanks out the data during one period by using one dummy variable for each time point. This tests whether the dynamics of a subperiod differ significantly from the dynamics of the longer period taken as a whole.

[29] Attempts to estimate the model during the period resulted in poor Durbin-Watson statistics and other indicators that the model was misspecified.

[30] This simpler model thus has three equations (for *SB*, *IS*, and *SI*, respectively), with the same three variables (lagged) on the right-hand side of each equation.

[31] Very fast bilateral reciprocity may have existed (actions and reactions within a single week), as suggested by the high, positive

TABLE 3. Estimated Models for Three Periods

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	4/93–2/94 (Drift) Coefficient	$p <$	2/94–12/94 (Threats) Coefficient	$p <$	12/94–7/95 (Promises) Coefficient	$p <$
Explaining International toward Serb							
IS_t	IS_{t-1}	+ 0.1	.41	− 0.0	.97	+ 0.2	.39
	SI_{t-1}	+ 0.1	.64	− 0.6	.22	− 0.0	.89
→	SB_{t-1}	+ 0.0	.86	+ 0.8	.006**	+ 0.1	.68
	BS_{t-1}					+ 0.1	.82
	Constant	−13.7	.04*	−35.3	.12	−22.0	.29
Explaining Serb toward International							
SI_t	IS_{t-1}	+ 0.0	.91	+ 0.0	.93	+ 0.5	.005**
	SI_{t-1}	− 0.2	.13	− 0.2	.32	+ 0.1	.72
	SB_{t-1}	+ 0.1	.18	+ 0.2	.05*	− 0.2	.33
	BS_{t-1}					+ 0.1	.78
	Constant	− 9.3	.02*	−21.1	.04*	−29.5	.03*
Explaining Serb toward Bosnian							
SB_t →	IS_{t-1}	− 0.4	.11	− 0.2	.07	+ 0.2	.33
	SI_{t-1}	+ 0.1	.71	+ 0.4	.12	+ 0.2	.51
	SB_{t-1}	+ 0.2	.17	+ 0.6	.001***	+ 0.2	.25
	BS_{t-1}					+ 0.5	.24
	Constant	−27.4	.003**	−27.3	.04*	−19.2	.20
Explaining Bosnian toward Serb							
BS_t	IS_{t-1}					− 0.0	.72
	SI_{t-1}					− 0.0	.67
	SB_{t-1}					+ 0.2	.004**
	BS_{t-1}					− 0.3	.14
	Constant					− 8.6	.13
Contemporaneous Correlation of Residuals							
IS_t with SI_t		.01		.62		.74	
IS_t with SB_t		.06		.43		.39	
SI_t with SB_t		−.05		.43		.11	
[BS with IS, SI, and SB, 12/94–7/95, respectively, −.05, .06, .15]							
Durbin-Watson statistics							
Equation for IS_t		1.56		1.88		2.13	
Equation for SI_t		1.81		1.97		2.08	
Equation for SB_t		1.97		1.64		2.10	
Equation for BS_t						2.04	
Number of weeks (N)		43		44		32	

Note: Bosnian actions toward Serb forces (BS) are included only for 12/94–7/95. Arrows indicate triangular responses of Serb and international forces. Estimation is by OLS. Probability levels ($p < \ldots$) are for the *t*-statistic on each coefficient.
$^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

in both dyads. Serbian behavior toward the international community responds directly to international behavior toward the Serbian forces (.005 in the right-hand column of Table 3), while the Bosnian government reciprocates the actions of Serb forces toward it (.004 in that column). Thus, bilateral reciprocity seems to appear late but strong.

With regard to hypothesis 2—bilateral bullying—we found no evidence in either dyad in any period. This suggests that bullying (inverse response) may be an inherently triangular concept connected with outside powers' attempts to regulate the behavior of regional actors. Formal models which include bilateral inverse response (such as Hirshleifer and Coll 1988) might profitably be extended to explore triangular versions.

Hypothesis 3—triangular response by the international community to Serb actions toward Bosnia—corresponds with the third row of Table 3 (marked by an arrow). In the threats period, after February 1994, the significant positive coefficient ($p < .006$) indicates that Serbian attacks on (or restraint toward) Bosnia were followed by like actions by the international community toward Serb forces. Interestingly, recent Serbian behavior toward Bosnia was a far better predictor of international behavior toward Serb forces than was either the international community's own recent behavior or the behavior it just received from Serb forces. Before February 1994, hypothesis 3 is not significant ($p < .86$). And as the international community backed off in the promises period after December 1994, the international responses to Serb actions toward Bosnia seemed to weaken again ($p < .68$).

Hypothesis 4—triangular Serbian reciprocity—received no support in these results.

Hypothesis 5—triangular Serbian bullying of Bosnia—corresponds with the second row marked by an arrow in Table 3. For the 4/93–2/94 period (drift), it is the only response anywhere close to statistically

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contemporaneous correlation of residuals (.62) for *SI* and *IS* in the 2/94–12/94 threats period.

FIGURE 4. Net Cooperation toward Serb Forces by United States/NATO and by Europe/UN



significant ($p < .11$). It is nearly significant ($p < .07$) for 2/92–12/94 (threats), when international efforts to manage the conflict were most active. In both these periods the negative sign of the coefficient indicates the responses were inverse, not reciprocal. For 12/94–7/95 (promises), the response is not significant; indeed, all the triangular relationships seem to disappear in that period. But that picture turns out to be inaccurate.

FURTHER RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We disaggregated the international actors, distinguishing European and UN targets and actions (which we call *E*, for Europe), from American and NATO ones (which we call *A*).[32] We split them this way because actions by and toward the UN in Bosnia generally involved UNPROFOR troops from the European countries; actions by and toward NATO typically involved U.S. airplanes and U.S. political initiatives. Our model then had six variables instead of four (*IS* and *SI* are each split). Figure 4 shows the time series for European and American actions toward the Serb forces. Generally, the two series moved in tandem, though NATO took far more conflictual actions in crises (using military force).[33] This led us to expect no difference in response patterns when we disaggregated the international community. Furthermore, disaggregation did not create substantial new results in the period before February 1994.

In the important threats period of 1994, disaggregation produced only one interesting result: The responses found between *IS* and *SB* involved U.S./NATO actions and responses, while responses found between *SI* and *SB* involved European/UN ones. That is, the international actions *toward* Serb forces that mattered were those of the United States and NATO, while the Serb forces' own actions toward the international community that mattered were those toward Europe and UNPROFOR. These results elaborate those presented

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[32] In separate preliminary analyses, we tried disaggregating Serbian variables into those of or toward Serbia proper (Belgrade) and those of or toward the Bosnian Serb forces (Pale). For 3/92–10/94, international behaviors toward Belgrade and Pale, respectively, were positively cross-correlated at .63, but Belgrade and Pale's behaviors toward the international community were at only .19. Reestimating our model with the two variables replacing Serb forces (both as actors and targets), we did not find substantively meaningful differences in response patterns.

[33] In the periods before February 1994, unlagged cross-correlations (between *AS* and *ES*, and between *SA* and *SE*, respectively) are small, below .22. But in subsequent periods they jump to around .6 to .7 positive correlation.

TABLE 4. Estimated Model for 12/94–7/95 with "International" Disaggregated

	Dependent Variable											
	America/NATO toward Serb AS_t		Europe/UN toward Serb ES_t		Serb toward America/NATO SA_t		Serb toward Europe/UN SE_t		Serb toward Bosnian SB_t		Bosnian toward Serb BS_t	
Independent Variables	Coefficient	p <	Coefficient	p <	Coefficient	p <	Coefficient	p <	Coefficient	p <	Coefficient	p <
AS_{t-1}	− 0.4	.26	− 0.7	.002**	+ 0.2	.11	− 0.2	.50	− 0.9	.006**	− 0.1	.71
ES_{t-1}	+ 0.9	.03*	+ 1.1	.001***	+ 0.4	.02*	+ 0.8	.02*	+ 1.7	.001***	+ 0.0	.97
SA_{t-1}	+ 0.8	.09	+ 0.7	.04*	+ 0.5	.008**	+ 0.6	.08	+ 1.5	.002**	− 0.1	.66
SE_{t-1}	− 0.5	.14	− 0.1	.74	− 0.2	.12	− 0.3	.28	− 0.3	.31	+ 0.0	.94
SB_{t-1}	− 0.2	.25	− 0.2	.18	− 0.2	.006**	− 0.2	.19	− 0.2	.30	+ 0.2	.02*
BS_{t-1}	+ 0.2	.53	+ 0.4	.10	+ 0.1	.46	+ 0.3	.25	+ 1.0	.02*	− 0.3	.15
Constant	−11.9	.33	− 6.3	.43	− 9.6	.05*	−22.8	.02*	−16.7	.17	− 7.7	.21
Durbin-Watson statistic		2.14		1.83		1.92		1.96		1.93		2.03

Note: Number of weeks (N) = 32. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Boxed coefficients are for Serb triangular response to international actions. Probability levels (p < . . .) are for the t-statistic on each coefficient.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

earlier (with the international community aggregated) but do not substantially change them. They do suggest, consistent with hegemonic stability theory, that Serb forces were more responsive to American actions than European ones.

The most interesting effects of disaggregation came in the promises period, 12/94–7/95. Table 4 summarizes the results. Although it had appeared (refer to Table 3) that Serb forces no longer displayed a triangular bullying response to international actions in this period, the actual responses were highly significant, but with opposite signs for the United States and Europe (see the boxed coefficients in Table 4 with $p < .006$ and .001, respectively). The inverse response pattern (triangular bullying) found in the two previous periods continues to be found and continues to apply specifically to U.S./NATO actions (as it did in the previous period). But this response is now supplemented by a triangular *reciprocal* response to European/UN actions—the only time Serb forces showed such a response and hence the only bit of evidence in this study supporting hypothesis 4.

In this disaggregated model for 12/94–7/95, bilateral reciprocity appears relatively strong and widespread in both dyads.[34] Thus, this one model for one period seems to contain bilateral reciprocity, triangular bullying (toward Bosnia) in the Serbian response to America, and triangular reciprocity (toward Bosnia) in the Serbian response to Europe—but no triangular response by the international community. The results for this period with the international community disaggregated, however, should be interpreted cautiously, since there are fewer degrees of freedom than for the results presented earlier.[35]

Across all three periods, the hypothesis most strongly supported by this study is hypothesis 5—Serbian triangular bullying. It was close to statistical significance in two periods and strongly significant in the third with regard to U.S./NATO actions when disaggregated from European/UN actions. Combining these three results gives an overall significance for this hypothesis at $p < .01$.[36] The results thus support the assumptions of the aggressor-victim school of thought that the international use of force could induce Serbian cooperation in this regional conflict. The containment interpretation of the events of fall 1995—that robust NATO air strikes finally caused the Serb forces to cooperate with the Bosnian government—resonates with our results.

By contrast, the warring-factions school of thought, with its preferred policy of using international cooperation to elicit Serbian cooperation toward Bosnia, receives little support. The results, for example, appear to contradict those who argued that air strikes would inflame Serbian hostility toward Bosnia.[37] The one supportive finding for this school is the apparent response of Serbian behavior (toward Bosnia) to *European* actions in the first half of 1995. Here, we find the triangular reciprocity posited by hypothesis 4, but it coexists with the triangular bullying of hypothesis 5 in response to U.S./NATO actions (and at a time when

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[34] Across ten possible variations of bilateral reciprocity on the international-Serbian and Serbian-Bosnian dyads, five are statistically significant. BS (top right of Table 4) responds reciprocally to SB (fifth line down), $p < .02$, and vice versa (also $p < .02$). AS responds reciprocally to SA ($p < .09$) but not SE (negative sign, $p < .14$), while SA responds reciprocally to AS ($p < .11$) and ES ($p < .02$). ES does not respond to SE ($p < .74$) but does respond reciprocally to SA ($p < .04$), while SE reciprocates ES ($p < .02$) but not AS ($p < .50$).

[35] The model now includes six variables and only 32 weeks of data. To test robustness, however, we reran this model with two weekly lags instead of one, and the response of SB was still negative to AS and positive to ES.

[36] We use Fisher's (1950, 100) method of doubling the sum of $-\ln(p)$, where p is the probability level in each test, to estimate chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to twice the number of tests. Here, p levels of .11, .07, and .006 give chi-square (6 DF) = 19.97 ($p < .01$).

[37] Boyd (1995, 37–8), for example, wrote just before the NATO air strikes in September 1995 that they "can only reinforce the paranoia that drives [Serb forces] to continue the fight so relentlessly."

U.S./NATO actions had become more salient than European/UN ones).

The divergence in European and American roles in the conflict is interesting. Apparently, by early 1995 the United States used "sticks" and Europe "carrots" to get Serb forces to cooperate. The results give some support to the idea that U.S. participation (as a hegemon) is crucial to the effective management of a major regional conflict—even in Europe. The results also suggest that a regional belligerent may try to play great powers off against one another and/or that the great powers may use a "good cop, bad cop" strategy.

CONCLUSION

Returning to the theories of cooperation promoted by neoliberal institutionalism, this study raises three main challenges. First, research on bilateral relationships—whether by formal modeling, statistical analysis, or case studies—may miss triangular relationships that are central to the management of regional conflicts. Since such conflicts are increasingly important in the post-Cold-War era, theorists of cooperation should give far more attention to triangularity as a context for the evolution of cooperation.

Second, the study of reciprocity as a strategy for eliciting cooperation has, to date, largely ignored strategies of inverse response (bullying). We have shown that inverse response is not just an abstract possibility; it characterizes the actual responses of the key actor in one of the most important regional conflicts of recent years. Clearly, such "nice" strategies as Axelrod's (1984) tit for tat or Osgood's (1962) GRIT do not work well against bullies. In eliciting cooperation from a bully, the relatively cheap options of the accommodation approach, such as mediation and peacekeeping, are unlikely to succeed. Thus, inverse response deserves far more attention from theorists and empirical analysts than it has received to date. Models of inverse response should, of course, reflect the triangular context of bullying, not the abstract notion of bilateral bullying (for which we found no empirical evidence). Theories of the evolution of cooperation under anarchy ideally should allow for our empirical finding that bilateral reciprocity can exist simultaneously with triangular bullying.

Third, if responding to regional conflicts creates collective goods dilemmas among outside powers, these dilemmas surely intensify when accommodation works poorly and containment becomes necessary. Regional conflicts involving bullies are most likely to exact high costs, to become dangerous precedents if left unsolved, and to create potential divisions among great powers about who should respond and how. Our results suggest that the participation of the world's hegemonic military power—the United States—was central to the containment of Serbian behavior toward Bosnia. For theorists of cooperation, then, propositions about hegemonic leadership should be incorporated into the formal and empirical study of cooperation, alongside the elements of triangularity and inverse response.

Methodologically, this research contributes to the study of regional conflict in several ways. In applying KEDS to a new regional conflict (beyond the Middle East, which was used in developing KEDS), we have provided additional evidence that: (1) intensive news reporting, such as that by the Reuters wire service, can serve as raw material for constructing events data; (2) machine-coding, with its obvious advantages in terms of cost and bias reduction, is a practical method for generating data from such textual sources; and (3) time-series analysis based on lagged correlations of movements along a net-cooperation scale can illuminate the dynamics of regional conflict. These approaches should allow future researchers and policymakers to understand the dynamics of international conflicts better and sooner.

We plan to analyze a series of regional conflicts in the 1990s, which should increase the statistical power of our tests.[38] Analysis of multiple cases may also illuminate two tantalizing suggestions from the present findings. The first is the idea that bilateral reciprocity (tit for tat) becomes stronger as a conflict persists. In our study, the bilateral reciprocity hypothesis received support only in the 12/94–7/95 period (the last year of the war). One interpretation is that parties learn to reciprocate from the experience of repeated interaction. An alternative interpretation is that a relative equality of power (which had developed in Bosnia by 1995) may contribute to the emergence of bilateral reciprocity.[39] Such power-balanced contexts, after all, most resemble the formal models of "evolution of cooperation" as well as great-power relations (both of which have proven conducive to reciprocal strategies). We cannot say in light of a single case which interpretation is correct. The second tantalizing idea, similarly indeterminate in a single case study, is that the United States as hegemon plays a special role in regional conflict management—a role which at times may run counter to that of other great powers. Analysis of multiple cases may allow exploration of that possibility.

The war in Bosnia took a terrible toll, both on the people of that small country and on the international institutions whose intervention efforts were so problematical. Nothing can change that history. But by better understanding what happened, and specifically by bringing the tools of social science to bear (in addition to the more common methods of journalism and history), we hope to contribute to the better management of future regional conflicts. To the extent that the models of cooperation studied by scholars of international relations can correspond more closely with the realities faced by policymakers, those models will become more useful.

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[38] NSF grant SBR-9617157 (1997–98) will fund analysis of about a dozen regional conflicts that occurred in 1990–96.

[39] By early 1995 the Bosnian government had built up its army sufficiently to give Serb forces a real fight, in contrast to the earlier extreme imbalance of power. At the same time, the international community's lack of will seemed to bring its power down toward the level of the Bosnian Serbs.

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The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation

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With which political and economic variables is change in international financial regulation robustly associated? I undertook multivariate regression analysis of this question using a quantitative measure of the regulation of international financial transactions. The measure was created by coding the laws of 64 nations. The associations between change in international financial regulation and measures of long-run economic growth, corporate taxation, government expenditures, and income inequality are estimated, using the models, methods, and data of Barro (1991), Deininger and Squire (1996a), Leamer (1983, 1985), and Levine and Renelt (1992). The findings point to a new agenda for research on international financial regulation.

International financial liberalization is well advanced in many countries, but scholarly descriptions and analyses of this form of deregulation are in their infancy. My aim in this paper is to address a basic lacuna in scholarship on the politics of international finance: With which political and economic variables are changes in international financial regulation robustly associated? Here, I examine liberalization's association with two political-economic outcomes, economic growth and income distribution, and two facets of fiscal policy, corporate taxation and government expenditures. I seek to rule out some broad claims made about the association of changes in international financial regulation with each.

This investigation can be made because now there is a measure of the regulation of international financial transactions (see Quinn and Toyoda 1997). The measure, called *Openness*, assesses the many government policies regulating inward and outward financial transactions and allows comparison of the forms and intensity of that regulation across time and space. Openness is based upon a coding of the domestic and international laws of 64 nations, most of whose legislation is available from 1950 to 1994. There is enough information about the forms and degrees of international financial regulation to allow for the computation of a measure of change, which I believe is the first such measure.

The correlates of change in international financial regulation are examined in cross-section regression analysis using the models, methods, and data of other scholars, including Barro (1991), Deininger and Squire (1996a and b), and Levine and Renelt (1992). To increase reader confidence in the robustness of the results, the extreme bounds analysis of Leamer (1983, 1985) is used.

THE CORRELATES OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

Political scientists have long been concerned that democracy and a capitalist economy are partly at odds, which is generally taken to be a bad thing normatively (see, e.g., Lindblom 1977). If governments were indeed "structurally dependent" on business firms in the relatively closed economies of the postwar world, then increasing international financial liberalization is likely to have deepened the state's structural dependence on capital (Freeman 1992, 1996; Garrett 1995). A number of scholars claim, based upon either case studies or formal analysis, that international financial deregulation is associated, in particular, with increasing regressivity of both taxation and income as well as with decreasing government expenditures. (See, e.g., Kurzer 1993, Steinmo 1994; see Cohen 1996 for a review.) Cohen's (1996, 288) judgment is that "the globalization of finance obviously has increased pressures for general policy convergence toward an agenda set by investors." According to Bates and Lien (1985, 59), "those sectors that possess more mobile factors will have greater control over public policy."

The analyses that led to these conclusions (or fears) are undoubtedly well executed and valuable, and most are surely consistent with the data surveyed in them. The studies, however, generally focus on a handful of very wealthy, advanced industrial countries over a comparatively short period, and they do not systematically control for multiple sources of influence. Kurzer's (1993) qualitative case study, for example, examined four small corporatist economies in Northern Europe. So, important questions remain unanswered. Are the associations robust to multivariate analysis and to changes in modeling assumptions? Are they long run? Are they found also in a broader range of countries? We do not know.

Economists are generally as optimistic about the

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FIGURE 1. Trends in Financial Openness, Medians by Year, for Each Group of Countries



positive benefits of international financial liberalization as political scientists are pessimistic about the normative implications. The optimism is founded on systematic empirical studies of financial development and economic growth, which show financial development to be associated with long-run economic growth. (See, e.g., King and Levine 1993. The literature is reviewed in Dooley 1995, Maxfield 1997, Pagano 1993, and Quinn and Inclán 1997.) As Levine and Zervos (1993) note, however, none of the research employed measures of change in government laws regulating financial activity. These studies also do not look at the association between change in international financial regulation and other variables, such as income distribution.

The aim of this paper is to identify some of the most important correlates of change in international financial regulation. I will use multivariate analysis to study several topics of general and scholarly interest: growth; government fiscal policies, in particular corporate taxation and government expenditures; and income inequality.

Growth and Changes in International Financial Regulation

Economists offer strong theoretical arguments that an increase in national economic growth will result if a government liberalizes legal restrictions on international financial flows. Scholars identify three growth-promoting effects of international financial liberalization in particular. First, with financial openness, the relative prices paid to domestic factors of production will approximate world prices (Sweeney n.d.); in turn, domestic firms are more likely to undertake an investment project only if it meets the "Net Present Value > 0" criterion, which should promote economic growth. Second, capital and current account restrictions reduce the volume of trade in goods and, most especially, services (see Mathieson and Rojas-Suárez 1993, 8–21). Third, full financial liberalization allows the citizens of a nation to acquire an internationally diversified asset portfolio. Diversification should cushion them (and the nation's tax base) from the full effects of domestic shocks, and this diversification should be reflected in increased national wealth (Mathieson and Rojas-Suárez 1993).

The ether of economic theory hits the rock of reality, or so the experiences of many nations suggest. Figures 1 and 2 chart the levels of international financial openness for 64 nations, in four groupings, from 1958 to 1990. (The data will be described in detail below.) Many East Asian nations tightly restricted international finance during the late 1950s and 1960s, liberalizing slowly thereafter. Did financial closure benefit East Asia? In comparison, Latin American nations were relatively financially open in the late 1950s and 1960s. Did financial openness hurt their growth? East Asia has experienced high rates of growth, whereas much of Latin America has suffered economic stagnation. Are these outcomes connected to earlier policies?

Many scholars, particularly political scientists, believe so. Johnson (1982) and Zysman (1983), for example, studied financial restrictions in Japan and argued that financial repression, in conjunction with well-considered industrial and export policies, stimulated high rates of business firm investment. (See also Nam and Lee 1995, World Bank 1993.) Regarding Latin America, Edwards (1984), among others, reports that liberalizing finance produced disastrous results for many countries. (See also Diaz-Alejandro 1985, Hastings 1993.)

Rapidly liberalizing capital account transactions, in

FIGURE 2. Trends in Capital Account Openness, Medians by Year, for Each Group of Countries



particular, may have deleterious effects on growth. (Quirk and Evans 1995 review the literature; see also Caves 1996, 189–93, 224–37.) In the analyses of Dornbush (1976) and Eichengreen, Tobin, and Wyplosz (1995), for example, international capital markets adjust more quickly to change than do labor and other markets. These differences in adjustment speed can produce economic disequilibria.

The empirical evidence, however, is not at all decisive in support of the view that international financial liberalization adversely affects national economic performance. Many economists see evidence, albeit indirect, otherwise (e.g., Pagano 1993).

Absent adequate data for use in multivariate analyses, we cannot say whether change in international financial regulation is correlated with long-run growth. I will report measures of change in financial regulation and employ them below in multivariate analyses.

Government Fiscal Policies and Changes in International Financial Regulation

A central issue for political scientists is what happens to policy *Y* when policy *X* changes. With widespread change in the regulation of international financial transactions, the obvious question is what are the implications for other government policies of either liberalization or reregulation. The effect of liberalization on monetary and exchange rate policies has been well studied, and I will not address it here. (See, e.g., Cukierman 1992, Frieden 1991, and Goodman and Pauley 1993. Woolley 1994 reviews some of the literature.)

I know of fewer studies that investigate the links between international financial regulation and domestic fiscal policy. I will examine two aspects of that policy, corporate taxation and government expenditures. Is international financial liberalization associated with reductions in either? The data from Figure 1 suggest that the answer is "no." The countries with deregulated international financial markets have extensive welfare states and high levels of corporate taxation. The nations with limited welfare states and weak tax systems have lower levels of financial openness. The graphs are no substitute for systematic analysis of this complex question, however.

Corporate Taxation. Perhaps the first assessment of the effects of financial openness on government taxation of capital was made by Adam Smith. He argued that government taxation of capital stock leads to capital flight, with a subsequent decrease in both government tax revenues and national economic prosperity (Smith [1776] 1976, ii373–79).

In modern times, formal studies of the relationship between taxation and investment in open economies without capital controls suggest that differences in national government tax treatment of similar investments allow for arbitrage profits by firms and owners of capital assets (Bovenberg et al. 1990). Firms *generally* will overinvest in countries with low taxes on new investment and will underinvest in countries with high taxes. (See Frenkel, Razin, and Sadka 1991.) In these theoretical models, "optimal taxes simply consist of taxes on immobile domestic factors, presumably labor and land" (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1995, 88). The optimal level of government taxation of corporations is zero.

Bates and Lien (1985, 59) draw related conclusions from their formal and historical analyses. They offer the proposition that governments "will impose higher taxes on those sectors of the economy that are less elastic, that is, possess the less mobile factors."

Governments, therefore, as they liberalize capital account transactions, both effectively reduce their taxation of multinational corporate income and shift the tax burden away from multinational firms and owners of capital (Steinmo 1994). Cohen (1996, 286) wonders, based upon the studies he reviewed, if "redistributive strategies are out; tax relief for financial interests is in." Swank's (1996, 13) review of the evidence leads him to conclude that "the conscious redistributive . . . roles of corporate taxation are being reduced."

The ether of this line of theory also hits the rock of reality, or so the evidence regarding corporate tax *rates* suggests. What is indisputable is that corporate tax rates, both average and marginal, are high in many parts of the world, notwithstanding either formal models of corporate taxation with financial openness or structural dependence theory. Caves (1996, 189) asserts that "all countries levy taxes on the net incomes of corporations at marginal rates typically ranging from 30 to 50 percent." Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995, 88) conclude that in "the observed tax law in essentially all developed countries, . . . corporate taxes not only exist but are roughly comparable to the top personal tax rates."

Several recent studies report results consistent with the "stickiness" of corporate tax rates. Wallerstein and Przeworski (1995) offer a formal analysis of the effects of financial openness with a government tax regime that includes incentives to investment. Their analytic result is that high tax rates on uninvested profits need not lead to capital flight. Garrett (1995) found no statistically significant association between financial openness and corporate taxation. Swank (1996), using level measures drawn from the data set on international financial regulation reported below, found corporate tax as a percentage of operating income higher in the absence of financial restrictions. We do not know, however, whether the result comes from increases in taxes, decreases in operating income, or both. (Financial openness may allow firms to attribute some of their operating income to lower tax localities.)

While both average and marginal corporate tax rates are indisputably high, one question remains unresolved: Does international financial liberalization erode the corporate tax *base*? That is, governments may tax marginal corporate income at a high rate, but international financial liberalization may allow corporations to shift taxable income to other jurisdictions, in which case tax *revenue* may decrease. (This was Adam Smith's original hypothesis.) The formal models of corporate taxation with financial openness may not be wrong; corporations may move their productive assets out of high tax locations. Perhaps the models erroneously assume that governments will respond to the erosion of their corporate tax base with reductions in corporate tax rates.

Caves (1996) offers another suggestion: Governments in emerging market nations may be more vulnerable to erosion of the tax base than are governments in advanced industrial nations. Emerging market governments may be the ones vulnerable to the tax arbitrage strategies of international corporations.

I will assess below whether liberalization is associated with decreasing corporate tax collections. Of interest is whether deregulation is associated with redistribution of the tax burden away from corporations.

Government Expenditures. The same logic suggesting that higher rates of corporate taxation are harder to sustain as a nation liberalizes finance leads to the conclusion that high levels of government expenditure also are harder to sustain. (See, e.g., Kurzer 1993.) If those expenditures increase, then governments need to maintain and extend either sources of revenue or sources of credit. As above, tax collections from mobile sources of income may be more difficult under financial liberalization. Lenders usually cannot be compelled to lend to governments. Fiscal crises may result if financial openness is combined with a high level of government expenditure (Offe 1984). Garrett (1995) finds evidence for this effect in his study, where the absence of capital restrictions was a relatively important negative influence on government expenditures.

Let me offer a countervailing logic about the relationship between changes in international financial regulation and government expenditures. Quinn and Inclán (1997) found overwhelming evidence that owners of internationally uncompetitive factors (i.e., the domestic price of the factor exceeded the world price) demanded restrictions on international finance. Government expenditures may serve as a substitute for international financial protection, that is, may partly compensate losers from financial liberalization. Conversely, financial restrictions lessen the need for compensation via government expenditures.

Income Inequality and Changes in International Financial Regulation

In a broad study of inequality policies, Page (1996, 1) concluded that "economic globalization may gravely impair, or even eliminate, the power of nation-states to redistribute income or wealth within their boundaries." He cautioned, however, that international financial liberalization has not been proven to be associated with increasing inequality, noting that "it is an important task for political scientists to figure out whether such structural tendencies [i.e., increasing inequality due to globalization] are at work" (Page 1996, 1).

To my knowledge, there has been much speculation over the association of change in international financial regulation with change in the distribution of national income, but no systematic study. (See, e.g., Deininger and Squire 1996b and Nielsen and Alderson 1995 for reviews.) There are three reasons to believe an association exists. First, imagine that international financial liberalization does produce economic disequilibria. Whose income sources are better protected—those who hold an internationally diversified portfolio of assets or those whose income sources are specific to a domestic economy? Financial liberalization enables individuals to hedge against domestic disequilibria, and this ability to hedge should be reflected in higher incomes to those possessing movable assets. (See Baxter and Jermann 1997.)

A second mechanism through which income inequality may be enhanced by international financial liberalization has already been reviewed. Gini coefficients and other measures of income equality generally reflect the effects of progressive tax policies and transfer payments. If progressive taxation and government income transfers are, in fact, diminished by international capital mobility, then we may see evidence of increased income inequality (Steinmo 1994).

A third route from liberalization to increased inequality may be termed the "relative price" effect. The relative prices of capital and various types of labor in an economy are influenced by the presence of international financial restrictions (Quinn and Inclán 1997). To the extent these limit the international investment opportunities of domestic investors, the efficiency of the investments is limited as well as their returns. To the extent financial restrictions limit the ability of highly skilled domestic workers to offer their services to foreign would-be investors, the "efficiency" of workers' investment in skill and education is diminished as well as their wages. Relatedly, financial restrictions on capital outflows enable unions representing unskilled or semiskilled workers to increase wage demands because the exit options of owners of capital are limited. Financial restrictions allow for the redistribution of income from the top downward. With full financial liberalization, however, the income distribution of a nation is likely to shift in favor of owners of capital and highly skilled workers, as opposed to unionized semiskilled and unskilled workers.

Summary: The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation

I reviewed the theory and evidence regarding several practical problems that confront policymakers considering international financial liberalization. Is deregulation associated with long-run economic growth? Is it associated with the erosion of the corporate tax base? With reduced government expenditures? Is liberalization associated with increased income inequality? These questions are unresolved because scholars have not had adequate data to measure laws and policies regulating international financial transactions. In the next section, I report a measure of international financial openness from which I compute measures of change. I will use these measures in cross-sectional regressions to address the questions above.

MEASURING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

Data: Sources and Coverage

A measure of a nation's level of international financial regulation was created from the text of a volume published yearly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions* (subsequently retitled *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions*). (The full details of the measure and its properties are available in Quinn 1992 and Quinn and Toyoda 1997.) Data from 64 countries for 1958 to 1989 are used in this analysis. (See Appendix A, which more fully describes the measure, and Appendix B Table B-1, which lists the countries and the data used.)

Types of Restrictions and Their Indicators

The laws reviewed in *The First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions* (hereafter, *Exchange Restrictions*) were those that limited the ability of private citizens either to pay or receive payment for economic exchanges with nonresidents. Some laws reported in *Exchange Restrictions* governed the proceeds of transactions (e.g., exchange surrender requirements); others governed the underlying transactions themselves (e.g., license requirements for direct foreign investment).

The IMF authors of *Exchange Restrictions* have used the same categories regarding legal regulation from 1950 to the present. The treatment of the laws regulating international financial transactions has been consistent across time and space. The emphasis was and continues to be on reporting those laws that affect the ability of private economic agents to undertake either international financial transactions or the underlying transactions. The classification of each nation's laws governing current and capital account regulation is qualitative. Even so, the continuity of categories and the consistency of the collection and presentation of the information allow for the conversion of the qualitative text to quantitative indicators of each nation's level of financial openness in each year.

I developed coding rules, reported in Appendix A, and coded the text of *Exchange Restrictions*. Restrictions on both currency transactions and the underlying international commercial transactions are included. Arrow (1973) provides the regulatory taxonomy on which the scoring is based.

Inward and outward capital account transactions are measured by *Capital*, which is scored on a 0–4 scale. Inward and outward current account transactions are coded *Current*, which is scored on a 0–8 scale. (The latter scale is larger because goods and services are each scored on a 0–4 scale, and both are included by the IMF as current account transactions.) The sum of the six dimensions of Current and Capital generates a 0–12 score, ranging from most closed (0) to most open (12) economy. In addition, I added a seventh dimension, for international legal agreements (*Agree*) that constrain a nation's ability to restrict exchange and capital flows; its scoring was 0, .5, 1, 1.5, or 2, ranging from not at all to very constrained.

Appendix Table A-1 provides examples of how the text was translated into a quantitative measure for three countries in 1979: the United States, a financially fully open economy; Sweden, partly open; and India, substantially closed.

The resulting 0–14 measure of financial openness is called *Openness*. I then generate a measure of change in international financial regulation by taking the first difference of Openness. A measure of capital account liberalization is generated by taking the first difference of Capital. These change measures of international financial regulation are the independent variables measuring financial liberalization.

Refer to figures 1 and 2, which summarize data for four groupings of countries according to Openness and Capital from 1958 to 1990.

Other Indicators

I know of no other measures of change in international financial regulation, apart from the ones used here. Scholars have previously used financial development (e.g., Levine and Zervos 1993) or market integration (Bekaert and Harvey 1995) as proxy measures of government liberalization policies.

In a table, "Summary Features of Exchange and Trade Systems in Member Countries," at the back of the 1967 *Exchange Restrictions* and thereafter, the IMF provides an indicator of the presence or absence of restrictions on payments by residents of current and capital account obligations, which can be considered a level indicator of one aspect of international financial regulation. In the table, a dash shows the absence and a vertically centered period the presence of a restriction of some type on either current or capital payments. The IMF's indicator may be easily turned into a level measure, usually 0 or 1, and used in regression analysis. Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Epstein and Schor (1992), Garrett (1995), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Leblang (1995), Milner (1996), and Razin and Rose (1994) each created or used such a measure from the table and employed the level measure in regression analysis.

This 0 or 1 measure is of limited use, however, in indicating the level of international financial openness. Perhaps its most severe drawback is that the mere presence of regulation conveys no information about the *magnitude* of a nation's financial restrictions on current or capital payments by residents. In the majority of cases in the data set, government laws impose some restrictions on these international financial transactions, but the economy is neither fully closed nor fully open. A second drawback is that the table does not contain information about important aspects of financial openness, such as restrictions on *nonresident* transactions (e.g., inward foreign direct investment). (See Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 1995, 14, and Epstein and Schor 1992, 141–3, for a discussion of these and other limitations.)

The IMF indicator is of no use in generating a measure of *change* in regulation, which is the subject of this paper. Taking the first difference of the IMF indicator (coded as 0 or 1) produces a data set of zeros interspersed with a handful of ones and minus ones. The vast majority of cases in which governments have liberalized or reregulated international financial transactions cannot be captured from this table.

I know of one other measure of the level of international financial openness that goes beyond the IMF table. Haggard and Maxfield (1996) report the results of a measure of financial openness for four countries (Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Mexico) from 1970 to 1990, and it contains enough information to generate a measure of liberalization. Their measure is not directly comparable, however, as it includes information on market entry and exit rules for financial intermediaries, as well as data on payment and receipt restrictions.

METHODS, MODELS, AND MEASURES

In a provocatively titled paper, "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics," Leamer (1983, 38) argues that "the fundamental problem facing econometrics is how adequately to control the whimsical character of inference." He proposes that scholars undertake "sensitivity analysis" to see if their econometric results can be attributed to their modeling assumptions. As he puts it, "an inference is not believable if it is fragile, if it can be reversed by minor changes in [modeling] assumptions" (p. 38).

To my knowledge, my investigation is the first multivariate examination of the association between change in international financial regulation and a variety of political-economic outcomes. Many of the results that I will report challenge commonly held beliefs among political scientists about financial liberalization. To increase confidence that the results do not arise from whimsical choices I have made about models and data, I use Leamer's strategy of sensitivity analysis. I also use models, data, and methods that are well grounded in previous scholarship and add to them the data on financial liberalization.

Below, I describe briefly the models, methods, robustness checks, and data used to analyze the dependent variables. More detail may be found in Appendix B.

Long-run Economic Growth

Empirical studies of economic growth have been characterized by fragile econometric results. Among political scientists, for example, we have seen many controversies about appropriateness of models, methods, and data for examining the political determinants of growth. (See, as a very recent example, Granato, Ingelhart, and Leblang 1996 versus Jackman and Miller 1996 versus Swank 1996.) Similar debates have raged among economists. (Good reviews are found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Fagerberg 1994, and Levine and Renelt 1992.)

A central problem in settling these controversies is that the authors of the contending studies rarely used similar models. The attention of the scholarly community turns, therefore, to sorting out which effects on economic growth are robust to differences in model specification.

Fagerberg (1994) reviewed 29 regression studies of the determinants of economic growth. He reported that the estimated coefficient on the initial level of income was statistically significant and negative in 28 of the studies, and the estimated coefficient of investment was statistically significant and positive in 21 of the 23 studies in which it was employed. Fagerberg found little evidence that other variables were systematically associated with growth.

Levine and Renelt (1992) also reviewed the long-run economic growth literature. Their strategy was to use a well-established method, cross-sectional regression analysis, to test the observed relationships among long-run economic growth and various political and economic variables for robustness to specification, as suggested by Leamer (1983, 1985). They found, as did Fagerberg, that the initial level of income (negative) and investment (positive) were the *only* robust, statistically significant associations between long-run growth and political-economic variables.

My interest is in knowing whether international financial liberalization is robustly associated with long-run growth and the other dependent variables of interest, not in assessing the determinants of the dependent variables per se. I wish, therefore, to work within well-understood methods and models of growth analysis and use whatever framework I choose as a platform for assessing the consequences of financial liberalization.

The Barro (1991) cross-sectional regression model, used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and others, has been well examined in the literature and is appropriate for studying long-run trends. It has some important disadvantages. It does not allow for the study of lags. It also does not allow for an analysis of the differences in the speed and volatility of change in financial regulation. Yet, the Barro model has not been the target of methodological controversies, in contrast to either cross-sectional—time-series approaches or vector autoregression (VAR) methods. (See, e.g., Beck and Katz 1995; Freeman et al. 1997) Leamer's extreme bounds analysis (EBA) is a useful analytic method for assessing the robustness of relationships. Because of the widespread acceptance of cross-sectional regression analysis and EBA, I adopt them here. I add measures of change in international financial regulation to Levine and Renelt's (1992) models, follow their robustness checks, and add several others.

Corporate Taxes

Levine and Renelt (1992) include numerous fiscal policy variables in their analysis, and I continue to use EBA and their data in analyzing corporate taxation. I do not use their base model of the determinants of long-run economic growth in assessing taxation and expenditures, however. Instead, the base model is a lagged endogenous model with investment, the merchandise balance of trade, and the rate of growth (for reasons outlined in Quinn and Shapiro 1991). Data limitations cause me to lose 27 out of 64 cases. (See Appendix Table B-2, which lists the countries with data unavailable for various analyses.)

In the taxation models, I use corporate tax paid divided by three denominators: gross domestic product, total government tax collections, and total individual tax collections. The last two measures explicitly examine redistributive aspects of tax collections.

Government Expenditures

For government expenditures, I estimate a base model similar to that for corporate taxation. In addition to a general measure of government outlays net of defense and education expenditures (as a percentage of gross domestic product), I also report results using government welfare and social security payments to examine more directly whether changes in social welfare policies are correlated with financial liberalization.

Income Inequality

The Levine and Renelt models are not a useful "platform" for assessing changes in income inequality, a subject that they did not address. In constructing the "platform model," I need to look elsewhere for guidance, though I will continue to test for robustness. (This section draws on work done jointly with John Woolley. See Quinn and Woolley 1996.)

Scholars in economics and sociology generally use similar models and methods in inequality analysis. [Compare Crenshaw (1992) and Nielsen and Alderson (1995) with Deininger and Squire (1996b) and O'Neill (1995).] Investment (in primary and secondary education, in physical capital, or all three) and growth in the population are usually incorporated into the analyses. I also use these variables. Increasing investments in both education and capital are widely believed to lead to converging incomes, and growth in the population has been associated with greater income inequality. I use changes in per-capita income to capture the effects of changes in economic development.

As I am interested in the association of liberalization with changes in income inequality, I use the initial level of inequality as an independent variable; the difference between the beginning and end-of-sample inequality is the dependent variable. This has not been a common practice in previous studies, which used Gini coefficients as a dependent variable but not the initial level of inequality as an independent variable. These studies addressed cross-sectional differences in the *levels* of inequality, however.

The data sources for the independent variables are described in Appendix B.

RESULTS

Liberalization and Long-run Growth

Is international financial liberalization robustly associated with long-run economic growth in the cross-section of countries for which I have data? Tables 1 and 2 suggest an answer.

Table 1 is an exact replication of the models and data in Levine and Renelt (1992, Table 5, models i and iv), with the measures of change in financial regulation added. (The sample is smaller: 58–64 observations versus 83–103.) Capital account liberalization is robustly associated with economic growth. Its coefficient is statistically significant and positive beyond the .01 level in the base model. The coefficient of the measure of change in international financial regulation is positive and statistically significant beyond the .05 level in the base model. Are these estimates robust to changes in the conditioning information?

In Table 2 and Table 1, models 4 and 5, the sensitivity and robustness checks are reported. In Table 2, the estimated coefficients of change in international financial regulation are positive and significant at the .05 level or lower, except for the model with the three regional dummy variables added to the analysis. The estimated coefficient is not significant in Table 1, model 4, which might be termed the "kitchen sink" because of the wide range of variables Levine and Renelt (1992) added. The estimates of the coefficients of change in international financial liberalization are clearly influenced by changes in the models used, and the strength of the estimated relationships may reasonably be termed "fragile." (Most sensitivity tests are reported hereafter in Appendix Table B-4.)

The statistical relationship of capital account liberalization to economic growth is, in contrast, highly robust and not sensitive to the variables included in the model. Its coefficients are significant at the .05 level or lower in all models in Table 2. In model 5, Table 1, the "kitchen sink," the coefficient for capital liberalization is still statistically significant and positive at the .05 level. (I cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are the same across the country groupings, even though the signs are not fully consistent. See Appendix B.)

To my knowledge, this is the first systematic demonstration of a robust correlation between change in capital account regulation and long-run economic growth. The results suggest that capital account deregulation may contribute to economic growth. It joins investment and initial level of income as variables that should be included in analysis of the determinants of long-run economic growth.

The strong association between capital account liberalization and growth leads me to focus on its effects on fiscal policy and inequality, and not further analyze change in international financial liberalization. (Its influence is broadly similar.)

Liberalization and Corporate Taxation

Is international capital liberalization associated with the erosion of the corporate tax base? No. Once I control for other variables—notably the initial level of corporate taxation, economic growth, and investment—I see statistically significant evidence that capi-

TABLE 1. Cross-country Growth Regressions, Average Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP as Dependent Variable, 1960–89

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(Base + Δ*CAPITAL*) 64 countries	(Base + Δ*OPENN.*) 58 countries	(Base + Δ*CAPITAL*) 58 countries	(Full + Δ*OPENN.*) 58 countries	(Full + Δ*CAPITAL*) 58 countries
Initial GDP per capita	−0.414**	−.406**	−0.399**	−0.425**	−0.415**
(RGDP60)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.093)
Investment share	15.28**	13.47**	13.63**	9.221**	8.593**
(INV)	(2.86)	(2.93)	(2.77)	(3.114)	(3.008)
Population growth	−0.249	−0.231	−0.233	−0.186	−0.111
(GPO)	(0.193)	(0.201)	(0.183)	(0.232)	(0.234)
Secondary-school enrollment	2.058*	1.913*	1.913*	1.386	1.225
(SEC)	(0.982)	(0.892)	(0.881)	(0.865)	(0.919)
Financial liberalization		0.463*		0.179	
Δ*OPENNESS* (1958–88)		(0.203)		(0.167)	
Liberalization of *CAPITAL*	0.467**		0.441**		0.300*
Δ*CAPITAL* (1958–88)	(0.157)		(0.153)		(0.141)
Primary-school enrollment				0.882	1.059
(PRI)				(0.721)	(0.702)
Government share				−0.236	−0.545
(GOV)				(3.396)	(3.347)
Growth of government share				−0.043	−0.063
(GSG)				(0.069)	(0.062)
Socialist economy				1.29*	1.297*
(SOC)				(0.57)	(0.538)
Revolutions/coups				−0.498	−0.675
(REVC)				(0.631)	(0.598)
Africa dummy				−0.855*	−0.949**
(AFRICA)				(0.395)	(0.360)
Latin America dummy				−0.675	−0.544
(LAAM)				(0.374)	(0.325)
Growth of domestic credit				0.011	0.008
(GDC)				(0.009)	(0.009)
Standard deviation of domestic credit (STDC)				−0.008 (0.005)	−0.006 (0.004)
Export-share growth				0.130*	0.120*
(XSG)				(0.057)	(0.052)
Civil liberties				−0.050	−0.002
(CIVIL)				(0.115)	(0.105)
Intercept	0.064	0.338	0.381	0.807	0.751
	(0.662)	(0.758)	(0.684)	(1.105)	(0.990)
Adj. R^2	.54	.52	.54	.63	.65

Note: Models and data are from Levine and Renelt (1992) and Barro (1991), except Openness and Capital. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients. Coefficients were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), with a heteroskedascticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1984). The variable names used by Levine and Renelt (1992) are in parenthesis below the name of the variable. The data are annual data averaged from 1960 to 1989, except for Δ*OPENNESS* and Δ*CAPITAL*, which are annual changes, averaged over time. The financial regulation data, for example, are the measure of the laws as reported by the IMF on December 31, 1958. The models and results replicate those found in Levine and Renelt (1992, 950, Table 5, models *i* and *iv*), which are in turn based on Leamer (1983, 1985). *≤ .05; **≤ .01.

tal account liberalization is positively associated with most of the indicators of corporate taxation. See Table 3.

The estimated coefficients of capital account liberalization are statistically significant and positive in models 1, 2, and 3. Model 1 uses as a dependent variable a redistributive aspect of taxation: corporate taxation as a percentage of individual taxation. Contrary to the case-based evidence, capital liberalization is associated with *increasing* redistributive taxation.

Models 2 and 3 estimate the association between capital liberalization and corporate taxation revenue as a percentage of GDP. I estimate two models for this dependent variable because the parameter estimates of some variables appear to differ across two groups of countries, and it is inappropriate to pool data if the underlying relationships among variables are different.

The coefficient estimates of capital account liberalization are associated with *increasing* corporate tax revenue in both models, not with the erosion of the tax base. I do not find support for the intuition of Caves (1996) that corporate tax arbitrage particularly afflicts governments in emerging markets.

Changes in corporate taxation as a percentage of total taxation (model 4) do not appear to be associated with changes in capital account regulation. I find some evidence of possible regional differences in parameter estimates for model 4, but the parameter estimates of

TABLE 2. Sensitivity and Robustness Results for Δ*OPENNESS* and Δ*CAPITAL*, Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita as Dependent Variables, 1960–89

Variables	β	Standard Error	t-ratio	Adj R^2	Robust or Fragile
Δ*OPENNESS*:					
1. Base model (Table 1, 2)	0.463*	0.203	2.29	.52	fragile
2. STDC, REVC, GOV	0.536**	0.188	2.85	.54	
3. *X*, PI, REVC added	0.448*	0.203	2.21	.54	
4. E. Asia, L. America, and other emerging market dummies added	0.209	0.185	1.13	.55	
Δ*CAPITAL*:					
1. Base model (Table 1, 3)	0.441**	0.153	2.88	.54	robust
2. STDC, REVC, GOV	0.455**	0.147	3.09	.56	
3. *X*, PI, REVC added	0.397**	0.150	2.65	.55	
4. E. Asia, L. America, and other emerging market dummies added	0.301*	0.149	2.02	.57	

Note: I implement the Levine and Renelt (1992) version of Leamer's (1983, 1985) extreme-bounds analysis (EBA). "Robust" means the estimated coefficient of a variable is always significant at .05 or beyond when the "conditioning information" changes (i.e., other independent variables). "Fragile" means the estimated coefficient of Δ*OPENNESS* and Δ*CAPITAL* is *not* significant at the .05 level or lower in at least one model, as the conditioning information changes. All coefficients were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), with a heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1984). The variable names are those used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and are defined in their Table 1, except *X*, which is export share of GDP, and PI, which is average inflation of GDP deflator. The models and results replicate those found in Levine and Renelt (1992, 947, Table 1). *≤ .05; **≤ .01.

the capital account liberalization measure interactions with regional dummy variables are not robust.

Is increasing corporate taxation, either as a percentage of individual taxation or GDP, robustly associated with capital account liberalization, as is shown in models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3? There are too few observations for any robustness checks for the analyses in models 2 and 3. These results should be considered indicative only. The results for models 2 and 3 are, however, clear evidence against the proposition that the capital account liberalization reduces capital taxation.

For model 1, however, I am able to replicate again the robustness checks as carried out by Levine and Renelt (1992), the results of which are reported in Appendix B, Table B-4. (I cannot replicate the model in Table 1, model 5 in this analysis, because I have too few observations.) The overall results are extremely robust. The estimated coefficient of capital account liberalization remains statistically significant and positive, changes in the conditioning information notwithstanding. Estimates of the coefficients only slightly differ among the models.

Initially, it may be hard to reconcile these results with the expectation of political scientists that financial liberalization is associated with redistribution of the tax burden away from corporations and toward wage earners. This expectation about the relationship between change in financial regulation and change in corporate taxation has not been subject to multivariate analysis before. The proposition that international financial liberalization is negatively associated with corporate taxation is not sustained by the evidence; indeed, it is refuted.

TABLE 3. Corporate Taxation, 1974–89

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent Variable	Corporate Tax as % of Individual Taxation	Corporate Tax as % of GDP/OECD Members	Corporate Tax as % of GDP/non-OECD Members	Corporate Tax as % of Total Tax
Lagged dependent variable Yt(1973)	1.575**	0.670**	1.449**	1.114**
	(0.064)	(0.137)	(0.102)	(0.127)
Income growth per capita 1974–89 (GYP)	−0.043	0.006	0.002	0.011
	(0.143)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.008)
Investment as % of GDP 1974–89 (INV)	−0.049	0.022	−0.041	−0.011
	(4.316)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.259)
Trade balance as % of GDP, 1974–89	11.642**	0.064	0.002	0.097
	(3.862)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.189)
Δ*CAPITAL*, 1973–88	0.443**	0.003*	0.004*	0.002
	(0.154)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Constant	0.443	−0.014	0.008	0.093*
	(0.759)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.041)
Adjusted R^2	.98	.55	.95	.89
Number of observations	36	19	17	36

Note: See the note at the bottom of Table 1 for sources. Coefficients were estimated using OLS, with heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1984). Standard errors are given in parentheses; *≤ .05; **≤ .01.

TABLE 4. Financial Liberalization and Government Expenditures, 1974–89

	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	Government Welfare and Social Security Payments as % of GDP	Government Expenditures as % of GDP (Net of Defense and Education)
Government transfers (1973)	0.577	0.034
as % of GDP	(0.385)	(0.071)
Income growth per capita	−0.014	−0.009**
1974–89 (GYP)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Investment as % of GDP	0.327	−0.030
1974–89 (INV)	(0.309)	(0.126)
Trade balance as % of	0.621*	0.252*
GDP, 1974–89	(0.265)	(0.118)
Δ*CAPITAL*, 1973–88	0.023*	0.013**
	(0.010)	(0.004)
Member of OPEC	−0.083	−0.048**
	(0.055)	(0.015)
Constant	0.048	0.096**
	(0.063)	(0.029)
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.31
Number of observations	30	38

Note: Please see the note at the bottom of Table 1 for sources. Coefficients were estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix, White 1984. Standard errors are in parentheses; *≤ .05; **≤ .01.

Liberalization and Government Expenditures

Does international financial liberalization lead to decreasing government expenditures? No. As shown in Table 4, the estimated coefficients of capital account liberalization are statistically significant and positive in both models. Once I control for other factors, including past levels of expenditures, capital account liberalization is associated with *increasing* government expenditure.

The results, however, are not fully robust. (See Table B-4.) The coefficient estimates are positive and statistically significant in all models, except those with dummy variables entered for regions. Even so, the proposition that capital account liberalization reduces government social expenditures is wholly inconsistent with the evidence presented here.

Liberalization and Income Inequality

Is capital account liberalization related to increased income inequality? Yes. Table 5 reveals a positive association, and it is robust. Model 1, which is the base model, and model 2 both show that past levels of income inequality are negatively associated with change in inequality. This result suggests that, as with economic growth, income inequality is subject to an international tendency toward convergence. (See Quinn and Woolley 1996 for a discussion.) Put simply, countries with more equitable income distribution, such as the Netherlands, seem to have a secular tendency to become less equitable, and countries with lower levels of income equity, such as Brazil, seem to have a tendency to become more equitable.

This result matters because many studies of the advanced industrial nations report that income inequality is increasing, and some analysts wonder if this may be attributable to financial deregulation (e.g., Page 1996). But there appears to be a secular tendency at work, which is above and beyond any estimated associations with financial deregulation.

The estimated coefficients of capital account liberalization are positive and statistically significant in the models with or without government expenditures. It

TABLE 5. Financial Liberalization and Changes in Income Distribution, with Change in Gini Index, the Dependent Variable, 1973–90

		Model 2
Dependent Variable	Model 1	w/Gov. Expenditures
Gini coefficient 1973	−0.353**	−0.336**
	(0.109)	(0.108)
Income growth per capita	−0.473	−0.502
1974–89 (GYP)	(0.450)	(0.433)
Investment as % of GDP	−21.626	−23.385
1974–89 (INV)	(18.320)	(17.740)
% of population, primary	12.304*	11.645*
school education (PRI)	(5.170)	(5.145)
% of population, secondary	−0.057	2.155
school education (SEC)	(4.374)	(4.236)
Growth of the population	5.423**	4.823**
1974–89 (GPO)	(1.218)	(1.367)
Government expenditures		−22.035
1974–89 (GOV)		(16.470)
Δ*CAPITAL*, 1973–88	1.661**	1.515**
	(0.605)	(0.587)
Constant	−0.079	3.930
	(5.768)	(6.960)
Adjusted R^2	0.21	0.21
Number of observations	43	43

Note: The higher the value of the GINI index, the more inequitably distributed are incomes. Please see the note at the bottom of Table 1 for sources. Coefficients were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix, White 1984. The data for inequality are from Deininger and Squire 1996a. *≤ .05; **≤ .01.

appears that financial liberalization has a strong association with increased income inequality, independent of the effects of government outlays.

Is the relationship between capital account liberalization and increased income inequality robust to changes in the conditioning information? See Table B-4. The answer is that the statistical association is highly robust. Even with the Latin American countries omitted from the analysis, the estimated coefficient for capital account liberalization is positive and highly statistically significant.

CONCLUSION

I find that capital account liberalization is robustly and positively associated with economic growth. I find no support for the proposition that financial liberalization erodes the corporate tax base; the evidence is generally robustly consistent with capital account liberalization being positively associated both with increasing corporate taxation and with the redistribution of taxation toward corporations and away from individual wage earners. Capital account liberalization and increased government expenditures are also positively associated, though not robustly. Furthermore, there is a robust, positive, statistically significant correlation between capital account liberalization and increased income inequality.

Looking at the results of the analysis as a whole, what do they offer? There is suggestive support for three propositions. First, economic growth is enhanced by liberalization because it increases the "efficiency" of investments in capital and labor. Second, increased returns to efficient investments imply a shifting of relative prices (and incomes) in an economy. The shift favors those who make "efficient" investments in assets or skills in high demand/low supply in international markets (e.g., highly skilled workers or managers). It disfavors the holders of assets or skills in low demand/high supply in international markets (e.g., unskilled or semiskilled labor). Third, governments considering international financial deregulation face a tradeoff between equity and growth.

What directions for political science scholarship follow from this study? Correlation analysis does not allow for causal inference. An important extension of this research would be to examine the dynamics of the relationships between change in international financial regulation and change in these and other dependent variables.

The study also highlights the limits to the existing research agenda regarding international financial regulation. Structural dependence theorists see the issue of financial liberalization as being the constraints it imposes on voters and governments. But what constraints do we find? Voters evidently prefer higher growth to lower (Pacek and Radcliff 1995, Powell and Whitten 1993), and higher growth is associated with liberalization. Voters are notorious for preferring higher government expenditures paid for by someone else. Here, too, higher corporate taxes and higher expenditures are associated with liberalization.

Instead, the results suggest a new research agenda regarding international financial regulation. (See also Garrett 1995.) The agenda includes a number of questions. In what ways does international financial liberalization either *facilitate* governments in achieving goals desired by the voters or otherwise *enhance* governmental capacity? Does liberalization, for example, either enable governmental choices about intergenerational wealth transfers or lower the government's costs of meeting existing debt burdens? Is increasing inequality the price for larger national wealth and the enhancement of government capacity? I am optimistic that the "enablement" view is a useful perspective from which to view international financial liberalization.

APPENDIX A: DATA ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

Sources and Coverage

In 1950 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its first *Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions*. In it, the IMF reviewed the laws governing current and capital account payments and receipts for member nations that restricted some international payments, and therefore were of "Article XIV" status. This volume has been published annually since. While the coverage of national laws is more comprehensive in recent years than before, the categories of laws restricting finance have changed little.

The countries covered in *Exchange Restrictions* changed over time, and the coverage determined which countries could be used in the analysis. (See Appendix Table B-2 for details.) Data are available for 56 nations from 1950 to 1994, and for another eight nations from 1954–60 to 1994 (Quinn and Toyoda 1997). Sixty-four nations are represented in the catalogue.

The authors of the IMF text organize it in terms of current account restrictions (e.g., on payments for goods and services) and capital account restrictions (e.g., on payments for capital). (IMF members who have accepted Article VIII status are permitted to restrict capital account, but not current account, transactions.)

The IMF further distinguishes between "exchange payments" and "exchange receipts." Under "exchange payments," the IMF separately reports restrictions on payments for imported goods, on payments for "invisibles" (by which is meant internationally traded services such as insurance or legal services), and on payments or transfers of capital abroad. Under "exchange receipts," the IMF separately reports restrictions on the proceeds of exports, on the proceeds for service (invisibles) transactions, and on both the proceeds and transfer in of capital.

Coding

I followed the categories used by the IMF in assessing a nation's financial restrictions, that is, on exchange payments (imports, invisibles, capital) and on exchange receipts (exports, invisibles, capital). (See also Quinn and Toyoda 1997.) I also followed the text of the IMF's 1950 report (pp. 4, 13) and Arrow (1973), and I defined the regulation of international transactions (e.g., administrative rules and quantitative restrictions) as being more restrictive from an economic viewpoint than is taxation (e.g., multiple currency practices) of these transactions. As the IMF notes in the 1950 report:

TABLE A-1. Example of Scoring for United States, Sweden, and India Based on 1979 IMF Data

Variable	*Exchange Restrictions* Text	Comments	Score
UNITED STATES			
Agree	The United States formally notified the Fund on December 10, 1946, that it was prepared to accept the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, of the Fund Agreement (p. 423).	One point assigned on basis of Article VIII status.	1.0
Current: Payment for Imports	There are no restrictions on foreign payments, except those imposed for security reasons. . . . Imports of Cuban, Kampuchean, North Korean, and Vietnamese origin are prohibited under Treasury regulations, unless specifically licensed. Imports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iran are prohibited (p. 423).	Essentially free. A few agricultural commodities and products from some Communist countries are restricted.	2.0
Current: Payment for Invisibles	Payments and transfers abroad may be made freely, except for payments to or for the account of the authorities, instrumentalities, or controlled entities of Iran. . . . , Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, North Korea, and Vietnam (p. 424).	Free.	2.0
Capital: Payment	Incoming or outgoing capital payments by residents or nonresidents are not subject to exchange controls. In addition, inward and outward direct or portfolio investment is generally free of any other form of approval (p. 424).	Free.	2.0
Current: Receipts for Exports	The proceeds of exports are not subject to exchange controls. . . . Under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the President can suspend the export of goods for reasons of national security, foreign policy, or short supply in the domestic economy, although every effort is made to make sparing use of such authority (p. 424).	Essentially free.	2.0
Current: Receipts for Invisibles	Payments and transfers abroad may be made freely, except for payments to or for the account of the authorities, instrumentalities, or controlled entities of Iran. . . , Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, North Korea, and Vietnam (p. 424).	Free.	2.0
Capital: Receipts	Incoming or outgoing capital payments by residents or nonresidents are not subject to exchange controls. In addition, inward and outward direct or portfolio investment is generally free of any other form of approval. Investments involving banks are subject to federal and state banking regulations (p. 424).	Free.	2.0
SWEDEN			
Agree	Sweden formally accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, of the Fund Agreement, as from February 15, 1961 (p. 382).	One point assigned on basis of Article VIII status; 0.5 point for membership in European Free Trade Association (EFTA).	1.5
Current: Payment for Imports	With the exception of some agricultural and fishery products, practically all goods are free from quantitative restriction and import licensing. . . . Payments for imports, including normal advance payments, may, as current payments, be made without permission through authorized banks and without the formality of presenting an import license (p. 383).	Essentially free.	2.0
Current: Payment for Invisibles	Persons domiciled in Sweden may make (current payments) without restriction in favor of persons domiciled abroad. The payments must be made through authorized banks in order to ensure that capital payments are not made in the guise of current payments. . . . The export by travelers of Swedish banknotes in denominations larger than SKr 100 is prohibited. . . . No traveler may, however, without specific permission take out of Sweden more than SKr 6,000 in Swedish banknotes and coin (p. 384).	Mostly free. Approval process exists to verify transactions and to prevent capital restrictions from being circumvented.	1.5
Capital: Payment	Direct investment abroad by Swedish residents requires individual authorization, which normally is granted only if the investment is considered likely to promote exports or otherwise to benefit the balance on the current account, regardless of the return on the investment. . . . Residents do not need authorization to sell portfolio holdings of foreign securities to nonresidents. The purchase of both listed and unlisted securities by residents from nonresidents requires authorization. As a rule, such authorization is not granted (p. 385).	Approval required for direct investments; some capital payments and capital sales permitted.	1.0

TABLE A-1. Continued

Variable	*Exchange Restrictions* Text	Comments	Score
SWEDEN cont.			
Current: Receipts for Exports	All exports, with some exceptions . . . are exempt from license. . . . Proceeds from exports of goods do not have to be surrendered (p. 384).	Free.	2.0
Current: Receipts for Invisibles	Receipts *from* invisibles are subject to the same treatments as those from exports (p. 384).	Free.	2.0
Capital: Receipts	Foreign direct investments in Sweden require authorization, which normally is given, provided that not more than 50 percent of each individual investment (investments below SKr 5 million excepted) is financed with domestic credit. . . . Residents are permitted to receive capital receipts from abroad on account of life, pension and annuity contracts (and others). . . . Residents may accept *other kinds of capital receipts from abroad only upon approval of* the Riksbank (p. 384). Permission is needed for the issuance of bonds and shares in Sweden by nonresidents; bond issues in favor of other Scandinavian countries and [the World Bank] have been admitted (p. 385).	Approval required for all large and many small nonresident financial activities. Some approvals denied.	1.0
INDIA			
Agree		No agreements	0.0
Current: Payment for Imports	The Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1947 empowers the Central Government to prohibit, restrict, or otherwise control imports (p. 193). . . . Where a valid import license is held, the required exchange is released by an authorized bank on presentation of the exchange control copy of the license and the shipping documents. . . . Advance remittances before shipping . . . are not normally allowed (p. 194). The import of certain commodities [list given here] is reserved for the Government or state trading enterprises. . . . In addition to any applicable import duty, imports are subject to an auxiliary duty of 5, 15, or 20 percent (p. 194).	High degree of administrative control over imports and import payments. Approval (in the form of licenses) frequently granted for many imports.	1.0
Current: Payment for Invisibles	In general, payments abroad for invisibles require approval. Foreign exchange is granted freely for a few such payments, mainly expenses incidental to trade transactions and transfers of a recurring contractual obligation. . . . Profit remittances by branches of foreign firms, companies, and banks require the prior approval of the Reserve Bank. Remittances of dividends by Indian companies to their nonresident shareholders do not require prior Reserve Bank approval . . . (p. 194). The export of Indian currency notes and coins, except to Nepal, is . . . prohibited (p. 195).	High degree of administrative control. Strong restrictions on export of currency.	0.5
Capital: Payment	Residents are prohibited, except with Reserve Bank permission, from engaging in any transaction which increases beyond 49 percent the nonresident share of business outside India . . . and they are also prohibited, except with Reserve Bank permission, from holding, acquiring, transferring, or disposing of immovable property outside India. . . . Furthermore, Reserve Bank approval is required for residents exporting Indian securities to any place outside India and transferring Indian securities to nonresidents (p. 196). Indian nationals are not normally granted any exchange facilities for emigration purposes (p. 197). Foreign borrowing by nonbank Indian companies is subject to Reserve Bank approval; only in exceptional cases is permission granted (p. 196).	Approval required, rarely granted.	0.5
Current: Receipts for Exports	Exchange control is exercised over the proceeds of exports to countries other than Bhutan and Nepal. . . . Foreign exchange holdings, including the proceeds of exports, must be offered for sale against rupees to authorized dealer, unless the holder has been authorized by the Reserve Bank to retain them. . . . Export proceeds must be surrendered within six months of shipment (p. 195).	Prohibitions and suspensions in place. Eventual surrender of proceeds required.	0.5
Current: Receipts for Invisibles	Proceeds from invisibles must be surrendered. . . . The import of Indian currency notes and coin is, in general, prohibited. . . . Foreign currency notes may be brought into India without limit, provided that the total amount brought in is declared. . . . Foreign currency notes may be sold to any authorized dealer in foreign exchange (p. 195).	Surrender of proceeds required. Strong restrictions on Indian, but not foreign, currency.	0.5

TABLE A-1. Continued

Variable	*Exchange Restrictions* Text	Comments	Score
INDIA cont.			
Capital: Receipts	All proposals for direct investments in India, with or without equity participation, are reviewed by the Foreign Investment Board. . . . The general or specific approval of the Reserve Bank is necessary for the continuance of commercial, industrial, or trading activities in India or companies incorporated abroad, or with more than 40 percent nonresident interest (p. 191). [Details of conditions for continuation of business in India provided, including equity dilution formulas. pp. 195–61.] In exceptional cases, companies that do not meet these criteria but have developed skills . . . , or use technologies not indigenously available, may be permitted a more than a 40 percent foreign participation. . . . Branches of foreign companies other than airlines, shipping companies, and liaison offices must in all cases become Indian companies (p. 196).	Approval required for all direct investments. Extensive and pervasive indigenous equity requirements. Some "national interest" investments permitted outside guidelines.	0.5

Note: This table shows examples of how the financial regulation scores are derived based on the text of the 1980 *Exchange Restrictions*, related to the United States, Sweden, and India during 1979. These three cases range from open to closed and represent differences in size, region, degree, and type of industrialization. The United States has been substantially open to financial flows from the earliest point in the data series. Sweden liberalized current accounts long before capital accounts. India is an economy with extensive restrictions, including restrictions on incoming investments.

> The extent of deliberate selection is almost unlimited under quantitative restrictions, while it is confined under cost restrictions to the application of different effective selling rates of exchange to specified international transactions, foreign currencies, or means of international payment [pp. 4–5].

In addition to measuring the intensity of domestic laws, the effects of international laws and agreements are assessed with a measure called *Agree*. I did so because the member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Union (EU), and IMF have agreed among themselves to separate codes of financial liberalization (IMF 1995). When nations join the OECD, IMF, or EU, they agree to liberalize aspects of their financial markets. Therefore, Agree can be interpreted as a measure of a government's commitment to other governments to refrain from restricting its current and capital transactions. The consequences to a society of liberalizing as part of an international agreement may be more advantageous than if that same society were to liberalize alone, since economic agents may be more likely to undertake irreversible investment (Pindyck 1991).

Coding Rules

In assessing the severity of a nation's financial restrictions, I adopted a scale of 0, .5, 1, 1.5, and 2 for each dimension of exchange restriction. For example, 0 means that, import payments are forbidden, and 2 means that they are unrestricted. The range of 0 to .5 is reserved for laws that impose quantitative or other regulatory restrictions, such as licenses, that completely (0) or partly (.5) forbid certain economic behavior. Laws requiring the exchange transaction to be approved by authorities or subjecting it to heavy taxes, whether in the form of multiple currency practices or other taxes, are scored 1. The 1.5 score is used where exchange is taxed, and 2 is used where exchange is free.

The decision rules for goods and invisibles payments and receipts are as follows. If all receipts or payments are necessarily surrendered or blocked, then $X = 0$. If transfers require approval (unless automatic), then $X \leq 1$. If transfers require approval (usually automatic) and are heavily taxed, then $X = 1$. If transfers are effected through the market mechanism and taxed, then $X \geq 1$. The degree of taxation determines Y, where $X = 1 + Y$. If transfers are free, then $X = 2$.

The decision rules for restrictions on capital payment and receipts are as follows. If approval is rare and surrender of receipts is required, then $X = 0$. If approval is required and sometimes granted, then $X = .5$. If approval is required and frequently granted, then $X = 1$. If approval is not required and receipts are heavily taxed, then $X = 1$. If approval is not required and receipts are taxed, then $X = 1.5$. If approval is not required and receipts are not taxed, then $X = 2$.

The decision rules for international agreements and laws are as follows. If the country has IMF Article VIII status, then $X = 1$. If the country is a member of the European Union, then $X = 1$. If the country is a member of the OECD, then $X = .5$. If the country is a member of a free-trade area, then $X = .5$. If a country is a member of a currency zone (e.g., French franc area), then $X = .5$.

Reliability

Two coders separately coded the text of *Exchange Restrictions* for 21 advanced industrial nations and 36 emerging market nations for various years, following the above coding scheme (Quinn and Toyoda 1997). The major substantive disagreements, which are defined as intercoder differences greater than .5 on a scale of 0–14, are as follows. The data for three emerging market countries were attributed to the wrong years in the 1990s because the IMF country reports for these nations (e.g., Sri Lanka) included information through March 31 of, for example, 1994, instead of the more common practice of ending the report on December 31, 1993. Another disagreement emerged over four OECD members in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A recurring problem for many Latin American countries was the treatment of export bounties or other export incentives; the effects of these (essentially) positive trade incentives are not reflected in these data. The scoring of membership in both the British sterling and French franc areas was also a source of intercoder difference. This was because the formal rules of nondiscrimination within the area were violated more often than not. The two coders resolved the differences by continuing to include membership in exchange areas as a component of Agree, but by having the restrictions reflected in the other components of Openness.

TABLE B-1

	CAPITAL 1958 (0–4 scale)	*OPENNESS* 1958 (0–14 scale)	Δ*CAPITAL* 1959–88	Δ*OPENNESS* 1959–88	Δ*CAPITAL* 1973–88
LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS					
Argentina	3.0	8.5	−0.83	−0.60	0.78
Bolivia	4.0	11.0	−0.83	−0.12	−0.78
Brazil	1.5	5.0	0.00	−0.12	0.00
Chile	3.0	7.0	−1.25	0.00	−0.78
Colombia	2.5	8.0	−0.83	−1.07	0.00
Costa Rica	3.0	8.0	−0.83	0.12	−0.78*
Dominican R.	4.0	13.0	−0.83	−1.07	0.78
Ecuador	3.0	7.5	−0.42	0.24	−0.78
El Salvador	4.0	13.0	−2.50	−1.90	0.00
Guatemala	4.0	12.5	0.00	−0.12	2.34
Honduras	4.0	13.0	−1.67	−1.43	−2.34
Mexico	4.0	12.5	−1.25	−0.48	−0.78*
Nicaragua	2.0	7.5	−1.25	−1.07	−3.12
Panama	4.0	13.0	0.00	0.00	0.00*
Paraguay	4.0	10.5	−2.08	−1.43	−1.56
Peru	3.5	10.5	−2.08	−1.31	−0.78
Uruguay	3.0	7.0	0.42	1.07	1.56
Venezuela	4.0	11.0	−1.67	−1.19	−2.34
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA					
Burma	1.0	4.0	−0.83	−0.71	0.00
Hong Kong	3.0	9.0	0.83	0.83	1.56
Indonesia	1.5	2.5	0.83*	1.55*	0.00
Japan	1.0	2.5	1.25	1.90	0.78
Korea	1.0	2.5	1.25	1.31	1.56
Malaysia	3.0	9.5	−0.42	0.36	−0.78
Philippines	0.0	1.0	0.83	0.83	0.00
Singapore	3.0	9.5	0.83*	0.95*	1.56
Thailand	2.0	6.0	−0.42	−0.12	0.00
MEMBERS OF OECD (1989), EXCLUDING JAPAN					
Australia	2.5	6.0	0.42	1.19	2.34
Austria	0.5	4.5	2.08	1.67	2.56
Belgium	3.0	9.5	0.00	0.12	0.00
Canada	4.0	13.0	−0.42	0.00	0.78
Denmark	2.0	6.5	0.83	1.07	1.56
Finland	0.5	2.5	1.25	1.90	1.56
France	2.5	7.0	0.42	0.95	0.00
Germany	4.0	11.0	0.00	0.71	0.00
Greece	1.0	2.5	1.66	1.19	1.56
Ireland	2.0	6.5	0.83	0.95	1.56
Italy	2.0	7.5	0.83	0.71	1.56
Netherlands	3.0	10.0	0.83	0.95	1.56
New Zealand	1.5	5.5	1.67	1.67	3.13
Norway	1.5	5.5	0.83	0.95	2.34
Portugal	1.0	3.0	1.25	1.31	1.56
Spain	0.5	3.5	2.08	2.02	0.78
Sweden	0.5	6.5	2.08	1.07	0.78
Switzerland	4.0	11.0	0.00	0.48	0.00
Great Britain	1.5	4.5	2.08	2.26	3.13
USA	4.0	13.0	0.00	0.11	0.78
OTHER EMERGING MARKET NATIONS					
Egypt	1.5	5.0	0.00	0.12	0.00
Ethiopia	0.5	3.5	0.00	−0.48	0.78
Ghana	2.5	8.0	−0.83	−0.83	0.78
Haiti	4.0	12.5	−2.08	−0.71	−1.56*
India	1.5	5.0	−0.42	−0.12	−0.78
Iran	0.5	4.0	0.83	0.24	0.00

TABLE B-1. Continued

	CAPITAL 1958 (0–4 scale)	*OPENNESS* 1958 (0–14 scale)	Δ*CAPITAL* 1959–88	Δ*OPENNESS* 1959–88	Δ*CAPITAL* 1973–88
OTHER EMERGING MARKET NATIONS cont.					
Israel	0.5	3.0	0.83	0.71	−0.78
Jordan	2.5	7.0	−0.83	−0.47	0.78
Liberia	4.0	12.0	−0.42	−0.36	−0.78
Morocco	0.5*	4.5*	0.00	−0.74	0.00
Nigeria	3.0*	9.5*	−0.93	−0.40	1.56
Pakistan	0.5	4.0	0.83	−0.36	0.78
South Africa	1.5	6.0	0.00	−0.36	1.56
Sri Lanka	1.5	4.0	−0.83	−0.12	0.00
Syria	4.0	11.0	−1.67	−1.42	−1.56
Tunisia	2.0	6.0	−0.42	−0.48	0.00
Turkey	1.0	3.5	0.00	0.60	0.78

Note: The indices of capital and openness are computed as follows: $\Delta CAPITAL = ((CAPITAL_t - CAPITAL_{t-1}/4)*100$; $\Delta OPENNESS = ((OPENNESS_t - OPENNESS_{t-1}/14)*100$. Zero represents a financially closed economy. Four (for Capital) and 14 (for Openness) represent financially open economies. *Costa Rica, Haiti, Mexico, and Panama - 1972–87; Indonesia - data unavailable for 1965 and 1966, and the data reported for those years is 1964 data; Morocco - the initial data are for 1959; Nigeria - the initial data are for 1960; Singapore - the data reported for Malaysia are used for Singapore during the two years of union between Malaysia and Singapore.

TABLE B-2. Countries Whose Data Are Omitted from Estimations

Table 1 models 2–5	Table 3 all models	Table 4 model 2	Table 4 model 1	Table 5 all models
Argentina	Argentina	Argentina	Argentina	Argentina
Burma	Burma	Brazil	Bolivia	Austria
Chile	Colombia	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia
Hong Kong	Dominican Rep.	Colombia	Burma	Burma
Liberia	Egypt	Dominican Rep.	Chile	Ecuador
Singapore	El Salvador	Ecuador	Colombia	El Salvador
	Ghana	Egypt	Dominican Rep.	Ethiopia
	Guatemala	El Salvador	Ecuador	Ghana
	Haiti	Ethiopia	Egypt	Haiti
	Hong Kong	Ghana	El Salvador	Israel
	India	Guatemala	Ethiopia	Jordan
	Israel	Haiti	Ghana	Korea
	Japan	Hong Kong	Guatemala	Liberia
	Jordan	India	Haiti	Morocco
	Liberia	Israel	Honduras	Nicaragua
	Malaysia	Japan	Hong Kong	Nigeria
	New Zealand	Jordan	Indonesia	Paraguay
	Nicaragua	Liberia	Iran	Singapore
	Nigeria	New Zealand	Ireland	South Africa
	Pakistan	Nicaragua	Israel	Switzerland
	Panama	Nigeria	Japan	Syria
	Peru	Peru	Jordan	Uruguay
	Philippines	Philippines	Liberia	
	Singapore	Portugal	New Zealand	
	South Africa	Singapore	Nicaragua	
	Syria	South Africa	Nigeria	
			Peru	
			Philippines	
			Portugal	
			Singapore	
			South Africa	
			Syria	
			Turkey	

Note: The countries listed are unavailable (or unreliable) in the original sources for at least one of the variables used in the analysis. A recurring limitation of the data is that many government sector variables (e.g., corporate taxation collections) are unavailable from the International Monetary Fund's *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* for 1973 through 1976. Another limitation is that high quality inequality data from Deininger and Squire 1996a are not available for the countries listed under the column, "Table 5."

TABLE B-3. Variables Used in the Analysis

AFRICA	Dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries
CIVIL	Index of civil liberties
CAPITAL	0–4 measure of capital account regulation
Δ*CAPITAL*	Change in capital
CTX (L)	Ratio of central government corporate income tax revenue to GDP
EASIA	Dummy variable for countries in East and Southeast Asia
GOVW (L)	Government welfare and social security payments as percentage of gross domestic product
GOVX (L)	Government consumption less defense and education share of GDP
GPO	Growth of population
GSG	Growth of the share of government consumption (GOV)
GYP	Growth of real per capita gross domestic product
INV	Investment share of gross domestic product
ITX (L)	Share of central government individual income tax revenue to GDP
LAAM	Dummy variable for Latin American countries
OECD	Dummy variable for OECD countries (members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as of 1989)
OPEC	Dummy variable for OPEC countries (members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
OPENNESS	0–14 measure of financial regulation
Δ*OPENNESS*	Change in openness
PI	Average inflation of GDP deflator
PRI	Primary enrollment rate 1960
REVC	Number of revolutions and coups per year
RGDPxx	Real GDP per capita in 19xx
SEC	Secondary enrollment rate 1960
SOC	Dummy for socialist economy
STDC	Standard deviation of GDC (growth of domestic credit)
TAX (L)	Ratio of central government tax revenue to GDP
XSG	Growth of export share of GDP
X	Export share of GDP

(L) indicates only available for 1974–89 period.
Sources: Levine and Renelt 1992, Quinn 1992, Quinn and Toyoda 1997.

A second reliability check was undertaken. It compared some of the results reported here to the dash measure used by the IMF in the Summary Table to indicate the absence of payment restrictions on current and capital account transactions by residents. In nearly every instance the two agree.

Another reliability check was to compare these results to those of Epstein and Schor (1992) from their scoring of the IMF Summary Table. They reported results for 20 years and 16 countries using an indicator derived from several categories of restrictions from the table. The correlation between my results and theirs is .66.

APPENDIX B: METHODS, MODELS, AND DATA

I follow Barro (1991), Leamer (1983, 1985) and Levine and Renelt (1992) in using cross-section regressions with a "base" model for each of the dependent variables, followed by extreme bounds analysis (EBA). Another robustness check, not undertaken by either Leamer (1983, 1985) or Levine and Renelt (1992), is to test whether the estimates of the relationship of capital account liberalization to the various dependent variables differ in statistical significance by groups of countries. I enter dummy variables (for both slopes and intercepts) for each regional grouping from Figure 1 to establish whether the coefficient estimates are robust to their inclusion. I undertake this test for all models estimated in the paper and report the results where the coefficient estimates may differ.

Growth

The starting point for the long-run growth regressions is the Barro (1991) "base model," which is a cross-sectional model. The initial level of per-capita income at the start of the period is used to represent all the variables that contributed to the initial level of national prosperity: the capital stock, the initial level of financial openness at the beginning of the period, and the initial level of education, for example. (Many of the level variables—such as the initial capital stock, initial level of financial openness—are substantially collinear with the initial level of income.) Change variables are then entered as independent variables to see if change in one is associated with change in others. Those variables always used in Levine and Renelt's (1992) estimates include change in investment, secondary school enrollment rates, and annual rates of population growth.

Once the base model is estimated, Levine and Renelt (1992) added whatever particular variable was of interest to the base model. Then, they ran many regressions, changing each time a few of the other independent variables. They did so to test if a particular variable has a robust statistical relationship to long-run growth or if the effects depend on the conditioning information.

I do the same. The measure of change in international financial regulation is added to the "base model" in the long-run growth equations. The variables are then added and subtracted to see whether changes in the conditioning information produce changes in the estimated relationship between the measures of liberalization and long-run economic growth. I replicate the Levine and Renelt (1992)

TABLE B-4. Sensitivity and Robustness Results for Effects of Capital Account Liberalization on Corporate Taxation, Government Expenditures, and Income Inequality

Dependent Variable *N* Changes in Conditioning Information	β of $\Delta CAPITAL$	Standard Error	*t*-ratio	Adj R^2	Robust or Fragile
1. Corporate taxation as % of Individual taxation					
1. Base model (Table 3, 1)	0.443**	0.154	2.89	.98	
2. OPEC added	0.349**	0.133	2.62	.99	Robust
3. *X*, PI and REVC added	0.467**	0.159	2.94	.98	
4. STDC, REVC, GOV added	0.462**	0.157	2.94	.99	
5. E. Asia, L. America, and other emerging markets dummies added	0.654**	0.148	4.41	.99	
2. Government welfare and social security payments as % of gross domestic product					
1. Base model (Table 4, 1)	0.023*	0.010	2.34	.50	Fragile
2. OPEC deleted	0.024*	0.010	2.30	.49	
3. *X*, PI and REVC added	0.020**	0.005	3.65	.76	
4. STDC and REVC added	0.017*	0.008	2.27	.59	
5. E. Asia, L. America, and other emerging markets dummies added	−0.003	0.008	0.32	.73	
3. Government expenditures as % of gross domestic product (net of defense and education)					
1. Base model (Table 4, 2)	0.013**	0.004	3.29	.31	Fragile
2. OPEC deleted	0.014**	0.004	3.61	.25	
3 *X*, PI and REVC added	0.015**	0.005	3.19	.32	
4. STDC and REVC added	0.015**	0.005	3.30	.34	
5. E. Asia, L. America, and other emerging markets dummies added	0.008	0.005	1.65	.42	
4. Income distribution: Change in Gini index 1973–90 (quintiles)					
1. Base model (Table 5, 1)	1.661**	0.605	2.75	.22	
2. Latin America deleted	1.293*	0.598	2.16	.29	Robust
3. *X*, PI and REVC added	1.553*	0.676	2.30	.17	
4. STDC and REVC added	1.562*	0.621	2.52	.27	
5. E. Asia, L. America, and other emerging market dummies added	2.122**	0.554	3.83	.44	

Note: Please see the notes to Table 2. *≤ .05; **≤ .01

tables, adding measures of financial liberalization to the analysis.

In the long-run growth models, there are possible regional differences. The coefficient estimates for the interactions of capital account liberalization with dummy variables for the OECD, Latin America, East Asia, and other emerging market economies are −0.308, 0.673*, 0.716**, and −0.008, respectively (*≤.05; **≤.01). The tests for statistically significant differences among the slope estimates were insignificant. On this evidence, I cannot reject the proposition that the coefficients are the same, the negative (but insignificant) OECD interaction term notwithstanding.

Taxation and Government Expenditures

I found in previous work that estimated influences of independent variables on corporate taxation were not fully robust to different measures of corporate taxation (Quinn and Shapiro 1991). The problem is this: Government revenue from corporate taxation is the appropriate numerator, but scholars need a denominator that allows for valid comparison of tax collections over time and space. For this reason, I estimate three different models. I add a dummy variable, *OPEC*, for member nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries as a variable to be included in the robustness checks because royalty payments from oil companies to governments are accounted for in the IMF's *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* as corporate taxation.

Income Inequality

The measures sociologists and economists use to assess economic development usually differ. Sociologists use some measure of the level of energy consumption as an indicator, whereas economists tend to use the level of per-capita income. The energy consumption indicator widely employed in sociological analysis is problematic. For example, Sweden produced 21,700 kWh of electricity per capita in 1988. In the same year, the U.S. produced 11,790 kWh per capita, and Germany produced 7,200 kWh per capita (*World Factbook 1989*, 285, 309, and 109, respectively.) It is not clear that these numbers have any interpretation in terms of development.

As with all the models estimated in this analysis, I conduct robustness checks by changing the conditioning information. For inequality, I examine two possible additional influences on the robustness of the estimates. To see whether liberalization is associated with increased income inequality from sources other than changes in government expenditures, I estimate one model with government outlays as an additional variable. Income inequality is very high in many Latin American countries compared to elsewhere (Deininger and Squire 1996a). The inequality models are estimated with and without data for Latin America to see whether any observed effects are strongly influenced by observations from that region.

The coefficient estimates for the interactions of capital account liberalization with dummy variables for the OECD, Latin America, East Asia, and other emerging market economies are 3.466**, 2.389**, −3.916, and −.287, respectively (*≤.05; **≤.01). (The tests for whether the slope coefficient estimates differed statistically revealed insignificance.) On this evidence, the proposition that the coefficients are the same cannot be rejected, the negative (but not statistically significant) interaction between capital account liberalization and East Asia notwithstanding.

Data for Independent Variables

Table B-3 lists the variables used in the analyses. The data on long-run economic growth are averaged by country, 1960–89. Data for corporate tax collections and other fiscal policy variables are from the IMF's *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook*, various years. Some fiscal policy data are available only from 1974 onward; the Levine and Renelt (1992) data set contains averaged data for 1974–89 tax collections and types of government expenditures. I collected data as available for 1973 from the *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* to create the initial level of the dependent variables for use as independent variables. In creating a measure of the initial level of government expenditures, I used 1973 data from line BI ("Total expenditure by function, consolidated central government") of the *Yearbook* and divided by line 99b ("Gross Domestic Product") from the IMF's 1973 *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*. The resulting measure is government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Another initial measure is created by multiplying by the reported measures of government welfare and social security payments as a percentage of government spending times government spending as a percentage of GDP. More than half the countries in the data set are excluded from the expenditure analysis due to missing observations. The 1973 tax data are from Table A, Revenue and Grants, Central Government, *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook*.

The data on income inequality are Gini coefficients from the World Bank Income Inequality Data Set (Deininger and Squire 1996a). As Deininger and Squire (p. 3) note, "while a large number of earlier studies on inequality have amassed substantial data on inequality, the information included is often of dubious quality." They establish strong standards for including data in their survey, and the result is data of higher quality and broader range than any previously available; the number of "high-quality" observations is nine times greater than in any other data set.

I use only those data described by Deininger and Squire (1996a, 4–10) as high quality. Joining their data to the international financial liberalization data produces a cross-sectional data set of 42 observations (i.e., nations). I use as a measure of a nation's initial level of income inequality the Gini coefficient whose date of reporting was 1973 or earlier, except for Belgium (1979), Denmark (1979), France (1979), Indonesia (1977), Italy (1975), and the Netherlands (1975). Deininger and Squire (p. 14) caution that there is a "significant and systematic difference between income-based and expenditure-based [Gini] coefficients." Gini coefficients for nations using expenditure-based methods will be systematically lower than for nations using consumption-based methods. I adjust Gini coefficients by adding 6.6 to expenditure-based Gini coefficients, which is what Deininger and Squire recommend. The results do not depend on this correction. (See also Quinn and Woolley 1996.)

Both the Levine and Renelt (1992) and the Deininger and Squire (1996a) data are available from the World Bank (www.worldbank.org).

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The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform

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Previous studies of political decision making have used only "static" choice sets, where alternatives are "fixed" and are a priori *known to the decision maker. We assess the effect of a* dynamic *choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a two-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based "process tracer" in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).*

The debate whether heuristic-based cognitive models or holistic rational theories explain decision making or choice is at the crux of social science research (see Green and Shapiro 1994, Grofman 1993, Monroe 1991, Zey 1992). Some scholars argue that decision makers use maximizing holistic strategies. Others claim that satisficing, nonholistic rules are employed. Although past studies typically examine "static" situations in which policy alternatives and decision criteria are simultaneously introduced into the decision matrix, foreign policy crises are very often characterized by a different decision structure: an evolving choice set in which policy options emerge *during* the process.

This was apparently the case during the Haitian crisis of September 1994, when the option of sending a delegation led by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to Haiti to try to resolve the crisis was raised relatively late in the process but was eventually adopted by the Clinton administration. Similarly, during the 1990–91 crisis in the Persian Gulf, Secretary of State James Baker flew to Geneva to meet with his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, but a compromise solution was not adopted by presidents Bush and Hussein. During the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, a new contingency emerged when Manuel Noriega escaped, and the United States had to respond to this new development. During the Cuban missile crisis, the situation also was in flux, with some options disappearing and reappearing at a later date, and some totally new alternatives emerging periodically throughout (see Anderson 1983). It would seem, then, that theories of foreign policy decision making should explore the effects of a *dynamic* decision matrix on the process of decision making and upon the decision outcome. In this paper we study the effects of changes in the choice set on strategy selection (the use of a mixture of decision strategies during an evolving foreign policy crisis), and choice.

The study incorporates some of the work of cognitive psychologists on behavioral decision making, more specifically, contingency theories of judgment and choice that distinguish among multiple processing strategies and that try to identify the conditions under which various strategies will or will not be activated (see also Abelson and Levi 1985; Arkes 1991; Maule and Svenson 1993; Payne 1982; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1992; Svenson 1979; Tetlock 1992; Tetlock and Boettger 1989). While we focus on decisions in the foreign policy arena, dynamic aspects of decisions are highly relevant, of course, to a wide variety of other areas in the social sciences. For example, one can study the effects of changes in the number of candidates during a campaign on the ultimate choice, or the effect of changes in the number of policy options on committee deliberations.

In this article, we address several specific questions: Do national security decision makers change decision strategies during foreign policy crises? If so, do they switch from an alternative-based search to a dimension-based search or vice versa? What are some of the factors that influence the change in decision strategy during a foreign policy crisis? What is the effect of strategy on choice? To answer these questions we use a new research technology—the Foreign Policy Decision Board "process tracer"—in a study of U.S. Air Force commanders. We first introduce the poliheuristic theory of decision, which provides a theoretical framework and guide for assessing the effect of changes in a choice set on strategy selection and choice. We then describe the Foreign Policy Decision Board. Finally, we report results based on a test of the board with top-ranking Air Force officers.

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THE POLIHEURISTIC THEORY OF DECISION

The poliheuristic theory of decision highlights the cognitive mechanisms that mediate foreign policy choices. It incorporates the conditions surrounding those decisions as well as the cognitive processes themselves (the "why" and "how" of decision making). The term poliheuristic can be broken down into the roots *poly* (many) and *heuristic* (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions. Heuristics compensate for incomplete information by providing cognitive shortcuts to complex situations by organizing information in a manner that facilitates the decision process (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 19).

A key premise of the poliheuristic theory is that policymakers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions, including strategies that are suboptimal (i.e., not always the "best"). A decision strategy consists of a set of procedures "that the decision maker engages in when attempting to select among alternative courses of action, and a decision rule that dictates how the results of the engaged-in procedures will be used to make the actual decision" (Beach and Mitchell 1978, 439–40). The poliheuristic theory also postulates that policymakers employ a two-stage decision process: an initial screening of available alternatives and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize rewards.

The first phase in the decision process involves a nonexhaustive search where a selection of "surviving" alternatives is typically being made across dimensions prior to the completion of the consideration of all alternatives along all dimensions (Mintz 1993, Mintz and Geva 1997). Often, foreign policy decisions are based on the adoption or rejection of alternatives according to one or at most a few critical criteria. The second phase involves a maximizing or lexicographic decision rule for selecting an alternative from the subset of "surviving" alternatives. Thus, decision makers not only change strategies while coping with different decisions but also use a mixture of decision strategies en route to a single choice.

The two-stage decision process in the poliheuristic theory does not always correspond to the well-known elimination-by-aspects (EBA) strategy. Multiple decision strategies (such as lexicographic, disjunctive, conjunctive, or expected utility) can be used in each of the two decision stages subject to different environmental and personal conditions. In the subjective expected utility strategy, "the procedures are the computation of product sums of subjective probabilities and utilities for each alternative and the decision rule is maximization-selection of the alternative with the maximum product sum" (Beach and Mitchell 1978, 440). In the poliheuristic strategy, the procedures and rules are not "fixed"; they vary depending on such intervening factors as the domain in which the decision maker operates, his or her goals, and other situational constraints (Mintz 1997). Tetlock and Boettger (1989, 388) note that decision makers often use different information-processing strategies in different situations. In this regard the poliheuristic theory is compatible with a host of contingency theories of decision and judgment that attribute to the decision maker sufficient flexibility in adapting the decision process to changing problem and environmental demands and to the cognitive/personal makeup of the decision maker (Abelson and Levy 1985; Beach and Mitchell 1978; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 1993; Tetlock 1992). A key assumption of poliheuristic theory is that political leaders measure success and failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards using *poli*tical terms. The theory suggests procedures for eliminating alternatives by rejecting or adopting courses of action based on the political heuristic in a two-stage decision process.

The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making can also explain the decision *not* to use force in a crisis (see DeRouen 1994). In such instances, the decision maker anticipates that using force will have a negative utility on the political or military dimension that cannot be compensated for on other substantive dimensions.

The poliheuristic theory thus incorporates key elements of two disciplines that study foreign policy decision making (Hermann 1986, x–xi): cognitive psychology and political science. From the former, the interesting questions center around how the decision maker(s) selects or rejects alternatives in light of time constraints, uncertainties, risks, task complexities, and so forth. From the latter come political issues, à la Lasswell, such as who wins and who loses politically as a consequence of the decision.

In this article we test the poliheuristic proposition that national security decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies in arriving at a decision. We first review the literature on types of decision strategies, the causes of strategy selection, and the link between strategy and choice. We then test the effect of static versus dynamic choice sets on strategy selection and choice during a foreign policy crisis.

Types of Decision Strategies

Previous studies of process tracing (e.g., Ford et al. 1989; Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1993) specify two "pure" modes of information acquisition often used in decision science: alternative-based versus dimension-based. The alternative-based (interdimensional) strategy implies a sequential review of all items for a given alternative across different dimensions or aspects and then a review of information for another alternative across dimensions. The dimension-based (intradimensional) strategy implies focusing on a given dimension, reviewing all the options along this dimension, and then repeating the process for another dimension. Riggle and Johnson (1996) suggest that these two modes of decision making represent two poles along an information-processing continuum.

The strategy shift from alternative-based to dimension-based processing (or vice versa) can be best conceptualized as a movement between more complex, more demanding, compensatory tradeoff reasoning (associated with the alternative-based strategy) and less complex, less demanding, noncompensatory rules (associated with a dimension-based strategy).[1]

Causes of Strategy Selection

In a widely cited study of strategy selection and choice, Beach and Mitchell (1978, 440) explain that strategy selection is contingent upon the characteristics of both the decision task and the individual decision maker. Some characteristics are inherent, of course, in the decision problem itself and affect strategy selection (Billings and Scherer 1988). For example, the ambiguity of the task affects strategy selection (Beach and Mitchell 1978), as does the amount of relevant information to be considered and the degree to which the problem will influence future decisions (Billings and Scherer 1988). Time pressure also influences strategy selection (Ford et al. 1989), since exogenously imposed time constraints may exclude some strategies from consideration.

Several experimental studies demonstrate that strategy selection is also significantly influenced by changes in the format in which the information is presented to decision makers. Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994) examined the importance of individual and contextual variations in information-processing strategies for candidate evaluation. They found that differences in the presentation format play a critical role in candidate appraisal. Stone and Schkade (1991, 42) show that when the values (utilities) associated with alternatives are given in words rather than in numbers, decision makers resort more to an alternative-based information search and less to compensatory processing. Gilliland, Wood, and Schmitt (1994) found that the labeling (or unlabeling) of alternatives likewise affects the selection of one kind of decision strategy rather than another. According to these authors, labels may facilitate the recall of information relevant to the decision. Decision makers may rely on labels that refer to information previously acquired, which would cause them to access less new information. When provided with labels, decision makers may also employ simplified decision models, because it may appear to them that not all alternatives may need to be accessed.

In the area of foreign policy decision making, Mintz and Geva (1997; see also Geva, Redd, and Mintz 1996) found that the familiarity of the decision maker with the choice set affects the selection of a decision strategy. When information search patterns were compared for scenarios containing familiar and unfamiliar alternatives, it was revealed that a dimension-based pattern is characteristic of the unfamiliar (and therefore more cognitively demanding) scenarios, whereas an alternative-based search is more common in familiar choice sets. Mintz and Geva (1997) also show that accountability affects strategy and choice: Decision makers who expect to justify their decisions invest more effort in acquiring and retaining information than do those who do not (see also Tetlock 1992). Maoz (1997) found a significant relationship between levels of stress and the selection of a particular decision strategy: The analytic approach characterizes decision making at moderate stress levels; the cybernetic approach tends to be associated with low stress; the cognitive approach is often found at high levels of stress. Suedfeld, Wallace, and Thachuk (1993, 185) point out that leaders, as cognitive managers, ultimately need to weigh the "potential advantages and drawbacks of differing levels of complexity in choosing the kind of strategy [they] adopt."

In correspondence with the "poly" proposition of the poliheuristic model, it is expected that changes in the structure of the choice set (i.e., concurrent availability of all the alternatives in the set, as compared with their sequential emergence into the set) will affect the decision strategy. Hence, decision makers facing either a static or dynamic matrix are expected to process information in different ways.

What is the effect of strategy selection on choice?

Strategy and Choice

It is well documented that the selection of a particular strategy affects the ultimate choice (see, e.g., Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). Thus, one can expect policy outcomes to differ when leaders employ a poliheuristic strategy as opposed to an expected utility procedure. Moreover, experimental evidence shows that choices made while processing information by alternative are often very different from choices made while employing dimension- (or attribute-) based processing (Ford et al. 1989). Similarly, choices based on a compensatory strategy are in many cases very different from those made under noncompensatory rules. Of course, the plausibility that choices are affected by decision structure and strategy has significant implications for war and peace decisions.

Leaders desire to make "correct" decisions. Choices such as decisions to use force, to terminate hostilities, and the like, may be influenced, however, by the alternatives admitted to, or excluded from, the choice set; the way these alternatives are presented (or framed) to the decision maker by advisors, representatives of the intelligence community, the military establishment, and other bureaucracies; the time pressure involved; group dynamics; and the decision strategy.

In the field of foreign policy decision making, Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987, 216–7) studied the relationship between process and outcome in international crises and found significant correlations between the quality of the decision-making process and the decision's outcome (see also Stein and Tanter 1980). These findings support the hypothesis that "poor-quality procedures used in arriving at a decision give rise to avoidable errors that increase the likelihood of obtaining an unsatisfactory outcome" (Herek, Janis, and Huth 1987, 220). Moreover, it was found that analytic decision-making strategies lead to better outcomes, whereas cognitive heuristics and other shortcuts may result in defective decision making, miscalculations, and less favorable outcomes. We build on their study by attending to factors that influence strategy selection, such as the structural and dynamic aspects of a choice set.

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[1] Elsewhere, Mintz and Geva (1997) introduced five processing characteristics of decision making to help categorize different decision rules. These address both the procedures by which information is acquired and organized in the decision process and the rules by which information is aggregated to form a choice. These characteristics are: (1) the extent to which the information acquisition stage is holistic; (2) whether the information is organized by dimensions or by alternatives; (3) whether the information reflects a compensatory or noncompensatory decision rule; (4) whether a maximizing or satisficing criterion is used; and (5) the order (sequence) by which information is accessed and reviewed by the decision maker. For reviews and analyses of processing characteristics of decision making, see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988 and Riggle and Johnson 1996.

Evolving Choice Sets and Changes in Decision Strategies

Monumental decisions in foreign policy, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the hostage rescue mission in Iran, or the Gulf War, have been analyzed and explored using many different perspectives and methodologies (see e.g., Allison 1969; Janis 1982; and Kugler, Snider, and Longwell 1991). In most studies, the choice set is assumed to be stable over the entire crisis (see James and Oneal 1991). Therefore, it is assumed that all policy alternatives are made available to the decision maker at the beginning of the crisis. While this may often be the case, one must question whether it is necessarily so. In any given foreign policy scenario, are *all* alternatives available to leaders *all* at the same time? If not, what is the effect of an evolving choice set on strategy selection?

The static versus dynamic nature of the choice set is a logically complex variable. As such, it can be studied in a variety of ways (see Simonson 1989). In our study, the dynamic structure is represented by changing the size of the choice set (i.e., by adding a new alternative during the foreign policy crisis).[2] Simonson (1989) and Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) argue that the addition of a new option will strengthen the choice probability of the alternative that is the "compromise" in the set. Other scholars (e.g., Olshavsky 1979; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988) have shown that the strategy a decision maker employs is very often contingent upon the difficulty of the task. Olshavsky (1979) states that increasing task complexity leads to decision strategies that attempt to alleviate cognitive strain. Still others (e.g., Russo and Dosher 1983, Stone and Schkade 1991) find that task complexity increases the likelihood of intradimensional, or dimension-based, processing.

Following this logic we suggest that, faced with a static choice set, the decision maker will be more likely to employ heuristic, dimension-based strategies. When a subset of alternatives is being evaluated and a *new* option appears, however, the emerging alternative is likely to be compared to the others using alternative-based, analytic methods, especially when the number of surviving options in the core matrix is small. A change in strategy in the middle of the process is less likely, however, when the decision maker operates with a static choice set. The introduction of a new alternative requires the decision maker to assimilate it into the decision process, in which case s/he is more likely to employ an alternative-based information search pattern for the added alternative. Alternatively, it is plausible that if a new alternative appears sometime after much of the decision search has been completed, then the decision maker will be tempted to ignore it due to the "sunken costs" involved.[3]

In order to test for the effects of the nonsimultaneous introduction of alternatives into the decision process on changes in the decision strategies employed by national security decision makers, we used the Foreign Policy Decision Board platform in a study of U.S. Air Force commanders. This computer program is designed to record the sequence of information acquisition and the choices made by the decision makers.

PROCESS TRACING

Theories from cognitive and social psychology are widely used in the study of foreign policy decision making. These theories are not easily tested using historical case studies alone. George (1979) advocated process tracing in the late 1970s, a method that had not yet been rigorously applied to the study of foreign policy decision making. Its main strength is its ability to identify specific strategies used by decision makers and to test theoretically derived implications of situational and personal variables on the decision process and its outcome.

Three groups of scholars in political science use process tracing techniques: (1) Taber and Steenbergen (1995) focus on tracing the cognitive algebra in political decision making; (2) Riggle and Johnson (1996) and Johnson and Riggle (1994) employ protocol tracing techniques to investigate age-related differences in strategies used to evaluate political candidates; and (3) Lau and Redlawsk (1992) use information boards to trace compensatory and noncompensatory strategies of decision making.

Ford et al. (1989) point out that process tracing directly identifies what information is accessed to form a judgment and the order in which it is accessed. This knowledge then can be used to make inferences about what decision strategies were employed in arriving at a choice. According to Ford et al. (1989, 77), the examination of the decision maker's pattern of information search can "identify alternative models or strategies used in making a decision."[4]

The common use of process tracing in the study of cognitive decision making typically concentrates on information acquisition patterns of decision makers and, to a lesser degree, on the "cognitive algebra" by which items of information are consolidated (aggregated and integrated) to form a choice. Advances in computational tracing methods (see Taber and Steenbergen 1995) in conjunction with decision boards may enhance our understanding of choice strategies.

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[2] Lau (1995) introduced the notion of a dynamic context in studies concerning the choice of political candidates by adding continuous streams of information about the candidates.

[3] The sunk cost effect is demonstrated by a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment of effort, time, or money has been made (Arkes and Blumer 1985).

[4] For a description of process tracing models of political decision making, see Herstein 1981; Lau 1995, 185–6; and Riggle and Johnson 1996, 102–13.

The Decision Board Platform

The core structure of the decision board platform is a matrix of decision alternatives and decision dimensions. The decision maker's task is to choose an alternative from a set of alternatives on the basis of information s/he can access from the computer. The subject sits in front of a computer terminal, and the board records key features of the decision-making process. These features are then used to identify the processing characteristics of decision makers. A major category of these features relates to the *sequence* in which the information is accessed by the decision maker.

As shown in Figure 1, a decision task typically consists of choosing one of Ai alternatives, which are evaluated along different D_j dimensions. The values (V_{ij}) inside the matrix represent the evaluation of a given alternative (A_i) on a given dimension (D_j). These "information bins" can be opened to reveal their contents by the click of the mouse. Choices are made by clicking on the choice box of a desired alternative. The computerized decision board records (1) the sequence in which decision makers acquire the information; (2) the number of items subjects view for every alternative along every dimension; and (3) the amount of time that elapses from the time subjects begin the task until the time they make their choice. Using process tracing measures, one can identify the processing characteristics of decision makers.

We used two foreign policy scenarios to introduce concrete alternatives and dimensions into the board. One was a military dispute between two small islands that erupted over control of a large uranium field (see also Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993). Eventually, one nation invaded the other and held hostage foreign citizens. The decision maker was presented with four alternatives: use of force (attack the invader); containment (naval blockade); international sanctions; and isolationism (do nothing). Because of an a priori bias toward the selection of a particular alternative out of a portfolio of alternatives found in preliminary studies (the "preference over preference" phenomenon), we also used a more "neutral" decision task. Consequently, the second scenario dealt with the choice of a site for a new U.S. naval base in the Pacific. The alternatives for this decision consisted of four "unknown" islands. The experimental task and both scenarios are described in Appendix A.

FIGURE 1. The Decision Board



Note: The dashed rectangle marks the part of the decision board that appeared late in the dynamic condition; it was present from the beginning in the static condition.

The dimensions employed in both contexts represent themes/environments found to be relevant in other studies of foreign policy decisions involving the use of force (see James and Oneal 1991, Morgan and Bickers 1992, Ostrom and Job 1986). Hence, the dimensions in the decision board were as follows: political, economic, military, and foreign affairs (diplomatic). Following the definition of the four alternatives and the four dimensions, values (V_{ij}) were inserted by the authors into the decision matrix. These consisted of an evaluative descriptive statement and a summarizing numeric value (on a scale from -10 to $+10$).

In a typical decision task, the value V_{ij} is a summary of the decision maker's consideration and deliberation of the utilities that alternative A_i has on dimension D_j. For instance, the decision maker can speculate, on the basis of her/his stored beliefs (Taber and Steenbergen 1995), how the use of force will affect the political dimension (see Appendix B). S/he may evaluate the use of force option in terms of public approval and decide that it is too costly. Converting such a "conclusion" to a scale, the decision maker assigns a low score, $V = -10$ or -8, to this alternative on the political dimension. The V_{ij} values also can stem from an external source. For example, a credible source, such as a chief economic advisor, may tell the chief executive that "do nothing" can be very beneficial to the nation's trade deficit, implying a high score ($V_{ij} = 9$) for this alternative on the economic dimension. The decision maker may attribute differential weights (importance levels) to advisors, and the extent of their influence on the final value of V_{ij} may represent various factors associated with the decision maker's expertise and susceptibility to influence (see Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983). Thus, the alternatives and their values (utilities) were introduced into the decision board as being provided by chief advisors to the decision maker: "the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," "the Secretary of State," the "Chief Political Advisor," and the "Chief Economic Advisor."

The values (V_{ij}) used in this experiment are presented in Appendix B. It should be emphasized that the same value matrix was used across all experimental conditions, although the descriptive statements differed as a function of the specific scenario.

One distinguishing factor between the two scenarios is the decision maker's familiarity with various alternatives. The extent of that familiarity, of course, may affect the decision maker's dependence on the information in the decision board.[5]

METHOD

Subjects

Forty-four U.S. Air Force commanders participated in the experiment (2 brigadier generals, 12 colonels, 13 lieutenant colonels, and other high-ranking officers). They are members of the command and instructional staff at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The participants were recruited by a former U.S. Air Force Academy cadet, with permission of the academy. The subjects were experienced in making national security and defense-related decisions. The study used the decision board platform as a "process tracer." The commanders were randomly assigned to the different experimental conditions.

Design

A 2 × 2 between-groups factorial design was employed. The two factors were structure of choice set (dynamic versus static) and familiarity with the choice set (i.e., familiar versus unfamiliar alternatives).

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables consisted of two process tracing parameters of decision making: *Information Acquisition Patterns* (i.e., whether subjects used alternative-based or dimension-based strategies) and the *Choices* subjects made. The shifts from one strategy to another were compared and measured using the Billings and Scherer (1988) search index.[6] It ranges from −1 (purely dimensional processing) to +1 (purely alternative-based processing). Obviously, a change of sign in this indicator represents a change in the decision strategy.

The scoring of the moves on the search index followed Billings and Scherer's (1988, 10) procedure:

> Each move to a new piece of information which was within the same alternative and across dimensions was classified as an interdimensional move (alternative-based), while a move within a dimension and across alternatives was labeled as intradimensional (dimension-based). Moves to both a different alternative and a different dimension were labeled shifts. The search pattern variable is defined as the number of alternative-based moves minus the number of dimensional moves divided by the sum of these two numbers.

As in Billings and Scherer (1988), shifts were disregarded from this index. The index tallies the number of dimensional moves (d), alternative moves (a), and shifts (s) (moves that are not alternative- or dimension-based) and uses the equation $SI = (a - d)/(a + d)$ to define the search index. Positive numbers imply more alternative-based moves, while negative numbers express dimensional moves. Alternative measures such as adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) offer a logically comparable index developed in the context of memory organization in free recall tasks (see Roenker, Thompson, and Brown 1971).[7]

To identify the change in strategy as a function of a change in the structure of the decision matrix, we compared the search pattern that officers exhibited for the first six items of information to the search pattern of the remaining items subjects reviewed during the crisis.[8] As was pointed out above, the fourth alternative (A_4) emerged in the *dynamic* choice set after subjects reviewed several "information bins." The subjects did not expect that a new alternative would emerge. Since in the *static* condition subjects faced the same matrix for the entire duration of the task, changes (if any) that occur between the first and second phases of data acquisition can serve as an appropriate base rate for the assessment of changes in the information acquisition patterns in the dynamic choice set.

The Research Instrument

A 4 × 4 (alternatives × dimensions) matrix was used. The decision board was developed as a SuperCard application for the Macintosh. The main advantages of the decision board are its ability to record the cognitive "moves" of decision makers, its user friendly interface, and its multimedia capacity. Figure 1 portrays the decision board main screen used in our experiment. The decision matrix was presented using 16 information bins. These contain the information pertaining to the evaluation of a given alternative along a specified dimension. It should be pointed out that the matrix covers main alternatives and dimensions identified in the literature as being regularly considered by policymakers during a foreign policy crisis. Whereas the size of this matrix (4 × 4) creates the impression that it demands only a limited memory space, it actually covers a considerable amount of relevant information. This information was presented as a statement followed by a summary evaluation (see Appendix B for complete documentation). For example, "Containment of the crisis might prevent the disruption of trade flows to and from the surrounding countries; although not solving the crisis quickly might destabilize the world economy. I would rate this alternative as a 3." The decision maker could open any information bin by clicking on it. A particular bin could be accessed only once. Whereas one can speculate that the inability to reaccess information may have affected the strategy selection, the introduction of a multiple-access procedure would have caused (in this particular case) severe ambiguities in the interpretation of the search data. After the decision was made, subjects clicked on the choice button beneath the corresponding alternative. Each commander dealt with only one of the four decision matrices: familiar-static, familiar-dynamic, unfamiliar-static, or unfamiliar-dynamic.

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[5] For familiar alternatives, we expect decision makers to allocate less attention to the information in the decision board. Moreover, a familiar scenario is assumed to make the decision task cognitively easier. If this is the case, then we can expect more alternative-based processing in the less cognitively demanding context than in the unfamiliar choice sets.

[6] This index is only one of several typically used in decision research. We concur with Riggle and Johnson (1996) that while many of these indices are conceptually and empirically correlated, each represents a specific operational definition and measurement.

[7] The first-order correlation between the Billings and Scherer (1988) SI and the ARC in several of our experiments ranged from .90 to .93.

[8] We chose six items as the cutoff point because several of our pretests showed that virtually all decision makers acquired at least six items in arriving at their choice.

Research Material

The common denominator of the variables that mediates the onset of decision strategies seems to center on the cognitive demands imposed by the decision task (Olshavsky 1979, Russo and Dosher 1983). The heavier the demand, the more likely is the decision maker to employ simplifying heuristics. In this experiment, the variations along the cognitive demands continuum were introduced by presenting the decision alternatives in a static versus dynamic fashion and by manipulating the familiarity of the alternatives in the choice set.

Manipulation of Structure. Subjects in the static structure were presented with the 4 × 4 decision matrix, as depicted in Figure 1. In the dynamic choice set, the dashed rectangle did not appear on the screen with the initial decision matrix. The decision maker faced a 3 × 4 matrix—three alternatives along four dimensions. When an officer completed reviewing the sixth information bin, a message appeared informing the decision maker that another alternative had emerged, along with a description of the fourth alternative. The screen then changed to the entire 4 × 4 matrix (see Figure 1).

Manipulation of Familiarity. As was pointed out above, the unfamiliar choice set consisted of potential sites for a new naval base in the Pacific: four hypothetical islands (alternatives) unknown to the officers in this experiment. The familiar choice set consisted of using force, containment, sanctions, and isolationism ("doing nothing") in an international dispute between two islands, one of which invaded its neighbor to gain control of large uranium fields. Memory-based choice strategies suggest that subjects may have a priori preferences strong enough to resist the objective ranking of choice options.

To increase the "mundane reality" of the experiment (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968), and since many foreign policy and national security decisions are made under time and information constraints, all the subjects were exposed to time pressure manipulation. They were told there was a time constraint, and, to prevent a leisurely review of the information, a timer on the decision board screen beeped every 15 seconds. Obviously, if no time constraints are introduced into an experiment, subjects are likely to review all the information regardless of its content. The instructions and the computer did not convey other, more specific, time constraints.

Procedure

The study was administered in the computer laboratory of the U.S. Air Force Academy. Each officer operated individually on the decision board platform. Instructions and scenarios were displayed on the computer screen. Subjects were told they would be exposed to a specific international scenario and be presented with a decision matrix containing action alternatives and their consequences on different dimensions. The officers were asked to select the best choice among the available options. The instructions also mentioned that the "quality of decision you make in the context of the simulation will suggest your ability to comprehend national level decision making." Previous studies (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1980) indicate that portraying a decision task in these terms increases the motivation of the subjects to perform the task seriously, without contaminating or confounding the salience of a particular decisional dimension.

Prior to performing the foreign policy decision, a simple practice session was administered to familiarize the officers with the decision board platform. Once the decision was made, a postdecision questionnaire was administered, followed by a detailed debriefing.[9]

RESULTS

Data analysis concentrated on two questions: Do decision makers shift from an alternative-based to a dimension-based search during the decision task? Which outcome do they select? Two aspects of decision making were evaluated. First, we tested whether the employment of an alternative-based or dimension-based strategy was affected by dynamic versus static presentation of information while also controlling for the familiarity of the decision makers with the alternatives in the choice set. Second, we tested for the effects of the decision structure on the choices subjects made.[10]

Strategy Selection

The poliheuristic theory suggests that decision makers can employ more than one strategy in arriving at a choice. In our search for such changes in decision strategy, we focus mainly on dimension-based versus alternative-based strategies.[11]

To test for the dynamic structure effect, we calculated the proportion of officers who changed their strategy between the two phases of information acquisition in the four experimental conditions. Figure 2 displays these proportions.

Our findings suggest that, across both scenarios, 55%

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[9] The questionnaire asked for background information on the respondents and included free recall probes pertaining to the information that was viewed.

[10] Because our subjects often make decisions similar to those in the experiment, the generalizability of our results is more certain than if students had been used.

[11] Other processing characteristics are known to be highly correlated with these patterns of information acquisition (see Ford et al. 1989).

FIGURE 2. Proportion of Subjects Who Changed Processing Strategy as a Function of Both Dynamic versus Static and Familiar versus Unfamiliar Choice Sets



of the national security decision makers in the dynamic choice set changed their strategy during the information search, while only 32% of them changed their decision strategy when they faced a static matrix. This difference is close to conventional significance by the z test for proportions (Langer and Abelson 1972) ($z = 1.63$, $p < .06$). Furthermore, change of strategy was more evident in decisions involving an unfamiliar choice set than a familiar choice set ($z = 1.66$, $p < .05$).

These results indicate that decision makers change their information-processing strategy as the result of introducing a new alternative. It is also of interest to explore which strategies are used at different *phases* of the decision process. To answer this question, a 2 × 2 × 2 split-plot ANOVA was conducted on the search index scores of the two phases. The findings, illustrated in Figure 3, show that decision makers tend to begin the information search with a dimension-based strategy and as the task proceeds, shift toward an alternative-based strategy. The difference between the search index at phase I [Mean (M) = $-.03$] and at phase II [Mean (M) = .29] is significant: $F(1, 40) = 17.70, p < .0001$.

As predicted, a strong main effect was revealed for the familiarity factor, $F(1, 40) = 8.74, p < .005$. That is, the unfamiliar choice set (which is cognitively more demanding) led to more of a dimension-based pattern ($M = -.18$) than did the familiar choice set ($M = .45$). Moreover, the shift toward a more pronounced alternative-based strategy was likelier in the unfamiliar choice set (SI/I = $-.45$; SI/II = .08) than in the familiar choice set (SI/I = .39; SI/II = .50). This statistical interaction was also significant: $F(1, 40) = 7.49, p < .01$.

These results support two major propositions of the poliheuristic theory of decision making. First, the theory posits a two-stage process by which decision makers first use cognitive heuristics to screen alternatives in a dimension-based process; then, as the number of "acceptable" alternatives is reduced, they employ a more analytic/alternative-based process. The second proposition addresses the cognitive underpinning of the previous proposition. Specifically, complex decision tasks, that is, those which impose cognitive strain on the decision maker, trigger simplifying strategies, such as a dimension-based search. The unfamiliar choice set imposes such a strain. Since the officers operating in the unfamiliar choice set could not use previous knowledge to facilitate the decision process, they had to pay more attention to information provided by the decision board. Moreover, the unfamiliarity with alternatives increased the difficulty of differentiating among them. These difficulties explain why decision makers facing unfamiliar alternatives frequently use dimension-based processing, as predicted by the poliheuristic theory: They adapt to complexity by using simplifying, dimension-based heuristics.

Decision Structure, Strategy, and Choice

In addition to strategy selection, we also focused on whether changes in the choice set affect the choices

FIGURE 3. Search Index Scores of Subjects for the Two Phases of Information Acquisition as a Function of Both Dynamic versus Static and Familiar versus Unfamiliar Choice Sets



TABLE 1. Percentage of Subjects Choosing a Particular Alternative as a Function of Both Dynamic Versus Static and Famililar Versus Unfamiliar Choice Sets

	Alternatives				
	A_1	A_2	A_3	A_4	
Unfamiliar Choice Set					
Dynamic	9.09	27.27	9.09	54.55	100%
Static	0.00	9.09	36.36	54.55	100%
Familiar Choice Set					
Dynamic	27.27	0.00	54.55	18.18	100%
Static	27.27	9.09	27.27	36.36	100%
Across all Conditions	16.00	11.00	32.00	41.00	100%
					(N = 44)

eventually made. It should be recalled that all the officers faced a decision matrix consisting of the same value structure. Moreover, the value structure of the matrix defined A_4 as the alternative with the highest cumulative score (highest utility). Hence, one could expect that this alternative would be chosen across all conditions.

Table 1 shows the frequency with which each alternative was selected as a function of the choice set's structure and familiarity. The interesting finding that emerges is that the choice was largely unaffected by the dynamic or static nature of the choice set. The likelihood of choosing the optimal alternative (A_4) was unaffected by whether it was displayed during the entire decision process or appeared after the decision maker had already entertained information about three other options. In fact, 41% of the officers (18 of 44) across all experimental conditions selected the optimal alternative irrespective of the dynamic or static nature of the choice set.

In contrast, familiarity with the alternatives in the choice set significantly affected the selection, $\chi^2_{(3)} = 8.52, p < .05$. Overall, the most popular alternative in the familiar choice set was sanctions (A_3), not the optimal A_4. In the unfamiliar choice set, A_4 was the most popular. These findings seem to reflect the well-known "preference over preference" phenomenon, that is, a priori evaluations of alternatives dilute the influence of new information (see Gilliland, Wood, and Schmitt 1994). These findings are also compatible with those of Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994), who observed that unfamiliar information requires more processing capacity (see also Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, and Kleinmuntz 1979; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).

CONCLUSION

National security choices made during foreign policy crises often depend upon the decision strategy employed by a given decision maker. Whereas one can seldom infer from the outcome the nature of the decision process (see Keinan 1987), it is well documented that the decision process itself affects the outcome. In this paper we examined the effect of dynamic versus static choice sets on changes in decision strategy (and ultimately the choice) during foreign policy crises. We found that the appearance of a new alternative in the midst of the crisis increased the likelihood of a change in decision strategy. These shifts in strategy were mainly from a dimension-based search to an alternative-based search. Thus, the findings lend support to the poliheuristic proposition of a two-stage decision-making process in which decision makers facing a complex decision start by using heuristic strategies and then often shift to more analytic methods.[12]

The results reported here show that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies in arriving at a decision, and the appearance of a new option during the decision process causes the decision maker to select one kind of strategy rather than another. These results both support and add to previous findings about foreign policy behavior. They augment the literature by addressing the actual decision process rather than just the outcome. As such, they open up the "black box" of foreign policy decision making. For example, they suggest that alternative-based expected utility strategies may indeed operate in decision making, but mainly in the second stage of the decision process (or when the number of alternatives in the original choice set is small). They also add credence to case studies conducted by Alexander George (1980) and by Ole Holsti (1969, 1972) and Holsti and George (1975) on the effects of cognitive demands on information processing in the foreign policy arena. Given the rising importance of the debate over choice processes in political science more generally, the findings have relevance to a wide variety of other areas as well. More research is needed, however, on a number of issues related to the nature and number of the "emerging" decision alternative(s). In particular, future work should focus on the effects of "disappearing" alternatives on the selection of decision strategies, since options considered feasible at the onset of a foreign policy crisis often become obsolete as the crisis progresses. Furthermore, research is needed on compromise effects (Simonson 1989), that is, whether an alternative is chosen more frequently if it represents a compromise solution, or a middle option, in a choice set. Future work testing such refinements of our original thesis should be undertaken to cross-validate our findings.

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[12] It should be noted that our research deals with the cognitive underpinnings of choice among at least two alternatives. Other attempts to examine cognitive operations in political settings (see McGraw and Steenbergen 1995) use the impression formation paradigm. In the latter case, the focus is on judgments about one alternative on the basis of information on one or multiple dimensions.

APPENDIX A: THE SCENARIOS

"The Gorendy-Raggol Crisis"

During the past few days the media has focused almost exclusively on the military crisis in the Gorendy-Raggol region. This Pacific region is extremely important since one of the world's largest concentrations of uranium is near the shores of the Gorendy and Raggol islands.

Gorendy's army has invaded Raggol. Information transmitted to you indicates that a number of Americans working for the Raggol National Uranium Development Company were taken prisoner.

As the president of the United States, you must decide what to do. Since you are up for reelection soon, you must be very careful as to how you approach the situation. This decision will have a crucial effect on your reelection. Moreover, our evaluation of your decision will be influenced by whether it increases your chances in the election.

The situation has political, economic, foreign affairs, and military implications. You have assembled advisors representing each of the pertinent policy areas. Your key political advisor is your chief of staff, who is primarily concerned with how this decision may affect your reelection. The economic advisor is your budget director and is concerned about the consequences of each alternative on defense spending, the trade balance, and economic growth. The Secretary of State is your chief foreign affairs advisor and must weigh the consequences of each alternative, particularly as to how the outcome may affect both U.S. foreign policy and U.S. standing in the international community. Your military advisor is the Secretary of Defense, whose primary concern is the feasibility and security of any military action.

Your advisors arrive at several alternatives:

Containment: U.S. military units will be used to blockade the region and prevent any international trade and exchange of goods with Gorendy.

Isolationism: Publicly condemn the invasion, but maintain that the conflict is a regional matter and that the United States is staying out of the conflict.

International Sanctions: In conjunction with the United Nations and other international organizations, declare that no country will trade with Gorendy. In addition, freeze Gorendy's accounts in other nations' banks until the conflict ends.

Use of Force: U.S. military units will resolve the conflict by expelling Gorendy troops from Raggol. [This alternative was presented as part of the original scenario only in the static condition. In the dynamic condition, it appeared *during* the decision process.]

The decision board will indicate how each advisor evaluated these options. Their evaluations are summarized as a rating on a 21-point scale (−10 implies that an advisor perceives the option unfavorably, 0 implies a neutral position, and 10 implies a very favorable evaluation).

As in the practice session, the decision board is presented in the form of a matrix with alternatives heading the columns and dimensions as the rows.

A decision has to be made. Please begin the computer simulation to explore the evaluations given by the advisors and then determine your choice.

As with all "real-life" decisions, there is a tradeoff between the amount of information you consider and the time it takes you to make a decision based on that information. The beeps that you hear from the computer represent the passage of time.

Taking too much time to review the evaluations may be costly. Remember that you can only access a particular "box" of information once.

Press CONTINUE to start the decision process.

"The Pacific Naval Base Decision"

During the past few months the media has concentrated almost exclusively on the decision about where to build a new U.S. naval base in the Pacific. Ever since the closing of Subic Bay in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy has focused its efforts on finding a new location from which it can maintain the security of the Pacific Basin. This new base would benefit both the United States and the majority of the Pacific Basin countries. The only problem is deciding exactly where to build it. The choice has been narrowed to several islands in the Pacific Ocean.

As the president of the United States, you must decide what to do. Since you are up for reelection soon, you must be very careful as to how you approach the situation. This decision will have a crucial effect on your reelection. Moreover, our evaluation of your decision will be influenced by whether it increases your chances in the election.

The situation has political, economic, foreign affairs, and military implications. You have assembled advisors representing each of the pertinent policy areas. Your key political advisor is your chief of staff, who is primarily concerned with how this decision may affect your reelection. The economic advisor is your budget director and is concerned about the consequences of each alternative on defense spending, the trade balance, and economic growth. The Secretary of State is your chief foreign affairs advisor and must weigh the consequences of each alternative, particularly as to how the outcome may affect both U.S. foreign policy and U.S. standing in the international community. Your military advisor is the Secretary of Defense, whose primary concern is the feasibility and security of any military action.

Your advisors arrive at several alternatives:

Alpha Island: It is located approximately 550 miles west of the Island of Minalo, which is at the southern end of Vermaid.

Beta Island: This is the largest of the islands and is positioned along the Equator. It is located 1,250 miles north northwest of the Island of Kersoune.

Charlie Island: The northernmost of the islands, it is located 2,500 miles southeast of Zorka.

Delta Island: Also located on the Equator, it is approximately 1,500 miles west northwest from Puportes. [This alternative was presented as part of the original scenario only in the static condition. In the dynamic condition, it appeared *during* the decision process.]

The decision board will indicate how each advisor evaluated these options. Their evaluations are summarized as a rating on a 21-point scale (−10 implies that an advisor perceives the option unfavorably, 0 implies a neutral position, and 10 implies a very favorable evaluation).

As in the practice session, the decision board is presented in the form of a matrix with alternatives heading the columns and dimensions as the rows.

A decision has to be made. Please begin the computer simulation to explore the evaluations given by the advisors and then determine your choice.

As with all "real-life" decisions, there is a tradeoff between the amount of information you consider and the time it takes you to make a decision based on that information. The beeps you hear from the computer represent the passage of time.

Taking too much time to review the evaluations may be costly. Remember that you can only access a particular "box" of information once.

Press CONTINUE to start the decision process.

APPENDIX B: THE DECISION MATRICES

The Gorendy-Raggol Crisis Decision Matrix (Familiar Choice Set)

Dimensions	Alternatives			
	Containment	Isolationism	Sanctions	Use of Force
Political	"If we send in troops to the region we can appear strong and garner public approval without actually risking high casualties; although you may be hurt at the polls in the upcoming election if we have not yet resolved the crisis." I would rate this alternative as 3	"This is safe. If the crisis is kept quiet the public will assume that we have done well. The public often prefers to stay out of other countries' affairs." I would rate this alternative as 9	"Sanctions are politically safe because the public usually prefers to be patient in situations like this. However, there is the slight possibility that if the crisis is prolonged because of the wait for sanctions to take effect, your chances for reelection may be hurt." I would rate this alternative as 4	"A use of force in this case is unwise. The public knows that the U.S. does not have a vital national interest in this region and, if casualties are as high as expected, then you will take the blame come reelection time." I would rate this alternative as −9
Military	"This option shows the international community that we are unable to protect our interests. It also prolongs the problem and subjects our military forces to greater risk, which will ultimately lead to a greater number of U.S. casualties." I would rate this alternative as −9	"This would show that the U.S. only resorts to force as a defensive reaction. This would also mean no casualties; however, there is the possibility that isolationism will damage the future credibility of U.S. military forces." I would rate this alternative as 2	"Sanctions give the military time to prepare for any possible confrontation with the invading forces. This reduces the chance of U.S. casualties." I would rate this alternative as 7	"The use of force shows that we are strong enough to protect our vital national interests and shows other neighboring countries that they cannot take advantage of us." I would rate this alternative as 7
Economic	"Containment of the crisis might prevent the disruption of trade flows to and from the surrounding countries; although not solving the crisis quickly might destabilize the world economy." I would rate this alternative as 3	"Ignoring the problem may be safe politically, but economically it could mean disaster. Allowing the possible nationalization of U.S. firms would destabilize the stock market." I would rate this alternative as −8	"Economic sanctions create a dependency whereupon allies such as Germany and Japan must compensate us financially. Also, it could mean more trade for the U.S." I would rate this alternative as 6	"A use of force will create an economic boost as well as prevent the invading forces from nationalizing our enormous investment of resources in this country." I would rate this alternative as 8
Foreign Affairs	"Containment will show the world that the U.S. does not always have to resort to the use of force. It also shows that the U.S. is willing and patient enough to gather support for its initiatives from neighboring countries." I would rate this alternative as 10	"By asserting that the conflict is a regional matter and not becoming involved, the U.S. can preclude international criticism as a bully and the crisis can be 'defused.' However, we may also be perceived as a paper tiger, unable to assert ourselves in the world arena." I would rate this alternative as 4	"Economic sanctions would not be effective in this case because the international and regional communities would realize that sanctions only prolong the crisis. The U.S. cannot afford this loss of prestige." I would rate this alternative as −10	"This demonstrates to surrounding countries that the U.S. will not allow an aggressor nation to attack a weaker neighbor. However, we may be perceived of as 'bullies' or as the world's policeman." I would rate this alternative as 4

Pacific Naval Base Decision Matrix (Unfamiliar Choice Set)

	Alternatives			
Dimensions	ALPHA	BETA	CHARLIE	DELTA
Political	"Since most of the public knows nothing about this place, it will not harm you to put the base here; although it won't bring you any special recognition either." I would rate this alternative as 3	"Previous administrations attempted to build a naval base here and were denied. Your success in establishing a base here would translate into positive ratings in the polls." I would rate this alternative as 9	"A new base here would increase your standing in the polls and your overall popularity. However, since the public knows little about this island your political gains won't be extraordinary." I would rate this alternative as 4	"There is no logic in placing the naval base here. Voters may punish you for any collaboration with a nation that has such a poor record concerning human rights issues." I would rate this alternative as −9
Military	"The only site available is not conducive to military operations because of its vulnerability to attack from local guerrillas." I would rate this alternative as −9	"This site will help shore up naval defenses in the area, especially with regard to recent efforts at collaboration and training with the local military." I would rate this alternative as 2	"Offers an opportunity to control most of the strategic waterways and oceans east of the Asian continent." I would rate this alternative as 7	"This location is a good strategic choice because of the advantage the U.S. Navy will have in controling the South China Sea and the entire Indian Odean." I would rate this alternative as 7
Economic	"We will be the first foreign influence in the area and should, therefore, benefit from the new relationship by having a new market for our exports; though it should be noted that the initial costs of building a base here may be quite high." I would rate this alternative as 3	"Prohibitively expensive. Building a naval base here would in effect 'break' the budget, especially in light of recent budget cuts." I would rate this alternative as −8	"We can strengthen our economic relations with this nation by building the base here. Discoveries of enormous amounts of polanium (a raw material for futuristic energy-based industries) near the island's shores makes the island economically important." I would rate this alternative as 6	"An already existing infrastructure helps defray the costs of building a new base here. With the shrinking military budget, this is the best economic choice, which will provide the best return on our investment of time, money, and resources." I would rate this alternative as 8
Foreign Affairs	"This demonstrates to neighboring countries and areas that the U.S. is willing to help minimize foreign threats, as well as protect a weaker nation from a potential aggressive adversary. This helps increase both regional and world stability." I would rate this alternative as 10	"Choosing this site will demonstrate that the U.S. sticks to its international commitments and that we can be trusted about our intentions to be involved in maintaining the region's security; although there is the minimal risk of offending one or two other states in the region." I would rate this alternative as 4	"This choice would lead to a breakdown in relations with many of the surrounding islands and would severely hurt U.S. influence and power in the region." I would rate this alternative as −10	"Constructing a naval base here adds to the stability of the region and demonstrates to the world that we are resolved to be where it counts internationally. However, there is a very slight chance that neighboring countries will view our actions as 'meddlesome.'" I would rate this alternative as 4

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Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance

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Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy. Two experiments examined the effect of news frames on tolerance for the Ku Klux Klan. The first presented research participants with one of two local news stories about a Klan rally that varied by frame: One framed the rally as a free speech issue, and the other framed it as a disruption of public order. Participants who viewed the free speech story expressed more tolerance for the Klan than participants who watched the public order story. Additional data indicate that frames affect tolerance by altering the perceived importance of public order values. The relative accessibility of free speech and public order concepts did not respond to framing. A second experiment used a simulated electronic news service to present different frames and replicated these findings.

About 50 million Americans watch the CBS, NBC, or ABC network news on an average evening, and an even greater share of the public watches at least a portion of their favorite local news broadcast (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993). Among those citizens who rely on only one news outlet, television is preferred over newspapers and other sources by wide margins (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993), and television news also enjoys the most trust of any news source at the national and local level (Kaniss 1991). An institution with such broad reach and appeal would seem to carry great potential power to shape the political views and outlooks of ordinary citizens, yet media scholars have differed sharply about the effect of the news in general and of television news in particular, often dismissing media impact as "minimal" at best (McGuire 1985, Patterson and McClure 1976). While numerous individual and institutional reasons could account for weak media effects (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993; Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt 1995), some failures to find media effects can be blamed on weak research designs or measurement error (Bartels 1993, Graber 1993). Further advancement of the conceptual and analytical tools needed to describe and measure the often subtle effects of the news is required.

One way the media may shape political opinion is by framing issues in distinct ways (Gamson 1992, Iyengar 1991, Nelson and Kinder 1996). Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy. In the present research, we examine how local television news outlets framed a specific, dramatic event: a demonstration and rally by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in a small Ohio city. We explore the effect of alternative news frames for this event on tolerance for KKK activities. We also test contrasting hypotheses about how viewers psychologically process news frames, and how such frames ultimately affect viewers' thoughts about political controversies.

THE EFFECT OF NEWS FRAMES

People's reasoning about divisive political issues may be shaped by the mass media's depiction of the issues. Because both journalistic norms and market forces dampen strong ideological biases within most news organizations, especially television news (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993; Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt 1995; Bennett 1996), media influence is bound to be more subtle than outright "propaganda" effects (Bartels 1993).[1] Examples of subtle media influence include the well-known agenda-setting and priming effects (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, Krosnick and Kinder 1990, McCombs and Shaw 1972), both of which demonstrate how mere media attention to an issue or problem can affect public opinion. Framing is another possible mass media influence, but one that centers on the effects of media content rather than the mere coverage of a problem (Gamson 1992; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989; Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson N.d.).

By framing social and political issues in specific ways, news organizations declare the underlying causes and

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[1] Many critics have argued that the restriction of media coverage within a narrow liberal-conservative latitude is itself a kind of status-quo bias (e.g., Bennett 1996, Parenti 1986). Still others have faulted the media for an excessively critical and cynical outlook concerning government institutions and political figures of both parties or for emphasizing the lurid and sensational over the weighty and substantive (e.g., Patterson 1993). Our claims about the forces restricting overt partisanship among the mainstream press should not be construed as a refutation of these other theories of media bias.

likely consequences of a problem and establish criteria for evaluating potential remedies for the problem. Iyengar (1991) argues that media stories typically exemplify either an episodic frame (focused on individual cases) or thematic frame (focused on broader social trends), with important consequences for how viewers make attributions about the causes of, and solutions to, such social problems as poverty and crime. A broader treatment can be found in the discussion by Gamson and colleagues of media frames as symbolic issue constructions (Gamson 1992; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989). In this approach, frames act like plots or story lines, lending coherence to otherwise discrete pieces of information (see also Best 1995, Entman 1993, Pan and Kosicki 1993, Schneider and Ingram 1993). By this account, frames function much like alternative formulations of a decision-making task (Carroll and Johnson 1990). Frames organize the presentation of facts and opinion within a newspaper article or television news story. Poverty, for example, may be framed in a way that emphasizes the responsibility of the poor themselves for their disadvantaged status or in a way that suggests social, economic, or political forces are to blame (Iyengar 1991). Similarly, a social policy such as welfare may be framed as a key element of the "cycle of poverty" that reinforces degenerate morals and behavior patterns or as a "helping hand" or "ladder out of poverty" for those willing to better their condition (Gamson and Lasch 1983).

Frames may originate within or outside the news organization. Journalists' common reliance on elite sources for quotes, insight, analysis, and information means that the media often serve as conduits for individuals eager to promote a certain perspective to a broader public audience. A well-placed quote or soundbite will convey a construction of an issue that could ultimately benefit a particular interest. Other symbolic devices that carry frames include visual images, metaphors, caricatures, and catchphrases (Gamson and Lasch 1983). While elites are the source of many frames and framing devices, news organizations themselves will readily construct them on their own in order to summarize concisely the kernel of a story. Such rhetorical apparatus has special appeal to television news journalists, editors, and producers, who are on constant lookout for colorful and punchy verbal and visual material with which to enliven a story (Bennett 1996, Kaniss 1991).

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO NEWS FRAMES

Frames, and the verbal and visual material that helps convey them, can have significant consequences for how viewers perceive and understand an issue, and they can direct the formation of individual opinions about the controversy (Iyengar 1991, Nelson and Kinder 1996). Frames shape individual understanding and opinion concerning an issue by stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy, reducing a usually complex issue down to one or two central aspects (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson N.d.). Attaching the label "free speech controversy" to a KKK rally, for example, stresses the fundamental civil liberties at stake, while visual images of police in riot gear emphasize the violence and disruption that could emerge during the rally. These differences in emphasis can translate into differing tolerance levels among observers of these frames.

Three separate models help explain how viewers process mass media information and how that information ultimately affects political opinion. The learning model holds that mass media messages such as television news stories influence viewer opinion by providing new information about an issue (Graber 1994). If a viewer were unaware, for example, that KKK rallies have the potential for violence, then coverage of a rally that included video footage of violent clashes among demonstrators, counterdemonstrators, and police might turn that individual's opinion toward greater restrictions on such events.

Beyond simply providing the raw data for constructing an opinion, mere coverage of an issue brings associated beliefs and feelings to the forefront of conscious thought. Such is the basis for a second, broadly accepted model of communication effects, the priming or cognitive accessibility model (Iyengar 1991, Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, Kinder and Sanders 1996, Zaller 1992). The emphasis on accessibility derives from a depiction of the individual as a cognitive miser or limited-capacity information processor (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Our inability to process simultaneously a large number of ideas ensures that political judgments and evaluations are based on only a subset of all potentially relevant thoughts, feelings, or other considerations (Zaller 1992). Considerations that are accessible, that is, easily retrieved from long-term memory or perhaps already present in conscious thought, will enter into such judgments with greater likelihood than inaccessible thoughts. Presumably, issues featured recently and/or repeatedly in the news will be relatively accessible to viewers and thus have greater potential to influence judgments and opinions.

However appealing accessibility explanations may be for some mass media effects, we believe they are not the primary mechanism that accounts for framing effects. Nelson and Kinder (1991) used a question-wording manipulation to simulate different frames for affirmative action and found effects of the frames on participants' opinions without corresponding changes in the accessibility of frame-related constructs, as measured in a reaction-time task (Fazio 1990). Accessibility models stress that information must be accessible to be influential, but they neglect the important qualification that equally accessible information will not have an equal effect on judgments or opinions (Anderson 1991). Expectancy-value models, and other algebraic formulations of attitudes (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), stress that different pieces of information (facts, beliefs, values, etc.) carry different weights, reflecting their relative effect on the summary attitude. These weights correspond to the perceived importance, relevance, reliability, or perceptual salience of the information (Anderson and Zalinski 1991, Taylor and Fiske 1978, van der Pligt and Eiser 1984). We suggest that media frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts, or other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame. In other words, frames affect opinions simply by making certain considerations seem more important than others; these considerations, in turn, carry greater weight for the final attitude.

In the case of the Ku Klux Klan public rallies, we anticipated that local television news outlets would vary in the frames they used to portray the controversy and that differences in framing would influence viewer tolerance for KKK activities. We expected news frames emphasizing the civil liberties at stake, namely, the KKK's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, would encourage more tolerant attitudes among viewers. By contrast, stories framing the issue with reference to the potential dangers that such rallies pose, especially the threat of violent confrontations among Klan supporters, counterdemonstrators, and police, would inspire less tolerant attitudes. We believe that any such effects would arise primarily because the emphasis placed on these alternative facets of the issue elevates the perceived relevance or importance of these considerations compared to others. So, for example, a frame emphasizing the constitutional guarantee of free speech (versus some other kind of frame) should make the value of free speech seem relatively more important and especially relevant to tolerance judgments. While framing may indeed affect the accessibility of corresponding considerations, we do not expect cognitive accessibility to be the primary carrier of framing effects.

TOLERANCE OF HATE GROUPS

Tolerance controversies are a potentially fruitful area for studying news frame effects. Small towns and large cities throughout America have witnessed numerous public speeches, rallies, and other symbolic acts by the Ku Klux Klan in recent years, many of which have attracted considerable media attention. These acts have included attempts by the KKK to erect crosses on public property, such as the capitol grounds in Columbus, Ohio, and efforts to participate in "Adopt a Highway" cleanup programs, complete with a sign in the group's honor on a designated stretch of road. Among the most notorious of the Klan's activities have been numerous public speeches and rallies, which the increasingly media-savvy KKK has parlayed into tremendous amounts of free publicity, courtesy of local newspapers and television news broadcasts. The spectacle of these events, with the outrageous rhetoric and outward appearance of Klan members juxtaposed against the fury of angry counterdemonstrators, makes them irresistible targets for local television news outlets.

The public debate over the KKK's activities and what, if anything, individuals and governments should do about them revisits age-old vexations about extending civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly to hate groups and other politically unpopular minorities (Gibson and Bingham 1985, Gross and Kinder 1996, Marcus et al. 1995). While some people undoubtedly share the KKK's extreme political views, most who defend their right to rally and to make public speeches argue that these activities should be tolerated because freedom of speech and assembly must extend to all, no matter how repugnant their views. Defenders of the KKK's rights claim that the idea of civil liberties is meaningless unless we are willing to grant these liberties to those with whom we disagree.[2] This view corresponds exactly with Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus's (1982) definition of tolerance: the willingness to extend liberties and protections to disliked or even hated groups.

Those who seek to curtail some of the KKK's activities do not generally discount the value of civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly. They argue that civil liberties may be restricted when other important values are put at risk. The KKK's history of violence and intimidation, along with its special offensiveness to certain groups, represents a significant threat to equality and civil rights, according to this view (Gibson and Bingham 1985, Hanson 1993). Furthermore, the potential for violent confrontations between the KKK and counterdemonstrators (a few of which have indeed occurred) represents a significant threat to public order and civic harmony and thus is a compelling reason for limiting the Klan's public appearances and speeches.

The debate over tolerance for hate groups thus lays bare a conflict between competing fundamental values in American political culture (Tetlock 1986). On the one hand are the almost sacred rights to free speech and assembly embodied in the Bill of Rights and endorsed, at least in the abstract, by overwhelming proportions of Americans (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). On the other hand are the values of protection for vulnerable minority groups and the preservation of public order and safety, all of which face significant threat from the KKK and its often unruly rallies. When important values are brought into conflict by a public controversy, the opinions that develop about the issue are often ambivalent and unstable (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Chong 1993; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995). Chong's (1993) qualitative examination of how certain individuals reason about civil liberties shows that many people can be "talked out" of their positions on such issues as wiretapping, search and seizure, and censorship. The seeming readiness with which people switch positions on these issues suggests that they are aware of the competing values exposed by such controversies but are unable to assert firmly the dominance of one value or consideration over another. Similarly, Kuklinski et al. (1991) found significantly different tolerance levels when participants were asked to focus on their thoughts versus their feelings about granting civil liberties to certain groups. Clearly, not only the collective public is divided over tolerance and civil liberties issues, but also individuals feel drawn in opposite directions by competing feelings, beliefs, and values. When opinions are ambivalent, the framing of an issue by the mass media or other communication agent may have an uncommon influence on opinion by shaping the values and other considerations individuals draw on when formulating their own views on the subject.

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[2] In an editorial supporting the KKK's right to place a cross on the grounds of the Ohio capitol, the Columbus *Dispatch* wrote (January 24, 1995): "The heartbeat of this enduring democracy is found in the First Amendment. The courts must—with unflagging zeal—guard freedom of speech against even well-intentioned encroachment."

Tolerance is usually considered a function of individual and group characteristics. People vary in their tolerance for certain groups, and their degree of tolerance may be related to specific individual variables, such as educational achievement (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Furthermore, the activities of different groups will be tolerated to differing degrees by the broader public, depending on both attributes of the group and the nature of the times (Kuklinski et al. 1991, Stouffer 1955). Mass media coverage represents a potential contextual determinant of tolerance. We contend that tolerance reflects not only stable characteristics of individuals and groups but also more volatile environmental factors, such as the way the mass media frames the central features of the tolerance controversy.

STUDY 1

Overview

We chose the laboratory experiment as the best approach to testing our main hypotheses about the effect of media frames on tolerance and the critical role of value weighting in mediating frame effects. Through random assignment of participants to conditions, systematic manipulation of the independent variable, and control over extraneous sources of variance, laboratory experiments provide superior information about the causal relationship between independent and dependent variables (Kinder and Palfrey 1993). In Study 1, participants were assigned, on a random basis, to watch different television news stories about KKK activities; they then expressed their tolerance for the KKK. In such a laboratory setting, any differences in tolerance will almost certainly be due to the experimental manipulation (the different news stories). In addition, the laboratory setting permits measurement of the psychological processing of media messages, which would be very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in other research settings.

Design and Procedure

The participants were 222 undergraduate students (107 women, 115 men) enrolled in introductory political science courses. They received extra course credit for their contribution. Participant groups ranged in size from one to five persons. The experiment followed a completely randomized, between-subjects design, with two manipulations: (1) the news story frame (free speech versus public order) and (2) the cognitive processing task (reaction time task versus importance rating task).

TABLE 1. Demographic and Political Characteristics of Participants

	Study 1	Study 2	TOPS Sample[a]
Sex			
Female	48.2%	41.0%	57.1%
Male	51.8	59.0	42.9
Race/ethnicity			
White	83.8	82.1	89.6
Black	5.0	12.8	8.0
Asian	6.3	2.6	.5
Hispanic	1.8	0.0	1.4
Other	3.2	2.6	1.5
Political ideology[b]			
1 = very liberal	4.5	5.1	
2	7.2	25.6	11.7
3	16.7	17.9	18.2
4 = moderate	26.6	17.9	8.9
5	18.0	15.4	32.0
6	19.8	17.9	29.1
7 = very conservative	7.2	0.0	
Party identification			
1 = strong Democrat	5.0	7.7	11.1
2	10.4	28.2	16.9
3	13.1	15.4	11.9
4 = Independent	22.5	15.4	12.8
5	18.0	7.7	12.4
6	21.2	20.5	20.4
7 = strong Republican	9.9	5.1	14.1
Class in college			
First year	14.0	35.9	
Sophomore	14.0	28.2	
Junior	19.8	23.1	
Senior	49.5	12.8	
Graduate	2.3	0.0	

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents who fall into each category for each variable. Missing data are excluded. Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding error.

[a] The Ohio Political Survey (TOPS) was a representative telephone survey of 808 voting-age Ohio residents conducted during November and December 1994.

[b] Respondents in the two experiments marked their ideological position on a seven-point scale. TOPS respondents were first asked to identify themselves as "liberal," "moderate," "middle of the road," or "conservative." Those in the moderate and middle-of-the-road categories (56% of the sample) were then asked if they considered themselves "closer to" liberal or conservative.

A convenience sample of undergraduates inevitably raises questions about the representativeness of any findings (Sears 1986). Table 1 summarizes the demographic and political characteristics of our sample and compares it with a representative sample of Ohio adults. The data show that our sample is not homogeneous, but instead varies appreciably on important demographic and political variables. Far from being the proverbial "college sophomores," fully half of the Study 1 participants are seniors. Still, we do not claim that the *level* of tolerance expressed by the participants accurately reflects that of the U.S. adult population.

TABLE 2. Content of KKK News Stories, Study 1

	Free Speech Frame	Public Order Frame
Theme	Members of the KKK and those protesting their appearance were determined to get out their message.	KKK rallies have the potential for disorder and physical violence between KKK supporters and those protesting their appearance.
Quotes	"No free speech for racists," on sign held by protester. "I came down here to hear what they have to say and I think I should be able to listen if I want to," spoken by a supporter of the KKK.	"Here you have a potential for some real sparks in the crowd," spoken by an observer. "The tension between Klan protesters and supporters came within seconds of violence," spoken by a reporter.
Images	Chanting of protesters. KKK leaders speaking before a microphone.	Police officers standing in front of Klan members protecting them from the protesters.
Interviews	Three of the four people interviewed were Klan supporters who wanted to hear the Klan's message.	All three people interviewed emphasized the violence and disruption of public order that they had witnessed.

We do believe, however, that it is reasonable to assume the effect of news framing observed in our sample would not differ drastically from that of most other groups.

News Frames. Participants began the experiment by watching one of two different seven-minute videotapes that was described as a compilation of stories from recent local television news broadcasts. Each tape began with the same five-minute "warm-up" segment: a story about the development of a local science museum, two brief human interest stories, and one commercial. The final story, immediately following the commercial, concerned the KKK rally. We videotaped news broadcasts from different Columbus television stations during the period surrounding two highly publicized KKK rallies, expecting that any stories about these rallies would be captured by a relatively small number of frames. We selected as our critical stories two reports about the same event—a speech and rally by the KKK on the steps of the Ross County Courthouse in Chillicothe, Ohio—broadcast by two different Columbus stations. Each story featured a reporter on location, with video of KKK speakers, crowd scenes, and interviews. Although there was considerable overlap in the stories, especially in their imagery, they exemplified two alternative framings of the event: a free speech frame and a public order frame. The former emphasized the right of KKK members to speak to the public and, especially, the right of their supporters and the curious to hear what the Klan had to say. The latter highlighted the disturbances that erupted during the rally and included images of police officers in riot gear. Table 2 provides a summary of the stories' content. Appendix A contains a more complete discussion of our procedure for selecting these stories.

Tolerance Measures. Immediately following the videotape, participants answered two questions concerning their tolerance for the KKK. The first asked: "Do you support or oppose allowing members of the Ku Klux Klan to hold public rallies in our city?" The second asked: "Do you support or oppose allowing members of the Ku Klux Klan to make a speech in our city?" Respondents used a seven-point scale, anchored by "strongly support" and "strongly oppose," to indicate their tolerance for the KKK.

Cognitive Processing Tasks. Following the tolerance measures, half of the participants completed a reaction time task, which measured the cognitive accessibility of such concepts as freedom and disorder, while the remaining participants completed an importance rating task, which measured their perceptions of the importance of free speech and public order values with respect to tolerance for the KKK. Both of these tasks were presented via an interactive computerized questionnaire.

The reaction time task closely followed the word/nonword judgment paradigm suggested by Fazio (1990). Participants viewed a series of letter strings flashed in the center of the computer monitor and indicated as quickly as possible whether the letters constituted a true English word, like "center," or a nonsense word, like "treskl." They did so by pressing one of two keys, clearly labeled "WORD" and "NOT A WORD." After two practice trials, four categories of word probes appeared in random order: words related to free speech (e.g., "liberty"), words related to public order (e.g., "danger"), neutral filler words (e.g., "planet"), and nonsense words. Appendix B contains a complete listing of the words. The computer recorded the duration of time between the initial display of the word and the keypress. Response time was taken as an indicator of the relative accessibility of the concept in memory, with more accessible concepts producing faster times (Fazio 1990).

For the importance rating task, five values, beliefs, or other considerations with respect to the tolerance issue were presented. Participants were asked to indicate "how IMPORTANT each of these ideas is to you when you think about the question of whether or not the Ku Klux Klan should be allowed to make speeches and hold demonstrations in public." Among these five statements were two summarizing civil liberties perspectives on the controversy and one statement stressing public order considerations. Appendix B gives the full text of these questions.

TABLE 3. Tolerance Judgments, Reaction Times, and Importance Ratings by Framing Condition, Study 1

	Free Speech Framing Condition	Public Order Framing Condition
Tolerance for rallies[a]	3.96	3.31
Tolerance for speeches[a]	4.17	3.54
Reaction time for free speech words[b]	6.34	6.42
Reaction time for disorder words[b]	6.43	6.53
Reaction time for filler words[b]	6.35	6.48
Importance of free speech[c]	5.49	5.25
Importance of public order[c]	4.75	5.43

[a]Higher members indicate greater tolerance.
[b]Entries are natural logs of reaction times in milliseconds.
[c]Higher numbers indicate greater importance.

We randomly assigned participants to one or the other processing task to eliminate the contamination of these measures. For example, the importance item "freedom of speech for all citizens is a fundamental American right" by its mere appearance may have primed the concept of freedom of speech for all respondents, rendering subsequent reaction time measures for that concept ambiguous (Katz and Hass 1988).

Other Measures. To conclude the experiment, respondents completed a number of items measuring beliefs, opinions, and demographic variables potentially related to tolerance for the KKK. Included were authoritarianism, measured by a four-item version of the *F*-scale (Lane 1955); racial prejudice, measured by a four-item version of the modern racism scale (McConahay, Hardee, and Batts 1981); support for free speech rights and civil liberties (adapted from Kuklinski et al. 1991 and Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982); and concern about public order. General attitudes toward the KKK were measured by a series of semantic differential trait scales (e.g., "peaceful—aggressive"). Also included were feeling thermometers for the KKK and civil rights leaders. Appendix C contains the full text of these items.

Results

Effects of News Frames on Tolerance. We expected that participants in the free speech framing condition would express greater tolerance for KKK public rallies and speeches than those in the public order condition. Independent-samples (Student's) *t*-tests showed higher levels of tolerance for KKK speeches ($t_{220} = 2.33, p = .02$) and rallies ($t_{220} = 2.34$, $p = .02$) among participants in the free speech framing condition than among participants in the public order condition. Mean tolerance scores for the two conditions appear in Table 3.

In addition to producing differences in tolerance for KKK activities, the news story frames were expected to affect the relation between tolerance for the Klan and other related opinions (Nelson and Kinder 1996). By constructing the issue as especially relevant to a single value (freedom of speech or maintaining public order), the two frames sent implicit messages about which considerations should dominate opinion. We therefore hypothesized that attitudes toward civil liberties in general and freedom of expression in particular should relate more closely to tolerance for the KKK among participants in the free speech condition than among participants in the public order condition. In contrast, we expected that attitudes toward government efforts to maintain public order would relate more closely to tolerance for the KKK among participants in the public order framing condition. To test these hypotheses, we regressed tolerance for the KKK on a set of predictor variables, including support for civil liberties, support for freedom of expression, and support for government efforts to maintain and preserve public order. The regressions included other variables potentially related to tolerance, based on extant research (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982): authoritarianism, racial prejudice, attitudes toward the KKK, and feeling thermometer ratings of the KKK and civil rights leaders. Two regressions were performed for both tolerance outcome measures (tolerance of KKK speeches and KKK rallies): one for participants in the free speech condition and one for those in the public order condition. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 4.

The results provide mixed support for these hypotheses. Support for civil liberties did indeed predict tolerance for KKK speeches and rallies more strongly in the free speech frame than in the public order frame. This difference between framing conditions in the regression coefficient was statistically significant for the speeches measure ($p = .01$) but not quite significant ($p < .08$) for the rallies measure.[3] Conversely, public order concerns significantly predicted tolerance for KKK speeches in the public order condition but not in the free speech condition; the difference between the conditions did not reach statistical significance, however. The effect of public order concerns on tolerance for KKK *rallies* did not vary by experimental condition. Finally, contrary to our prediction, the effect of support for freedom of expression on tolerance for the KKK was somewhat more powerful in the public order condition, although the difference was not significant.

Psychological Processing of News Frames. The reaction time and importance rating tasks were designed to test two alternative hypotheses about the psychological processes that mediate framing effects. The framing of

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[3] To establish the statistical significance of these differences, we reestimated the regression models for the entire sample and included variables representing the experimental condition (dummy variable) and the interactions between the experimental condition and the crucial predictor variables (support for free speech, endorsement of civil liberties, support for public order). These interaction terms, estimating the difference between experimental conditions in the effect of some predictor on tolerance (say, the effect of support for free speech on tolerance for KKK rallies), then can be tested for statistical significance.

Table 4. Regression Model Predicting Tolerance for KKK Speeches and Rallies, by Framing Condition, Study 1

	Tolerance for Speeches		Tolerance for Rallies	
	Free Speech	Public Order	Free Speech	Public Order
Public order	−.25	−.44**	−.35	−.34*
	(.19)	(.17)	(.22)	(.17)
Civil liberties	.41***	.07	.33**	.11
	(.12)	(.11)	(.13)	(.11)
Freedom of expression	.70***	.92***	.67***	.88***
	(.15)	(.16)	(.17)	(.17)
Attitudes toward the KKK	.48***	.18	.52***	.32
	(.17)	(.22)	(.19)	(.23)
F-Scale	−.16	.09	−.12	.19
	(.14)	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)
Modern racism	−.17	.10	−.15	.01
	(.13)	(.13)	(.15)	(.14)
Feeling thermometer: KKK	−.05	.08	−.04	.05
	(.09)	(.12)	(.11)	(.12)
Feeling thermometer: Civil rights leaders	−.21**	−.01	−.15	−.04
	(.09)	(.08)	(.10)	(.08)
Ideology	−.22*	−.13	−.23*	−.14
	(.12)	(.10)	(.14)	(.11)
Number of cases	113	109	113	109
Adjusted R^2	.44	.46	.36	.43

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded so that a higher score indicates a more tolerant attitude toward the KKK. The independent variables are coded so that a high score indicates high support for public order, high support for freedom of expression, high support for civil liberties, a positive attitude toward the traits of KKK members, more authoritarian attitudes, racial intolerance, favorable evaluations of the KKK and civil rights leaders, and a liberal ideology.
*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$.

news stories may influence opinion either by increasing the cognitive accessibility of such concepts as freedom and public order or by increasing the perceived importance or relevance of these values for tolerance.

If framing effects are mediated by accessibility, then participants should respond relatively swiftly to words most consonant with the frame they viewed. Thus, participants in the free speech framing condition should have responded more quickly to words related to free speech than to words related to public order, while participants in the public order condition should have displayed the opposite pattern. The reaction times did not conform to this pattern. Before analysis, a natural log transformation of response times was conducted, to correct for skewness in the distribution. Extreme outliers were also removed from the analysis. The transformed reaction times were averaged across the two critical categories of word probes (free speech and public order) for each participant. The data then were analyzed using a 2 × 2—(free speech versus public order probe) × (free speech versus public order framing condition)—repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with type of probe treated as a within-subject variable. While there was a main effect of probe type (all participants, regardless of video condition, responded more quickly to free speech than public order words, $F_{1,81} = 36.51$, $p < .001$), probe type did not *interact* with frame condition ($F_{1,81} < 1$), indicating that participants did not respond more or less quickly to specific categories of probes as a result of their framing condition.[4] Refer to Table 3 for the relevant means.

If framing effects are instead mediated by perceived importance, then participants in the free speech condition should rate free speech values as more important than should participants in the public order condition. Conversely, the latter should rate public order values as more important than should the former. To test this hypothesis, we combined the scores for the two free speech items (Pearson's $r = .36$) into one measure and analyzed the importance ratings according to a 2 × 2—(free speech versus public order values) × (free speech versus public order framing condition)—repeated-measures ANOVA, with values treated as a within-subject variable. Average ratings for the two types of considerations, displayed in Table 3, conform

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[4] To control for individual differences in response quickness, researchers commonly use filler words and calculate difference scores between the target and filler words (Fazio 1990). We also performed a repeated measures ANOVA on difference scores, but the results are somewhat misleading. Subjects in the free speech condition responded more quickly to all probes, *including filler items*. As a result, the difference scores, which subtract reaction times to the neutral fillers from reaction times to the other two probe categories, *appear to indicate that reaction times were quickest for free speech* words among subjects in the public order condition. Again, this is only relative to the neutral filler probes; the fastest reaction times to free speech probes were, in fact, observed for subjects in the free speech condition (refer to Table 3). For clarity, we report results only for the logarithmic transformed scores, not for the difference scores. The ANOVA for the difference scores also fails to show the critical interaction predicted by the accessibility hypothesis.

FIGURE 1. Path Analysis Testing the Mediational Role of Importance Judgments for Framing Effects, Study 1



Note: Coefficients are equivalent to standardized partial regression (β) weights. Frame is dummy coded such that the free speech frame condition = 0, and the public order frame condition = 1. Freedom of speech and public order importance variables are coded such that higher numbers indicate greater perceived importance of the value. Tolerance is coded such that higher numbers indicate greater tolerance. In the paths directly leading to tolerance, coefficients in regular typeface are for tolerance of rallies; coefficients in boldface are for tolerance of speeches. Residual variance is indicated by boxed *R*'s.
$^{*}p \leq .05$; $^{**}p \leq .01$.

exactly to our predictions: Free speech values are rated as somewhat more important by participants in the free speech framing condition, while public order values are rated as considerably more important by participants in the public order framing condition. The critical interaction from the ANOVA was significant ($F_{1,134}$ = 4.33, $p < .05$). Refer to Table 3 for the means.

The results thus far substantiate our main points: Media framing of the KKK controversy significantly affected tolerance for the group, and this effect came about primarily because the two frames stressed the relevance or importance of different values (free speech versus public order), not because the frames altered the cognitive accessibility of those values. In order to ensure that value importance truly mediated the effect of the frames, a path-analytic or causal modeling analysis is required (Asher 1983). The path model illustrated in Figure 1 was tested, using OLS regression to estimate path coefficients. The results support our expectation: Framing condition (in the analysis, a dummy variable) affected the perceived importance of free speech and public order, which in turn affected viewer tolerance toward the KKK. As was apparent from the initial examination of the mean importance ratings, most of the effect of framing was transmitted via the perceived importance of public order. In fact, the effect of framing on the perceived importance of free speech, while consistent with our predictions, is nonsignificant—perhaps because of the already stratospheric level of support enjoyed by free speech values (see Appendix C). A subsequent causal analysis showed that the accessibility of concepts related to free speech and public order did not mediate the effect of framing on tolerance.

Discussion

Two lessons may be learned from Study 1. The first is that news framing of a civil liberties confrontation matters for viewers' tolerance. Participants in this experiment, who witnessed news reports about the very same event, expressed significantly different opinions depending upon media framing of that event. Those who saw a story framing the KKK rally as a free speech issue expressed greater tolerance for the Klan than did those who saw a story depicting it as a potentially explosive clash between two angry groups. The second lesson is that the effect of news frames on tolerance judgments is carried by the frames' influence on the perceived importance of specific values evoked by this issue, especially, as it turns out, the importance of maintaining public order. For framing that elevated public order concerns, tolerance was relatively lower.

The Study 1 results are intriguing in part because the experimental stimuli were extracted from the real world of television news and not concocted in the researchers' imagination. This external validity comes at a price, however: While the two stories differed in terms of framing, they also may have differed in other subtle ways that we could not control. Although the mediational analysis lends credibility to the claim that the crucial difference really is the frames and their emphasis on the importance of different values, even greater credibility would accrue from a replication of these results using experimental stimuli *expressly created to represent these two frames*. This was our primary goal in Study 2.

STUDY 2

Overview

Study 2 preserves the essential conceptual features of Study 1 but changes the presentation of the frame stimuli and adds a second measure of value importance. Rather than rely on actual news coverage of an event, we constructed artificial (but realistic) free speech and public order frames and embedded them in an electronic newspaper-style format. We thus could exert greater control over the information that varied across framing conditions, minimizing the chance that idiosyncratic features of the news stories confounded with the frames were responsible for the observed effects. A second measure of value importance—a values ranking procedure (Rokeach 1973)—was added to the importance rating procedure used in Study 1.

Design and Procedure

The participants in Study 2 were 71 students, who received extra credit. They were somewhat younger and more liberal than those in Study 1, but they still varied appreciably in their basic demographic and political characteristics (refer to Table 1). Participants were randomly assigned to either a free speech or a public order news frame condition. After reading the news story, each completed either an importance rating or ranking task. Thus, the experiment incorporated a 2 × 2—(free speech versus public order frame) × (importance rating versus importance ranking)—between-subjects design.

The computer-controlled experiment was described to participants as a study of how effectively Internet news services provide information to the public. Participants were told they would view images from a "prototype" of the campus newspaper's World Wide Web news page. Their task was to read the stories presented on screen and answer a series of questions concerning their reactions. Participants saw three stories, the first of which was the KKK story, framed in either free speech or public order terms.

Both KKK stories presented the same set of facts about the controversy: (1) The university administration was considering a request from the KKK to hold a speech and rally on campus; (2) various courts had ruled that the KKK has a constitutional right to free expression; and (3) similar rallies around Ohio had sparked violent clashes between KKK supporters and counterdemonstrators. The full text of each story appears in Appendix D. While this basic information about the controversy was held constant across the two stories, additional features—the headline, picture, and quotes within the body of the article—established each story's frame. The photograph accompanying the free speech frame, for example, showed the U.S. Constitution, while the photograph accompanying the public order frame showed police forcefully suppressing a riot. Likewise, "Clifford Strong," a fictional law professor, was quoted in the former as stressing the preeminence of free speech, while claiming in the latter that "safety must be our top priority."

After reading the story, participants answered a common series of questions, beginning with the tolerance item: "Do you think that O.S.U. should or should not allow the Ku Klux Klan to hold a rally on campus?" The students then completed one of two tasks designed to measure the perceived importance of upholding freedom of speech and maintaining safety and security on campus, with respect to the KKK controversy. The importance rating task resembled the task from Study 1 and asked respondents to rate the importance of "a citizen's freedom to speak or hear what he or she wants" and "campus safety and security."

The importance ranking task was intended to capture the tradeoff between the values of freedom of expression and public order implied by the KKK controversy. Respondents were shown four statements: "A person's freedom to speak and hear what he or she wants should be protected"; "Campus safety and security should be protected"; "Racism and prejudice should be opposed"; and "Ohio State's reputation should be protected." Participants were instructed to use the computer mouse to select the most important concern "based on how important (it is) to you when you think about whether or not OSU should allow the Ku Klux Klan to hold a speech and rally on campus," then the second most important, and so on, until all four were ranked. The program precluded ranking the same option more than once or ranking fewer than four options. Participants were permitted, however, to change their rankings as often as they wished.

Results

Framing significantly affected tolerance for the KKK rally, with those in the free speech frame expressing greater tolerance than those in the public order frame ($t_{69} = 1.73, p < .05$). Table 5 displays the means by condition. The table also shows that framing had the expected effect on the ranking and rating of free speech and public order concerns. An ANOVA was performed on the importance ratings, treating value (campus safety versus free expression) as a within-subject variable and framing condition (free speech versus

TABLE 5. Tolerance, Importance Ratings, and Importance Rankings by Framing Condition, Study 2

	Free Speech Framing Condition	Public Order Framing Condition
Tolerance[a]	4.38	3.54
Importance rating of free speech[b]	6.38	5.88
Importance rating of campus safety and security[b]	6.46	6.92
Importance ranking of free speech[b]	3.11	2.69
Importance ranking of campus safety and security[b]	2.84	3.00

[a] Higher numbers indicate greater tolerance.
[b] Higher numbers indicate greater importance.

public order) as a between-subjects variable. The critical interaction between framing condition and importance rating was reliable, $F_{1,37} = 3.62$, $p < .07$.[5] A similar ANOVA for the ranking data did not indicate a significant interaction, $F_{1,30} = .87$, $p < .36$. The two value ranking variables were recoded into simple dichotomies, the first indicating whether the participant had ranked free speech concerns as the most important concern or had ranked it at position 2-4, the second likewise indicating whether or not the participant ranked safety and security concerns as the most important. Analysis of these dichotomous variables indicated a small framing effect: 42.1% of participants in the free speech frame rated free speech concerns as the most important, versus 15.4% in the public order condition ($\chi^2 = 2.57$, $p = .11$); 46.2% of participants in the public order condition rated safety and security concerns as the most important, versus 31.6% in the free speech condition ($\chi^2 = .70$, $p = .40$).

The mediational role of value importance was tested using a path analytic procedure similar to that described for Study 1. Only participants who completed the importance rating task were included. The results appear in Figure 2. They show a pattern quite similar to that found in Study 1: Framing significantly affects the importance assigned to the value of public order, which in turn significantly affects tolerance for the KKK. While the importance of freedom of expression is a powerful predictor of tolerance, it is not significantly affected by framing.

Discussion

Study 2 reaffirms the conclusions reached for Study 1 with respect to both the effect of news frames on tolerance for hate groups and the presumed mediator of a frame's effect, namely, the importance accorded to one specific value among the many brought into focus by the controversy. Because we held constant features of the fictional news stories beyond the two frames, the results relieve concerns that idiosyncratic aspects of the actual news stories used in Study 1 were responsible for frame effects. Both the ranking and the rating measures of value importance responded to issue framing, although the effect appears stronger for the rating measure. This finding is, in itself, instructive: It suggests that a single frame may enhance the perceived importance of a single value but will not necessarily influence the *relative* preferences among a set of values.

CONCLUSION

The results of these two studies substantiate the claim that the choices journalists make about how to cover a story—from the words, phrases, and images they convey to the broader "angle" they take on a controversy—can result in substantially different portrayals of the very same event and the broader controversy it represents. These alternative portrayals, or frames, can exert appreciable influence on citizens' perceptions of the issue and, ultimately, the opinions they express. Previous approaches to framing have shown how frames affect perceptions of causality and responsibility for social problems such as crime and poverty (Iyengar 1991) and the relationship between policy opinions and predictors of those opinions (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 1996; Nelson and Kinder 1996). The present results show a clear effect of news frames on an entirely different kind of judgment: the willingness to extend civil liberties protections to ignoble and potentially dangerous groups. These findings affirm that tolerance decisions reflect not only long-standing individual and group characteristics but also short-term political forces, including the activity of the mass media. Although these experiments took place within the laboratory, the first relied on actual media coverage of a real event that took place within the participants' local area, while the second employed an engaging and highly realistic presentation of the key manipulation. These real-life details produced a vivid and profound experimental setting.

News Frames and Public Opinion

Bartels (1993, 267) calls research on mass media "one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science" for its repeated failure to demonstrate significant mass media effects. It is indeed a bewildering paradox that the discipline continually produces reports of minimal media effects even as more astronomical amounts of resources are invested in an industry that almost daily makes further inroads into our personal lives and public affairs. Refinements in research design and measurement will surely turn up previously

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[5] The relatively small number of cases here, as well as the skewed distribution of the importance responses, probably robs the *F* test of some statistical power.

FIGURE 2. Path Analysis Testing the Mediational Role of Importance Judgments for Framing Effects, Study 2



Note: Coefficients are equivalent to standardized partial regression (β) weights. Frame is dummy coded such that the free speech frame condition = 0, and the public order frame condition = 1. Freedom of speech and public order importance variables are coded such that higher numbers indicate greater perceived importance of the value. Tolerance is coded such that higher numbers indicate greater tolerance. Residual variance is indicated by boxed *R*'s. $^{*}p \leq .05$; $^{**}p \leq .01$.

hidden effects, but we also must advance our theories and conceptions of mass communication influence. The evidence is steadily accumulating that framing is a powerful concept for explicating the activities of journalists and news organizations. It also provides leverage for understanding the behaviors of public relations specialists, "spin doctors," and other elites and professionals whose job it is to produce congenial concepts, beliefs, and opinions among the broader public.

Public debate over such controversial issues as tolerance for hate groups takes place within a specific "symbolic environment" consisting of the images, slogans, stereotypes, and other devices that anchor and illuminate different positions (Gamson and Lasch 1983). Individuals and groups with interests at stake expend great effort in articulating a packaged message that may contain both hard evidence as well as symbolic content designed to leave lasting impressions in an information-dense climate. The battle for public opinion is in part a fight to shape public definitions of the debate—a tug-of-war between "contestable categories" (Edelman 1993) to be applied to a controversy. The mass media play a vital role in this process, either as conveyers of elite-sponsored frames or as originators of frames in their own right (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). As we have seen, the choice of a frame may have important implications for the balance of public opinion on an issue. Labeling the KKK controversy as a "free speech issue" tilts opinion in the group's favor, while the label "public safety issue" tilts it in the opposite direction.

Psychological Responses to News Frames

Coming to appreciate the power of the media to shape public views on political problems requires a broader understanding of message processing than is implied by simple learning or priming models. Certainly, a major function of the news media is to inform the public, that is, to provide reliable new information that shapes our beliefs about important people, places, and events (Zaller 1992). But beyond this reporting function, the media also provide cues about how we should integrate our beliefs into attitudes. In this vein, theories of media priming (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) make the sensible claim that when the media focus attention on an issue, that issue should come to a citizen's awareness relatively more easily and exert correspondingly greater effect on opinion. The media's influence on the weight, importance, or relevance viewers attach to particular values and other considerations goes beyond mere accessibility, however. In numerous ways, through both verbal and visual channels, the media provide hints about what is truly at issue in a public controversy. While it is not inevitable that audiences will take the media's word for it, these studies show that the hints can be compelling.

It is important to note that while many researchers have presented evidence consistent with the priming model, few have conducted direct tests (using, for example, reaction-time measures) of the crucial accessibility link. The evidence from the present pair of studies reveals that the accessibility of different considerations is not nearly as important as the *weight* attached to these considerations. There are many ideas about how to conceptualize and measure weight in research on judgment, decision making, and attitudes. The concept of weighting reflects the seemingly obvious point that some kinds of information are more important than others for a particular judgment, regardless of their value. In selecting a restaurant, for example, one may be very impressed by fine table linens and a lengthy wine list but would probably overlook those attributes if the food and service were terrible. Anderson equates weight with "psychological importance" (e.g., Anderson and Zalinski 1991) while others equate it with perceived relevance (van der Pligt and Eiser 1984), subjective confidence (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), reliability and consistency (Kelley 1973), and perceptual vividness (Taylor and Fiske 1978).

Some researchers ask respondents to self-report on subjective weight (e.g., Ericsson and Simon 1980; Zaller and Feldman 1992), while others claim that introspective reports on the factors affecting one's judgments are hopelessly unreliable (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). The traditional open-ended "likes and dislikes" questions that appear in such surveys as the National Election Study assume that respondents can accurately identify the information that has the greatest effect on their political opinions, but these items have been criticized as revealing little about what actually influences opinions and behavior (Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994; Smith 1989). In our studies, participants rated or ranked the importance of different values with respect to their tolerance for the KKK. These judgments (especially the ratings) resonated with the frame to which participants were exposed; moreover, the causal analysis supports our contention that these judgments about the importance of difference values mediated the effect of the frames on tolerance. We find this evidence persuasive, and we hope it will inspire more work to establish the validity of importance measures.

Memory, Ambivalence, Communication, and Opinion

Our results contribute to the growing body of evidence questioning mere accessibility models of political judgment and opinion (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994). Zaller (1992) and others have argued that political opinions are "top-of-the-head" phenomena, formed from whatever cognitions and emotions happen to be accessible at the time the attitude is expressed (see also Kelley and Mirer 1974). This memory-based model of opinion, coupled with evidence about Americans' dismal command of politically relevant facts and information (Kinder and Sears 1985), has led many students of mass politics to question the quality of citizens' political judgments and opinions (Converse 1964). If we believe that opinions are purely ephemeral, swinging wildly from side to side due to arbitrary changes in the relative accessibility of a few concepts, then we must be very pessimistic indeed about the caliber of popular opinion regarding political matters, especially if we question the depth of knowledge that informs those opinions.

"Top-of-the-head" models of opinion suggest that information must be accessible at the time an opinion is expressed in order to have influence and that all accessible considerations will have equal effect on the expressed opinion. The first claim is disputed by a number of memory researchers (Anderson 1991, Hastie and Park 1986, Manis et al. 1993), while the present results appear to contest the second. We do not dismiss the possibility that frames, or any other kind of political communication, *may* prime specific considerations, making them more accessible and hence more influential for subsequent judgments. Still, we believe that the expression of attitudes is a more mindful process than top-of-the-head models imply. Our results point to a more deliberate integration process, whereby participants consider the importance and relevance of each accessible idea. Just as accessibility may be regulated by contextual cues, so the perceived weight of specific ideas may respond to messages from the political environment.

While evidence suggesting an impoverished and superficial public opinion abounds, it now appears that the pessimism has been overstated. Refinements in measurement techniques have restored some faith in the rationality of public opinion (Krosnick and Berent 1993, Page and Shapiro 1992). Still, it is not clear what opinion instability and inconsistency signify. They may indicate the presence of "nonattitudes"—poorly thought-out utterances created mainly to conceal a lack of mastery of the political world (Converse 1964). Some volatility of opinion also could signify ambivalence, a dynamic tension fostered by the awareness of two or more sides to an issue, and a hesitation to side decisively with only one (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995). Political campaigns and persuaders of all stripes exploit this ambivalence by using frames as levers to move opinion in their direction. If partisans can effectively claim ownership of a specific value while asserting its special significance or high priority, then they are in a strong position to capture public favor.

Support for the principle of free speech is a powerful current in American public opinion. Our results concur with those of others (Gross and Kinder 1996) in showing the dominating influence of such values on tolerance for the KKK—an influence that largely resisted the frames' effect.[6] While tolerance as a general principle enjoys widespread support among Americans (Marcus et al. 1995), including the participants in these studies,[7] the volatility and inconsistency in support for civil liberties in specific cases (Chong 1993) or for specific groups (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982) reveals the ambivalence that permeates the public's views. Our results suggest that even though free speech values outshine most others, the public recognizes that unqualified and unyielding support for freedom of speech may impede other values, such as preserving civic harmony. When a competing value is brought into greater prominence and embodied with special significance and legitimacy, tolerance may weaken. While it would be going too far to say that underneath every publicly tolerant citizen is a privately intolerant one, it does appear that within many citizens are the makings of greater or lesser tolerance depending upon many things, including framing.

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[6] Some reviewers of this paper suggested that a control group would

APPENDIX A: SELECTION OF KKK NEWS STORIES, STUDY 1

We chose our KKK news stories based on the results of a pilot study conducted during spring 1994. Over several months we collected a number of local television news stories concerning the activities of the Klan in central Ohio. We selected four stories to use in the pilot study, two of which, in our view, exemplified free speech frames, and two of which exemplified public order frames.

Sixty-eight undergraduates enrolled in introductory political science classes participated in our pilot study in exchange for extra course credit. They were randomly assigned to view one of the four news stories about the KKK. They then were asked to describe, in an open-ended format, any "message" they thought was contained in the story. Next, we provided them with a checklist of specific messages that might be contained in a newscast about the KKK and asked them to check all the messages that pertained to the story they had just viewed. These messages included such statements as "free speech for all people and groups is an important right" and "Ku Klux Klan rallies may create disorder and/or violence."

The participants agreed with our a priori assessment and perceived both the stories that we considered to be free speech frames as containing free speech messages, but they saw one of the stories as containing additional messages. We decided to use the "purer" free speech frame. Similarly, the two stories we considered public order frames were also perceived that way by the participants, although one was considered a less adulterated version. Again, we chose to use the purer frame. Conveniently, the two stories we selected covered the same KKK rally.

While the participants detected elements of the free speech and public order frames, only five expressed any sense that the coverage was "biased" for or against the KKK's right to hold a rally, based on the open-ended responses. These responses were not reliably associated with any particular story. The vast majority of participants who detected a bias in the coverage felt that the stories disapproved of the KKK *as an organization*.

APPENDIX B: COGNITIVE PROCESSING TASKS AND OTHER MEASURES, STUDY 1

Reaction Time Task

Participants in the reaction time condition were asked to indicate whether a series of letters flashed on the computer screen formed a true English word or a nonsense word. They were instructed that both "speed" and "accuracy" were important in this task. Participants were given the opportunity to respond to two practice words (PLAIN and SLNAMFP) and then to query the experimenter if they did not understand the task. Next, participants responded to 20 words flashed on the screen in random order. These words and nonwords were as follows:

Free Speech Words:	freedom, liberty, rights, independence
Public Order Words:	violence, disorder, danger, disturbance
Filler Words:	telescope, friendly, train, planet, place, basketball
Nonwords:	plsty, dinrlsy, wiqhvtz, beirmpt, tvaxmc, molyptrzb

Importance Rating Task

Participants in the importance rating condition received the following instructions:

> We would now like to ask you a few questions about the opinions you just expressed. Different people think about different things when expressing an opinion. For example, when expressing an opinion about a political candidate, some people might think about the candidate's background and experience, while other people might think about the candidate's political party.
>
> On the next few screens you will see several thoughts or ideas that other students have expressed when describing their opinions about whether or not the Ku Klux Klan should be allowed to make speeches and hold demonstrations in public. Some of these ideas may seem important to YOU as you think about this issue, while others will seem less important. Please tell us how IMPORTANT each of these ideas is to you when you think about the question of whether or not the Ku Klux Klan should be allowed to make speeches and hold demonstrations in public.

Participants rated the following items on a seven-point scale (1 = "completely unimportant"; 7 = "extremely important").

Free Speech Items: Freedom of speech for all citizens is a fundamental American right.
Some people are interested in what the Ku Klux Klan has to say, and they have the right to listen.
Public Order Item: There is always a risk of violence and danger at Ku Klux Klan rallies.

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have provided valuable information about the "default" or "baseline" levels and correlates of tolerance. As this was a project concerned with the effects of *alternative* news frames on opinion, rather than the effects of framing versus no framing, we were reluctant to assign scarce participants to a "no frame" control condition. Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of an entirely frameless media treatment of a tolerance controversy. Nevertheless, we agree that a control group potentially could provide interesting information about which frames come closest to the manner in which people "normally" think about tolerance problems (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 1991).

[7] For example, 78.4% of participants in Study 1 strongly agreed (7 on a 1–7 scale) with the statement that "No matter what a person's political beliefs are, she or he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else."

APPENDIX C: OPINION MEASURES, STUDY 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
F-Scale							
What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.	3.6	9.9	14.4	14.4	30.6	16.7	10.4
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	9.5	13.5	18.5	14.0	25.7	15.3	3.6
A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.	12.2	16.2	20.7	19.4	15.3	13.5	2.7
An insult to your honor should never be forgotten.	15.8	20.7	19.8	17.6	11.7	5.9	8.6
Modern Racism Scale							
Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.	7.2	6.8	13.5	18.9	14.0	20.3	19.4
Over the last few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	14.4	18.0	22.1	20.7	10.4	9.0	5.4
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	12.2	15.8	23.0	20.3	13.5	9.5	5.9
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.	9.0	9.0	14.4	13.5	24.3	16.2	13.5
Equal opportunity for blacks and whites is very important but it's not really the government's job to guarantee it.	19.4	18.9	18.0	12.2	11.3	9.9	10.4
Civil Liberties Scale							
No matter what a person's political beliefs are, she or he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.	.9	.9	.9	.5	6.3	12.2	78.4
When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if it violates their rights.	26.6	17.1	11.7	23.0	8.6	8.1	5.0
Any person who hides behind the laws when he or she is questioned about his or her activities does not deserve much consideration.	11.7	19.4	17.6	25.2	14.0	8.6	3.6
People should have the right to live in any neighborhood they want if they can afford it.	.5	0.0	0.0	1.4	3.2	17.6	77.5
Groups should not be prevented from holding public meetings.	3.6	1.4	6.3	7.2	11.3	32.0	38.3
Freedom of Expression Scale							
I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be.	2.3	4.5	4.5	7.7	9.9	29.3	41.9
People should have the freedom to express their own opinions publicly.	1.8	.5	5.0	9.5	11.7	28.8	42.8
The government should not have the right to censor published materials.	4.5	5.9	7.2	6.8	19.4	23.0	33.3
Public Order Scale	Too harshly						Not harshly enough
In general, do you think the courts deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?	.9	.5	1.4	13.1	15.8	29.3	39.2
	Low priority						High priority
Do you feel that maintaining public order and discipline should be a high priority for government or a low priority?	1.8	1.8	6.3	11.3	23.9	28.8	26.1
	Support strongly						Oppose strongly
Do you support or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?	41.9	21.6	9.5	7.7	4.1	6.3	9.0
Do you support or oppose aggressive government action to protect citizens from public disruption and harassment?	12.6	17.1	25.2	18.5	12.6	7.7	6.3
Do you support or oppose the courts giving severe sentences to protesters who refuse to follow police instructions?	6.8	11.7	25.2	23.4	17.1	10.4	5.4
Do you support or oppose laws to forbid all public protest demonstrations, in the interest of public safety?	3.6	3.6	9.9	16.2	18.0	20.3	28.4

APPENDIX C: (Cont.)

Attitudes toward KKK

Below is a list of words that people use to describe political figures and groups. Please think about members of the Ku Klux Klan and enter the number for each scale that you think most accurately describes these members.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Honest						Dishonest
5.9	3.6	6.8	21.6	17.6	23.0	21.6
Bad						Good
48.2	27.0	10.4	10.4	1.8	.9	1.4
Harmless						Dangerous
.5	1.8	5.0	10.8	18.5	26.1	37.4
Trustworthy						Untrustworthy
1.4	1.8	2.3	20.7	17.6	22.1	34.2
Violent						Nonviolent
32.4	21.6	21.2	17.1	5.0	2.3	.5
Unpredictable						Predictable
14.9	12.6	10.8	19.8	14.0	15.8	12.2
Strong						Weak
5.4	8.6	18.9	22.5	15.8	19.8	9.0
Democratic						Undemocratic
4.1	1.4	5.0	21.6	12.6	18.5	36.9

Feeling Thermometer

We would now like to get your feelings about a number of groups in society. Please rate the following groups using a 1–9 "feeling thermometer." The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward the group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that group. You would given the group a "5" rating if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them.

Ku Klux Klan	$\bar{X} = 2.33$
Civil Rights Leaders	$\bar{X} = 6.66$

Note: With the exception of the feeling thermometer measures, results reported are percentages and may not add to 100 due to rounding error.

APPENDIX D: KKK FRAMES IN STUDY 2

Free Speech	Public Order
Headline: **Ku Klux Klan Tests OSU's Commitment to Free Speech**	*Headline*: **Possible Ku Klux Klan Rally Raises Safety Concerns**
How far is OSU prepared to go to protect freedom of speech? The Ku Klux Klan has requested a permit to conduct a speech and rally on the Ohio State campus during the Winter Quarter of 1997. Officials and administrators will decide whether to approve or deny the request in December.	**Can campus police prevent a riot if the KKK comes to town?** The Ku Klux Klan has requested a permit to conduct a speech and rally on the Ohio State campus during the Winter Quarter of 1997. Officials and administrators will decide whether to approve or deny the request in December.
Numerous courts have ruled that the U.S. Constitution ensures that the Klan has the right to speak and hold rallies on public grounds, and that individuals have the right to hear the Klan's message if they are interested. Many of the Klan's appearances around Ohio have been marked by violent clashes between Klan supporters and counterdemonstrators who show up to protest the Klan's racist activities. In one confrontation last October in Chillicothe, Ohio, several bystanders were injured by rocks thrown by Klan supporters and protesters. Usually, a large police force is needed to control the crowds.	Numerous courts have ruled that the U.S. Constitution ensures that the Klan has the right to speak and hold rallies on public grounds, and that individuals have the right to hear the Klan's message if they are interested. Many of the Klan's appearances around Ohio have been marked by violent clashes between Klan supporters and counterdemonstrators who show up to protest the Klan's racist activities. In one confrontation last October in Chillicothe, Ohio, several bystanders were injured by rocks thrown by Klan supporters and protesters. Usually, a large police force is needed to control the crowds.
Opinion about the speech and rally is mixed. **Many students, faculty, and staff worry about the rally, but support the group's right to speak. *Clifford Strong, a professor in the law school*, remarked, "I hate the Klan, but they have the right to speak, and people have the right to hear them if they want to. We may have some concerns about the rally, but the right to speak and hear what you want takes precedence over our fears about what could happen."**	Opinion about the speech and rally is mixed. **Many students, faculty, and staff have expressed great concern about campus safety and security during a Klan rally. *Clifford Strong, a professor in the law* school, remarked, "Freedom of speech is important, but so is the safety of the OSU community and the security of our campus. Considering the violence at past KKK rallies, I don't think the University has an obligation to allow this to go on. Safety must be our top priority."**

Note: Material that varied between the phrases is displayed in boldface. This material appeared in normal type in the experiment.

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Voting Correctly

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The average voter falls far short of the prescriptions of classic democratic theory in terms of interest, knowledge, and participation in politics. We suggest a more realistic standard: Citizens fulfill their democratic duties if, most of the time, they vote "correctly." Relying on an operationalization of correct voting based on fully informed interests, we present experimental data showing that, most of the time, people do indeed manage to vote correctly. We also show that voters' determinations of their correct vote choices can be predicted reasonably well with widely available survey data. We illustrate how this measure can be used to determine the proportion of the electorate voting correctly, which we calculate at about 75% for the five American presidential elections between 1972 and 1988. With a standard for correct vote decisions, political science can turn to exploring the factors that make it more likely that people will vote correctly.

The classic texts of democratic theory (such as J. S. Mill and Rousseau) assume that for a democracy to function properly the average citizen should be interested in, pay attention to, discuss, and actively participate in politics. The attention and discussion provide information about political affairs, which allows citizens to make political decisions (e.g., a vote) based on rationally considered principles reflecting their own self-interest and the common good. All citizens may not be able to live up to these standards—some may be too disinterested, or lack sufficient information or the skills to understand politics, and as a consequence they vote by habit or narrow prejudices, or do not vote at all. But as long as a clear majority lives up to these standards, the collective wisdom of the people will prevail.

Five decades of behavioral research in political science have left no doubt, however, that only a tiny minority of the citizens in any democracy actually live up to these ideals. Interest in politics is generally weak, discussion is rare, political knowledge on the average is pitifully low, and few people actively participate in politics beyond voting (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). And what good is even voting if for so many it is based on so little information?

The wide divergence between classic normative theory and political reality has led to two widely divergent responses. On the one hand are those who accept both the normative theory and the empirical data and who conclude as a consequence that governments calling themselves "democracies" are not truly democratic. An apathetic public cannot possibly constrain government officials, this line of argument goes; instead, some capitalist power elite, military-industrial complex, and/or giant media conglomerate uses democratic institutions and a complacent citizenry to manipulate government policy toward its own ends (e.g., Bennett 1988, 1992; Burnham 1965, 1974; Fishman 1980; Gans 1979; Mills 1971).

On the other hand are those who accept the empirical evidence but revise downward the requirements of normative theory so that modern governments can still be considered mostly "democratic." For instance, Page and Shapiro (1992) show how aggregate public opinion can be fairly stable and "rational"—and even, perhaps, guide public policy—while based on mostly ill-formed "nonattitudes" among individual citizens. Fiorina (1981) shows the advantages of basing vote decisions on retrospective judgments of the party's past performance rather than spending the time to learn about the candidates' future policy proposals. Others argue that the widespread ignorance of and indifference toward politics typically seen in Western democracies is in fact a good thing, for it reduces social conflict and contributes to greater system stability (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; McClosky 1964; Meuller 1992; Prothro and Grigg 1960). In other words, democracy still "works," and in fact may even work better, if only some *minority* of the population is attentive to politics, ideological in its thinking, and so on (see also Dahl 1961, 1989; Huntington 1968; Lindblom 1965; Schattschneider 1960).

Although we are somewhat in sympathy with each of these divergent responses, we take issue with the very point on which they both agree: Do the empirical data in fact require so drastic a revision of classic democratic theory? True, if modern citizens paid the type of attention to public affairs that Rousseau prescribed several centuries ago, they would do nothing else but follow politics. Such standards are unrealistically high and, we argue, not necessary for the average citizen.

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Classic democratic theory prescribes active attention to and close scrutiny of government policy because, logically, it seems the only way that citizens can make "correct" decisions. If A (an active, attentive public) is necessary for B (democracy), and A is not true, then logically B cannot be true.

This syllogism holds only if we accept the premise that close attention to politics and the actions of government officials and the promises of competing candidates are *necessary* for correct voting decisions. But what if they are not? What if people can make reasonably good decisions, most of the time, without all the motivation and attention and knowledge required by classic theory?

Modern cognitive psychology teaches us that humans are limited information processors (Fiske and Taylor 1991, Lau and Sears 1986). People process only a small fraction of the information to which they are exposed. The human mind, although effectively unlimited in its long-term storage capacity, is severely limited in how much information can be kept in short-term or active memory at any given time (Simon 1979). As a consequence, both perception and storage of incoming information, as well as subsequent recall of that information from memory, are structured (and thus biased) by prior expectations or cognitive "schemata" that help determine what information is noticed, where it is stored, and how likely it is to be retrieved from memory. Thus, citizens do not have all the information about politics that is required of them by classic democratic theory, and they do not process that information in as logical a way as those theorists hoped, in large part because of strict cognitive limitations. It is not so much that we do a particularly bad job of processing political information; rather, we do an equally bad job of processing any type of complex information. If the same standards that classic democratic theory holds up for citizens were to be applied to any other area of human life, such as finding mates or buying cars or choosing colleges, then people would be found to be just as inept in those areas as well.

Most people nonetheless seem to make an adequate marriage, get a decent education, and make reasonably good automobile purchases. How is this possible, if people behave and make decisions in ways that are so far from the dictates of normative theory? Quite simply, human beings have adaptively developed a large series of cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that allow them to make "pretty good" judgments most of the time (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). These heuristics "do sometimes lead people astray when they are overextended or misapplied . . . [but] people's intuitive inferential strategies are probably used appropriately and effectively in the great majority of cases" (Nisbett and Ross 1980, 255).

As a consequence, if we are going to make judgments about the "democratic" nature of different forms of government, we should do so at least initially on the basis of the quality or "correctness" of the political decisions citizens make within that system of government rather than on the basis of the ways in which those decisions are reached. Democracy is not a simple form of government, and judgments about the nature of different governments that claim to be democratic should not be made in a simplistic, either-or manner. Certainly, "degrees" of democracy are possible; and we argue that a crucial criterion is the proportion of citizens voting correctly at any particular time, rather than the manner in which those vote decisions are reached. That is, if most people, most of the time, vote "correctly," then we should not be too concerned if those vote decisions are reached on the basis of something less than full information about the different policies espoused by different candidates, much less information about how government actually carries out policy decisions or who the important players are.

WHAT IS A "CORRECT" VOTE DECISION?

Determining the "correctness" of a vote decision is not an easy task. Who is to decide what is "correct"? We are reluctant to define what is "good" for everyone; even if we were not, we doubt that many people would be willing to accept our judgments. Instead, we begin by defining "correctness" *based on the values and beliefs of the individual voter*, not on any particular ideology that presumes the values and preferences which *ought* to be held by members of different social classes, for instance, and not on any larger social goods or universal values. Given the limitations of human cognitive abilities discussed above, however, we are equally reluctant to accept as "correct" any individual vote just because it is freely chosen by that individual, as Downs (1957) and his followers might. Instead, we adopt a theoretical middle ground by defining "correctness" based on the "fully informed" interests of individual voters. As Dahl (1989, 180–1) writes, "a person's interest or good is whatever that person would choose with fullest attainable understanding of the experiences resulting from that choice and its most relevant alternatives." (See also Bartels 1990, Connolly 1972, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1995, Lippmann 1955, Mansbridge 1983). Thus, we define a "correct" vote decision as one that is the same as the choice which would have been made under conditions of full information. Ideally, this determination can best be made subjectively, by the voter, on an individual basis.

This paper has several purposes. First, we describe experimental work that attempts to operationalize this ideal of fully informed voters determining for themselves what is the correct vote decision. Second, we use this operationalization as a means of validating an easily obtainable measure of correct voting. In so doing, we move from a completely subjective, individually determined definition to a more objective, expert-determined judgment of which candidate best matches the voter's own stated preferences. The experimental data are crucial for justifying and validating an objective, externally determined measure. Third, having obtained it, we briefly illustrate the use of such measures with the 1972–88 American National Election Studies (ANES). These latter results provide important predictive validity for this measure. Finally, we return to the question of what ought to be required of citizens by democratic theory, once we have a better idea of just how well our disinterested, apathetic, uninformed citizens actually do in making their vote decisions.

A DYNAMIC, PROCESS TRACING METHOD FOR STUDYING THE VOTE CHOICE

We have designed an interactive experimental paradigm to study voter decision making that captures the crucial features of modern political campaigns: They are media-based; they provide an overwhelming amount of relevant information, some of which voters choose to expose themselves to, some of which comes to voters without any conscious decision to learn it, and much of which is simply missed; and they are dynamic, in the sense that information available today may be gone tomorrow (see Lau 1995 and Lau and Redlawsk 1992 and n.d. for more details). Our experiments involve a primary election with from two to four candidates in the Democratic and Republican primaries, followed by a general election campaign involving one candidate from each party.

In our experiment, brief descriptions of information available about candidates in the election (e.g., "Fisher's Stand on Welfare," "Martin's Family Background") scroll down a computer screen, and subjects (voters) must actively "access" the information in which they are interested by clicking on it with a mouse. This conscious search reveals the type of information which might be learned about a candidate from an opening paragraph in a newspaper or magazine article. Six of these descriptive labels appear on the screen at any given time, but only one item may be accessed at a time. Moreover, when an item is accessed the scrolling continues, hidden in the background, while subjects read the information they have chosen. Thus, an entirely new set of options faces a subject when s/he has finished reading the particulars of the item s/he chose and returns to the campaign. The information available at any point in a campaign is determined by a stochastic process within certain constraints meant largely to replicate the type of information available during American presidential campaigns.[1] At certain points, the computer screen is "taken over" by 20-second political advertisements for one of the candidates running in the election. Voters can close their eyes and ears when the ads come on, but they cannot do anything else relevant to the campaign until the commercial is over.

Our goal in designing this mock election simulation was to overwhelm people with information to force them to be selective in what they learn. The experiment that provided the data used here involved 212 distinct items which could be accessed during the primary campaign, including 26 individual policy stands, background information, and personality descriptions about each of six different candidates in the two parties' primary elections; endorsements by 11 different groups for candidates in each primary; the results of 24 different surveys conducted at various points during the campaign; and the results of five earlier primaries in each party. Eight to ten "televised" political advertisements also appeared during the course of the primary campaign. Thus, the simulation provided far more information than could possibly be handled by anyone, even under ideal conditions.

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were recruited from the central New Jersey area during fall 1994. The only two provisos were that they be American citizens at least 18 years old (i.e., eligible voters) and not currently going to college. Subjects were recruited by ads in local newspapers and by approaching charitable organizations (such as churches, PTA chapters, the American Legion) that could provide experimental subjects in return for the subject payment fee of $20. Subjects who responded directly to our advertisements were paid the $20 upon completion of the experiment.

We recruited 303 subjects for the experiment; the analyses reported below rely on data from 293 of them.[2] We make no claims that this is a representative sample of central New Jersey voters, much less the nation as a whole. We were successful in recruiting a broad range of people, but our subjects were slightly more likely to be female, college educated, and retired than is true of the area from which we recruited (according to the 1990 Census).

Procedure

All subjects participated in the experiment individually and in a reasonably private setting where there would be no interruptions. The complete experimental procedure is sketched in some detail in Figure 1. For current purposes, the crucial features are these. (1) Subjects initially completed a fairly standard political attitudes questionnaire in which their political preferences, knowledge, and so on, were determined. (2) After the nature of a mock 1996 presidential election was described and subjects were given practice using

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[1] To make these probabilities realistic, we first conducted an elaborate study of the prevalence of different types of information in newspapers during the 1988 presidential campaign (Lau 1992). We then modeled the probabilities after the actual prevalence of those types of information during the 1988 campaign.

[2] Of the 303 recruits, three were eliminated when they could not complete the study for time reasons (some subjects took more than 2½ hours to complete the experiment), two were eliminated because of computer errors, and another five were dropped because the experimenter, after running a subject, believed s/he had not taken the experiment at all seriously. Of the remaining 293 subjects, 60% were female; 84% were non-Hispanic whites; 22% had a high school education or less, while 52% were college educated; and 22% had family income under $25,000, while 25% had family income over $75,000. The median age was 52; half were currently employed, and one-third were retired; 30% were Catholic, 29% Protestant, 18% Jewish, with the remainder expressing some other or "no" religious preference. Forty percent were Democrats, 25% Republicans, and the remainder independents.

FIGURE 1. Outline of Experimental Procedure

1. Political Attitudes Questionnaire
   Questions to measure subjects'
   - political preferences;
   - political interest, participation, knowledge, and media usage;
   - importance of different types of political information for 1992 vote choice;
   - background/demographic information (about 30–40 mintes)
2. Mock Election Campaign
   a. Practice session accessing information with the mouse about 1988 presidential election (about 8 minutes)
   b. Explicit instructions and 1996 campaign scenario; random assignment to different experimental conditions (hidden from subjects) (about 5 minutes)
   c. Primary election campaign involving six candidates (about 22 minutes)
   d. Vote in party's primary election; evaluate all six candidates; manipulation check on difficulty of choice (about 3 minutes)*
   e. Break for party conventions; general election candidates selected (about 2 minutes)
   f. General election cmapaign involving two candidates (about 12 minutes)
   g. Vote in party's primary election; evaluate all six candidates; manipulation check on difficulty of choice (about 3 minutes)
3. Unexpected Memory Task
   Subjects were asked to remember as much as they could about two general election candidates. (about 10 minutes)
4. Correct Voting Determination
   Subjects were presented with complete information about two candidates from the primary (the one for whom they voted and, of the remaining candidates in that same party, the candidate closest to the subject on the issues) and asked to decide the one for whom they would have voted if they had obtained all this information when they actually had to made their choice (about 10–15 minutes)
5. Debriefing
   Subjects' general impressions of the experiment were gathered; any remaining questions were answered; and so forth. (about 5 minutes)

*Experiment II subjects completed the unexpected memory task (step 3) at this point for candidates in their party's primary. They then completed a detailed guided protocal analysis, to explain why they had selected the items they chose to examine during the primary, before determining their correct vote choice (step 4).

the computer, (3) subjects registered to vote in either the Democratic or Republican primary. They then experienced a primary campaign involving six candidates (two from one party and four from the other) and much more information than can possibly be processed. (4) After the primary campaign, subjects voted for one of the candidates in their party's primary. Finally, after several activities of no concern here,[3] (5) subjects determined if their vote was "correct."

Determining "Correct" Vote Choices

After the mock election campaign was over, subjects were questioned about their impressions of the experiment and were asked to complete one final task. The experimenter commiserated with each subject about how difficult the election had been but explained it was very important to know whether the subject thought s/he had voted "correctly." The pictures of two candidates from the primary election were shown on the computer screen, the one for whom the subject voted and another from that same party. If only two candidates from the party ran in the primary, then those two were shown. For the four-candidate primary there was some discretion, however, and to make this choice as difficult as possible, the computer was programmed to select the candidate (from the three available) who was closest to the subject on the issues.

The experimenter brought out a notebook in which all the information about these two candidates was laid out side-by-side, so that it was very easy to compare. Explaining that it was not possible to learn everything about any candidate during the experiment, the experimenter asked the subject to examine the material carefully and decide if s/he still would have voted the same way if s/he had known all the available information about these two candidates. These instructions were designed to get subjects to take this final task seriously and to set up a context in which they would feel free to change their mind about their initial vote choice in the primary without feeling defensive or foolish about that choice.

After the subjects carefully considered all the information about the two candidates, if they decided they still would have voted as they did, then we classified them as voting "correctly." If they would have *changed* their initial vote, then we classified them as voting "incorrectly." This is our first, and probably most defensible, measure of correct voting.[4]

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[3] We actually ran two different experiments that diverged after the vote in the primary election, but in this paper we only use information from the primary election campaign, which was essentially identical across the two experiments. The experiments also involved several other random manipulations, but only the two- versus four-candidate manipulation affected the probability of a correct vote, and for present purposes the other manipulations are ignored. For simplicity we have collapsed together subjects from the two experiments.

A Second Measure of Correct Voting

None of us can learn everything there is to know about the candidates in a real election, and few people are motivated to learn even what is readily available. Nonetheless, almost everyone *tries* to vote correctly, given what they have learned about the candidates (and parties) by election day. We now attempt to model how people could "naively" or "intuitively" go about making these decisions.

From the preelection questionnaire, we knew subjects' political preferences and policy stands. We also knew the candidates' stands, and those can be expressed on the same scales employed by subjects through the use of expert judges.[5] Most important, we knew exactly the information to which a voter was exposed about the different candidates. We did not know precisely how that information was evaluated by each individual, but we could make very informed guesses based on our knowledge of the voter's preferences. Thus, we were in an excellent position to try to model the vote decisions that people actually made in our experimental elections.

In fact, assuming that people try to vote correctly, this is essentially a second measure of correct voting—a *normative* measure of naive vote preferences. It is based on the voter's own values, to be sure, but ultimately is determined by the authors rather than the voter. We consciously juxtapose the terms "normative" and "naive" in the description of what we are trying to model. This variable is "naive" or "intuitive" in that it is based on the voter's actual information-gathering strategies rather than any ideal, logical, or expert-determined process; but it is "normative" in that it is based on an objective evaluation of that information. Thus, an objective determination can be made of the candidate for whom the subjects *should* have voted, given their own political preferences and the differential candidate information to which they were exposed.

Unfortunately, there is an almost infinite number of ways in which voters can combine information about the candidates with their own values and policy preferences to form candidate evaluations. After examining in some detail various methods that span the range of possibilities (but provide results very similar to those presented below), we provide data from one of the simplest procedures. We assume that voters average together the favorableness of all information they have learned about a candidate, weighting some parts of it more heavily than others. After comparing the summary evaluation of each candidate, voters should choose the candidate with the highest evaluation. This is essentially the method assumed by many popular models of the vote decision (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Kelley and Mirer 1974; Lau 1986, 1989; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; Markus and Converse 1979).

Three types of information went into each candidate evaluation in our experiment. First, the favorableness of a candidate's issue stands was calculated by the directional method (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989), with the mean rating of our seven experts providing the stands (refer to footnote 5). Whenever a voter learned a candidate's position on an issue, and if the voter had expressed an opinion about it in our initial questionnaire, agreement or disagreement on that issue (rescaled to range from -1 to $+1$) was added into the candidate's total evaluation. Second, group endorsements learned by a subject were scored $+1$ if the subject liked the group (i.e., rated it above the mean of all groups evaluated and above the midpoint of the scale), -1 if the subject disliked the group, and 0 if the subject was indifferent toward the group. Third, the favorableness of personality descriptions learned about candidates and the attractiveness of their picture used in campaign ads were based on the ratings of 67 independent pretest subjects, again rescaled such that $+1$ was the highest possible evaluation and -1 was the lowest possible.[6]

Each bit of information was weighted according to subjects' judgments (from the preexperiment questionnaire) about how important different broad types of information were to their vote in the last presidential election. The weights ranged between 0 ("Not at All Important") to 1 ("Most Important"). Because every individual evaluation was scaled to range between -1 and $+1$, and the total evaluation was divided by the number of items upon which it was based, the summary evaluation itself ranges between -1 and $+1$. A detailed example of our method of calculating candidate preference is given in the Appendix.

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[4] Besides random error, there are at least three plausible reasons subjects may not be completely accurate in their own assessment of the correctness of their initial vote choice. One is self-presentation: Despite our efforts to make it acceptable to revise one's decision—and we were careful to avoid such words as "mistake" and "incorrect"—some subjects still may have been reluctant to do so. A closely related reason is avoiding postdecision dissonance, or any unpleasant internal state resulting from learning that one has made a bad decision. A third reason is fatigue. This final task was presented after an average 126 minutes of prior effort (the range was 93 to 160, with a standard deviation of about 13 minutes), and the material about the two candidates was almost twelve pages long, single spaced. Nonetheless we stressed the importance of this "final task," and most subjects made a very serious effort.

[5] Seven "experts" (the two authors, four graduate students in political science at Rutgers, and one local elected official) read all issue positions taken by eight different candidates and rated them on seven-point scales, in keeping with the items and scales on the political attitudes questionnaire given to subjects. We used the mean rating of these seven judges, rounded to the nearest whole number, as the objective stand of each candidate on that issue.

[6] Thus, most information learned about a candidate figured into the evaluation. We have no way of knowing how subjects evaluated some of the available information, however, particularly about candidates' personal background. Although we have no reason to suspect systematic biases, it is quite possible that some subjects preferred senators over governors, people from Florida over people from California, lawyers over former newsmen, 45-year-olds rather than 65-year-olds, and so on. It is important to note that our knowledge of subjects' preferences is incomplete.

RESULTS

Candidate Choice

The first analytic task is to see how well this simple method of determining differential candidate preference predicts the actual vote choice of our subjects. This question is not as interesting in the context of a mock election campaign as it would be in a real election, but it is the question in which most studies of voting behavior are primarily interested, and it will demonstrate that our simple normative method of determining naive candidate preference is reasonable. We specified a logistic regression in which vote choice in the primary election is regressed on the difference between the candidate evaluation measures calculated for the two candidates offered to subjects for closer inspection after completing the main experiment. This single variable (which, of course, incorporates issue voting, group endorsements, and candidate appearance and personality) was highly significant ($p < .001$), correctly predicting more than 60% of the actual vote choices against a baseline of 50%—about as good as can be expected in a primary election campaign in which party cannot be used as a voting cue.

Predicting "Correct" Voting

Survey designs of actual elections are far better vehicles for learning why one particular candidate wins, of course, or for building methods to predict the direction of the vote choice. In contrast, we are primarily interested in understanding whether people voted correctly according to their fully informed interests. Since 70% of the subjects (206 out of 293) would not have changed their vote after learning everything there was to learn about the two candidates, by our definition they voted correctly. The remainder, by their own determination, voted "incorrectly."[7] This is our first important finding, although it is impossible to say how generalizable this proportion is, given that it is based on a mock election, albeit one designed to simulate the crucial aspects of real campaigns.

The first major question we pose is how well our normative measure of naive or intuitive candidate preference predicts fully informed correct voting. If the prediction is good, then we are justified in referring to it as a "normative" measure, and we are justified in using it as a second measure of correct voting, a surrogate for the more complete, but much more difficult to obtain, fully informed correct vote determination.

Thus, we specified a second logistic regression in which the subject's fully informed determination of the correct candidate was regressed on the normative candidate differential variable described above. This single variable is again highly significant ($p < .001$) and correctly predicts almost 66% of the correct vote choices—better than this same variable predicts the actual vote choice! This is strong validation of our normative candidate differential variable as another measure of correct voting. Just as important, *our normative method of determining candidate preferences does almost as well in determining "correct" voting decisions as did voters themselves* (who voted for the "correct" candidate 70% of the time).

This finding is the crux of our argument, and we want to put it in clear perspective. We have good, but certainly incomplete, knowledge of voters' preferences; based on this knowledge, we can make reasonable (but again far from perfect) inferences about how subjects evaluated the information they learned about the candidates. Knowing nothing about how voters actually combine these evaluations into a vote choice but by modeling a plausible alternative, *we can do almost as well in determining correct vote decisions as do voters themselves*, who have *perfect* knowledge of their own preferences and perfect knowledge of how favorably they responded to the candidate information to which they were exposed.

The reason our normative measure of naive candidate preference predicts a fully informed vote choice better than an actual vote choice is that voters, under normal information processing circumstances, cannot possibly achieve the care and objectivity that would be possible if they were given more time and the opportunity to become fully informed about two opposing candidates. With the aid of a powerful computer to help keep track of what has been learned about the multiple candidates, we can reasonably approximate that care and objectivity. In other words, under normal circumstances the vote decision is an intuitive, global judgment, and people with limited cognitive resources have a very hard time combining complex sets of information to make such judgments. Only when given the time and presented with the information in a very focused (only two candidates, not all six) and easily comparable format (similar information about the two candidates presented side by side) can people approach the objectivity of our simple averaging algorithm.[8]

Our results suggest that (1) voters in our experiment, confronted with the same type of time constraints and information overload faced by voters in actual elections, nevertheless do a pretty good job of selecting the candidate for whom they would have voted had there

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[7] Since fully 30% of the subjects were willing to say they would change their vote, implicitly admitting that they had voted "incorrectly," self-presentation concerns were probably not a major issue to most subjects (refer to footnote 4).

[8] The finding that fairly simple but objective algorithms for combining multiple criteria for judgment outperform naive (or expert) decision makers who rely on a global judgment is fairly common in the decision-making literature. Perhaps the classic example is Meehl's (1954) summary of 20 different studies comparing what he called "clinical" judgment to a statistical summary of objective information available to the decision maker. In no case was the global judgment found to be superior to the statistical summary. Dawes (1988) reviews many subsequent studies, all of which reach the same conclusion.

TABLE 1. Willingness to Change Original Vote as a Function of the "Quality" of the Original Choice

	Would Not Change	Would Change	Total	(*N*)
Worst candidate chosen	56%	44%	100%	(82)
Intermediate candidate	62%	38%	100%	(58)
Best candidate chosen	83%	17%	100%	(148)
	Tau $c = .26, p < .001$			

been no constraints on their information-gathering capabilities (i.e., if they have full information); but (2) they could clearly do better than they do under current circumstances, given more time or presented with information in a more easily "digestible" manner; and (3) we as researchers or external observers can determine fairly accurately who individual voters, given full information, would want to pick as their best choice.

Further Validation of the Normative Measure

We can provide additional evidence that our normative candidate differential measure is a reasonable approximation of a fully informed correct vote decision and is, in fact, what voters were trying to achieve during the correct vote determination stage of our experiment. First, we can ask if the *additional* information subjects learn about the candidates during the final correct voting determination task can predict whether they will want to change their initial choice. If we cannot understand how additional information may *change* decisions, then we probably do not have a very good grasp of how those decisions are reached in the first place.

To explore this question, we put subjects' actual vote choices into three categories according to our normative measure of candidate preference: Had subjects voted for the best possible alternative, the worst possible alternative, or (in the four-candidate condition) a candidate who fell between these two extremes? If our measure reasonably captures voters' fully informed preferences, then we should observe a much higher percentage of voters who want to change their vote among those who (according to our measure) originally voted for the worst possible candidate than among those who voted for the best possible candidate. The data, shown in Table 1, reflect just this pattern: Almost 44% of those who we thought picked the worst alternative were willing to admit a mistake after examining more information about the candidates, while less than 17% of those who we believed picked the best possible candidate wanted to change their mind.

As a final check that our normative measure of differential candidate preference is a good approximation of how voters would try to process information and decide who is their best choice if they had the opportunity, we can use the same procedures to model the *additional* information subjects gained about the candidates during the final task—that is, information not available to them when they made their actual vote choice. If our method is a good one, then this new variable, which incorporates all the new information presumably gained only after the campaign was over, should predict which of the two candidates was selected by subjects as their correct choice, after controlling for the actual vote choice.

To address this issue we (1) recoded the dependent variable to represent whether Candidate A or Candidate B (an arbitrary distinction) was determined by the subject to be the correct choice, (2) used as predictors whether subjects had originally voted for Candidate A or Candidate B, and (3) added a new variable reflecting an evaluation of the information learned about the two candidates after the original vote. The original vote reflects the intuitive or naive candidate choice. Whatever information was learned about the candidates during the primary election (plus whatever inferences people were willing to make) is reflected in this vote choice. We already know this will be a highly significant predictor; after being presented with more information, 70% of subjects reported they had voted correctly—a substantial improvement over a chance level of 50%.

The more interesting variable is the second in the equation, that is, the effect of the additional information gained from the fully informed correct voting task. If we as outside observers, knowing only the voters' preferences and the stands of the candidates, can predict fully informed choices better than can voters with their own intuitive methods (that is, if we do indeed have a good idea of what voters will believe is their best choice), then our information-gain variable should add significantly to the predictive power of the equation. As shown in Table 2, that is the case. Therefore, we are now even more confident that we understand how voters are determining their "correct" vote choice because we can predict how additional information about the alternatives influences that decision. Thus, we feel reasonably confident in offering our "normative" method for determining candidate preference as an alternative criterion for correct voting.

TABLE 2. Effect of New Information on Decision to Change Vote

	B	Wald	Signficance
Direction of actual vote	1.76 (.27)	41.86	.000
Effect of new information	.28 (.12)	5.35	.010
Constant	−1.32 (.20)	42.12	.000

Note: The *B* coefficients come from a logistic regression analysis; standard errors are in parentheses. For this analysis, −2 times the log likelihood was 323.93, while the model chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom was 5.03 ($p < .000$). Classification was correct for 71.2% of the cases. $N = 288$.

AN APPLICATION TO AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The results from our experiment are quite impressive. Confronted by an information environment in some ways even more difficult than an actual campaign, our subjects nevertheless voted correctly 70% of the time. Some skepticism may remain, however, about generalizing to an actual election. Any experimental study of the vote choice, no matter how realistic it attempts to be, is a far cry from a real campaign. In this section we illustrate how our method can be applied to ANES data.[9]

It is certainly possible to construct a measure analogous to our normative method of determining naive or intuitive candidate preference using the information in the typical ANES survey. There is no analog to our importance weights, but in analyses not reported here, an equal-weights version of our normative measure performed almost as well as the weighted version. Likewise, we have no direct measure of the candidate information to which a voter has been exposed, but we can use willingness to answer ANES questions about the candidates (e.g., to attribute an issue stand to a candidate) as a reasonable indirect measure. Using this analog, we can determine (with a great many qualifications, of course) the percentage of "correct" voting in different American presidential elections.

We pose three simple macro-level hypotheses about differences across elections in the percentage of voters who should have voted "correctly." To the extent these hypotheses are supported, they provide important predictive validity for our surrogate measure of correct voting as it can be operationalized from survey data.

Hypothesis 1. *Given limited cognitive resources, voters are more likely to make correct decision when there are fewer candidates than when there are more alternatives in the choice set. This suggests that voters were more likely to make correct choices in 1972, 1976, 1984, and 1988 than in 1980, when there was a reasonably successful third-party candidate running in the general election.*[10]

Hypothesis 2. *If the number of candidates is held constant, then voters will be more likely to make correct decisions when the candidates are easy to distinguish than when they are difficult to distinguish. This suggests rates of correct voting were higher in 1972, 1984, and 1988, when more ideologically extreme candidates captured the two parties' nominations, than in 1976, when more centrist candidates opposed each other.*

Hypothesis 3. *All else equal, voters will be more likely to make correct decisions when campaign resources are reasonably balanced, giving all candidates an equal opportunity to get their case across, than when resources are imbalanced. Phrased more cynically, this suggests that candidates whose campaign resources are greater than those of opponents can attract more support than should have been the case if everyone had voted "correctly."*

Table 3 presents the results of a preliminary test of these hypotheses. Without going into all the details (which are left for the Appendix), we have replicated as closely as possible with ANES data an equal-weights version of our normative measure of naive candidate preference. In addition to party identification, every policy issue and candidate-group linkage that could be objectively estimated was included in the analysis. Taking this measure as our criterion of "correct" voting, we can determine the proportion of correct voters in recent American presidential elections.

Table 3 is broken into five sections, one for each presidential election between 1972 and 1988. The top row of each section displays the proportion of voters for each candidate (and the overall proportion) who, by our determination, voted correctly. These numbers range between a low of 51% for John Anderson in 1980 to a high of 89% for Walter Mondale in 1984. Overall accuracy of voting across these five elections ranges from just under 68% up to 79%, with a mean of 75%.

Consistent with hypothesis 1, the mean number of correct votes in years with two major candidates, 77.1%, is significantly higher than the mean of 67.8% ($z = 5.81$, $p < .001$) for 1980, when there was an important third-party candidate.[11] Consistent with hypothesis 2, the mean number of correct votes in the three two-candidate elections with ideologically distinct candidates, 77.7%, is greater than in the one year with two centrist candidates, 75.5% ($z = 1.83$, $p < .04$, one-tailed).

The data necessary for testing hypothesis 3 are less straightforward. Each section of Table 3 provides ANES data on the percentage of voters who reported voting for each of the major presidential candidates

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[9] The data used in the following analyses were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The 1972 data were originally collected by Warren Miller, Arthur Miller, Richard Brody, Jack Dennis, David Kovenock, Merrill Shanks, and the Center for Political Studies (Miller et al. 1975). The 1976 data were originally collected by Warren Miller, Aruthur Miller, and the Center for Political Studies (Miller et al. 1977). The 1980, 1984, and 1988 data were originally collected by Warren Miller and the National Election Studies (1982, 1986, 1989). Neither the collector of the original data nor the consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[10] The sporadic Ross Perot candidacy in 1992 appeared unlikely when the ANES staff made the final decisions about their preelection survey. This resulted in a dearth of questions about Perot in the survey and precludes that election from this analysis.

[11] If we consider only Carter and Reagan voters as the most appropriate comparison group (and ignore Anderson voters), then the 1980 proportion increases to 69.4% voting correctly, but the hypothesis is still strongly supported ($z = 4.53$, $p < .001$).

One reviewer suggested this hypothesis could be confounded by "strategic" vote considerations (e.g., Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde, 1992), for example, voters realizing that Anderson was their "best" choice but that he could not win and thus voting for their "second best," who had a much better chance. Such considerations should not affect the relative rankings of the three candidates on feeling thermometer evaluations, however. We repeated this analysis, substituting the relative ranking measure for the actual vote choice. With this alternative criterion the overall proportion of correct votes (or rankings) actually falls to 66.9%. If we limit the analysis to voters who evaluated Carter or Reagan highest, the proportion correct remains at 69.4%. In neither case would it appear that strategic voting considerations provide an alternative explanation for these results.

TABLE 3. Correct Voting in American Presidential Elections, 1972–88

Presidential Candidate	% Supporters Voting Correctly	% Reported Vote	% Predicted Correct Vote	Deviation, Reported − Predicted	% General Election Spending	Deviation of Spending from Proportional Share	Overall Accuracy
1972							79%
McGovern	74.5	35.7	38.5	−2.8	33.7	−16.3	
Nixon	81.5	64.3	61.5	2.8	66.3	16.3	
1976							75.5%
Carter	72.2	51.1	47.1	4.0	52.4	2.4	
Ford	78.9	48.9	52.8	−3.9	47.6	−2.4	
1980							67.8%
Carter	64.0	40.0	34.6	5.4	40.0	6.7	
Reagan	73.7	51.6	46.5	5.1	47.7	14.3	
Anderson	50.6	8.5	19.0	−10.5	12.3	−21.0	
1984							76.8%
Mondale	89.0	41.8	55.7	−13.9	40.5	−9.5	
Reagan	68.0	58.2	44.2	14.0	59.5[a]	9.5	
1988							77.1%
Dukakis	78.2	47.1	49.4	−2.3	53.0	3.0	
Bush	76.1	52.9	50.5	2.4	47.0	−3.0	

Note: Data are from the 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988 ANES.

[a] Includes spending during primaries because Reagan was essentially unchallenged, and his campaign manager is quoted as saying that all spending during the primaries was aimed at the general election campaign.

that year; the percentage each candidate would have received if all voters, by our calculations, had voted correctly; and the difference between the two (a positive difference indicates the candidate received more votes than he "should" have, while a negative difference means he received fewer votes than he should have); the percentage of all money spent by each candidate (or on his behalf) during the general election campaign[12]; and the difference between that percentage and a proportional share of all spending (i.e., 100% divided by the number of candidates).

The crucial data for hypothesis 3 are in the two rows of deviation or difference scores. If hypothesis 3 is correct, then candidates with a disproportionately larger share of campaign resources (i.e., a positive difference in the bottom row of each section of the table) should be able to win more votes than they correctly "should" have (i.e., a positive difference in the fourth row of each section of the table), while candidates with a disproportionately smaller share should, all else equal, receive fewer votes than they should have. The Spearman rank-order correlation between these two difference scores is .77, $p < .01$, providing strong confirmation of the third hypothesis.

DISCUSSION

Any political philosophy presumes a view, a psychological theory, of human nature (Lau 1985). Classic democratic theory sets unrealistic standards for ideal citizens at least in part because it holds unrealistic expectations about the very nature of human cognition. Beginning with a more circumscribed human psychology, we can set more realistic goals for democratic citizens—and still judge how readily those goals are met.

We offer a very simple standard: Irrespective of how the vote decision is reached, how frequently do voters vote correctly? To ask this question implies that one has an answer, or at least a method for obtaining the answer. Relying on notions of "fully informed" interests, we have suggested one such method. Our analyses of both experimental and survey data show that our method does a reasonably good job of measuring correct voting. Had we relied only on the experimental data and its rather artificial full-information determination of correct voting, our findings would have been of more limited value. But the second measure of correct voting, available in both experiments and surveys, should prove to be much more useful because it is much more widely applicable. Moreover, that we have found corroborating evidence from two very different research designs lends much credence to either set of findings alone.

We do not want to suggest that our method is the only way, or even the best way, of determining "correct" voting. Recently, Bartels (1996) and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1995) have presented research that, although aimed at a very different purpose, could be construed as alternative approaches to correct voting. Bartels (1996) seeks to find the political consequences of an electorate which, as a whole, is notoriously low in political knowledge. He addresses this question by estimating a logistic analysis which includes the vote decision regressed on 20 variables representing various demographic characteristics and the interaction between each of them and a measure of political knowledge. Based on significant interaction terms, Bartels concludes that the informed and uninformed portions of the electorate do vote differently and, moreover, that the results of close elections could change if uninformed voters voted as if they had full information. Although Bartels does not use the term "correct" to describe the votes of the fully informed, it is easy to make that interpretation and to call the votes of the less well informed, to the extent they differ, incorrect. His approach is drastically different from ours in that it completely avoids the "political values and preferences" that form the basis of our determination of what is correct, presumably because if the vote decisions of the less informed could be wrong, then so, too, could the political preferences upon which those decisions are based.

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[12] These spending figures are reported in great detail in Alexander 1975, 1979, 1983; Alexander and Bauer 1991; and Alexander and Haggerty 1987.

Delli Carpini and Keeter (1995) have the same aim as Bartels, to demonstrate the political consequences of low political information. They begin with two plausible assumptions: (1) Material interests differ across various gender, class, race, and age divisions in society, and (2) the more politically informed will be better able to discern their interests. The latter assumption clearly allows us to label the opinions of the most politically informed as "correct" and the opinions of the less politically informed, if they differ, as "incorrect," although Delli Carpini and Keeter are not this explicit. Their finding that the well-informed hold political opinions different from those of the poorly informed shows that information matters and, in general, tends to increase group differences on political issues. Delli Carpini and Keeter go on to show that the amount of political information affects the extent of issue voting. They note that the most politically informed women had a strong vote preference for Bill Clinton in 1992, but women in the lowest quartile of information preferred George Bush. Delli Carpini and Keeter do not take the step that for our purposes would be most relevant—tracing the extent to which holding "incorrect" opinions led the least politically informed to vote "incorrectly"—although we could imagine how one could perform this analysis.

Thus, we can point to three quite different methods of determining a "correct" vote. Each has its merits and problems, and we are not suggesting that our method is superior to the others. But we do suggest that the issue of "correct voting" is a very important one, and we hope that we have illustrated at least one way in which it can be addressed empirically.

Taking our results at face value, we can return to the question with which we began: Is 75% of voters voting correctly in a typical presidential election "good enough" for a system of government to be considered truly democratic? We are pleasantly surprised by these results: This high a level of "correct" voting certainly validates the efficiency of heuristic-based information processing that underlies our view of human nature (but see Bartels 1996). Moreover, it challenges those critics who hold that democracies' problems stem primarily from people not having the motivation to gather sufficient information to figure out what is in their best interest. Most people, most of the time, can make this calculation, at least in presidential elections.

But is this level high enough for us to consider that (at least) the American version of democracy "works" at some minimal level? It is certainly too soon to draw any firm conclusions about this question in any case, and we should mention several very important caveats.

First, if 75% of voters are voting correctly in the typical presidential election, then 25% are voting incorrectly. If this group were distributed randomly, then it would not be much of a problem, but our test of hypothesis 3 demonstrates otherwise. Candidates with more money have an advantage. Here is yet one more argument for serious campaign reform of American elections.

Second, the analyses in Table 3 only consider voters, but barely half of eligible Americans vote. The interests of nonvoters are beyond the scope of this paper but certainly not beyond the scope of theoretical concern.

Third, we have only examined presidential elections, but our federal system ensures that much of what is important in politics happens at lower levels of government. At those levels, we would expect even less correct voting—or at least for elections with less media attention than presidential campaigns, which is to say all others. If 75% of voters were to vote correctly for president and 65% were to vote correctly for mayor, we would be quite happy. If 75% were to vote correctly for president and 25% were to vote correctly for mayor, we would not.

Political science as a field has only begun to map out the "correct voting" landscape. A great deal more research must be conducted before empirical political science can be of much help to normative theorists struggling with this question.

Whatever may ultimately prove to be the answer to the question of the extent to which any system of government can be considered truly democratic, no one would argue that things cannot be improved. Given a metric of "correct" voting, we can turn to the equally important issue of what leads people to make more or less optimal decisions. This can be addressed at both the individual and institutional level. For example, we could ask if particular information search tactics or different decision or choice strategies lead some individuals to make better decisions than others. Bartels's (1996) recent findings warn us not to assume that all voters use heuristics and other information shortcuts equally effectively. We could ask whether different practices the media have developed for covering campaigns encourages or discourages the more effective information-processing strategies. We could ask whether institutional arrangements that favor two-party systems or that separate the fates of executives and legislators change the probability of correct voting. And we could study whether certain campaign tactics are particularly effective in distorting the "correct" outcome of an election and, if so, consider means of discouraging those tactics. All these questions—which a "relevant" political science ought to be asking—can only be addressed with a defensible measure of correct voting.

APPENDIX

Calculating "Naive" Candidate Evaluations in the Experiments

We assume that voters consider four general types of information in forming evaluations of candidates: party affiliation, issue stands, group endorsements, and a candidate's personality/appearance. For the first three categories the voter's own values or preferences are important (i.e., their party identification, issue stands, and their evaluation of the groups doing the endorsing), along with "objective" standards of where the candidates stand on the issues and the facts about the party each candidate belongs to and which candidate a group endorses. Because we are looking only at choice during a primary election, party affiliation becomes irrelevant as a means of choosing between candidates and, for present purposes, was ignored.

Issue Stands. Every issue for which a subject (1) expressed a stand on the pre-experiment questionnaire, and (2) learned a candidate's position (generally by choosing to "access" that information during the campaign, but also by exposure to a campaign advertisement) contributed one item toward that candidate's summary evaluation. We employed Rabinowitz and MacDonald's (1989) "directional theory" of issue voting, which argues that being on the same "side" of an issue is the most important consideration in issue voting. For computation, Rabinowitz and MacDonald suggest subtracting the midpoint of the scale from the voter's own opinion and from some determination of the candidate's position before multiplying the two together. With 7-point scales, the resulting product can range in theory from -9 to $+9$, but in practice depends on the range of opinions expressed by voters and the actual stand taken by the candidate. Each item was rescaled to range between -1 and $+1$. The candidate's positions were determined objectively by a panel of experts who carefully read each position taken by a candidate and placed it on the same scale subjects were using to express their political opinions (see footnote 5).

Group Endorsements. Eleven groups endorsed a candidate in each party's primary. Subjects had previously evaluated those groups (e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union) on 100-point feeling thermometers. Voters were considered to "like" groups they evaluated above the midpoint of the scale (50) and (to control for individual differences in use of the feeling thermometer) above the mean of all groups evaluated; they were considered to "dislike" groups rated below 50 and below their personal mean of all groups evaluated. Then any time a voter learned (through accessing that item) that a group endorsed a particular candidate, the endorsement (scored $+1$ if the group was liked and -1 if the group was disliked) counted one additional item toward that candidate's evaluation.

Candidate Personality/Appearance. Four different brief personality descriptions were available about each candidate, and one picture. (The picture could be accessed as a separate item, but it also appeared for the last five seconds of every campaign commercial.) All of these items were rated for their "attractiveness" by 67 pretest subjects. The mean ratings of the 67 pretest subjects, rescaled to range between -1 and $+1$, were treated as the "objective" value of that information. Every personality description accessed by a subject contributed one additional item toward that candidate's evaluation. Because all subjects saw every candidate's picture at least once (during a campaign advertisement sponsored by the candidate), the mean rating of the picture contributed one last item to each candidates total.

Importance Weights. Early in the pre-election questionnaire subjects were asked to think back to the 1992 presidential election and to explain briefly, in their own words, why they had voted for (or preferred, if they had not voted in 1992) one of the candidates over the others. After this recollection, subjects were asked to look at ten reasons people sometime give for voting for one candidate over another, and to pick the *one* that was the most important factor they used in deciding how to vote in 1992. The ten factors listed for consideration were "Appearance/I Just Liked Him Best," "Candidates' Party Affiliations," "Groups/Persons Supporting Him," "Couldn't Stand the Other Two Candidates," "Just Time for a Change," "Most Trustworthy Candidate," "Foreign/Defense Policies," "Economic Policies," "Social Policies," "Most Competent/Qualified Person." After subjects had chosen the one most important factor, they were asked to consider the remaining ones and select those that were "very important" in their vote decision. Subjects were allowed to select any number of reasons as very important. Finally, subjects were asked to consider any remaining factors and select those that were "not at all important" in their vote decisions. Again, any number of factors could be chosen. The most important factor was given a weight of 1; "Very Important" reasons were given a weight of .67; "Not at All Important" reasons were given a weight of 0; and any remaining reasons were considered to be "Somewhat Important" and given a weight of .33.

The information available about the mock candidates was then matched up with one of these ten reasons (all but "Couldn't Stand the Other Two Candidates" and "Just Time for a Change"), and the weight assigned to that reason was used as the "importance weight" of that particular type of information.

Summary Evaluations. Each item was multiplied by its weight before the mean was calculated. Then "naive differential candidate evaluations" were computed by subtracting the mean rating of the candidate a subject did not vote for from the summary evaluation of the candidate a subject did vote for. This difference score is positive if the subject voted for the candidate we calculated they should like the most, and negative if they voted for the other candidate. The greater the difference in evaluation of these two candidates, the stronger the presumed preference.

As an example, suppose a subject voted for "Chris Rodgers" during the primary election and, at the conclusion of the experiment, was asked to consider carefully all information about Rodgers and "Pat Thomas," another candidate in the same primary. During the campaign this subject learned Rodgers's stand on affirmative action (objectively determined to be 6), abortion (7), and defense spending (5), and Thomas's stand on abortion (4) and crime (6). To make life easy, let us assume this subject took conservative stands (i.e., 6) on all of these issues herself. During the course of the campaign two group endorsements were learned: the National Taxpayers Association preferred Rodgers, as did the National Rifle Association. This subject had previously rated "groups that try to limit taxes" 85 on a feeling thermometer, well above her personal mean of all groups rated (63); but disliked the National Rifle Association (thermometer rating of only 25). Two personality descriptions were learned about Rodgers, a family friend's description (rated .75 by the 67 pretest subjects) and an anecdote from the candidate's mother (rated .20); and two personality descriptions were learned about Thomas, a staff member's description (.60) and a political opponent's description ($-.50$). Pictures of both Rodgers

(.10) and Thomas (.23) were seen during political advertisements. During the pre-election questionnaire this subject had selected "Social Policies" as the most important reason for her 1992 presidential vote choice (given a weight of 1), "Foreign/Defense Policies" and "Groups/Persons Supporting Him" as very important reasons (weights of .67), "Most Trustworthy Candidate" and "Most Competent/Qualified Person" as somewhat important (weights of .33), and "Appearance/I Just Liked Him Best" as not at all important (weight of 0).

Table A-1 summarizes this information, and the way each bit of it was presumed to be evaluated. Rabinowitz and MacDonald's "directional" calculations (shown in the table only for Rodgers) are straightforward. These values are the numerator for the "rescaling." The denominator varies across issues; it is based on the presumption that subjects will use the entire 1 through 7 range of the attitude scale (and hence the first multiplicand is −3 or +3 at its extreme. The second multiplicand is constant across subjects, however, always equaling the objective rating of the candidate's position minus 4. The difference in the potential range of values across Rodgers's stand on abortion, affirmative action, and defense spending is reflected in the denominator used for the rescaling of those three issues (9, 6, and 3, respectively). The National Taxpayers Association endorsement counts +1 for Rodgers (because that group is liked), but the NRA endorsement counts −1, as that group is disliked. Ratings of the personality descriptions and appearance of the candidates have already been rescaled in the figures listed in the table. The mean candidate evaluation is simply calculated by summing the evaluation of every individual bit of information learned about a candidate, multiplied by its importance weight, and dividing by the total number of such bits of information. We would predict that this subject, "naively" calculating differential candidate evaluations, should decide to vote for Rodgers, because in this example he was the more highly evaluated candidate.

Calculating "Correct Voting" in the ANES Surveys

Our goal in establishing criteria for determining the candidate a respondent should have voted for was to include as many of the criteria for candidate evaluation that have been identified by prior research as possible, allowing respondents to determine their own preferences while relying primarily on "objective" criteria for rating the candidates. We included four categories of predictors: party affiliation, agreement with a candidate's policy stands, candidate-social group linkages, and (for incumbents running for reelection) performance evaluations. Emotional responses and trait ascriptions were not included because we could think of no defensible way to get an objective measure of them. The bulk of the items on which we rely were not introduced into the ANES surveys until 1972, and thus we go back only that far. We do not include 1992 in the analysis because there is a dramatic difference in the number of items available to evaluate Perot relative to Clinton and Bush. In general (although the survey analysis included a few more "types" of information), the "correct voting" determination in these surveys was calculated in exactly the same way as the "naive" candidate evaluations in the experiments, with one major exception: All weights were either 0 or 1. In all cases we rescaled the individual items to range between −1 and +1, with −1 representing the most negative evaluation and +1 representing the most positive evaluation. Summary evaluations of each candidate were determined by the simple mean of all nonmissing evaluative items; the "correct" candidate that should have been voted for is the one with the highest summary evaluation.

Party Identification. The 7 points of the standard party identification scale were recoded to equidistant values between −1 and +1, with "Strong Democrat" at −1 and "Strong Republican" at +1. The resulting item was included in this form in the summary evaluation of Republican candidates; it was multiplied by −1 before being included in the summary evaluation of Democratic candidates. As an example of how this variable worked, all weak Democrats received a +.67 toward their summary evaluation of McGovern in 1972, and a −.67 toward their summary evaluation of Nixon. Because Anderson ran in the general election as an independent in 1980, party identification was not relevant to his summary evaluation.

Agreement with Candidates' Policy Stands. All political attitudes on which respondents were asked for their own opinions and for their perceptions of the candidates' positions were considered. We established "objective" criteria for

TABLE A-1. Hypothetical Ratings of Two Candidates in Experiment

	Hypothetical Voter's Stand	Rodgers's Stand	Rabinowitz Directional Calculation	Rescaled	Importance Weights	Thomas's Stand	Rescaled	Importance Weights
Issue stands								
Abortion	6	7	(6 − 4 × (7 − 4) = 6	6/9 = .67	× 1.00	4	0	× 1.00
Affirmative action	6	6	(6 − 4) × (6 − 4) = 4	4/6 = .67	× 1.00			
Crime	6					6	4/6 = .67	× 1.00
Defense spending	6	5	(6 − 4 × (5 − 4) = 2	2/3 = .67	× .67			
Group endorsements								
Nat'l Taxpayers Assoc.	(liked group)			1.00	× .67			
Nat'l Rifle Assoc.	(disliked group)			−1.00	× .67			
Personality descriptions								
from family friend		.75			× .33			
from staff member						.67		× .33
from political opponent						−.50		× .33
anecdote from mother		.20			× .33			
Candidate's appearance		.10			× 0	.25		× 0
			Weighted sum		Σ = 2.08			Σ = .72
			Mean candidate evaluation		.30			.18

TABLE A-2. Correct Voting, 1972 ANES

		Political Experts' Mean Determination	
Issue Stands	Respondent's Position	Nixon's Stand	McGovern's Stand
Guaranteed jobs	V172	4.7	2.3
Tax rates	V178	4.5	2.8
Vietnam withdrawal	V184	4.8	1.6
Fighting inflation	V190	3.4	3.1
Legalizing marijuana	V196	5.5	3.3
School busing	V202	5.3	3.1
National health insurance	V208	4.8	2.4
Pollution	V214	3.3	2.5
Women's role	V232	3.5	2.7
Treatment of criminals	V621	4.3	2.8
Minority aid	V629	4.3	2.4
Liberalism-conservatism	V652	5.1	2.2
Solving urban unrest	V670	4.3	2.5
Student demonstrations	V678	5.1	2.8
Job performance evaluation	V46	3.9	
Groups with close links to Nixon: Businessmen, southerners, conservatives			
Groups with close links to McGovern: Liberals, poor people, blacks			
Party identification	V140		

Note: Data come from the 1972 ANES (Miller et al., 1975, Study #7010).

where each candidate stood on those issues by first creating a scale of political knowledge (from responses to all questions that clearly had a correct answer), and then taking the mean perceptions of where the candidates stand on the issues of all respondents above the median on the resulting political knowledge scale. Tables A-1 and A-2 list the particular items that were used to gather the respondent's opinion of these issues, and the resulting objective placements of each candidate on those same issues. As in the experiments, agreement scales were computed via the "directional" method suggested by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989). Thus, each political attitude on which a respondent expressed an opinion contributed one additional item to the evaluation of each candidate.

Candidate-Social Group Linkages. Beginning in 1972 the ANES surveys ask respondents which of a list of social groups they feel "close to." We then calculated a simple crosstab between each "closeness" item and the reported vote. Whenever this crosstab resulted in a significant relationship between feeling close to a group and preference for one of the candidates, a candidate-group linkage item was created, scored 0 for respondents who did not feel close to the group and 1 for respondents who did feel close to the group, and added to the summary evaluation of that candidate. As an example, in 1972 respondents who felt close to liberals, poor people, and blacks all showed a significant vote preference for McGovern; while respondents who felt close to businessmen, southerners, and conservatives showed a significant vote preference for Nixon.

Incumbent's Job Performance. In every election year where a sitting president was running for reelection, survey respondents were asked for their perceptions of the incumbent's job performance, both an overall perception and more specific (e.g., economic policy; foreign policy) perceptions. We recoded each such performance evaluation to run from +1 (Strongly Approve) to −1 (Strongly Disapprove), and added them to the summary evaluation of the incumbent candidate.

Table A-2 lists the specific items that were used in the correct voting determination for the 1972 ANES, along with the objective criteria that were used in this determination. Similar tables for the 1976–88 ANES are available from the authors upon request.

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Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics

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In some African countries, democratic openings have intensified ethnic competition and led to protracted transitions or outright conflict. In Kenya, I argue, the stalled transition reflects the effects of republican *citizenship in ethnic political communities and* liberal *citizenship in the national political community. This duality in citizenship engenders conflict over democracy—conceived as liberal majoritarian democracy—and results in ethnic coalitions disagreeing over which institutions are appropriate for a multiethnic state. I provide evidence from discourses over institutions from two transition periods in Kenya: at independence and in the recent shift from one-party rule. This study makes two contributions. First, it adds to current citizenship theory, which is largely derived from Western experience, by demonstrating that republican and liberal citizenships are not necessarily compatible and that the modern nation-state is not the only relevant community for forming citizens. Second, it adds to studies of African transitions by highlighting citizenship issues in institutional design with regard to ethnicity in Kenya.*

The recent political transition in Kenya provoked a debate over which institutions are appropriate to govern a multiethnic democracy. This continuing debate reflects the enduring and problematic relevance of ethnicity to democratic politics there and elsewhere in Africa (Glickman 1995, Ottaway 1994).[1] Yet, few studies of recent political change in Africa have focused on the discourse over democratic institutions, especially with regard to balancing competing ethnic interests (e.g., Diamond 1987, Diamond and Plattner 1994, Lemarchand 1995). This lacuna contrasts with work on the transition from colonial rule—the initial period of structuring democratic institutions—in which questions of ethnic balance of power featured prominently in constitutional negotiations and in political practice (see, especially, Rothchild 1964, 1968a and b, 1973; see also Bates 1974, Enloe 1973, Melson and Wolpe 1970, Olorunsola 1972, van den Berghe 1975, and Young 1976). One shortcoming of present studies is the typical conclusion reached when the transition to liberal majoritarian democracy flounders. For instance, in countries where political liberalization has been especially protracted (e.g., Kenya, Cameroon, Togo) or has led to state instability or atrophy (e.g., Burundi, Nigeria), analysts have been content to catalog the incumbents as stubborn antidemocrats or dictators harking on primordial ethnic attachments to maintain power.

In these failed transitions where ethnicity is evidently a factor in mobilizing for political change or for anticipated electoral politics, a more robust explanation for the conflict can be found by applying the theoretical framework of citizenship. While the conflict between the postcolonial state and ethnic subnationalism has been a consistent theme in studies of African politics (e.g., Diamond 1988a and b, Glickman 1995, Olorunsola 1972, Rothchild 1968a and b, Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983, Young 1976), the citizenship lens provides a more precise way of theorizing the relationship between ethnic identity, authority, and legitimacy.[2] Most research on ethnic politics, including more sophisticated analyses cognizant of the contextual and constructed nature of ethnicity, imply that ethnic mobilization and political action flow reflexively from identity. The moral and temporal underpinnings of the process that lends authority and legitimacy to ethnicity, and hence undergirds ethnic action, is not explained. In short, present work does not explain why rational individuals respond to ethnic mobilization. For instance, the well-known propensity for ethnically mobilized "census-type" elections (Bienen and Herbst 1996, 36–7; Horowitz 1985, 83–7; 1991, 91–100; 1994) is an empirical characterization that can be explained as a rational response to citizenship demands within ethnic communities.[3]

This paper demonstrates, with evidence from two transitional periods in Kenya, how ethnic politics arises

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[1] African countries that have debated or adopted institutional alternatives to accommodate subnationalism include Burundi, where power sharing has been attempted with mixed results (Lemarchand 1995); Tanzania, where the union between mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar has come under intense discussion (Kaiser 1996); Ethiopia, where the overthrow of the Marxist regime led to regionalism and independence for Eritrea; Uganda, where the current no-party grassroots democracy is an attempt to avoid ethnic and denominational divisions inherent in organized parties; Nigeria, with its perennial creation of new federal states to accommodate claims to self-determination and its recent attempt to legislate only two political parties; and post-apartheid South Africa, with its transitional government of national unity and negotiated constitution (Sisk 1995). See also Selassie 1992, more generally.

[2] I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this precise formulation.

[3] A census-type or polarizing election (Horowitz 1985, 83–7, 326; 1991, 97–8) is one in which voting is largely along ascriptive lines, leading to an outcome that is akin to a census of the different groups in the body politic and that gives the largest group a lock on power.

due to different and competing forms of citizenship in the nation-state and in ethnic communities. This perspective enriches the explanation of why ethnic loyalties undermine national stability by pointing to not only different loyalties (the stock explanation) but also different *forms* of loyalty. Moreover, citizenship theory highlights how particular democratic institutions are perceived by different elites as presenting opportunities for or constraints to their drive for state power through ethnic mobilization within electoral politics. Citizenship theory is especially appropriate in reviewing ethnicity in Africa because it introduces a discourse of rights and obligations as well as of opportunity and constraint in a political community. While such a discourse has been absent in previous studies, it is at the heart of the current political evolution in Africa, propelled by actors who see democracy as essential to assuring equitable access to state power and to curbing the abuse of that power against individuals and groups. By allowing us to invoke and envision individual rights within the context of group rights in a democratic society (Kymlicka 1995), citizenship theory is especially helpful in understanding ethnic politics and claims for self-determination within emergent democracies.

CITIZENSHIP

Fundamentally, citizenship "defines those who are, and who are not, members of a common society" (Barbalet 1988, 1). It expresses "a set of normative expectations specifying the relationship between the nation-state and its individual members which procedurally establish the rights and obligations of members and a set of practices by which these expectations are realized" (Waters 1989, 160). Therefore, citizenship allows one to participate in a community while enjoying certain rights and being obligated to perform certain duties in return. To the extent that ethnic groups in modern nation-states constitute identifiable communities of belonging and social practice, the traditional trajectory of citizenship theory has hindered its application to ethnic politics for two reasons. First, most discussions of citizenship that draw from North American and European experiences assume a single political community—the modern state—in which individuals participate and into which those previously excluded are admitted through the expansion of civil, political, and social rights (Marshall 1965). Thus, citizenship is held to be coterminous with the modern, democratic nation-state. Second, while debate abounds about differing conceptions of citizenship—liberal, civic-republican, and libertarian—the dominant view is that only one form can or ought to exist in a modern state, viewed as a single political community.[4] A related but less rigid consensus holds liberal citizenship as the hallmark of modern democracy.

The dominant understanding of citizenship as coterminous with the nation-state has recently been challenged by an emerging recognition of other communities as venues for elaborating citizenship.[5] Thus, in an age of increased globalization, Soysal (1994) and Roche (1995) view "transnational citizenship" as a distinct reality superseding the narrow national scope in terms not only of belonging but also of rights and obligations. This rings especially true in the wake of European unification. Alternatively, Stewart seeks to validate the subnational or substate level as an arena of enacting citizenship, which he terms "democratic citizenship," defined by a "*common* membership of a *shared* and *imminent* community" (1995, 75, emphasis in original). Such a citizenship is claimed and defined by political action launched from small communities of shared values and experience and enacted in the public sphere. This recognition of spheres of citizen formation other than the nation-state makes possible an analysis of ethnic groups as political communities in which citizenship can be formed and sustained.

The claim of the primacy of a singular form of citizenship in one political community is countered by Peled's (1992) analysis of Israel, in which he demonstrates the existence of two different forms of citizenship for two ethnic groups within one state. For Jews—the core members—the state prescribes a civic-republican citizenship, which allows them to secure a large bundle of rights and to participate fully in the national public sphere. For Arabs, the Israeli state extends liberal citizenship, which allows them "civil and political rights but [bars them] from attending to the common good" (Peled 1992, 436). A significant example of such exclusion from duty to the "common good" is the debarment of Arab Israelis from conscription. While Peled's analysis still assumes the nation-state as the central locus of defining and sustaining citizenship, his illustration of the coexistence of liberal and republican forms of citizenship is useful to apply to ethnically divided states in Africa. When combined with the recognition of substate political communities as arenas of citizen formation, the possibility of coexisting citizenships and *forms* of citizenship provides a powerful instrument to explain ethnic conflict in democratic politics in Kenya.

CITIZENSHIP AND ETHNICITY

Ethnic identity in Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon whose salience is largely a product of colonial rule (Ekeh 1975, Kalinga 1985, Young 1976) and of postcolonial dynamics in which elites have continued to reify ethnic identity for political mobilization (Lentz 1994, Sithole 1985, van Binsbergen 1994). In the case of Kenya, groups viewed today as monolithic entities were in fact not coherent communities before colonial rule. The Abaluhya, for example, are an ethnic group created by colonial anthropologists, missionaries, and administrators.[6] The name Baluhya dates only to the 1920s, when it was used to profess the unity of Bantu-speaking groups to which the British referred as the North Kavirondo, an administrative aggregation of sixteen separate groups; although proximate in location and having related languages, they differed sufficiently from one another to make unity elusive (Abwunza 1993, 130–5; Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 171; Kaplan 1984, 90–1, 96–7; Ogot 1981, 8). The British classification of these groups as one was strategically adopted by elites from the subgroups to assert unity for political goals, for example, through the creation of the Baluhya Political Union to join the independence struggle. Today, the artificiality of Abaluhya identity is marked by perennial divisions, especially among politicians, interrupted by brief interludes of unity when corporate interests are threatened.[7] Despite its recent and artificial nature, however, ethnic identity is instrumental in shaping individual interests and actions in the modern Kenyan state.

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[4] For now, it will suffice to note that the liberal vision of citizenship holds that rights are inherent in individuals, are prior to community, and are guaranteed with minimal obligations to the community, while the civic-republican view sees rights not as inherent but as acquired through civic practice that upholds obligations to the community. The libertarian vision, which will not be discussed in this article, considers citizenship a contractual exchange into which rational individuals enter in order to gain access to public goods (Miller 1995, 433).

[5] For other exceptions at the frontier of redefining arenas of citizenship practice, see Miller 1995 and, in particular, Kymlicka 1995.

A claim to the existence of ethnic citizenship must rest on evidence of identity, authority, and legitimacy for members of an ethnic group. To elaborate, this relationship can be compared with "state citizenship" (Stewart 1995). Essentially, the difference between ethnic and nation-state citizenship lies in the Weberian legal, rational, and bureaucratic frameworks that uphold identity, legitimacy, and authority in the nation-state, as opposed to the social customs, social practices, and nonbureaucratic structures that define and uphold citizenship in ethnic groups. Identity is elemental in both realms because it demarcates the boundaries of belonging. In the postcolonial state, national identity is legally circumscribed, normally endowed on all those born or naturalized within specified territorial borders (see Shklar 1991, 3–5). An individual's claim to nationality is validated in the public realm by legal and bureaucratic instruments, such as identity cards, passports, and voting cards. In contrast, ethnic identity rests on a socially, as opposed to a legally, constructed definition of belonging. As with early Athenian identity (Frost 1994), belonging in the ethnic community commonly is established by birth (or marriage or adoption) into a family and kin who consider themselves and are considered by others to belong to a community that believes in a shared history and values. While this identity may be signified by language or naming or may be literally inscribed through rituals such as circumcision, it is validated by the individual's participation in that community and by his or her interaction with the institutions of legitimate authority in the community.

In the nation-state, authority is vested in a Weberian state which enumerates rational and legal codes to govern relations among individuals in its community. In the modern democratic iteration of the nation-state, legitimacy is derived from the democratic right of citizens to affect these institutions. Yet, this is not the only historical possibility of state legitimacy, as theocratic and monarchic traditions obviously suggest. In ethnic groups, legitimacy and authority rest on nonlegal, nonbureaucratic forms of organization and cultural practice. Ethnic authority therefore is vested in the family, clan, extended kin, and beyond, to a community "imagined" as one (Anderson 1991). In the absence of a central state, authority is dispersed in the community and legitimated by customs that sanction and that are publicly enacted, beginning at the clan level, which is the basic unit of solidarity and public discourse outside the family. Ethnic authority in postcolonial state arenas begins as social practice in ethnic arenas and can be wielded by socially legitimated persons or structures, such as real or reinvented traditional authorities, ethnic associations, or charismatic leaders who gain recognition from their ability to underwrite communal practice by providing resources or a reputedly veritable memory. It is in the former capacity that politicians are able to draw upon the "pull of the tribe" (Jones 1967, 107) to advance goals in nation-state arenas.[8] Whatever the institution in which ethnic authority is vested, legitimacy is drawn from the satisfaction of certain material and nonmaterial needs of members in the identity group.

The ways in which social practice elaborates the norms of communal authority and legitimacy and the rights and obligations of citizenship within an identity group can be noted in at least two domains. One is the moral economy, whose foundation is norms of reciprocity as opposed to contract and whose bonds are strongest within the identity group. The moral economy enables individuals in various contexts to rely on nonbureaucratic mutual aid networks and to reciprocate toward those who belong to a common society. Examples include those better off helping relatives and clan members find jobs or pay school fees, as well as regular contributions to weddings and funerals, even for persons with whom face-to-face contact has never been established but who are imagined to belong to one's community. The moral economy can be formalized in ethnic organizations (such as hometown or funeral associations) that provide social insurance in the absence of state welfare programs.

The second domain is ethnic rituals that elaborate identity, legitimacy, and authority. As Comaroff and Comaroff (1993, xvi) argue, ritual is often "a vital element in the processes that make and remake social facts and collective identities. Everywhere." For instance, such initiation rites as circumcision continue to represent among most groups in Kenya the acquisition of full citizenship in the ethnic community. Among the Kikuyu, uninitiated men (rare) cannot inherit property or adjudicate in clan disputes, and parents of initiates ascend to an elder class which holds putative power in clans (Davison 1996, 231–2). Such rituals establish a hierarchy of power within the community that, when combined with other icons of power and status in the modern state, enables elites to mobilize within the ethnic community for interests in the secular state. At the same time, individuals can hold such persons accountable within the communal realm for actions in the state realm and especially for extracting resources from the state on their behalf (e.g., Ekeh 1975). An example is traditional oaths, which affirm identity and obligation within the ethnic community but which often have a purpose in the state arena, such as securing electoral victory or political succession. These oaths are recurrent motifs in national politics in Kenya.[9]

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[6] For an example of the kind of anthropological work that imbued groups with a coherence that may not have existed in reality or was enforced by colonial administrative practices, see Middleton and Kershaw's (1965) ethnographic work on the Kikuyu and the Kamba.

[7] Ethnic groups similarly created or consolidated include the Kikuyu and others in central Kenya (Ambler 1988), the Giriama and other Mijikenda groups (Brantley 1981), and the Kalenjin (Ogot 1981, 84). For instance, the Kikuyu are sewn together from peoples who continue to be divided by region (Nyeri, Muranga, and Kiambu) and, more recently, by class, which is especially salient among emigrants to settlements in the Rift Valley province. Indeed, many Kenyan subgroups continue to be divided by clan, region, and dialect.

[8] I use "tribe" advisedly and interchangeably with "ethnic group" because it remains a legitimate reference in Kenyan political discourse.

Whether "imagined" (Anderson 1991), "invented" (Vail 1989), or instigated in current memory by ethnic or cultural "entrepreneurs" (Lemarchand 1994, 5; Young 1976, 137–9), ethnic identity can become pervasive and can inspire collective action in pursuit of communal interests and privilege (Abwunza 1993, 136). Indeed, although socially constructed, ethnicity is reified for group members and outsiders by social practice, including ideologically legitimated customs, language, and histories. Furthermore, even as it is manipulated and reshaped over time, ethnicity is experienced as a concrete web of relationships with real persons and institutions in the present. Significantly, it is a source of security at particular historical moments, even when these are themselves part of the dialectic of reformulating identity.

DUAL AND COMPETING CITIZENSHIP

In postcolonial Kenya,[10] the socially enacted relationship between ethnic identity, authority, and legitimacy competes with the legally sanctioned membership, authority, and legitimacy of the nation-state.[11] Since neither has been able to erase the other, most individuals assume contingent and hierarchical allegiances depending on the arena of competition in which they find themselves. As Abwunza (1993, 147) shows among the Avalogoli subgroup of the Abaluhya, individuals and elites elaborate the following hierarchy of communities of allegiance. Foremost is one's own or the closest clan among all Avalogoli; second are the Avalogoli among all Abaluhya; third are all Abaluhya among Kenyans; and fourth are all Kenyans among any others. This hierarchy of attachment underscores the lack of an "unambiguous membership" (Waters 1989, 1) for individuals in postcolonial African states. Most significantly, individuals participate in two substantive publics (Ekeh 1975) and submit to two substantive authorities (Sklar 1993)—the ethnic group and the nation-state.

This duality of citizenship is complicated further by the fact that it is conceived differently in the postcolonial state and in the ethnic communities. The traditional dichotomy of liberal and civic-republican citizenship provides a useful framework for describing each conception. Essentially, the liberal vision holds that rights inhere in individuals, exist prior to community, and are guaranteed with minimal obligation to the community. The civic-republican vision considers rights not as inherent but as acquired through civic practice that upholds obligations to the community.[12] In the communal realm, citizenship takes an active civic-republican form, while in the modern state it is defined in liberal terms deemed appropriate for (elusive) constitutional democracy. In the modern state, a republican virtue is an ideal sought but not yet achieved at the national level, although in the parochial communities it is extracted in a variety of ways. Within the postcolonial state, liberal citizenship *qualifies* one to participate in the inclusive national community, while in the ethnic community republican citizenship *requires* members to participate in the group's preservation, especially in competition against other communities and against the national community—unless the state is controlled by fellow community members.

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[9] Another example is more directly related to national electoral politics. In the 1992 presidential campaign, politicians from communities that practice male circumcision as initiation into adulthood used this ethnically valid measure of full citizenship to denounce opponents from communities that do not circumcise men, suggesting that they were unfit presidential contenders since they were not yet "men." Given that a majority of Kenyan ethnic groups practice male circumcision, this was a potent charge against a minority. This powerful exclusionary tactic was invoked in the national arena but drew its potency from ethnic customs and assumptions.

[10] I am indebted to C. R. D. Halisi (1997) in crystallizing the following formulation, which draws on his analysis of citizenship in South Africa.

[11] This competition repeatedly has been noted across Africa (e.g., Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983). An important exception is Miles and Rochefort 1991, which shows that individuals from an ethnic group split between two countries exhibit closer affinity to citizens of their state than to fellow ethnics in the other country. This conclusion, based on a study of Hausas in Niger and Nigeria, does not necessarily undermine my argument, since the two Hausa groups orient themselves toward different states and, therefore, compete and reformulate their identities in two separate contexts. Also, their identities have been molded within separate colonial histories (French and British, respectively). In effect, they constitute two different communities in different countries. This is similar to European Jews before World War II, who saw themselves as citizens of Germany, Italy, or Denmark, for example, even as they identified culturally or religiously with Jews across the world. Within these countries, they were often treated as a distinct group. I am indebted to Richard Joseph for calling my attention to the Miles and Rochefort study and to Roger Smith for clarification on Jews in Europe. The interpretation is wholly mine.

[12] For concise discussions of the distinction between liberal and republican citizenship, see Oldfield 1990 and Smith 1988. For longer treatments, see, for example, Flathman 1989; Kymlicka 1989, 1995; Moon 1993; and Walzer 1970.

Liberal Citizenship in the Modern State

Analysts in the modernization tradition envisioned that the newly independent African countries eventually would forge a common national identity in place of the multiplicity of ethnic identities (Azikiwe 1978, Bendix 1964; cf. Enloe 1973). Critical to this transformation was overcoming the "crises" or challenges of reorienting identity, authority, and legitimacy by substituting the modern Weberian state for parochial ethnic communities and liberal democracy for traditional authority patterns (Binder et al. 1971). The liberal, majoritarian democracies installed in the new nations projected a liberal form of citizenship, which bestows on a person the status of a citizen as an individual member of the modern state. "The liberal-individualist conception of citizenship is an essentially 'private' conception. It is part of what is meant by calling individuals sovereign and morally autonomous beings, that they choose whether or not to exercise the rights of the status of citizen in the public or more narrowly the political arena" (Oldfield 1990, 178). Such *status* does not demand that the citizen perform any duties to retain these rights or membership in the political community.

A similar liberal conception of citizenship was central to the democracy movement in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. African democrats demanded that the illiberal, authoritarian states that had replaced the initial democracies return sovereignty and rights to the individual citizen. As is evident from the monotony of liberal, majoritarian, multiparty models demanded and instituted across the continent, African democrats of the 1990s assumed that what led to the demise of liberal democracy in the 1960s was merely its implementation, not its irreconcilable relationship with ethnic citizenship. They continued to believe that one can achieve, for example, a functional nation of 100 million Nigerians acting as "sovereign" and "morally autonomous" individuals in a secular state, not as agents of 100 separate moral and organic communities—to which allegiance is legitimated by a web of social practices in which the daily life and significant life events of individuals are embedded.

Republican Citizenship in the Ethnic Group

In the ethnic community, citizenship can best be characterized as illiberal and republican. Whereas liberalism is centered on the individual, ethnic groups are centered on the community, and a person cannot claim rights that would jeopardize group claims. Individuals are therefore not "sovereign" or "morally autonomous" but instead gain rights and deserve defense only as active members of a community. Such benefits are secured by obligations and participation necessary "to define, establish and sustain a political community of fellow citizens" (Oldfield 1990, 181). A citizen is such through participation in the public life of the community.

Curtis's (1995) study of male migrants in Nairobi in the 1980s provides a good illustration of the rights and obligations imposed by ethnic citizenship in the modern socioeconomic setting. Curtis found that migrants from all class backgrounds maintained ties with their rural home (largely ethnically homogeneous) and participated in informal but extensive mutual aid networks with others who claimed the same or proximal rural base. These networks of "obligation and opportunity" underscore reciprocity in aiding members of a common society financially, in job placement, and in spreading news from home (Curtis 1995, 113–45). Moreover, these ties and those that each family or clan maintains with a rural base (often by holding land) establish membership in a larger imagined *and* experienced community. That community combines the extended clan in the native region with the experiential community in the urban diaspora and its assumed kin extensions in other areas.

The Curtis study (1995, 139) quotes Grillo's (1973, 63) apt description two decades earlier of the obligations of ethnic citizenship that migrants face:

> Through his rural network he keeps alive his status as a member of the rural community.... By making regular visits home, presenting gifts to kinsmen, marrying a locally approved girl, by assiduous attendance at funerals and other ceremonial occasions, by building a house, he is making an investment for his future return to the rural area, paying in advance for the goodwill and cooperation he may sometime require, or which through his death his family may need any moment.... A break... is tantamount to a break with kin and ethnic ties.

It is clear from the foregoing that the ethnic community draws legitimacy and authority from its ability to provide for its members in time of need (especially if the state has not institutionalized reliable social rights of state citizenship) and to extract obligation to meet such needs. It is upon these forceful ties that politicians can mobilize for interests outside the ethnic community and make their own access to power (seem) vital to individuals within the identity group. For their part, individuals who may not hold sophisticated opinions on institutional issues give merit to the claims advanced by their ethnic leaders in the national state because they can interact with and extract from them via ethnic bonds. They view the advancement of such leaders as an enrichment of their community.

Ethnic versus National Citizenship

While the preceding discussion suggests a clear dichotomy in citizenship and in the form it takes, the reality is less clear-cut. As pointed out earlier, individuals hold multiple and shifting identities and change roles depending on the situation in which they find themselves. Furthermore, people experience a convergence of demands from both of their citizenships, rather than some people experiencing a republican form, others the liberal form. Thus, individuals experience liberal citizenship demands at the national level which they may or may not find consistent with (or advantageous to) civic-republican demands within ethnic communities. In this way, the illiberal, republican citizenship prescribed by ethnic groups undermines the liberal citizenship assumed in the national community in two ways. First, even as they act in the national arena, individual citizens "form and revise their aims and ambitions" within their experiential life in parochial communities (Kymlicka 1989, 135). Thus, parochial civic-republican obligations taint one's "individual" preferences in the nation-state arena, especially since communal obligations are more effectively enforced in the parochial community. Second, for those who capture the state, the state becomes an arena in which to fulfill obligation to the subnational community. This is particularly so when one ethnic group in competition with others emerges as hegemonic. The new state elite is essentially an ethnic elite; its sphere of authority extends to the territorial limits of the state, but its sphere of obligation is limited to the subnational group able to extract obligation (prebends) from its sons and daughters (Joseph 1987).

The different articulation of citizenship in the national and subnational communities has implications for democratic transitions in multiethnic states, especially those in which there is great size disparity among groups. Members of larger ethnic groups, exercising the republican duty to vote for their community, propel their group to electoral dominance and therefore benefit from liberal democracy with majoritarian institutions, in which the individual is the presumed principal political actor. Such a situation leads to a stratified citizenship; members of groups that capture the state enjoy a larger bundle of rights and undertake a greater responsibility for the national state than do members of excluded groups, not unlike the stratified citizenship among Jews and Arabs in Israel (Peled 1992). For the minority groups, obligations of ethnic citizenship operate just as efficiently in an election, but their smaller population results in perennial defeat or exclusion from crucial participation, despite protection of individual rights and privileges.

As I demonstrate in the next two sections, in both the transition to independence and the recent transition from single-party rule in Kenya, competing visions of political community and of citizenship framed the conflict over what institutions are appropriate to structure democratic politics in a multiethnic state. While the present analysis relies on a comparison of two historical junctures in a single country, the issue of divided loyalties and their political consequences is common to many African nations. For example, countries that experienced ethnic or regional conflict at independence and/or during recent democratic transitions include Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zaire.[13] While the axis on which citizenship is contested varies (ethnicity, religion, region, or race), these conflicts fundamentally express disagreements about identity and political community and about power and legitimacy in the national state.

TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN KENYA, 1960–64

Kenya's independence in December 1963 was preceded by three constitutional conferences held in London in 1960, 1962, and 1963. The debates within these conferences and the events between and subsequent to them provide evidence for how dual and competing citizenship led ethnic groups to coalesce into rival parties propounding radically different institutional preferences. At the first constitutional conference, in January 1960, a broadly based coalition of African elites presented the case for independence from Britain and negotiated a new constitutional framework allowing greater African representation in colonial legislative institutions. They also received a commitment to eventual African self-government "based on parliamentary institutions on the Westminister model" (Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO] 1960, 6). As soon as the African delegates returned home, the united front they had forged to fight racial domination collapsed, and two rival parties with distinct ethnic compositions emerged. Ethnicity replaced race as the primary political cleavage, and subsequent debates elaborated the tension between ethnic and national citizenship as each party developed its vision of what would constitute legitimate citizenship in independent Kenya and what political institutions would fulfill its vision.

How the rival political parties formed was critical to their ethnic composition and to their reliance on activating ethnic citizenship to mobilize votes. Party formation proceeded on two related tracks. One was at the behest of a single leader who provided intellectual and financial patronage and who drew a core of founders linked more by personal ties forged in the ethnic arena than by ideological commitment. This core group relied on family, clan, and ethnicity as the initial scaffolding for the party infrastructure, because among these persons trust and resources could be exchanged on the basis of prior or assumed reciprocity and could attract others in the "community" with minimal resistance.[14] The other track stemmed from the colonial practice of restricting African political activities to local areas, which were ethnically homogeneous. In the absence of deep ideological differences, the district-level organizations tended to coalesce into ethnic blocs, and these were co-opted into the rival parties-in-formation. Thus, the nascent national parties were little more than clubs of personally connected individuals, and they immediately spread at the grassroots level (Okumu 1975, 188–9).

The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the dominant of the two parties. It drew the bulk of its leadership, membership, and support from the Kikuyu and Luo, the two largest ethnic groups in Kenya. Launched in March 1960 at Kiambu in the Kikuyu heartland just outside Nairobi, KANU was the reincarnation of the Kenya African Union, which in turn was a nationalist mutation of the proscribed Kikuyu Central Association. KANU also subsumed proscribed Luo-led organizations, such as the Kenya Federation of Labor and the Kenya Independence Movement. This fusion of multiethnic and labor organizations made KANU an intensely anticolonial and nationalist party. Nevertheless, because of its composition, the party was inescapably representative of Kikuyu and Luo ethnic interests and of the urban working and middle class; it also established a link between the Kikuyu and Luo urban populations, especially in Nairobi, and their rural brethren (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 37–8). For these ethnic and class groups, the integrity of the postcolonial state and a majoritarian electoral system would present new opportunities for advancement.

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[13] A comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this study, since it would require a deep immersion in the political history of each country and contextual reading of all the evidence to explicate the theoretical argument. The use of single-country case studies to demonstrate, elaborate, or challenge theory has produced critical advances in citizenship theory, as demonstrated by Peled's (1992) work on Israel; various works on the United States, such as Shklar (1991) and Smith (1988); and, more recently, Halisi's (1997) work on South Africa.

[14] A similar trend in formation and structure was evident in the parties that emerged in the transition from single-party rule in Kenya in 1990. See Barkan 1993 and Muigai 1995.

The second party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), united a diverse set of local associations that represented minority ethnic groups joined by the fear of domination by an exclusive Kikuyu-Luo postindependence government. KADU's component groups were themselves composite unions of smaller subethnic or district-level political organizations. For example, the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA) was formed in April 1960, in Kapkatet, by combining a number of organizations in the Rift Valley region under the leadership of Daniel arap Moi (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 40). In June 1960, the KPA merged with the Maasai United Front, the Coast African Political Union, Kenya African People's Party, and the Somalia National Association to form KADU in response to the emergence of KANU three months before (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 37; Odinga 1967, 194–5).

The prospect of Kikuyu-Luo dominance was real, since the two groups were larger, more politically conscious, and better organized than the KADU groups and presumably would sweep the polls. The expectation of a census-type vote was fulfilled in the February 1961 elections (Bennett and Rosberg 1961). Of the 33 open seats, KANU won 19 with 67.4% of the vote, while KADU won 11 seats with a paltry 16.4% of the vote. These proportions roughly approximated the population distribution of the ethnic groups backing each party. For example, the Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru, Kamba, and Kisii supporting KANU made up about 60% of the population, underscoring what Bennett and Rosberg (1961, 43) call the phenomenon of the "one-party tribe." Similarly, this "pull of the tribe" (Jones 1967, 107) was evident in the urban areas, where the proportion of "KANU tribes" reflected the KANU vote.

Indeed, in the areas where either party's "tribes" commanded a majority, the opposition candidates were soundly defeated, if they bothered to run at all. For example, in Machakos the winning KANU candidate polled 21,000 votes, beating five other KANU candidates, who polled 19,000, 15,000, 7,000, 1,700, and 400 votes, respectively; the sole KADU candidate received 380 votes. Polls in the KADU stronghold in the Rift Valley mirrored the situation. In Narok and Kajiado districts (Maasailand), KADU candidates sailed through unopposed; in Kipsigis the KADU candidate pulled in 56,000 votes against fewer than 200 garnered by *two* KANU candidates (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 204–17). The ethnic coalitions and rural-urban divide that emerged in 1961 elections were replayed in the independence elections of May 1963. A similar cleavage and vote pattern reappeared in the transition election of December 1992 (Barkan 1993, 94–8; Muigai 1995, 186–91), which underscores the durability of polarization in Kenya.

When the two Kenyan parties returned to London for the second constitutional conference in February 1962, KADU retracted its commitment to a "Westminister" form of government and instead demanded *majimboism*, or regionalism. That is, independent Kenya should be divided into autonomous regions, which KADU saw as the only institutional structure that would preserve the self-determination of minority groups, since the majoritarian Westminister model would likely keep them a permanent minority. KADU was adamant and was prepared to delay independence for "another ten years" and "sound a whistle... declaring civil war" against the independent state if majimboism was rejected by the dominant groups (Odinga 1967, 227–8). KANU, having prevailed in the recent elections, wished to retain the majoritarian model. KADU resisted during more than two months of negotiations and forced KANU to compromise, although the latter had a sufficient majority in the Lancaster delegation to override the majimbo advocates.

The result was a new constitution under which Kenya would hold elections for African self-government—a step away from full independence. According to this agreement a central government with a two-chamber national parliament would be created. It would consist of a lower House of Representatives with 117 elected members and 12 appointed members and a Senate of 41 members representing all administrative districts and Nairobi. In addition, power would be decentralized by dividing Kenya into seven regions, each with its own legislature and executive body, thus giving effect to KADU's demands for majimboism. The powers of the regions were substantial. Each had its own police force and civil service; regions could veto certain central government appointments, such as chief justice; and each region was entitled to a fixed proportion of the central government tax revenue. Moreover, the agreement required that any constitutional change affecting these powers must have a 75% majority (90% in the case of specially entrenched powers) in both the House and the Senate (Brown 1970, Singh 1965).

This majimbo constitution was a major triumph for ethnic minorities, who would now be able to preserve autonomy in "their" regions, since the more or less ethnically defined colonial administrative units (provinces) became the regions. The minority groups were assured representation and participation in the central government through the Senate, whose electoral districts were the even more ethnically homogeneous administrative districts. Moreover, the Regional Boundaries Commission was established to collate the views of all ethnic groups regarding the region to which they wished to belong. This resulted in some boundary changes and the creation of an eighth region to accommodate the secessionist Somali population. In another instance, the Saboti of Mount Elgon wished to be included in the Rift Valley province along with their Kalenjin cousins, but the commission denied this request.[15]

Following the Lancaster agreement of 1962, elections were held under the new constitution in May 1963. KANU won an overwhelming majority in these "independence elections," taking 66 seats against KADU's 31 in the lower house and 19 seats against KADU's 16 in the Senate. In the regional assemblies, KANU showed similar strength, gaining 158 seats against KADU's 51. The regional and ethnic spread remained similar to that of the 1961 elections, with each party predominating in its "tribal areas." When the two parties returned to London in September 1963 to finalize the independence constitution, KANU demanded amendments to the 1962 agreement to reduce regional powers, the special protections for minorities, and the constraints imposed on constitutional change. KADU, having suffered an electoral setback (and the defection of the Abaluhya and Kamba leaders), insisted on retaining the 1962 agreement as the framework for the final constitution. Again, KADU threatened the integrity of the new state if protections already attained were withdrawn. For example, it would force a partition of Kenya into two different states to avoid domination by the larger ethnic groups (Brown 1970, 26).

As a result of such intransigence, KANU accepted the majimbo arrangement as the independence constitution, but a number of changes were made in its favor. The regional police forces and civil services were combined into single, national organizations under the central government. KANU also won an important concession on constitutional change: Amendment proposals that failed to receive the required majority in the House and Senate would then require a two-thirds majority in a national referendum. KANU agreed to implement the majimbo constitution despite criticizing it as "one of the most complicated constitutions ever given to a newly independent state" (Kenyatta quoted in Brown 1970, 30) and one for which the "first requirement was a skilled corps of lawyers and clerks in the center and the regions to explain to legislators what they were required, permitted, or forbidden to do" (Odinga 1967, 234). The detailed division of powers and responsibilities was cumbersome for the nationalists in KANU but necessary for the KADU minorities.

Kenya thus became independent in December 1963 under a constitution that validated ethnic citizenship in autonomous regional governments and strove for a national, liberal citizenship within central government institutions. This constitution would prove short-lived, since the majority Kikuyu-Luo alliance in KANU was impatient with the unwieldy structures that curtailed majority power and was unwilling to invest the money to make the system work or to accommodate "parochial" minority demands that got in the way of nation-building (Odinga 1967). Within the first year of independence, KANU undermined the regional governments by withholding funds, passing legislation to circumvent regional powers, and forcing major changes to the constitution by threatening and preparing to hold a referendum if the Senate—in which KADU could block the proposals—did not accede to the changes. Outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and with no prospects for enforcing the compromise constitution or, given the reality of census-type voting, for overtaking KANU at the subsequent polls, KADU willingly dissolved and joined KANU to form a single-party state in 1964. KANU, then under a Kikuyu-Luo alliance (which soon became a Kikuyu hegemony), had installed its vision of liberal citizenship and established the nation rather than the ethnic group as the preeminent political community.

ETHNIC VERSUS NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, 1960–64

The political discourse underlying this constitutional dispute reflects the two competing citizenships: one national, the other subnational. The dispute was inevitable, given the character of the colonial Kenyan polity as an "aggregation" of ethnic groups yet to form a historically validated national union or "association" (see Rousseau 1987, 147). While ethnic identity remained intact and indeed was heightened by dealings with "others," such as through the "polarizing" elections of 1961 (Horowitz 1991, 96), individuals were expected to transfer political allegiance, which normally coincided with small-scale groups, to the new national political community. Political elites are important intermediaries in such a process. Given their leadership position in ethnic networks and depending on their own rational calculations about access to power, they propagate acceptance or instigate rejection of such transformation. While the immediately relevant conflict arises among elites, at times over such fairly complex issues as constitutional structure, the positions articulated become legitimated across the ethnic community, in which individuals view the fortunes of their leaders as linked to their own.

For the larger ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu and Luo (potential pluralities in national electoral politics), the transfer of political allegiance to the nationalist state was less threatening; under majority rule, they and their elites would be assured dominance or at least participation—full citizenship rights—in the larger political community. This transfer of political allegiance was a much more problematic proposition for the smaller ethnic groups, such as the Kalenjin and Maasai, since they could only remotely influence the dynamics at the center, and the republican virtues validated at the ethnic level would be denied them at the national level. If the postcolonial state were divided into smaller administrative and semiautonomous arenas of citizen participation that coincided with an ethnic preponderance (i.e., majimbo), then minority groups could be assured of an acceptable level of republican participation.

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[15] This denial proved instrumental in the ethnic clashes that erupted in this area during the transition to multiparty politics in 1990–92, as Saboti expelled non-Kalenjin (especially the Abaluhya), who had come to dominate the area politically and economically and who allied with the opposition parties against KANU (Republic of Kenya 1992, 22–4).

The transfer of political allegiance is not unique to formative nation-states; it is one that occurs often but is eased by assurances of a balance of obligation and rights. For example, the transfer of allegiance from the family to the clan, from the clan to the village, from the village to the tribe, and so on, is secured by privileges of belonging to the larger community. The problem for the minority groups at independence was that obligations to the larger political community were not adequately balanced by the benefits of inclusion. Moreover, the transfer of allegiance to an overarching tribal or national unit is not peculiar to the larger tribes, as the experience of the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA) suggests. Under the instigation of political elites seeking dominance in the state, such minor groups as the Nandi, Elgeyo, and Tugen transferred their allegiance to a larger community of identity and interest (the Kalenjin) and became numerically competitive in the state arena. It is important that when such minority groups joined KADU, decision making was consensual to preserve cohesion for the sake of numerical competitiveness: "Authority was dispersed and shared between the leaders and a sense of corporate leadership clearly prevailed. In seeking unity the party placed a high value on compromise, to attract and accommodate divergent interests and peoples" (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 42).

The majimbo constitution reflected concern about two principles: protection from majoritarian tyranny and apportionment of political power to ensure minority participation (Ghai 1967, Ghai and McAuslan 1970, Singh 1965; see Lijphart 1977). The liberal conception of national citizenship satisfied the first objective, since it guaranteed individual protections through a Bill of Rights. By providing minority groups an arena for self-regulation, the regional government constitution fulfilled the second objective. Political participation in the regions was circumscribed by "regional" citizenship. For example, in elections to the regional assembly, "only persons who had a genuine connection to the Region" could vote for representatives, and no candidate could be elected to the assembly if s/he was not a registered voter in the region (Ghai 1967; Ghai and McAuslan 1970; HMSO 1963a, 66–7). Although subnational citizenship was defined by geography (region) rather than ethnic group, the two coincided due to the work of the Regional Boundaries Commission and the colonial policy of homogeneous tribal reserves. In effect, under this constitution Kenyans had their dual citizenship recognized.

KANU's opposition to the majimbo constitution repudiated the second principle, that is, allowing for smaller arenas of self-regulation short of the nation-state. For KANU the guarantees of the liberal constitution were sufficient, and the regional proposals were indicative of a tribalism that endangered the integrity of the new state. For example, Tom Mboya, one of the most articulate defenders of the nationalist vision, offered *liberal* citizenship to attract skeptical minorities. In July 1962, speaking to white farmers who were uneasy about the prospects of a black-ruled Kenya and who were as unsure of their attachment to the new Kenyan political community as were the minority African groups, Mboya stressed a vision of citizenship informed by liberal virtues. All individuals belonging to the national political community would be equal in the rights they derived and in the obligations demanded:

> There will be a Bill of Rights for all Kenya citizens which we—the political leaders—have designed and will defend. All who accept this will no longer be "members of the immigrant community," but full members of a new community which will demand all our dedication, all our attachment to morality, all our strength.... Your interests will be defensible in law, and of great concern to the Government, as the interest of anybody else (Mboya 1970, 45–6).

Mboya and other nationalists saw the objective as creating a nation out of the mosaic of ethnic groups: The nation was the point at which preexisting, subnational "loyalties will coalesce" into one (Mboya 1970, 47). This vision was indeed the glue that held the liberation struggle together, especially between the Kikuyu and Luo. Another KANU nationalist, Ochieng Oneko, articulated this dissolution of preexisting prejudices in the drive to nationhood.[16] At the height of the anticolonial mobilization in 1952, Oneko exhorted a Kikuyu crowd in Nyeri: "I want you to love all Africans and I want tribes to get together. I said in Kiambu that I would marry a Kikuyu girl to show good relations amongst tribes" (Collins 1990, 164). More telling of KANU's drive for the suspension of ethnic loyalties for the sake of a single national identity was the colonial district police officer's record of the meeting in which, commenting on Oneko's specific exhortation, he reported: "Three years ago this would have been taken by the Kikuyu as an insult, for an uncircumcised Luo was the most despised thing imaginable to the Kikuyu. Today it is applauded" (Collins 1990, 164).

Proponents of the nationalist vision saw the conflict between ethnic and national citizenship as resulting from the instrumental manipulation of ethnic allegiances by politicians for individual goals. Mboya argued that "some leaders have revived these old hostilities for their own personal reasons. When a leader feels himself weak on the national platform, he begins to calculate that the only support he may have will come from his own tribe; so he starts to create an antagonism of this sort, to entrench himself as at least a leader of his tribe" (Mboya 1963, 66). Mboya's dismissal of tribalism as the bane of African politics is characteristic of the disdain with which the African middle and educated classes dismiss the force and morality of ethnic citizenship (Davidson 1992). But such "modernized" Africans are contradicted by their own lives, which are embedded in ethnic communities, and, alas, by their deaths, which are even more intimately enmeshed in the reproduction of ethnic communities (Cohen and Odhiambo 1992; see Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). The failure of Mboya and other "nationalists" wedded to the liberal conception of citizenship to consider that such ethnic commitments inescapably shape the supposed sovereign and autonomous individual—as Kymlicka (1989, 135) reminds us—is a fundamental and enduring failing among democrats confronted by a multiethnic state.[17]

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[16] This is a common tactic used by dominant groups to discourage ethnic countermobilization, as Lemarchand (1994, 31) shows in the case of the Tutsi elite in Burundi.

The debate over political institutions and power sharing after independence was especially animated with regard to land, which in an agrarian society is the primary social, economic, and political asset on and over which citizenship is defined and contested.[18] In Kenya, citizenship was historically defined in terms of rights of access to land, which assured livelihood: "Individuals had a community share in or the right to benefit from land.... Members' entitlement to land was based on the fact that the individual belonged to a particular group" (Kibwana 1990, 233). Who belonged and who did not belong to the community determined who benefited and who did not. Because of disagreement as to which was the preeminent community (national or ethnic), the differences between KANU and KADU were deepest and most irreconcilable with respect to how the land previously held by white settlers and the colonial government was to be redistributed. KANU defined community as the nation to which all belonged, and all had rights to land anywhere, subject to national laws and market exchange. The KADU groups, knowing their power would be diminished in the national political community, offered the ethnic group as the relevant community of citizenship and sought to limit land rights to those with membership in native groups in each region. Indeed, the KPA was formed expressly to "make clear its prior claim to control over land in western Kenya . . . [since] much of the land in the western highlands of Kenya belonged to the Kalenjin before the Europeans arrived" (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 40).

At independence, the disposition of all land was open to negotiation, and by far the most contentious was Scheduled Land, which included the developed white farms in the most fertile regions of the country.[19] The situation was complicated by historical factors and the scarcity of land among Africans as a result of colonial deprivation. Land was a scarce resource for all groups but particularly for the larger ethnic populations, whose number far outstripped their traditional lands and who would benefit from a freehold system. For the Kikuyu in Central Province, land scarcity had been worsened by colonialist appropriations. Many minority groups, especially the traditionally pastoralist Kalenjin and Maasai communities, whose Rift Valley pasturage had been alienated for white settler farming, now faced the loss of these lands due to the introduction of a land market that guaranteed individual tenure, which was more suited to the farming communities, especially Kikuyu and Luo. The latter were better placed economically to purchase land and would dominate the central state that would administer the land redistribution program (Njonjo 1977, Widner 1992b).

The two parties' positions on land reflected their ethnic composition and were calculated to maximize returns for their ethnic groups. KADU demanded that all land matters be vested in the respective regional governments; this would effectively have given each community primary claim to its ancestral land. KANU demanded that only communal land under the Native Reserves be entrusted to the regions, leaving the central government the say in distributing the white farms on Scheduled Land and the vast unalienated Crown holdings. In the agreement reached at the second constitutional conference in 1962, Scheduled Land was entrusted to the Central Land Board with the mandate to purchase the white farms and redistribute them to Africans. Control over Crown Land was given to the regions, while the former Native Reserves were entrusted to county councils (i.e., local authorities). This arrangement assured minority groups that their land would not be taken by the majority tribes, but it gave them little in the way of reclaiming or of limiting nonindigenous settlement on or commercialization of their ancestral land, especially in the Rift Valley. After the dissolution of KADU in 1964, control over land reverted to the central state. The subsequent dominance of KANU enabled it to apportion land, disproportionately favoring its core groups, especially the Kikuyu. This conflict over land persisted in postindependence politics and recurred alongside ethnic violence that erupted during the transition to multiparty democracy in the 1990s.

Until the next period of fundamental political transformation beginning in 1990, the discourse on ethnic and national citizenship remained muted, as KANU suppressed any alternatives to the unitary state. The unitary state itself became increasingly autocratic, thereby undermining the liberal polity promised at independence. It also was subsumed under an ethnic hegemony, first by the Kikuyu and later by the Kalenjin groups when Daniel arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta, which undermined the promise of coalescing tribes into one nation. Beginning in 1990, however, the transition from a single-party dictatorship to multiparty pluralism provided the first opportunity since independence to reconsider Kenya's political institutions. As elaborated below, the resurgent discourse on ethnic and national citizenship became and continues to be crucial to the fate of Kenya's transition to democracy.

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[17] Indeed, despite his dismissal of "tribalism," Mboya accepted the inescapable nature of the commitment to tribe: "Even African leaders and heads of African states have not succeeded in transforming themselves completely into individual personalities: They are still to some degree communal because their background and their relatives remain tribal, and so they themselves cannot afford to change at the risk of offending their family" (Mboya 1963, 64).

[18] While land is critical to citizenship claims in Kenya, other icons of identity may provoke conflict more powerfully in other countries. Regardless of the material object that defines identity or animates citizenship conflicts, the basic dynamic is one of competition for command over or access to resources and political power. Thus, in South Africa, language (especially among Afrikaners) is a critical issue in defining citizenship and self-determination; in Liberia, race is a salient divide among the Americo-Liberians, "white" immigrants such as the Lebanese, and indigenous groups (Konneh 1996); while among the secessionist Katangans in the then Congo, regionalism and control of mineral wealth were important to citizenship claims.

[19] Land in colonial Kenya was divided into three categories: Scheduled Land was fertile land alienated and occupied by Europeans in the highlands and in the Rift Valley. Native Reserves land was reserved for Africans and was under communal ownership, without title. Crown Land was all unalienated land (forests, parks, etc.), which was considered state land.

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1990–95

When Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, died in 1978, power passed peacefully to his long-serving vice-president Daniel arap Moi.[20] A member of the minority Kalenjin community, Moi had been appointed vice-president in 1967 to complete the absorption of KADU into KANU, to balance symbolically Kikuyu dominance in KANU after most Luo defected with former vice-president Oginga Odinga, and to placate the Kalenjin community as Kikuyu elites received fertile land in the Rift Valley. President Moi immediately embarked on efforts to consolidate his precarious position in a state and economy dominated by the Kikuyu. Part of this consolidation entailed reinvigorating KANU as a vehicle for bringing loyal politicians on board (Widner 1992b). By 1990, the state had been transformed into a stronghold of elites from the Kalenjin and other minority ethnic groups (Throup 1987, Widner 1992b), with these groups carrying an inordinate responsibility for and drawing immense benefits from the state (*Africa Confidential* 1990a, 1990b, 1996).[21]

Such practices undermined opportunities for advancement that would have accrued to the two most populous and most educated groups had a more liberal, competitive system been used instead of the affirmative action that the Moi regime instituted to provide access for minority groups to, especially, higher education, administrative recruitment, and the allocation of public funds (Barkan and Chege 1989). By 1990, the middle class—"with Kikuyus the most numerous among them, alarmed over the Moi regime's deepening Kalenjin ethnic bias—evinced a growing desire for the rule of law in the face of stiffening repression" (Holmquist and Ford 1995, 177). Increasingly, the KANU government came to view the "bid for democracy [as] a movement under the control of the rival Kikuyu ethnic group" (Widner 1992a, 216).

Although agitation for democratic reform by the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was a multiethnic effort, its leadership was dominated by the Kikuyu and the Luo. The FORD of 1990 echoed the KANU coalition of the 1960s, not only in its leadership but also in its middle class and urban base and its successful mobilization of rural support from its "ethnic areas." FORD opposed a KANU that resembled the 1960 KADU coalition of minority groups led by largely middle- and upper-class leaders whose base remained rural and who were unable to attract an urban following. FORD and its allied groups in civil society articulated a unitary nationalist vision, with a liberal conception of citizenship, and offered majority rule institutions as appropriate to structure public affairs in post–single-party Kenya. Not surprisingly, the incumbent KANU government opposed political change; less visibly but more important, it opposed the return to a liberal, majoritarian form of democracy that favored more populous ethnic groups. Furthermore, prominent politicians, including Moi, asserted and invigorated the integrity of Kalenjin ethnicity, claiming that there was no such identity as Nandi, Tugen, or Kipsigis (the subgroups)—only Kalenjin (*Africa Confidential* 1996, 3). Moi also forged a wider collaboration with other minority groups through leaders willing to invoke minority ethnic identity or reformulate new identities to balance the "Kikuyu-Luo" multiparty advocates. Confronted with an unstoppable reform movement, regime politicians from the incumbent minority groups, which would lose out in presumed census-type elections under majoritarian rules, asserted the majimbo option in 1991, as they had done in 1961.

The Second Majimbo Debate

The institutional preferences of the incumbent minority group coalition were initially articulated at five mass rallies held during six weeks in 1991. The first was on September 8, 1991, at Kapsabet, and the second was two weeks later at Kapkatet—where the KPA was launched 31 years earlier—both in the Kalenjin heartland in Rift Valley Province. The next three rallies were in the strongholds of three major politicians aligned with Moi: Narok (Maasailand), Machakos (Kambaland), and Mombasa (cosmopolitan, but supposedly a Mijikenda "native" area). These meetings were conducted under the tutelage of leaders in the ethnic coalition Moi was building to fight eclipse under a multiparty system. The initial rally at Kapsabet was attended by senior KANU leaders, cabinet ministers, members of Parliament, and local councilors, all from the Rift Valley region. The presiding contingents at subsequent rallies were similar and included, in addition, the major politicians of the relevant ethnic group in the host region—a recognition that the notions of "one-party tribes" and "tribal leaders" were largely valid three decades after independence.

In these rallies and in other public statements,

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[20] The seemingly smooth transition belied potentially catastrophic machinations launched by a faction within the ruling elite intent on retaining power in Kikuyu hands after Kenyatta's death (see Karimi and Ochieng 1980).

[21] Significantly, most critical positions (e.g., state security) were occupied by members of the Tugen, Elgeyo, and Marakwet subgroups of the Kalenjin, from which Moi and his closest allies hail (see *Africa Confidential* 1990a, 1). This is consistent with the hierarchy of allegiances (from clan, to subgroup, to ethnic group) discussed earlier. It suggests the possibility of having multiple and shifting citizenships, especially *within* an ethnic group, which, as pointed out, is not monolithic. I focus here on the conflict between ethnic and national identity (rather than on subgroups, for instance) because that is the point at which the distinction is most relevant to national politics and to democratic transitions and institutions.

KANU politicians called for a majimbo system as an alternative to the multiparty proposal advocated by proponents of political pluralism. Substantively, the call for majimbo was a modification to that proposal, since it accepted political change as inevitable but sought to proclaim separate regions, where each party, presumably a "one-tribe party," would hold sway. The politicians announced they would introduce a majimbo constitution if the multiparty advocates persisted in their crusade for what the incumbent regime saw simply as majoritarian rule. A number of KANU's ideas underlined the centrality of ethnic citizenship, especially its rights and obligations and the limits placed on the rights of "others" in an ethnic homeland, notwithstanding liberal citizenship rights endowed by the state. Some of these resolutions corresponded with invocations of the republican virtue demanded by ethnic groups: They extract obligations for ethnic citizens to act to ensure the survival of their tribe (see Oldfield 1990, 181). For example, Kalenjin politicians led the mass meetings in adopting "resolutions" committing the Kalenjin to ban a host of multiparty advocates from venturing into Rift Valley Province and asserting that "Kalenjins were not cowards and that they were ready to counter attempts to relegate them from leadership . . . using any weapons at their disposal" (Republic of Kenya 1992, 10).

Moreover, the majimbo rallies introduced a new lexicon of difference and intimidation, especially with reference to rights of access to and settlement on land and rights of political participation in selected regions. For instance, *madoadoa* (spots) and *kwekwe* (blemishes) referred to "contamination" of the ancestral lands of the Kalenjin and Maasai in the Rift Valley region by migrant ethnic groups (especially Kikuyu). These new settlers were also termed *chui* (leopards), a more insidious reference to the interlopers as land-grabbers. These references suggested the need to cleanse the regions of nonindigenous groups (Republic of Kenya 1992, 48). With regard to political participation, KANU politicians declared areas in the Rift Valley where the Kalenjin and Maasai were the majority or could claim nativity as exclusive "KANU Zones." In these areas, advocates of multiparty democracy and opposition politicians were banned from campaigning, and nonnative residents were cautioned against voting for opposition politicians. The implication was that "settlers" without ethnic citizenship in the communities of the Rift Valley could not exercise their national citizenship rights in these areas. National citizenship was subordinate to ethnic citizenship, and ethnic citizens were obligated to act to preserve community. Indeed, according to the inchoate majimbo framework offered at the rallies, "outsiders in Rift Valley [province] would be required to go back to their 'motherland' " (Republic of Kenya 1992, 9).[22]

Ethnic versus National Citizenship

Unlike the independence period, when the political transition was concluded through constitutional conferences, and unlike contemporary transitions in most of Francophone Africa, in which political change has been managed through sovereign national conferences (Nzouankeu 1993, Robinson 1994), the contemporary discourse on citizenship and institutional preferences in Kenya has been restricted to forums such as the media, public rallies, and, more violently, ethnic clashes. This discourse is seemingly inchoate and haphazard; because it is conducted in different arenas, it does not suggest an obvious dialogue. A clear and coherent body of thought can be construed, however, from the sustained and consistent contributions of a number of political actors.

Within KANU, President Moi has consistently articulated his distaste for multiparty politics by asserting that it will introduce ethnic conflict. This is in contrast with his statements in the 1960s and his actions as vice-president of KADU, when he vigorously defended the rights of free association and ethnic parties. The most articulate and consistent defense of minority interests, however, has come from the leading Maasai politician and former Minister for Local Government, William ole Ntimama.[23] Yet, three organizations, which I will call the liberal democracy coalition, have led the discussion on constitutional reform more concretely than have the divided and disintegrating opposition parties. The leaders are predominantly Luo and Kikuyu, urban-based middle-class professionals and intellectuals. The Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (henceforth Citizens Coalition) is made up of lawyers, human rights advocates, academics, and other professionals and has produced and publicized the most well-developed model constitution offered for discussion. Jointly and separately, the Protestant clergy in the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Kenya Catholic Bishops (KCB) also have participated in constitutional discussions and have led in criticizing government complacency toward or complicity in ethnic violence.

The debate between KANU and the liberal democracy coalition is not simply one between an antidemocratic incumbent regime and progressive democrats. It is more complex and involves fundamental differences regarding (1) the preeminent political community in a multiethnic state (national versus ethnic); (2) the political institutions appropriate to govern such a state and, therefore, the kind of constitutional reforms required to arrive at such institutions; and (3) the process of formulating constitutional reforms. These essential disagreements reflect positions developed from two distinct perspectives on citizenship, one nationalist and liberal, the other narrow and civic-republican. It is important that each side advances a position which holds the best prospects for its own access to power on the basis of an activated or assumed ethnic citizenship and demonstrated ethnic voting.

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[22] As recently as December 1995, prominent KANU politicians were making similar demands that "nonindigenous" settlers in Maasailand (in this case Kikuyu) be excluded from participating in elections and from voter rolls. See *Daily Nation*, December 2, 1995.

[23] At present he is Minister for Home Affairs.

The liberal democracy advocates propose fundamental constitutional changes *within*, and indeed seek to strengthen, the unitary state as the preeminent political community and the arena in which citizenship is defined and upheld. The NCCK (1995, 1) asserts a commitment to "the establishment of a united nation with strong democratic institutions" underlain by "political co-existence, freedom and tolerance, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights." The three organizations avoid constructing an ethnic conception of political community, rights, or political relations and instead mask their recognition of Kenya's pluralism in euphemisms expressing the need "to find out what the deep-seated fears of each group are . . . what our common ground is . . . what we disagree about and why we disagree about it" (Mwangaza Trust 1995, 2; see also Citizens Coalition 1995a, b). When specific groups are outlined as having interests that ought to be given special voice, only *associational* groups (e.g., NGOs, political parties, professional groups) are mentioned, while ethnic or other ascriptive groups are excluded (NCCK 1995, 2). Moreover, the noticeably few references to ethnicity or particular ethnic groups are in the (negative) context of ethnic conflict fomented by the KANU regime or exhortations to transcend ethnicity in building the Kenyan nation.

Along with the integrity of the national political community, the liberal democracy coalition asserts a liberal notion of citizenship in this community. The present constitution (amended numerous times in nearly three decades of single-party rule) and the government it sustains are lacking "commitment to the principles of sovereignty of Kenyan citizens, democracy, human rights, participation of people, accountability, [and] rule of law" (Citizens Coalition 1995d, 7). These organizations repeatedly articulate the goal of limited government countered by an unfettered civil society and by institutional checks and balances. For example, the Citizens Coalition asserts that a new constitution must guarantee the "duties, obligations, responsibilities and privileges that citizens enjoy within the framework of *individual* freedoms . . . [and] facilitate the expression of the will of All [sic] by *merely* aiming at facilitating the exercise of sovereignty by all governed" (Citizens Coalition 1995d, 2–5, emphasis added; also KCB 1994, 1995).

In making specific proposals regarding electoral rules and institutions of apportioning power, the liberal democracy advocates prefer majoritarian means. The NCCK (1995, 5) calls for "a referendum mechanism [to be] entrenched in [the] constitution" and for electoral mechanisms that enhance "a united nation with strong local government" rather than those that give free rein to ethnic regions; and nominated members of parliament, traditionally appointed to achieve ethnic balance (Berg-Schlosser 1985), should be appointed to represent nonascriptive interest groups in civil society (NCCK 1995, 5). The KCB (1994, 1995) offers similar majoritarian institutions as the proper mechanisms to govern a democratic Kenya, although with caveats to protect individuals from state repression. In contrast, leading KANU politicians, such as those presiding over the majimbo rallies of 1991, view the unitary state within a multiparty, majoritarian democracy as problematic, since it would shut out minority ethnic groups even if individual freedoms were guaranteed.

The NCCK's view regarding the "twenty-five percent rule," a consociational mechanism introduced by the KANU regime just before the 1992 election, is indicative of the rejection by elites from larger ethnic groups of any modifications to majoritarian democracy to benefit minority groups (NCCK 1995, 8–11). This rule required that a presidential candidate must garner 25% of the votes in at least five of the eight provinces, in addition to having at least a plurality of the nationwide vote. Barring that, a run-off would be held between the two leading candidates, and the one with the majority vote would be declared president. The NCCK and its allies argue that the provinces (the autonomous regions under the majimbo constitution) are administrative not electoral units and prefer the president be elected by a simple majority—without requirements of provincial or regional (and therefore ethnic) representation. Such a mechanism would favor the larger groups, whose numbers would propel them to dominance.

In contrast to the vision of the political community and the specific institutions proffered by the liberal democracy advocates, KANU's Ntimama suggests that "the only constitution reform needed is a small one: it is the introduction of *majimboism*" (Citizens Coalition 1995e, 1–2). But this "small" change would have enormous implications. It would require Kenyans to exchange their current "national" citizenship for a *jimbo* (region) citizenship and would require "that all those who find themselves in the [regions] other than those in which their ancestors were living in 1895 when Kenya was born to return to the [regions] of their ancestors and abandon property without compensation" (Citizens Coalition 1995e, 2). Ntimama maintains that a federalist system like the one prescribed by the 1963 constitution is the best for governing a multiethnic state such as Kenya. The Citizens Coalition counters that the system proposed by KANU in the 1990s approximates those proposed for Nigeria in the 1950s by Chief Obafemi Awolowo and for *apartheid* South Africa's homelands. Both, they argue, were based on the goal of a "federation of ethnic nations," which implies dismembering the present Kenyan nation (Citizens Coalition 1995e, 8).

Since proponents of democracy in Kenya tend to view majimboism and multiparty democracy as two distinct and incompatible options, the discourse between the incumbent regime and the opposition is viewed as being at cross-purposes. Yet, this discourse is precisely about which community will be the preeminent arena for democratic politics and which citizenship (ethnic or national) will prevail. Ntimama's views on the process for implementing a new constitution reflect the preference of the incumbent minority groups to control political change so as not to be outmaneuvered and outvoted by the larger ethnic groups, which would institute majoritarian democracy.

This fear underlies the final conflict over the *process* of constitutional reform.

In his 1995 New Year's message to the nation, President Moi announced he would invite foreign experts to collate Kenyan views on constitutional change and recommend reforms that parliament would then enact. For KANU, the process proposed by the president was the safest for the minority groups overrepresented in Parliament but outnumbered in the general population. Furthermore, according to majimbo proponents, after initiating the federalist constitution, the government would retain the prerogative to define the borders of the regions and administrative units and to delineate the rights and obligations that federal and jimbo citizenship would entail (Citizens Coalition 1995e, 3–5). This process would in fact be contrary to how the 1962 Regional Boundaries Commission determined both the territorial and ethnic composition of the regions under the 1963 independence constitution. In contrast, the liberal democracy coalition prefers a three-step process involving nationwide and grassroots participation. Specifically, it would rely on specialized caucuses for organizations in civil society, public forums around the country to explain proposals and elicit more views from the grassroots, and ultimately a national convention that would adopt a final constitution and subject it to a national referendum. The convention would then form an interim government to implement the new constitution (KCB 1994, 1995; Mutunga 1994). The mechanisms proposed—the convention, civil society participation, and referenda—magnify unfettered majority preferences and would advantage larger groups, the well-organized, and the urbanized middle class—in which the Kikuyu and Luo predominate.

Once again, land is a critical substantive issue on which the discourse about ethnicity and citizenship in Kenya converges. It was with regard to land that ethnic citizenship most clearly challenged national citizenship when minority groups enacted the initial majimbo provisions advocated by KADU at independence and abrogated by the Kikuyu-Luo hegemony in KANU in 1964. In the proposed model constitution, the Citizens Coalition asserts the right of any Kenyan to own land anywhere (Citizens Coalition 1995c, 11), a view repeatedly echoed by the NCCK (1993a, b) and the KCB (1994, 1995). The majimbo apologists deny a basis for the universality of this right, however, and limit land ownership to those who establish ethnic citizenship through clear and indisputable ancestral roots in a region. For example, in 1992 Minister Ntimama dismissed as "mere pieces of paper" the deeds held by nonindigenous residents of the Rift Valley for their land. Furthermore, there were moves to discourage nonindigenous communities from buying or leasing land in the Rift Valley. "Already the government has secretly instructed the local administration to ensure that nobody buys or sells land until and unless the provincial headquarters of Nyanza and Rift Valley are adequately informed . . . . [T]he government has issued a directive that there should be no leasing of land in Narok district unless the two parties are registered at the two provincial headquarters" (NCCK 1993a, 5; 1993b, 2, 6). KANU's views found forceful expression in the Rift Valley, where non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai farmers were violently ejected, while those near provincial borders were asked to "exchange" their land with Kalenjins farming in neighboring provinces (Republic of Kenya 1992).

Ethnic clashes that began in October 1991 in the Rift Valley and spread to the Coast, Nyanza, and western provinces were an elaboration of the discourse between national and ethnic citizenship in the area of land rights. The clashes began at Meteitei Farm, a cooperative not unlike thousands of others in the Rift Valley that resulted from the redistribution of white farms to Africans after independence. Located in Nandi District, Meteitei was owned jointly by 310 Kalenjin and 280 non-Kalenjin farmers. On October 29, a dispute arose between these two groups. With the apparent collusion of local administrators and politicians, the Kalenjin members of the cooperative claimed sole ownership of the land and expelled the non-Kalenjins (Kikuyu, Abaluhya, Kisii, and Luo). Those who resisted had their houses and property destroyed. This was barely two months after the first majimbo rally in nearby Kapsabet. Between October 1991 and September 1992, when a parliamentary committee investigating the violence completed its report, more than 700 lives had been lost; 54,000 people were displaced, 9,400 houses destroyed, and more than 3,000 head of livestock stolen. The overall damage was estimated at 200 million Kenya shillings (about U.S. $5 million) (Republic of Kenya 1992).

This communal violence peaked during the multiparty election in 1992, abated thereafter, and erupted sporadically in 1995. These land clashes were viewed as a strategy by the Kalenjin-dominated government to force the majimbo alternative by creating "a situation on the ground for a possible political bargain in the system about the government in future Kenya" (NCCK 1992, 1) and by "intimidat[ing] and terroriz[ing] the ethnic groups that seem to be in support of multiparty democracy" (NCCK 1992, 3). For example, in one incident reported by the press (and not without precedent) a clash victim, "Mrs. Odondi . . . said police and administration officials ridiculed them with two finger salutes [an opposition symbol] and said 'let FORD help you' " (NCCK 1992, 7). The ethnic clashes, therefore, were an extension of the discourse on citizenship and democracy in Kenya, with land once again an arena as well as the object of contest.

CONCLUSION

Ethnicity is a fundamental force in Kenyan politics, a fault line along which elites mobilized and competed for power within incipient democratic institutions at independence, in the authoritarian interim, and in the recent return to party pluralism. The significance of ethnic cleavage in the recent transition and in subsequent electoral politics was clear in the 1990s reenactment of the independence-eve conflict over national identity and representational institutions. Moreover, political parties today are as narrowly based on ethnic coalitions and organized under putative ethnic leaders as were those at independence. Yet, most analysts have laid undue emphasis on the intransigence of the incumbent regime in explaining the protracted nature of the Kenyan transition. Increasingly, they view the conflict as one between a "democratic" opposition and an "antidemocratic" incumbent. Instead, this paper gives ethnic cleavage prominence, not merely as a tool of frustrated politicians seeking to stay in power but as a foundation upon which deliberate calculations about representation and access to power in a democratic context are made, leading to fundamental disagreements about institutions.

I argue that individuals in a postcolonial state like Kenya operate with dual citizenship, one in an ethnic community and the other in the nation-state. This dual citizenship differs in form, especially in the balance of rights and obligations that each type grants the individual. Within the ethnic community, on the one hand, citizenship takes a civic-republican form that subordinates individual rights and demands certain actions in the public arena to preserve and advance the community. The postcolonial state, on the other hand, grants all its members a liberal citizenship that emphasizes individual rights and does not or is unable to extract obligations. I argue that the transition to democracy in Kenya is protracted because the vision of democracy assumed, propagated, and installed is the liberal majoritarian variety, and its presumption of autonomous individual actors is at odds with the reality of individuals fulfilling republican obligations to their subnational community. This condition affects both the "democratic" opposition and the "antidemocratic" incumbents, as is evident from the reliance of ethnic and subethnic or regional networks on the formation of political parties and mobilization of votes leading to patterns that approximate an ethnic census.

The comparative analysis of the two junctures of political transition in Kenya illustrates the consequences of this duality of citizenship on electoral calculations and, in particular, on institutional preferences. Individuals formulate opinions and actions within an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) whose experiential component has pervasive sanction in their lives and extracts obligations to advance its corporate interest. Politicians, in particular, relying on the electoral behavior of ethnically mobilized voters, perceive opportunities and constraints in different institutions and, thus, propound institutional preferences that advantage their access to power. As demonstrated here, the current transition in Kenya has stalled because the incumbent coalition of minority ethnic groups proposes federalist structures to limit the danger of domination by larger groups, who advocate liberal majoritarian democracy in a unitary state. The assumption of census voting is practically a reality, since this has been the character of the three democratic elections in Kenya's independence history.

The explication of ethnicity in terms of citizenship is not meant to lend ethnic politics an ideological or philosophical veneer—it remains a calculated, maximizing strategy. It does, however, enable us to move beyond the simplistic view of the Kenyan transition as retarded by conflict between antidemocratic incumbents and a progressive opposition. Such an explanation glosses over the fundamental debate about the appropriate form of democratic institutions for a multiethnic Kenya. By exposing the moral and temporal foundations that lend ethnicity saliency (especially the relationship among identity, legitimacy, and authority), citizenship theory provides a more elegant and parsimonious explanation for why and how ethnicity continues to plague democratic politics in Kenya. Conceiving ethnicity in terms of citizenship clarifies why the institutional preferences of the two major ethnic coalitions were consistent in both transition periods, even when the monopoly over state power was reversed. By recognizing, indeed legitimizing, subnational communities as arenas of claiming citizenship and as relevant aggregations of interest in democratic politics, the citizenship perspective allows us to incorporate issues of rights and obligations into the design of democratic institutions, such as alternative electoral rules and constitutions.

The dual and competing citizenships cannot be fully reconciled, but the tension inherent in their coexistence can be mitigated in two ways. First, electoral mechanisms can be employed that both respond to the reality of ethnic voting founded upon ethnic citizenship and offer incentives to politicians to seek votes outside narrow communities of accountability. Typically, federalism, limited electoral engineering, and consociationalism are the options proposed to accommodate ethnicity in democratic politics. As usually conceived, these options are of limited utility because they focus more on cushioning ethnically riven electoral outcomes and less on addressing issues of rights and obligations that propel individual action. Federalism's main advantage is to secure a local arena for political practice (which may coincide with mobilized subnational groups) and to assure participation at the center for all groups. In practice, the tendency has been for regional entities to emerge as vehicles for pursuing dominance at the center and for denying liberal rights to nonnatives of the local region (Diamond 1988b). Limited electoral engineering, as proposed by Horowitz (1991, 1994) and as attempted in Kenya (i.e., the 25% rule), seeks to provide electoral incentives to candidates to expand their community of accountability beyond a narrow ethnic or regional base. In practice, such designs are unsustainable since temporary electoral coalitions are unlikely to supersede the ethnic coalitions in which individuals' lives are embedded beyond electoral cycles. Consociational mechanisms combine elements of the previous two (Lijphart 1977). They allow for smaller arenas of political practice in which to enact ethnic citizenship and for representation at the center, and they provide institutional mechanisms at the national level to moderate elites exploiting or acting on ethnic obligations or citizens reacting to subnational mobilization.

By themselves, however, electoral mechanisms are insufficient to reconcile the destabilizing demands of dual citizenship. For instance, of the three options, consociationalism is most appealing, but it also falls short in that its overriding concern and justification is moderating or safely channeling electoral behavior and outcomes as opposed to resolving underlying citizenship dynamics of rights and obligations that propel such behavior. (This explains the shortcomings in the options noted above.) Therefore, the second way to mitigate tensions is to resolve outstanding conflicts between demands made by subnational communities for group rights and those made by national states for individual rights, even within groups. Thus, a strong constitutional articulation of group and individual rights can minimize some of the strains on democracy emanating from the dual and competing citizenships. In particular, it is necessary to specify the relationship and relative status between the dual citizenships. Such an articulation is obviously best negotiated in constitutional debates and constitution making, and ultimately it is underscored by political practice through time.[24]

Finally, this analysis contributes more generally to citizenship theory, which at present takes liberal and republican citizenship as coterminous and as compatible with democracy in a single political community—the modern nation-state. While replicating Peled's (1992) claim of the possibility of liberal and republican citizenship coexisting in a multiethnic state, my analysis goes farther by suggesting that these forms of citizenship are not necessarily coterminous. Citizens in a single state can be formed in two substantial political communities, one bestowing liberal citizenship, the other extracting republican citizenship. Moreover, these two distinct forms are not necessarily compatible; they can be contradictory and can undermine liberal democracy. In the case of Kenya, the national political community (nation-state) lacks the capacity to extract obligation but grants rights freely through a liberal citizenship. The ethnic community grants rights balanced by obligations enforced by social practice. Because the latter's authority and legitimacy are more pervasive in an individual's life, it predominates in dealings with others in the national arena (especially in questions of delegating authority) and often leads to conflict between different groups. Recognizing separate arenas of citizen formation and practice *as well as* the possibility of conflict between forms of citizenship forged in distinct arenas is a useful increment to current citizenship theory. It advances the possibility of understanding the persistent conflict between subnational and national loyalties, especially where the state has yet to form a capacity to extract obligation as strong as that of its subnational communities, whether ethnic, religious, or regional.

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[24] Under current circumstances it is perhaps unrealistic to seek to transform ethnic citizenship into a liberal form or, alternatively, to transform national citizenship into a strongly civic-republican form.

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Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland

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Electorates in several East European countries have thrown their support behind reconstructed communist parties. Is personal economic hardship driving this phenomenon? We argue that political behavior in postcommunist societies is fundamentally structured by interpretations of the transition histories, which were centrally constitutive events. We propose a structural equation model in which understandings of the past mediate the relationship between personal circumstances and satisfaction with economic reforms. We analyze cross-sectional data collected in Poland immediately after the 1993 parliamentary elections and find, consistent with our hypotheses, that understandings of the past exert as much of an effect on attitudes toward reforms as do personal economic assessments. We use multinomial logit to analyze vote choice and find that personal economic circumstances are of little importance. Attitudes toward economic reforms have a limited effect on voting behavior, but their importance is eclipsed by understandings of the past and other factors, such as religion.

What accounts for satisfaction with reforms in transitional societies? Does economic dissatisfaction translate into a vote for the return of reconstituted communist parties? Many scholars have hypothesized that as people's suffering intensifies, they are more likely to turn against economic and political reforms that enjoyed mass support prior to implementation (Diamond 1992; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski 1991, 1993). Although these theories of the dynamic of regime change address macrolevel relationships between economic change and mass support, they contain an implicit micrologic for individuals. Indeed, several studies of individual attitudes have found that the worse one's economic situation, the lower is the level of support for many aspects of reforms (McIntosh and MacIver 1992; McIntosh et al. 1994; Mishler and Rose 1994, 1996).[1]

The return of many reformed communist parties to power implies, at least on the surface, that this logic has played out in the voting booth. Popular press accounts of the 1992 Lithuanian elections, the Polish elections of 1993, and the 1994 Hungarian elections have suggested that people, weary of economic hardship, are casting their lot with postcommunist parties. Cross-national analyses of aggregate voting data in democratizing societies confirm the relationship between macroeconomic deterioration and the rejection of incumbents (Pacek 1994, Remmer 1991). It is not clear, however, that economic dissatisfaction is the primary motivation behind casting a vote for a former communist party.

Negative economic evaluations, which are widespread in postcommunist countries (see Evans and Whitefield 1995), should be connected to some notion of who is to blame for the situation, and how people decide to attribute blame must be understood within the context of a country's transition history. Briefly stated, we argue that transitions from authoritarian rule are centrally constitutive events, the varied interpretations of which become an important part of a country's political culture. Subjective perceptions of the transition from authoritarian rule encompass not simply what happened but also what people believe *could* or *should* have happened—and who deserves the blame when times get tough. These assignments of blame are "prior understandings" that fundamentally structure attitudes toward reforms, though subjective perceptions of one's economic situation have the power to reshape these understandings to some degree. With regard to voting, we argue that a vote for a reformed communist party is more a matter of how one understands the transition history—how blame for bad economic circumstances is attributed—than of simple dissatisfaction with reforms or evaluations of one's own personal situation.

We are not the first to suggest that the transition process itself has a lasting effect (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Stepan 1986). Some have gone so far as to argue that different "modes" of transition (e.g., reform, revolution, imposition, pact) are critical deter-

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[1] In contrast, Duch (1993) showed that negative economic evaluations have a positive effect on support for economic reforms in the USSR. His results, however, are consistent with and more appropriately comparable to research conducted in Poland prior to the implementation of market reforms in the late 1980s (see Mason 1992 and Przeworski 1993 for summaries of pretransition public opinion studies).

minants of democratic stability and regime consolidation (Karl 1990, Karl and Schmitter 1991). Critics of this approach have pointed to its deterministic tendencies, the inherent difficulties in categorizing countries according to this framework, and the fact that such a narrow conceptualization of transitions does not account for different outcomes of similar transition processes and similar outcomes of disparate processes (Cavarozzi 1992, Hagopian 1993, Hartlyn n.d.). Instead, they believe, we need to pay attention to both long-run historical processes and more proximate factors, such as newly formed institutions, economic interests, or culture.

Our purpose is neither to pursue the attack on modes of transition nor to defend the approach from critics. Insights from the debate, however, can be applied to the study of political behavior in societies undergoing transitions from authoritarian rule. Above all, we argue that transitions do matter, or at least can provide a contextualizing framework for political attitudes and behaviors. At the same time, we agree with critics of the modes-of-transition approach that transitions must be grasped more broadly in the context of long-run historical processes and economic dynamics. For our purpose, the influence of transitions must be viewed not only in the terms describing the nature of elite power transfers but also in the meanings that they have for ordinary people. Simply put, for the average citizen in the street, what looks to one like a "pact" may appear to another as an "imposition."

Based on our experience with the Polish case, we have developed a model that links understandings of the past, economic circumstances, and satisfaction with reforms. We believe the model has applicability to other postcommunist and, perhaps, postauthoritarian societies more generally. Poland is a good candidate for such analysis because the political and economic transitions had been under way long enough by 1993, the date of our survey, to give people a clear understanding of the economic effects of the transition and the contours of the political system. To test for hypothesized relationships between support for reforms and voting behavior, we used data from a national random-sample survey of the Polish population immediately after the September 1993 parliamentary elections.[2]

Thus far, debates over the extent to which transitions "matter" have focused on patterns of elite coalitions and institutions without addressing mass politics directly. Likewise, studies of mass political behavior in transitional societies tend not to make explicit links to theories of regime transition.[3] Our study represents a step forward in delineating a micrologic of political behavior for transitional societies that simultaneously are contending with economic reform and the incorporation of the vestiges of an old elite into a democratic order.

TRANSITIONS FROM COMMUNISM AS FOUNDING EVENTS

Founding events are particularly decisive moments for a society, and understandings of them have tremendous salience for the political culture by shaping patterns of discourse (Eliade 1963, Shils 1975, Weber 1968). These streams of discourse, in turn, provide a contextualizing framework for individuals' political thinking (Eckstein 1988, Feldman 1988, Hartz 1955, McClosky and Zaller 1984, Zaller 1992). The East European transitions from communism are classic examples of just such a founding event; they constitute a contested past in which people struggle over what should be remembered and forgotten, and who should be blamed, honored, excused, or praised (Middleton and Edwards 1990, 9). Interpretations of the transition from communism are "prior understandings" that invoke one's cumulative experiences and interpretations of history and help structure political attitudes and behaviors.

Understandings of founding events are not simply factual accounts uniformly held by everyone; they are subjective interpretations filtered through variations in contemporary circumstances (Coser 1992, Halbwachs 1951, Kinder and Sears 1985). Yet, these interpretations are not pure constructions of the present that are refashioned with each change in ephemeral circumstances; understandings of the past possess a certain element of temporal consistency (Middleton and Edwards 1990, Schwartz 1982) in the same way that ideologies and core values are believed to operate (Feldman 1988).

The Polish transition from communism, as is often the case with founding events, was actually a lengthy and complex struggle around which many competing historical accounts have emerged.[4] A prominent discourse reflecting the variation in understandings of the transition history encompasses notions of who is to blame for current economic problems. There was general consensus in 1993 that the economic situation was undesirable in some way, irrespective of the exact problem definition.[5] Just as in the United States in the later phases of the Vietnam War, variations in social discourse centered more around how to improve a bad situation than whether the situation was bad or good. In both cases, debates on how to extricate the country from its predicament presupposed the notion that someone was to blame for it (Schuman and Scott 1989).

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[2] Sampling was done through a stratified cluster method and is representative of all eligible voters in Poland. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,851 respondents.

[3] Many studies of public opinion in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have investigated the extent to which people embrace values and beliefs found in Western democracies and considered central to certain types of democracy and market economies (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Finifter 1996; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994; Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1996; Reisinger et al. 1994). Studies of postauthoritarian Spain have examined the relationship between economic evaluations and government support (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina 1986).

[4] Although the transitions to a capitalist economy and democracy are arguably incomplete, we contend that the transition from state socialism in Poland has concluded. It is disputable when the "point of no return" was reached, but most see the decisive moment as the defeat of the Communist Party in the 1989 elections and the subsequent defection of some party members to help form a Solidarity-led government.

[5] By 1993, Poland's unemployment rate was 16.4% (exceeding 30% in some regions), inflation was 36.9% per year, and per-capita income was below pre-1990 levels, despite the fastest rate of GDP growth in Europe—3.8% annually (Economist Intelligence Unit 1994, *Rocznik Statystyczny* 1994, *Rocznik Statystyczny Województw* 1994).

The general discourse of blame in Poland may be divided roughly into two currents based upon how the transition from state socialism is understood. The first reveals a deep antipathy toward the communist past, not only as a theoretical system but also as it was actually experienced. It contends that state socialism (1) limited Poland's potential and damaged society and individuals through its inherent flaws or debased form of realization and (2) still bears the responsibility for contemporary problems.[6] The second current of discourse embodies the notion that society was betrayed by opposition leaders who later implemented the early reforms: Either the transition was hijacked by a small elite, or society's goals from the early 1980s were not (or only minimally) realized through the enacted reforms.[7] Affect for the original Solidarity movement may vary in this latter understanding of blame, but its core sense is that something went awry in the transition from state socialism, and the first-wave reformers are to blame.[8]

Blame of Communist System and *Blame of First-wave Reformers* are measured by the extent to which respondents agree with statements that attribute responsibility for Poland's declining standard of living to 45 years of state socialism and to the first-wave reformers (see Appendix A for questionnaire items). The overall assignment of blame to the early reformers is higher than that attributed to the communist system; Table 1 shows mean values of 3.6 and 3.1, respectively, on a scale of 5. These understandings of blame are inversely related (−.34 Pearson correlation), but more than one-fourth of the sample expressed a high degree of blame for both systems, as revealed in Table 2.

TABLE 1. Mean Values of Blame, by Selected Groupings

Grouping	Blame Communist System (mean)	Blame First-Wave Reformers (mean)
Whole sample	3.10	3.60
Men	3.15	3.61
Women	3.06	3.59
Past Communist Party members	2.65	3.80
Past Solidarity members	3.39	3.53
Primary school unfinished	2.99	3.70
Primary school completed	3.05	3.77
Trade school completed	3.10	3.79
High school completed	3.15	3.39
College completed	3.19	2.94
Age 29 and under	3.21	3.46
Age 30–39	3.17	3.58
Age 40–49	3.02	3.68
Age 50–59	2.93	3.70
Age older than 59	3.12	3.59
Income bottom quintile	3.01	3.79
Income second quintile	3.16	3.58
Income third quintile	3.02	3.74
Income fourth quintile	3.13	3.51
Income top quintile	3.24	3.23
Place of residence rural	2.97	3.78
Place < 20,000 people	3.05	3.67
Place 20,000–49,999	3.21	3.65
Place 50,000–100,000	3.08	3.47
Place > 100,000	3.25	3.35
Church once a year/never	2.85	3.68
Church few times a year	2.94	3.65
Church at least once a month	3.02	3.61
Church once a week or more	3.32	3.54

With few exceptions, most categories of people blame the first-wave reformers more than the communist system, but a trend in one type of blame across a given variable does not imply the opposite trend for the other type of blame. For example, members of the pre-1989 Communist Party are much less inclined to blame Poland's state socialist past for contemporary problems than are former Solidarity members. In contrast, former Solidarity members blame the first-wave reformers only slightly less than do former Communist Party members. There is a dramatic drop in blame attributed to reformers among those who finished at

TABLE 2. Relationship between Blame of the Communist System and Blame of First-Wave Reformers

	First-Wave Blame		
	Low	Medium	High
Communist system blame			
Low	6.0%	1.5%	34.3%
Medium	1.0%	6.9%	3.0%
High	18.5%	2.1%	26.8%

Note: 1,581 respondents (85.6% of the sample) fall into one of the four extreme categories. High blame = responses of 4 or 5; low blame = responses of 1 or 2. *N* = 1,847.

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[6] A related line of research posits that people are more likely to support reforms if they fear a return of the communist system (Mishler and Rose 1994, 1996). Although the results of those studies show that perceptions of the communist past have an effect on support for reforms, we doubt that many people in East Central Europe actively feared a return of state socialism by 1991, when the data for the studies were collected. Political debate has centered on how reforms should proceed, not on how to stave off a reconsolidation of state socialism.

[7] Although stabilization measures undertaken by the post-Solidarity government in 1990 were generally successful and reasonably popular, such Solidarity movement goals as greater participation in workplace decision making, an increased role for trade unions, and assurance of certain social supports were lost as the focus shifted to privatization and market reform. See Legters (1992) for reprints of the strikers' 21 demands and the resultant Gdańsk Agreement signed by the government and the opposition in August 1980.

[8] Rifts began to appear in the Solidarity movement in early 1981, and opposition activity from 1981–89 was generally limited to core activists and intellectuals in urban areas. When strikes again swept the country in 1988, the "Solidarity" that participated in the Round Table Accords in 1989 was comprised mainly of activists from the movement's center. The former rank-and-file and many leaders on the periphery, both of whom gave the early movement its mass character, were not an integral part of the opposition that negotiated the end of state socialism.

least high school. Some of this may be due to an economic effect, but those who completed high school are also less inclined to feel betrayed by elite reformers; they have a similar social status and, perhaps, had congruent transition goals from the outset.

A clear cohort effect is also present. As age rises, blame of the communist system decreases except for those 60 years and older, and the opposite pattern is evident in blame of first-wave reformers. We argue that this cohort effect exists because people over age 60 came to political consciousness before the consolidation of state socialism. Those who survived World War II and remember the hardships and political struggles in its aftermath have a fundamentally different perspective from those born just a few years later. This cohort was socialized during the most concentrated period of state socialism (Sułek 1990), which accounts for the sharp difference between the two oldest age groups. There is no overall trend across income levels, although people in the highest income bracket attribute more blame, on average, to the communist system and less to the first-wave reformers. Finally, as frequency of church attendance rises, average levels of communist system blame markedly increase, but there is no analogous inverse pattern in the blame assigned to the first-wave reformers.

A CAUSAL MODEL OF ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORMS

We argue that prior understandings of the transition, manifested here as blame for Poland's current circumstances, have a direct effect on attitudes toward the economic reforms implemented since 1990. The more one blames the communist system, the greater is the satisfaction with reforms; the more one blames the first-wave reformers, the lower is the satisfaction with reforms, all else being equal. Although people assign each blame separately, these attributions are not entirely independent of each other. Accordingly, we further hypothesize that the extent to which one blames the communist system will have a direct effect on the level of blame attributed to the first-wave reformers; the greater one's blame of the communist system, the more likely one is to interpret the actions of the first-wave reformers positively by "forgiving" any of the reformers' perceived transgressions or missteps. We argue that communist system blame is causally prior to first-wave reformer blame because most of the experiences integral to the formation of communist blame have a temporally prior status. People's memories of the communist system have existed for much longer and are presumably more stable than their understandings of the first-wave reformers, the memories of whom have a more recent genesis.

Although attributions of blame are rooted in understandings of political history, they are not immune to influence from contemporary personal circumstances. Assessments of how one's life has changed will have some effect on the way the past is interpreted and, thus, on how blame is attributed. Therefore, evaluations of *change in living situation* not only will positively and directly affect evaluations of reforms but also will dampen or intensify each type of blame. Poles who think they have done well in the last two years will blame first-wave reformers less, and their prosperity may intensify the degree to which they blame communism. Poles who have done poorly may remember communism as "not all that bad" and lower the degree of blame they assign to it, while increasing their antipathy toward first-wave reformers.

Several exogenous variables also are incorporated into the model. First, we include objective socioeconomic measures of *Income* and *Occupation*. We expect that the higher one's income, the more likely one is to evaluate change in living situation positively and to have a favorable attitude toward economic reforms. Of all possible occupational categories, we believe that farmers, owners, blue-collar workers in state-owned industrial enterprises, and white-collar workers in the state sector are the most likely to have class-type interests and identities.[9] We hypothesize that owners will be more likely to be satisfied with reforms, whereas farmers will be less likely to be satisfied. Income and occupation are included as controls in all other equations.

We also include reported *Membership in Solidarity* until 1981 and the *Communist Party* at any time until 1989. Since actual membership is underreported, these variables are probably best understood as distinguishing a core of people that still identify with these groups.[10] Those who report past membership in the party are less likely to blame the communist system and more likely to blame the first-wave reformers for Poland's problems. Those who claim past Solidarity membership are more likely to blame the communist system, but they are not any more or less likely to blame the first-wave reformers, all else being equal. Although some former members have a continued identification with the Solidarity movement, many of them are among those most disappointed with the former opposition leaders, who are seen as having come to power at the cost of workers' influence.

Finally, we control for *Age*, *Gender*, *Education*, *Religion* (frequency of church attendance), *Size of Place of*

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[9] This supposition is loosely based upon each group's future expectations (cf. Kitschelt 1992) as well as shared experiences and social identities under state socialism. In Poland, the peasantry was acknowledged as a distinct social class, and owners began to emerge as a socioeconomic group in the later phases of state socialism. White-collar workers in state education, health care, and social services correspond roughly to a noncreative intelligentsia. Blue-collar workers in state-owned enterprises include both skilled and unskilled industrial workers. They are the most likely to have a worker identity, and they are still awaiting the effects of privatization on their place of employment.

[10] For both groups, reported past membership in the sample is clearly lower than actual membership. In 1981, roughly half the adult working population in Poland belonged to Solidarity, but only 18.8% of respondents still claim they were members. The number of former Communist Party members is more difficult to gauge, since the party lost about one-third of its membership after 1981. In our sample, 11.3% of respondents said they had belonged at some time to the PZPR or one of its shadow parties. This corresponds roughly to membership estimates from the mid-1980s, but it underestimates the total number of people who were *ever* in the party.

Residence, and *National Particularism*, which reflects the extent to which one feels Poland should be cautious toward outside influences and "follow its own road." Since plots of age against the endogenous variables revealed curvilinear relationships, we included a squared age term to capture this effect. To account for an observed step function in education relative to the dependent variables, we include a dummy variable for completion of high school and an interaction term between years of schooling and completion of high school. We expect that those who finished high school will blame the first-wave reformers less than those without a high school diploma, all else being equal. People who are more religious are more likely to blame the communist system and less likely to blame the first-wave reformers, since the fall of state socialism has opened the door to increased Church influence in public and political life. National particularism will have a positive effect on first-wave reformer blame and a negative effect on satisfaction with reforms, which are often considered "foreign" influences (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1996).

The hypothesized relationships are specified by the following structural equation model:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{CHANGLIV (Y1)} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1\,\text{INCOME} \\ & + \beta_2\,\text{FARMER} + \beta_3\,\text{OWNER} + \beta_4\,\text{BLUESTATE} \\ & + \beta_5\,\text{WHITESTATE} + \beta_6\,\text{AGE} + \beta_7\,\text{SQAGE} \\ & + \beta_8\,\text{SEX} + \beta_9\,\text{SIZEPLACE} + \beta_{10}\,\text{EDUC} \\ & + \beta_{11}\,\text{FINHS} + \beta_{12}\,\text{ED*HS} + E_{Y1};\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{BLAMECOMM (Y2)} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1\,\text{CHANGLIV} \\ & + \beta_2\,\text{INCOME} + \beta_3\,\text{FARMER} + \beta_4\,\text{OWNER} \\ & + \beta_5\,\text{BLUESTATE} + \beta_6\,\text{WHITESTATE} \\ & + \beta_7\,\text{FORMSOL} + \beta_8\,\text{FORMCOMM} + \beta_9\,\text{AGE} \\ & + \beta_{10}\,\text{SQAGE} + \beta_{11}\,\text{SEX} + \beta_{12}\,\text{SIZEPLACE} \\ & + \beta_{13}\,\text{EDUC} + \beta_{14}\,\text{FINHS} + \beta_{15}\,\text{ED*HS} \\ & + \beta_{16}\,\text{RELIG} + E_{Y2};\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{BLAMEFIRST (Y3)} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1\,\text{CHANGLIV} \\ & + \beta_2\,\text{BLAMECOMM} + \beta_3\,\text{INCOME} \\ & + \beta_4\,\text{FARMER} + \beta_5\,\text{OWNER} + \beta_6\,\text{BLUESTATE} \\ & + \beta_7\,\text{WHITESTATE} + \beta_8\,\text{FORMCOMM} \\ & + \beta_9\,\text{AGE} + \beta_{10}\,\text{SQAGE} + \beta_{11}\,\text{SEX} \\ & + \beta_{12}\,\text{SIZEPLACE} + \beta_{13}\,\text{EDUC} + \beta_{14}\,\text{FINHS} \\ & + \beta_{15}\,\text{ED*HS} + \beta_{16}\,\text{RELIG} + \beta_{17}\,\text{NATION} + E_{Y3};\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\text{ECONSAT (Y4)} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1\,\text{CHANGLIV} \\ & + \beta_2\,\text{BLAMECOMM} + \beta_3\,\text{BLAMEFIRST} \\ & + \beta_4\,\text{INCOME} + \beta_5\,\text{FARMER} + \beta_6\,\text{OWNER} \\ & + \beta_7\,\text{BLUESTATE} + \beta_8\,\text{WHITESTATE} \\ & + \beta_9\,\text{AGE} + \beta_{10}\,\text{SQAGE} + \beta_{11}\,\text{SEX} \\ & + \beta_{12}\,\text{SIZEPLACE} + \beta_{13}\,\text{EDUC} + \beta_{14}\,\text{FINHS} \\ & + \beta_{15}\,\text{ED*HS} + \beta_{16}\,\text{NATION} + E_{Y4},\end{aligned}$$

where

BLAMECOMM = blame communist system;
BLAMEFIRST = blame first-wave reformers;
CHANGLIV = evaluation of change in personal living situation;
ECONSAT = satisfaction with economic reforms;
INCOME = monthly income in hundreds of thousands of Polish zlotys;
FORMCOMM = reported membership in Communist Party until 1989;
FORMSOL = reported membership in Solidarity until December 13, 1981;
BLUESTATE = blue-collar workers in state-owned enterprises;
WHITESTATE = white-collar workers in health, education, and social services;
SQAGE = age squared;
EDUC = years of schooling;
FINHS = completion of high school;
ED*HS = interaction term of education and high school completion;
RELIG = frequency of church attendance; and
NATION = national particularism.

To analyze the structural equation model we use the ordinary least-squares method. Figure 1 shows the standardized coefficients of the model of satisfaction with economic reforms.[11] For clarity, we have shown only the paths among the endogenous variables; full model results are given in Table 3.

The results depicted in Figure 1 support the hypothesized relationships. As blame attributed to the communist system increases, satisfaction with economic reforms rises, whereas increasing levels of first-wave reformer blame decrease satisfaction with reforms. Blame of first-wave reformers has a stronger influence, however. This difference in relative effect is not surprising, since memories of the first-wave reformers are more recent and more closely linked with the reforms themselves. A comparison of the total effects (shown in brackets in the figure) indicates that the added effect of both types of blame has a greater influence on satisfaction with economic reforms than does change in personal living situation. In other words, understandings of the past are just as important as personal economic evaluations in determining satisfaction with the economic reforms.

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[11] In response to a reviewer's concern, we also tested a model in which reciprocal paths were run between blame of first-wave reformers and satisfaction with economic reforms. The results, which support our hypothesized model, are shown in Appendix B.

FIGURE 1. OLS Estimates of Causal Model of Satisfaction with Economic Reforms, Standardized Path Coefficients for Endogenous Variables


Change in Living Situation [.26]
-.12
.19
.19
Blame of First-Wave Reformers
-.30
Satisfaction with Economic Reforms
-.28
.08
Blame of Communist System [.16]

Note: Error terms are omitted for simplicity; all paths significant at $p < .05$, two-tailed test. [ ] = Total effect on satisfaction with economic reforms.

The results also support our argument that blame of the communist system mitigates blame attributed to the first-wave reformers. The direct effect of communist system blame on first-wave reformer blame is greater than the influence of change in one's living situation, even when indirect effects are taken into account. As expected, positive evaluations of change in living situation have a positive effect on satisfaction with economic reforms. Finally, personal economic assessments also are significant in shaping understandings of the transition history: Those who perceive an improvement attach more blame to the communist system and less to the first-wave reformers, while those who believe they are worse off focus more blame on the reformers while mitigating blame ascribed to the communist system.

Looking at the full model in Table 3, former membership in either Solidarity or the Communist Party is a strong determinant of where blame is fixed, but contrary to our expectations, former party members are not significantly more likely than Solidarity members to blame the first-wave reformers. Controlling for all else, income has a positive effect both on assessments of change in living situation and on satisfaction with reforms, as hypothesized, but the weak influence of occupation is somewhat surprising. As a group, the occupational variables were not significant. Age has a significant, curvilinear effect in all the equations, despite the fact that the t values for the separate coefficients do not always appear significant.[12] The interpretation of the age coefficients is that both older and younger people tend to evaluate their change in living situation more positively and are more satisfied with economic reforms than is true of those in the middle of the age range. People at both ends of the age spectrum also blame the communist system less and are more lenient in their assessments of the first-wave reformers.[13]

Education is not a significant predictor of communist system blame, but it has a significant effect in all the other equations. The results clearly show that those who have finished high school perceive that their living situation has improved since 1991, and they attribute significantly less blame to the first-wave reformers. Finally, the more religious people are, the more likely they are to blame the communist system and the less likely they are to blame the first-wave reformers, though the effect is more pronounced with regard to the communist system.

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[12] Age and age^2 naturally display a high degree of colinearity. Although multicolinearity does not bias the estimates of the coefficients, it makes it difficult to assess their significance. Multicolinearity tends to inflate the standard errors, which reduces the t values, and thus produces coefficients that appear insignificant even when this may not be the case. The presence of significant coefficients indicates a particularly robust effect, and F-tests of the null hypothesis that the aggregate effect of the age variables is zero was rejected for all the equations (i.e., age is significant in all equations).

[13] The curves, however, do not all look the same. By taking the derivative of the binomial age expression, setting it equal to zero, and solving for x, we can determine the minimum (or maximum) of each curve. These calculations show that evaluations of change in living situation tend to worsen until about age 43, when they turn upward. Similarly, blame of the communist system is at its lowest among those in their mid-forties. In contrast, blame attributed to first-wave reformers peaks at age 35 and then tails off slowly with increasing age. Satisfaction with economic reforms bottoms out at around age 52, then rises among the oldest people in the sample.

TABLE 3. OLS Estimates of Structural Equation Model: Satisfaction with Economic Reforms

	Change in Living Situation		Blame of Communist System		Blame of First-Wave Reformers		Satisfaction with Economic Reforms	
	b	*β*	*b*	*β*	*b*	*β*	*b*	*β*
Intercept	.77***		2.51***		3.71***		3.23***	
	(.10)		(.38)		(.33)		(.30)	
Endogenous Variables								
Blame first-wave reformers							−.29***	−.30
							(.02)	
Blame communist system					−.24***	−.28	.06***	.08
					(.02)		(.02)	
Change in living situation			.46***	.19	−.24***	−.12	.38***	.19
			(.06)		(.05)		(.04)	
Exogenous Variables								
Income	.05***	.26	−.01	−.02	−.02*	−.05	.02**	.06
	(.00)		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Farmers	−.07	−.04	.07	.02	−.06	−.02	−.17*	−.05
	(.04)		(.11)		(.09)		(.08)	
Owners	.15	.04	.08	.01	.12	.02	.26	.04
	(.08)		(.20)		(.16)		(.15)	
Blue-collar state workers	−.02	−.02	−.04	−.01	−.02	−.01	−.01	−.00
	(.04)		(.09)		(.07)		(.07)	
White-collar state workers	−.09	−.03	.05	.01	.19	.04	−.10	−.02
	(.06)		(.15)		(.12)		(.11)	
Solidarity (1980–81)			.34***	.09				
			(.09)					
Communist Party (until 1989)			−.42***	−.09	.14	.04		
			(.11)		(.09)			
Age	−.03***	−.72	−.03*	−.31	.01	.19	−.02*	−.29
	(.00)		(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Age^2	.00***	.76	.00*	.31	−.00	−.23	.00**	.34
	.00		(.00)		(.00)		(.00)	
Sex (Male = 1)	.04	.03	.15*	.05	.01	.00	.07	.03
	(.03)		(.07)		(.06)		(.05)	
Size of place	.02	.04	.07**	.08	−.03	−.04	.04*	.05
	(.01)		(.02)		(.02)		(.02)	
Education	−.01	−.06	.01	.02	.01	.02	.03	.06
	(.01)		(.03)		(.02)		(.02)	
Finish high school (Yes = 1)	−.33	−.25	.03	.01	.47	.18	−.49	−.19
	(.20)		(.48)		(.38)		(.35)	
Education*high school	.04*	.40	−.00	−.02	−.07*	−.34	.05	.25
	(.02)		(.04)		(.03)		(.03)	
Religiosity			.20***	.14	−.07*	−.06		
			(.04)		(.03)			
National particularism					.08***	.18	−.03**	−.06
					(.01)		(.01)	
Adjusted R^2	.12		.08		.22		.31	

Note: All estimated paths shown; standard errors in parentheses.
$^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$, two-tailed test. $N = 1{,}702$.

ECONOMICS, BLAME, AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Although the 1993 Polish parliamentary election was commonly perceived as a referendum on the course of economic reforms, it also centered around many other issues, such as the legacy of communism and Church-state relations (Sabbat-Swidlicka 1993).[14] Table 4 shows the major contenders for the Polish parliament in 1993, along with descriptions of their campaign appeal. We also include parties' left-right placement according to those surveyed in our sample, but this information should be approached with caution. The party space cannot be described in unidimensional categories of left and right because no single shared

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[14] This was the second parliamentary election since implementation of the structural adjustment program known as the Balcerowicz Plan in January 1990. By 1993, the effects of market reforms and privatization had become more widespread. The 1993 electoral system for the Sejm was based on proportional representation of 52 electoral districts, with 3 to 17 seats each. Parties had to surpass a 5% threshold nationwide in order to obtain seats; coalitions had to have 8% (Gebethner 1995).

TABLE 4. Major Parties Participating in the 1993 Polish National Election

Party	Vote % in Elections/ (Vote % in Sample)	Mean Left-Right Score from Sample	Characteristics of Appeal
Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD)	20.4* (20.8)	1.58	Left identity; some change in economic reforms; more social benefits
Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL)	15.4* (22.1)	3.07	Strong peasant identity; appeal to past: "We've always been for the PSL."
Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, UD)	10.6* (10.8)	4.36	Continuation of status quo; focus on party "stars"; split on role of Church
Union of Labor (Unia Pracy, UP)	7.28* (9.2)	3.44	"New Left"—largely noncommunist economic left
Catholic Election Committee-Fatherland (KKW—"Ojczyzna," KKW)	6.37+ (5.6)	5.68	Pro-Church, antiabortion, propatriotic/ religious schooling and free enterprise
Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, KPN)	5.77* (6.4)	5.26	Oldest opposition—neither "left" nor "right"; strong Poland
Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reform (Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform, BBWR)	5.41* (4.4)	N/A	Nonparty of "experts" not tainted by past political participation
Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ-Solidarność, SOLID)	4.90 (6.4)	4.96	Defender of worker and "true" Solidarity legacy
Center Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum, PC)	4.42 (2.9)	5.09	Anti-Wałęsa; anticommunist; against outgoing government
Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, KLD)	3.99 (2.4)	4.96	In search of new business class; secular alternative to UD; strong in Gdańsk
Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej, UPR)	3.18 (2.0)	N/A	No taxes, no government except for restoration of law and order
Coalition for the Republic (Koalicja dla Rzeczpospolitej, KdR)	2.70 (1.9)	N/A	"A republic of clean hands," similar to PC

Source: Pietrzyk-Zieniewicz and Zieniewicz 1995, Vinton 1993a, and author's collection of election materials.
* = obtained seats in Sejm; + = did not obtain seats since it did not surpass the 8% threshold for coalitions.

conception of the terms exists in Polish politics (Jasiewicz 1995, Wojtaszczyk 1995).[15]

The post-1989 governments were dominated by members of the Solidarity "camp," but coalitions and party affiliations of the representatives shifted frequently. Support for each initiative was cobbled together from a different array of parties, depending on the measure being considered. The Democratic Union (UD) and six other parties from the Solidarity camp, including the Catholic Election Committee (KKW) and the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), comprised the minority coalition government. The Solidarity Trade Union (SOLID) was not officially in the coalition but provided soft support, although it instigated the vote of no confidence that led to the government's collapse and precipitated the 1993 elections.[16]

The Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), both reconstituted communist-era parties, were the largest opposition groups prior to the election, but their policy interests were not always congruent. Several parties with a Solidarity pedigree (KdR, PC, and UP) also opposed the government despite their common heritage with the coalition parties. The Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), with a history of opposition predating the Solidarity movement, was a consistently shrill voice against the government.

The architects of the economic reforms (UD, KLD, and, to a lesser extent, KKW), along with the Union of Real Politics (UPR) and the political newcomer, Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), favored maintaining the status quo or accelerating the pace of reform. All other parties advocated some change; two in the Solidarity camp (UP and SOLID) made the strongest appeals for the protection of workers and society's weaker elements through subsidies or the slowing of privatization. The postcommunist SLD made general appeals for greater social protection, but its position was more ambiguous, since it had supported the government on issues of privatization.

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[15] "Left" is strongly identified with postcommunist parties, but it also connotes favoring increased state intervention in the economy, which is not entirely true for the main communist successor party. "Right" is often connected in general to post-Solidarity parties and therefore does not have a consistent association with free markets. Most often, "right" denotes religious and nationalist parties, those calling for the lustration (removal with the aim of purification) of former communist functionaries and having a certain shrill style of political conduct characterized by proselytization and combativeness (Pietrzyk-Zieniewicz and Zieniewicz 1995).

[16] The Solidarity Trade Union Party initiated an unexpectedly successful vote of no confidence in May 1993 as a move to force government concession to wage increases for striking public sector employees. When no alternative government emerged, President Lech Wałęsa dissolved parliament and called for elections (see Vinton 1992 and 1993b for good English-language summaries of Poland's party system).

To analyze voting behavior in the 1993 Polish parliamentary elections, we use a multinomial logit (MNL) model of unordered choice among several alternatives (see Appendix C for a discussion of this method). Table 5 shows the MNL coefficients, which represent the relative effect of each independent variable on the log-odds ratio of a given party, j, to a chosen reference party, J: $\ln[\text{Prob}(y = j)/\text{Prob}(y = J)]$. We selected SLD as the reference category because it best illustrates the decision to vote for the postcommunists in comparison with all other parties.[17]

The precise interpretation of MNL coefficients is not intuitively obvious since the dependent variable (log-odds ratio) itself is difficult to imagine. Nonetheless, looking at the parameter estimates, we can glean a basic understanding of which variables play an important role in determining the vote for the main postcommunist party (SLD) in comparison with the other parties in our analysis. Table 5 shows the overwhelming salience of communist system blame attribution and religiosity in the decision to vote for any one of the other parties relative to the SLD. People who blamed the communist system were more likely to vote for any party other than SLD, including the reformed communist Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Frequency of church attendance had the strongest effect on vote choice over SLD for parties that employ religious appeals (KKW, SOLID, and PSL). As we would expect, the more voters blamed the first-wave reformers, the more likely they were to choose SLD over one of the parties associated with implementing or advocating further economic reforms (UD, KKW, and BBWR).

Satisfaction with the economic reforms had a significant effect on the decision to vote for not only the main architects of the reforms (UD) but also for the Solidarity Trade Union (SOLID) as compared to SLD. This is an interesting finding, since Solidarity's campaign appeals were arguably more interventionist than those of the postcommunist SLD, but it supports our contention that interpretations of transition history are salient determinants of political behavior. Voters choosing SOLID over SLD were equally angry at first-wave reformers, but they were more satisfied with the reforms because of their intense antipathy toward the communist system and their continued identification with the opposition movement.

Controlling for all other variables, neither change in living situation nor income had an effect on vote choice for any party in comparison to SLD. Moreover, the influence of occupation was minimal. Admittedly, some economic effects may be masked by our decision to include both endogenous and exogenous variables in a single equation, particularly since we have already shown that the blame variables and satisfaction with reforms have a built-in economic component. In gaining the relative advantages of a multinomial logit analysis, we lose the ability to show the causal relationships among the variables that precede attitudes toward economic reforms. Therefore, we have removed the endogenous variables to show the full effects of income and occupation on vote choice. By adding back into the model one endogenous variable at a time, we can roughly replicate the causal order presented earlier in the paper. For clarity, in Table 6 we present the results only for the variables of interest and for four parties that adequately illustrate the differences across the party space: PSL, UD, KKW and SOLID in comparison to SLD.[18]

With all endogenous variables removed (Model 1), income is not a significant predictor of vote for any of the parties over SLD, and occupational effects are of quite limited significance. Given the speculation that imposition of a market economy will produce economic interests which will be expressed in the political realm (cf. Evans and Whitefield 1993, Kitschelt 1992), these results seem somewhat surprising. Our findings suggest that, with a few exceptions, parties are not mobilizing constituencies effectively along class or occupational lines. How people evaluate their change in living situation (Model 2) is an important determinant of vote for SLD over each of the reform-implementing parties (UD and KKW), but its addition to the model does not substantially improve the fit. For all parties, blame of the Communist system is highly significant, and its addition dramatically reduces the effect of change in living situation (Model 3). The inclusion of blame of first-wave reformers in the model does not substantially reduce the value or significance of blame of the communist system for any of the parties. When both blames are controlled, change in living situation remains significant for only one party, UD.

Since the MNL coefficients presented thus far still do not tell us the sensitivity of vote choice to changes in the independent variables, we calculated changes in the overall probability of voting for each of the parties at all levels of blame of the communist system and satisfaction with economic reforms. This is the most common way to interpret the results of MNL analyses.[19] Figure 2 illustrates the effects of communist system blame and satisfaction with economic reforms on the *probability of voting* for each of the parties when all other independent variables are held at their means.

The effects of communist system blame are particularly striking with regard to the reconstituted communist party (SLD). With all else equal, there is more than a 50% chance that someone who does not blame the communist system *at all* (value = 1) for Poland's

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[17] The choice of reference category is unimportant for estimation purposes and is based purely on substantive grounds (Liao 1994). Estimates produced with alternative reference categories are simply linear transformations of the same information.

[18] Full results for all parties in the original analysis with all estimated coefficients are available from the authors. We have chosen to structure our analysis this way rather than group the parties into blocs based on economic platform for several reasons, including the lack of a clear economic program in some parties and the intricate manner in which economic positions are tied into other issues, thus masking whatever "pure" economic interests may exist.

[19] See, for example, Gerber (1996), Whitten and Palmer (1996), and Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran (1996).

TABLE 5. MNL Model of Vote in 1993 Polish Parlimentary Election, with Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) as Reference Group

	ln[PSL/SLD]	ln[UD/SLD]	ln[UP/SLD]	ln[KKW/SLD]	ln[KPN/SLD]	ln[BBWR/SLD]	ln[SOLID/SLD]	ln[PC/SLD]
Intercept	−2.87*	−4.66***	−4.10**	−10.72***	−3.75*	−5.78**	−6.42***	−9.72***
	(1.27)	(1.41)	(1.33)	(2.18)	(1.58)	(1.82)	(1.65)	(2.39)
Satisfaction with economic reforms	0.01	0.38**	0.11	0.30	0.13	0.29	0.34*	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Blame of first-wave reforms	0.03	−0.41**	−0.06	−0.35*	−0.10	−0.47**	−0.12	−0.27
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Blame of communist system	0.45***	0.76***	0.54***	0.78***	0.54***	0.70***	0.72***	0.80***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.19)
Change in living situation	0.05	0.36	0.12	0.28	0.39	0.36	−0.17	0.26
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.38)
Income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Farmer	0.83*	−0.66	−1.97	−0.36	−0.80	0.06	0.44	0.06
	(0.39)	(0.67)	(1.08)	(0.65)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.61)	(0.94)
Owners	0.05	0.34	−11.12	1.18	−0.04	0.96	0.50	1.73
	(0.77)	(0.74)	(139.3)	(1.23)	(0.90)	(0.94)	(0.92)	(0.90)
Blue-collar state workers	−0.26	−0.72	−0.29	−0.07	−0.18	−0.26	0.12	−0.36
	(.32)	(.44)	(.37)	(.48)	(.39)	(.52)	(.40)	(.63)
White-collar state workers	−0.62	−0.51	0.06	0.84	−0.44	0.83	0.12	−0.90
	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.64)	(0.71)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(1.14)
Solidarity membership	−0.01	0.50	0.54	−0.06	0.55	0.51	1.12**	0.76
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.51)
Communist Party membership	0.26	−0.63	−0.48	0.00	−0.63	−0.80	−0.58	−0.45
	(.36)	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.59)	(0.56)	(0.70)	(0.57)	(0.72)
Age	0.02	0.04***	0.00	0.03**	−0.01	0.03*	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Sex	0.25	−0.76*	−0.24	−0.57	0.68*	−0.27	−0.35	0.54
	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.51)
Size of place	−0.73***	−0.24*	−0.14)	−0.38**	−0.15	−0.17	−0.08	−0.06
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Education	0.05	0.14*	0.14*	0.00	0.01	0.04	−0.02	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Religiosity	0.75***	0.45**	0.33*	2.10***	0.42*	0.63**	0.76***	0.79**
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.38)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.30)
National particularism	−0.04	−0.17**	−0.00	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)
−2 X log-likelihood ratio	4417.05***							
Correctly predicted (%)	47.2							
Reduction in error (%)	30.0							

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ two-tailed test. $N = 848$

TABLE 6. MNL Analysis: Effect of Sequential Addition of Endogenous Variables, Selected Variables and Parties, Compared to SLD

	ln[PSL/SLD]				ln[UD/SLD]			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Blame first-wave reformers				.02				−.50***
Blame communist system			.45***	.46***			.90***	.79***
Change in living situation		.22	.08	.08		.86***	.58*	.50*
Income	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00
Farmer	.93*	.94*	.82*	.82*	−.65	−.56	−.62	−.71
Owner	.27	.30	.19	.05	.32	.46	.35	.37
Blue-collar state workers	−.24	−.25	−.29	−.27	−.85*	−.80*	−.82	−.74
White-collar state workers	−.54	−.57	−.56	−.63	−.69	−.68	−.57	−.55
Solidarity membership	.06	.06	.00	.01	.61	.61	.46	.50
Communist Party membership	.09	.09	.23	.21	−1.04*	−1.06*	−.80	−.67
	ln[KKW/SLD]				ln[SOLID/SLD]			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Blame first-wave reformers				−.44**				−.20
Blame communist system			.88***	.79***			.77***	.74***
Change in living situation		.79**	.48	.40		.29	.02	−.04
Income	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00	−.00
Farmer	−.36	−.18	−.32	−.38	.57	.60	.43	.39
Owner	.98	.99	1.03	1.23	.63	.70	.58	.56
Blue-collar state workers	−.27	−.20	−.14	−.09	.12	.13	.11	.12
White-collar state workers	.54	.59	.74	.84	.06	.07	.11	.11
Solidarity membership	.10	.09	−.06	−.06	1.22***	1.22***	1.10**	1.13**
Communist Party membership	−.26	−.24	−.11	−.06	−.81	−.82	−.63	−.61

Fit statistics[a]	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Correctly predicted	41.5%	41.6%	45.6%	46.9%
Reduction in error	22.5%	22.7	28.0%	29.7%
−2 X log-likelihood ratio	4819.72	4765.87	4512.98	4441.93

[a] Each model (1, 2, 3, 4) contains all eight parties compared to the reference party, SLD, as in Table 5. Fit statistics are reported for the full models, but only selected parties and variables are shown here due to space considerations. *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

problems will vote for SLD. Someone who attributes a high degree of blame to the communist system (value = 5) has only a 10% likelihood of voting for SLD. This effect is not as strong for the other communist-era party, PSL, which shows a curvilinear relationship; the probability of a vote for PSL drops off only at higher levels of communist system blame.

The likelihood of voting for the reform architects (UD) rises as communist system blame increases, but the changes in probability are much smaller than for SLD. A move from the lowest to the highest level of communist system blame is accompanied by a 44% decrease in vote probability for SLD and only a 12% increase in vote probability for UD. By means of comparison, there is only a 13.5% difference in vote probability for UD between the highest and lowest values of first-wave reformer blame. Since the post-Solidarity camp is more fragmented than the postcommunist camp, no single party benefits from high communist system blame in the same way that the postcommunist parties (SLD and PSL) benefit from higher levels of first-wave reformer blame.

Overall, the changes in vote probability for each of the parties over different levels of satisfaction with economic reforms are not as great as those for either blame attribution. As one moves from total dissatisfaction with economic reforms (value = 1) to total satisfaction (value = 5), the probability of voting for UD only rises about 10%, and the probability of voting for SLD drops by only a slightly larger 13.5%. All else being equal, at the highest level of satisfaction with economic reforms, voters are about equally as likely to vote for the party that spearheaded reforms (UD) as for its main postcommunist challenger (SLD).

DISCUSSION: LINKS BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Although evaluations of individual economic circumstances have a strong effect on satisfaction with reforms, one's view of the transition history is equally important, and understandings of the past, manifested as blame attributions, are essential determinants of voting behavior. Satisfaction with economic reforms has some influence on voting, but its effect is not as large as one might expect, given the prominence of market reforms and privatization. The greatly attenu-

FIGURE 2. Predicted Probability of Vote Across Levels of Communist System Blame and Satisfaction with Economic Reforms



ated economic effects and the fact that, for many Poles, noneconomic issues are of paramount importance, suggest that the ascendancy of postcommunist parties is not so easily explained by economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents.[20]

If economic circumstances and satisfaction with economic reforms did not play a large role in voter choice, then what accounts for the fact that the vote for postcommunist parties has increased over time? One explanation may lie in the transition history and, odd as it may seem, particularly the original goals of the Solidarity movement. After 1989, the post-Solidarity camp became increasingly fragmented both across and within parties by church-state issues, lustration (see footnote 15), and attempts to claim the "true" legacy of the movement. Politicians associated with this camp came to be regarded as exceedingly quarrelsome and absorbed with their own interests at the expense of society and the movement's goals.

In contrast, the major inheritor of the communist legacy, SLD, was not divided on issues of religion and lustration. Setting aside considerations of platform position for a moment, the SLD, at the very least, had to convince voters inclined to blame the communist system for Poland's problems that it had turned over a new leaf and was substantively different from its communist-era predecessors. Those who attribute little or no blame to the communist system and focus their blame on first-wave reformers could quite easily vote for the postcommunists. At the other extreme, people with the highest degree of blame for the communist system and lowest degree for the first-wave reformers would be very hard to persuade. They either would not be convinced of the postcommunists' competence, given their past errors, or they would see gains of power and privilege by postcommunists as unjust reward in light of their past. Voters with moderate or mixed blame attributions are harder to predict. People who blame both would have to decide not only that the new socialists were sufficiently distinct from the old in their competency, but also that a postcommunist attainment of power would not unfairly reward people from the old system.

As daunting as was the postcommunists' task, the first-wave reformers and, more generally, the post-Solidarity parties had an even larger image problem in some respects. They had to convince potential voters that they had not abandoned society in their struggle for power, and many of them also had to demonstrate they could manage to function as a party, would be able to work with other likely coalition partners, and could produce predictable policy outcomes. Given this scenario, it is easy to imagine how even those with a substantial degree of antipathy toward the communist system could decide that the reformers had outlived their usefulness for the moment and could be persuaded by the pragmatic appeals of the "new" socialists.[21]

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[20] On an aggregate level, one can see that the main party associated with the reforms, UD, was not punished as severely as the two postcommunist parties were rewarded. That is, SLD and PSL increased their share of the vote by 8.4% and 6.2%, respectively, from 1991 to 1993, whereas UD's support slipped by only 1.7% (Gebethner 1995).

[21] Two features of the electoral system also amplified the gains of the postcommunist parties: the newly implemented 5% threshold worked against the fragmented Solidarity camp, and a change in the method of seat allocation disproportionately benefited the highest vote-getters (Gebethner 1995).

CONCLUSION

In societies emerging from state socialism, where politics itself is discredited and people are often loath to identify with political parties, how one interprets the past fundamentally structures political attitudes and voting behavior. Our analysis of attitudes toward economic reforms in Poland demonstrates that although evaluations of personal economic circumstances strongly affect satisfaction with reforms, how one sees the transition is equally important. Prior understandings of the transition history, manifested as blame attributions, serve as a heuristic frame for sifting through the complicated political and economic situations that often characterize societies in transition. The importance of blame attributions is even more evident in our analysis of voting behavior in the 1993 Polish elections, which reveals that the effect of individual economic circumstances on vote choice was very weak.

What is the implication for future studies of political behavior in Eastern Europe or, more generally, in societies emerging from some form of authoritarian rule? Our findings suggest that we need to view democratic transitions (broadly construed) as critical founding events that should be understood as ordinary people apprehend the changes. Transitions have the potential to create a distinct political cleavage of lasting influence on the public consciousness, particularly when they involve an opposition movement that transcends or cross-cuts any existing social cleavages, as is the case in Poland. Many factors conceivably contribute to the likelihood and depth of a transition-based cleavage. Obviously, "bigger" events will have a larger effect, but certain general dimensions of transitions will determine whether these events play (and will continue to play) a salient role in shaping political attitudes and behavior.

First, protracted struggles are more likely to leave a lasting impression in people's minds than are rapid transitions. Second, transitions in which there is some element of mass participation, even of limited scope, are more likely to remain salient than are transitions involving only elites. People are more likely to feel psychologically invested if they participate (even if only as a spectator), and mass participation is likely to generate expectations that are part of an overt, public discourse.

Third, transitions in which clearly defined, distinct protagonists emerge are likely to crystallize and focus public debate in a way that creates a cleavage and perpetuates it in the future. Subsequent reconciliations and accommodations, such as those in Chile or Poland (the "thick line" demarcating past and present), do not necessarily eliminate distinctions between the opposition and the old regime; they may only recast the form of public discourse. If the truce seems hollow or inauthentic on some level, then it will not resonate with the citizenry and may intensify the cleavage.

Fourth, all else being equal, a violent transition is likely to demarcate stark lines of conflict and have a residual effect on public consciousness. If it is so violent that large segments of the elite, opposition, or society itself are decimated, however, then the "cleavage" may become a moot point.

Finally, the extent to which the old elite is discredited and whether it is removed from political life after the transition affects whether the transition history continues to be salient. For example, salience of a transition-based cleavage may be relatively low in the Czech Republic, where the small elite was thoroughly discredited and quickly removed from political and economic power. The existence of moderate forces or splinter groups in the old elite may blur the distinctions of past and present and make conflicts less pronounced. This seems to be the case in Hungary, where the political elite was less discredited and opposition to the regime not as continuous or well-defined as in Poland. Hungary's political arena remains bifurcated into postcommunist and postopposition camps, but the reformed Socialist Party and one of the main opposition parties have been able to form a coalition government, which has not occurred on the national level in Poland.

Although we have focused primarily on why understandings of the past may remain important for individuals, we also recognize that institutions must reinforce and perpetuate the salience of this division once the original transition stimulus has passed. In Poland, the continued presence of postcommunist parties as the most consolidated forces on the political scene will contribute to the maintenance of a discourse of blame in the immediate future. Although this may dissipate over time, it is also likely that political parties and key personages will continue to inherit and appropriate the legacies of the past. Furthermore, due to the dual nature of the political and economic transitions in Eastern Europe, the continued presence of former elites in economic life will tend to perpetuate a "scorekeeping" discourse centered around who is and rightfully should be profiting from the changes.

Poland's transition history is unique in some ways; perhaps this accounts for one of the most complicated patterns of political attitudes in Eastern Europe (see McDonough 1995 for this observation). Yet, its uniqueness should not be exaggerated. Our analysis of the Polish case suggests a more general framework that can be used to explain both how understandings of the past structure political attitudes and behaviors as well as why the transition history itself may be highly salient in some political cultures and relatively unimportant in others.

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS

Attribution of Blame

For some time—and especially in the election campaign—a debate has been running about who bears responsibility for the worsening state of our economy and the lowering of the population's standard of living. Do you agree with the opinion that:

TABLE A-1. Frequency of Left-Right Placement of Polish Parties

Party	Decidedly Left 1	2	3	4	5	6	Decidedly Right 7	*n*
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)	66.7%	20.7%	5.6%	4.4%	.9%	.4%	1.2%	1,552
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	8.8%	30.0%	29.5%	19.2%	5.5%	3.6%	3.4%	1,535
Democratic Union (UD)	2.6%	5.1%	15.9%	36.2%	19.8%	11.2%	9.2%	1,512
Union of Labor (UP)	5.8%	20.6%	30.5%	23.4%	10.0%	6.3%	3.5%	1,507
Catholic Election Committee-Fatherland (KKW)	1.6%	1.9%	3.2%	13.2%	18.4%	23.8%	37.9%	1,513
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)	3.2%	3.8%	7.2%	17.2%	15.9%	23.8%	28.8%	1,512
Solidarity Trade Union (SOLID)	2.0%	3.5%	7.9%	27.2%	20.4%	20.4%	18.5%	1,516
Center Alliance (PC)	2.6%	3.1%	5.9%	28.2%	16.7%	18.3%	25.2%	1,514
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)	.9%	2.8%	6.4%	31.0%	23.1%	19.3%	16.5%	1,493

*Blame Communist Regimes** (*n* = 1,847)

45 years of postwar PUWP and communist governments led the country to ruin and the people to the edge of poverty? (Decidedly so = 22.1%, Somewhat so = 25.2%, Hard to say = 10.9%, Rather not = 24.1%, Decidedly not = 17.7%)

*Blame First-Wave Reformers** (*n* = 1,848)

The last 4 years of successive governments pushed our country into a state of chaos and poverty? (Decidedly so = 28.3%, Somewhat so = 35.8%, Hard to say = 10.5%, Rather not = 18.2%, Decidedly not = 7.1%).

Satisfaction with Economic Reforms*

In your opinion, are the changes that have occurred in the last four years in the area of economic life: (Very positive? = 4.1%, Somewhat positive? = 22.4%, Hard to say? = 8.8%, Somewhat negative? = 36.0%, Very negative? = 28.8%; *n* = 1,851).

Evaluation of Change in Living Situation

Since the last elections (1991) has your living situation generally: (Improved? = 6.9%, Not changed? = 27.8%, Worsened? = 65.3%; *n* = 1,810).

Reported Communist Era Memberships

Solidarity (*n* = 1,851)

Before the imposition of martial law on December 31, 1981—in 1980–81—did you belong to: (The Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions-Solidarity = 18.8%, branch unions = 12.4%, autonomous unions = .6%, Polish Teachers' Union = 1.5%, The Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions of Individual Farmers-Solidarity = .5%, other unions = 1.2%, do not remember = 2.1%, refused answer = .6%, did not belong = 62.3%).

Variable recoded as 1 = reported Solidarity membership, 0 = no reported Solidarity membership

Communist Party (*n* = 1,848)

Did you belong at any time to:

(The Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) = 7.9%, United Peasants' Party (ZSL) = 2.9%, Democratic Party (SD) = .4%, Union of Socialist Youth or Union of Polish Socialist Youth = 8.0%, never belonged to any of the aforementioned parties = 80.5%)

ZSL and SD were satellite parties of the main communist party, PZPR. Variable was recoded as 1 = membership in PZPR, ZSL, or SD, 0 = no membership in any communist party.

National Particularism Scale

Do you agree with the following statements? [Scale: decidedly agree = 5, rather agree = 4, hard to say = 3, rather disagree = 2, decidedly disagree = 1]

Poland should not imitate Western patterns, but rely above all on its own traditions and experiences. (5 = 32.6%, 4 = 38.9%, 3 = 8.5%, 2 = 16.4%, 1 = 3.7%; *n* = 1,845)

Our schools should teach Polish history above all, and to a lesser extent world history. (5 = 22.4%, 4 = 39.0%, 3 = 8.3%, 2 = 24.4%, 1 = 5.9%; *n* = 1,845)

Foreign capitalists should not be permitted to buy up our Polish wealth—land, factories, houses. (5 = 39.1%, 4 = 30.5%, 3 = 10.4%, 2 = 14.6%, 1 = 5.4%; *n* = 1,845)

Left-Right Placement of Parties

Some parties taking part in the last elections to the Sejm are defined as "right," and others as "left." How would you situate the parties given below on a scale where 1 indicates a decidedly left orientation, and 7 decidedly right? (See Table A-1 above.)

Vote in 1993 Parliamentary Elections

For which list of candidates to the Sejm did you cast your vote? Please give the number of the list (20 response options = 92.8%, "do not remember" and "refused answer" = 7.2%; *n* = 1,142).

APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATION

To test a model with reciprocal paths between blame of first-wave reformers and satisfaction with economic reforms, several control variables that were not significant in the original model were dropped to identify the model adequately. The revised equations are:

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*A middle category was created from unprompted "hard to say" responses.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{CHANGLIV (Y1)} &= \beta_0+\beta_1\,\text{INCOME}+\beta_2\,\text{FARMER}\\ &+\beta_3\,\text{OWNER}+\beta_4\,\text{BLUESTATE}+\beta_5\,\text{WHITESTATE}\\ &+\beta_6\,\text{AGE}+\beta_7\,\text{SQAGE}+\beta_8\,\text{SEX}+\beta_9\,\text{SIZEPLACE}\\ &+\beta_{10}\,\text{EDUC}+\beta_{11}\,\text{FINHS}+\beta_{12}\,\text{ED*HS}+E_{Y1};\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{BLAMECOMM (Y2)} &= \beta_0+\beta_1\,\text{CHANGLIV}\\ &+\beta_2\,\text{INCOME}+\beta_3\,\text{FARMER}+\beta_4\,\text{OWNER}\\ &+\beta_5\,\text{BLUESTATE}+\beta_6\,\text{WHITESTATE}\\ &+\beta_7\,\text{FORMSOL}+\beta_8\,\text{FORMCOMM}+\beta_9\,\text{AGE}\\ &+\beta_{10}\,\text{SQAGE}+\beta_{11}\,\text{SEX}+\beta_{12}\,\text{SIZEPLACE}\\ &+\beta_{13}\,\text{EDUC}+\beta_{14}\,\text{FINHS}+\beta_{15}\,\text{ED*HS}\\ &+\beta_{16}\,\text{RELIG}+E_{Y2};\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{BLAMEFIRST (Y3)} &= \beta_0+\beta_1\,\text{ECONSAT}\\ &+\beta_2\,\text{CHANGLIV}+\beta_3\,\text{BLAMECOMM}+\beta_4\,\text{INCOME}\\ &+\beta_5\,\text{FORMCOMM}+\beta_6\,\text{AGE}+\beta_7\,\text{SQAGE}\\ &+\beta_7\,\text{EDUC}+\beta_8\,\text{FINHS}+\beta_9\,\text{ED*HS}+\beta_{10}\,\text{RELIG}\\ &+\beta_{11}\,\text{NATION}+E_{Y3};\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\text{ECONSAT (Y4)} &= \beta_0+\beta_1\,\text{CHANGLIV}\\ &+\beta_2\,\text{BLAMECOMM}+\beta_3\,\text{BLAMEFIRST}\\ &+\beta_4\,\text{INCOME}+\beta_5\,\text{FARMER}+\beta_6\,\text{OWNER}\\ &+\beta_7\,\text{BLUESTATE}+\beta_8\,\text{WHITESTATE}\\ &+\beta_9\,\text{AGE}+\beta_{10}\,\text{SQAGE}+\beta_{11}\,\text{SEX}\\ &+\beta_{12}\,\text{SIZEPLACE}+\beta_{13}\,\text{EDUC}+\beta_{14}\,\text{NATION}+\beta_{Y4}.\end{aligned}$$

We analyzed the nonrecursive model using two-stage least squares, an instrumental variables regression method that corrects for the bias of OLS estimates in interdependent systems of linear regression equations. The results are consistent with our expectations that blame of first-wave reformers affects one's evaluations of the economic reforms, but not the other way around (see Figure B-1). Blame of first-wave reformers had a strong and significant effect at −.69, while the path in the opposite direction was statistically insignificant. The values of the remaining path coefficients did not change dramatically, but the path from blame of communist system to satisfaction with economic reforms became insignificant. We acknowledge, however, that blame of first-wave reformers and satisfaction with economic reforms are closely related temporally and appear to be very similar conceptually, given the high value of the path from the former to the latter. We also offer the caveat that the model is not strongly identified, since it is difficult to find instruments that are strong, unique predictors of both these variables. As a result, a thorough disentanglement of the separate effects of blame of first-wave reformers and satisfaction with economic reforms on each other may not be possible with these data.

FIGURE B-1: Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates of Reciprocal Paths between Blame of First-Wave Reformers and Satisfaction with Economic Reforms, Standardized Path Coefficients


Blame of First-Wave Reformers
-.69
-.19
Satisfaction with Economic Reforms

Note: Error terms are omitted for simplicity; solid path significant at $p <$ .05, two-tailed test.

APPENDIX C: EXPLANATION OF MULTINOMIAL LOGIT (MNL)

MNL is an appropriate method for analyzing vote choice in multiparty systems because it most closely replicates the choice faced by voters, and it yields results that are best for determining the relative bases of support among all the parties (Whitten and Palmer 1996). MNL models permit the simultaneous comparison of parties relative to one another in comparison to a single reference group rather than through multiple independent paired comparisons. MNL is appropriate for situations in which characteristics of the individuals are the primary determinant of the choice (Schmidt and Strauss 1975).

Despite the advantages of MNL models, the coefficients are somewhat difficult to interpret since they represent the relative effect of each independent variable on the log-odds ratio of a given party in comparison to a reference category. For this reason, we calculated the *marginal* effects for all independent variables and parties in the analysis. This was done by taking the partial derivative of Prob(y = j) with respect to each independent variable. The results confirm our presentations in tables 5 and 6 along with Figure 2, but they are too cumbersome to report here. Instead, they are available upon request from the authors.

One limitation of MNL is that the disturbance terms are assumed to be uncorrelated, commonly known as the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) (Greene 1993). When this assumption is violated, nested multinomial and multinomial probit (MNP) models are appropriate, because they relax the IIA assumption. In voting models, violation of the IIA assumption may arise as an issue in one of two ways. First, IIA implies that the removal of one party from the choice set (J) does not affect the relative probabilities of voting for the remaining parties. If one is trying to model the effect of the withdrawal or addition of a party to a choice set, then MNL is not an optimal method (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). Since we are interested in explaining vote choice at one point in time, this problem is not particularly vexing for us (Whitten and Palmer 1996).

Second, if subsets of parties (e.g., "government" or "opposition" parties) in the overall choice set are perceived similarly, this can cause the disturbances to be correlated. This is potentially more of a problem for our analysis, but the use of MNP is to date considered impractical due to the computational power required, and its inability to produce stable estimates for choice sets larger than three or four. Whitten and Palmer (1996), in comparing the results of their own multiparty vote analyses using both MNL and nested multinomial logit, found that the impracticalities associated with the latter outweighed its potential benefits. They conclude that MNL models produce sufficiently accurate results when the independent variables are individual-specific. For the equations of the general model and the partial effects as well as a more detailed treatment of these methodological issues, readers are referred to Greene 1993, Liao 1994, and Whitten and Palmer 1996.

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Political Constructivism in Rawls's *Political Liberalism*

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In Political Liberalism, *John Rawls employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The "method of convergence" would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.*

In *Political Liberalism*, John Rawls (1993) employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice. He argues that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." I will not question his claim that his method supports his principles, but I do not believe Rawls adequately defends his reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed, which would also give rise to quite different moral principles.

For reasons of space, I concentrate on the first part of this two-part argument. I begin by reviewing Rawls's conception of political liberalism and his method of political constructivism. Next, I contrast his method with an alternative, to which I refer as the method of convergence, and suggest the alternative moral principles this other method would produce. I then argue for the superiority of this alternative method on the basis of detailed criticisms of Rawls's method. Finally, I examine two possible criticisms of my argument and present a brief conclusion.

RAWLS'S POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

In *Political Liberalism* Rawls argues that fundamental disagreements in liberal societies are unbridgeable. Because people who deliberate about moral and political issues emphasize different aspects of questions and employ different methods of investigation, they will come to different and irreconcilable answers (Rawls 1993, 54–8). Rawls calls this fact of human reason the "burdens of judgment," and he argues that a diversity of doctrines is "a permanent feature" of liberal public culture, not an accident of history, destined to pass away (Rawls 1993, 216–7).

Political philosophy contributes to the stability of liberal societies by providing a basis for agreement where agreement is possible. Toward this end, its subject matter is restricted in two important ways. First, the range of issues with which it deals is circumscribed. Rather than address all questions that might concern citizens, political liberalism is confined to what Rawls calls society's "basic structure," its "main political, social, and economic institutions, and how these fit together into one unified system of social cooperation" (Rawls 1993, 11). Rawls includes in the basic structure certain ideas and values; it encompasses not only the "framework of basic institutions" but also "the principles, standards, and precepts that apply to it, as well as how these norms are to be expressed in the character and attitudes of the members of society who realize its ideals" (Rawls 1993, 11–2). In contrast to a "political" view that deals with basic structures, Rawls describes a moral view as "general" if it addresses a wide range of subjects.

Second, Rawls describes a moral view as "comprehensive" if it contains answers to a full range of difficult and controversial questions, for example, what is of value in human life and ideals of personal character. A view is "fully comprehensive" if it encompasses "all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system" (Rawls 1993, 13). In contrast to comprehensive views, a political conception is articulated without reference to wider philosophical background. In order to be compatible with the range of comprehensive views found in contemporary liberal societies, a political conception should be as far as possible independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm (Rawls 1993, 10–1).

In order to attain the support of adherents of different comprehensive views, political liberalism attempts to generate an "overlapping consensus." Briefly, Rawls argues that, in spite of their important differences, the comprehensive views in liberal societies are able to agree in regard to a range of issues and principles bearing on the smooth functioning of society's basic structures. Though people will support this range of principles for different reasons, with those of each person stemming from his or her own compre-

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hensive view, the area of agreement throughout society will be sufficiently broad to contribute to stability.

In addition to the necessary content, an overlapping consensus is accepted by its adherents in a particular way. Rawls contrasts the overlapping consensus with a modus vivendi, which is conceived on the model of a truce, the outcome of political bargaining. Because people adhere to a modus vivendi for self-interested reasons, its terms reflect the balance of power between contending factions and so are subject to renegotiation as the balance shifts (Rawls 1993, 147). In contrast, an overlapping consensus is a moral conception to which people subscribe for moral reasons. Its adherents will not withdraw their support if the relative strength of their view increases and eventually becomes dominant (Rawls 1993, 147–8). Because Rawls believes that the balance of power on which a modus vivendi rests can be precarious, he views the distinction between modus vivendi and overlapping consensus as important to social stability.

In spite of obvious respects in which *Political Liberalism* differs from Rawls's earlier *Theory of Justice*, he believes that much of the content of the latter work is retained in the former (Rawls 1993, xiv–xvi). Especially important for our purposes, he argues that "justice as fairness," the celebrated principles of justice defended in *Theory of Justice*, constitutes the content of the overlapping consensus that should exist in a liberal society.[1] The two principles are familiar and need not be discussed in detail here (Rawls 1971, 60–1, 302–3).[2] The first guarantees equal liberty for all members of society. The second has two parts. It guarantees, first, that positions in society are to be open to everyone and distributed according to fair equality of opportunity and, second, that economic inequalities must benefit the least advantaged members of society, Rawls's famous "difference principle."

The method of "political constructivism" through which the principles are derived is complex. As in *Theory of Justice*, the principles of justice are the outcome of a process of choice, conducted in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance. The original position is a "device of representation" to help focus our moral ideas: "It models what we regard—here and now—as fair conditions under which the representatives of free and equal citizens are to specify the terms of social cooperation in the case of the structure of society" (Rawls 1993, 25–6). Given problems caused by the pluralism of liberal societies, the principles arrived at must be acceptable to adherents of society's different comprehensive views. Accordingly, argument must be from "intuitive ideas" that Rawls believes are deeply rooted in liberal culture and to which adherents of different comprehensive views must subscribe. Rawls describes public culture as comprised of "the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and doctrines that are common knowledge" (Rawls 1993, 13–14).

The two specific intuitive ideas on which Rawls focuses are a view of society as a fair system of cooperation and a conception of the person as possessing two moral powers, concerning abilities to form and revise one's own conception of the good and to live on fair terms of cooperation with others. Though Rawls does not describe in detail how the intuitive ideas tie in with the choice of principles in the original position, it is clear that the intuitive ideas are represented by central features of the original position and the deliberations of the representative individuals. Because these particular conceptions of the person and of society are built into the structure of the original position, selection of principles of justice under these conditions identifies them as the most suitable principles for free and equal citizens, possessing the two moral powers, who seek to live on fair terms of cooperation with others.

Because the principles of justice must be acceptable to adherents of different comprehensive views, Rawls argues that justice as fairness is a "freestanding view." This means that it is not constructed on the basis of the existing comprehensive views found in society but, rather, through the intuitive ideas. Rawls divides the process of construction into two stages. In the first, the principles are constructed without reference to existing comprehensive views, although, apparently, inhabitants of the original position can be aware of the existence of particular views in particular societies, but not the ones to which they themselves subscribe. Rawls says of the principles of justice: "Their content is not affected in any way by the particular comprehensive doctrines that may exist in society" (Rawls 1993, 141). Once the principles of justice are chosen in the first stage, they are reviewed in regard to whether they would be acceptable to proponents of society's comprehensive view, or as Rawls terms this, in regard to their contributions to stability.[3] If the principles are lacking in this respect, suitable adjustments may be necessary (Rawls 1993, 65–6).

For the sake of argument, we can assume that Rawls's principles of justice would be the outcome of the method he describes.[4] But this goes only part of the way toward making his case. Basic features of the selection process itself must be justified. In *Theory of Justice*, Rawls notes that different versions of the conditions under which principles of justice are chosen will yield different sets of principles: "We may conjecture that for each traditional conception of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial situation in which its principles are the preferred solution" (Rawls 1971, 121). In order to avoid vicious circularity, Rawls must show that the features he presents rather than others should characterize the choice situation. The fact that he never makes this argument in detail is a serious shortcoming of *Political Liberalism*—though this does not necessarily mean that reasons for these features do not exist. I will attempt to piece together Rawls's defense of the method, or the defense he would give if pressed, from points he makes in different contexts in *Political Liberalism* and in some of his articles leading up to it.[5]

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[1] Rawls is somewhat ambiguous as to whether his aim is the best possible principles of justice or simply acceptable principles, under the assumption that more than one set is acceptable; see Rawls 1993, 164; 1987, 6–7; 1980, 565, 569. In either case, however, it is safe to say that justice as fairness could constitute the core of an overlapping consensus and that Rawls is not aware of alternative principles that work better.

[2] For Rawls's latest statement of the principles, see 1993, 5–6.

[3] For Rawls's use of "stability," see 1989, 239 n12. For the concept of stability elsewhere in Rawls's works and problems with it, see Klosko 1994. Stability is discussed below in the conclusion.

[4] An excellent account of a possible argument for this outcome is given in Cohen 1993.

The two main problems with Rawls's method on which I will focus are (1) his concentration on two—and only two—basic, intuitive ideas in liberal public culture and (2) his account of justice as fairness as a freestanding view. I will argue that these features of Rawls's method are not defensible in reference to the specific tasks of political liberalism. Rather, as I have noted, a simpler, alternative method is better suited to these tasks. The method of convergence is without these objectionable features of Rawls's method.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CONVERGENCE

In order to consider Rawls's method, we must inquire into exactly what political liberalism is to accomplish. Assessment of means depends heavily on the end. There is, however, a problem here, in that Rawls sets two goals for political liberalism, which do not necessarily coincide. The "first fundamental question" he presents about political justice in a democratic society is as follows: What is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of society over a complete life . . . (Rawls 1993, 3)?

The aim here is to identify the *best* possible principles, with the criteria clearly normative. The second question concerns what Rawls calls "toleration understood in a general way" (Rawls 1993, 3). Rawls wishes to find a means of bridging the multiplicity of reasonable doctrines that arise in liberal society. His aim here is practical, to identify principles on which adherents of different doctrines can agree, so as to contribute to social stability (Rawls 1993, 3–4). I will not discuss the additional requirement that the principles of justice must be "liberal" (Rawls 1993, 6; 1987, 17; 1989, 241). We should note that, given the diversity of the liberal tradition, this requirement should still leave a great deal of latitude. Another important issue I will not address concerns the nature of the desired consensus in liberal societies. Different sorts of agreements can be envisioned, especially encompassing different percentages of the population (different degrees of popular consensus), with narrow agreement perhaps being more substantial in terms of both percentage of belief-systems agreed on (extent of issue agreement) and intensity of commitment to shared beliefs.[6]

Rawls's conception of how his principles are justified is in keeping with the practical task:

> Justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and others publicly recognize as true. . . .
>
> Thus the aim of justice as fairness, as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons (Rawls 1985, 229–30; similarly 1987, 6; 1989, 250)

He writes similarly in *Political Liberalism*: "The aim of justice as fairness, then, is practical: it presents itself as a conception of justice that may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing political agreement. It expresses their shared and public political reason" (Rawls 1993, 9).

Though his remarks on justification emphasize the practical side of his project, Rawls places greater weight on the normative. He addresses this in the first of the two fundamental questions and in the first of the two stages of political construction. Yet, the need to respond satisfactorily to the practical question places limits on possible answers to the normative. Rawls recognizes this in his requirement that construction be from intuitive ideas in the political culture and the need for a second stage in the construction process. But I believe he does not go far enough. The need to address the practical question should make Rawls's political liberalism more political than he himself acknowledges.

An immediate difficulty confronts an attempt to find the most appropriate conception of justice for a pluralistic society. Because liberal societies are torn by deep disagreements over fundamental values, Rawls recognizes the likelihood of disagreements over principles of justice. He resorts to the intuitive ideas to find a way around this problem. The intuitive ideas are intended to be generally subscribed to in ways that principles of justice are not. Accordingly, Rawls describes them as "public and shared ideas" (Rawls 1993, 90). However, because of the burdens of judgment, it seems unlikely that adherents of conflicting comprehensive views will readily agree that a specific conception of justice is best suited to free and equal people who have to live together. Among the many issues over which adherents of different views will probably disagree are the precise characteristics of free and equal persons. "Freedom" and "equality" are "essentially contested" concepts (Connolly 1983, chapter 1; Gallie 1955–56). In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, there is little reason to believe liberal citizens will agree more readily about these issues than about other aspects of their moral views. Indeed, one reason Rawls advances for his method of construction is the existence of conflicting strands in liberal societies concerning how the values of freedom and equality should be reflected in the rights of citizens (Rawls 1993, 4–5).

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[5] The main articles on which I draw are Rawls 1980, 1985, 1987, and 1989. Also important are Rawls 1982 (reprinted as Lecture 8 of *Political Liberalism*) and 1988.

[6] Rawls apparently prefers a somewhat narrower popular consensus, as is evident in his insistence that the overlapping consensus be between "reasonable" views (1993, 36, 63–4). I will not explore different ways in which the variables in regard to consensus could play out, though we should note that Rawls defines "reasonable" quite narrowly and so may well exclude many inhabitants of liberal societies from the necessary consensus; for criteria of "reasonable" comprehensive views, see 1993, 58–62; and below, in the next section; for related criticisms along these lines, see Wenar 1995. Given the tasks of "political" philosophy, I believe it is preferable to construe "reasonable" more broadly. The only people who are not "reasonable" are those whose comprehensive views would prevent them from coexisting peacefully with other members of society. See Rawls 1971, 216–21, on tolerating the intolerant.

Rawls addresses the possibility that principles derived in the first stage of construction will not be generally accepted in the second. He notes that this would require "acceptable changes" in the principles to bring them into accord with society's comprehensive views (Rawls 1993, 66). But he sets this problem aside, assuming—"on the basis of a number of plausible considerations"—that it will not arise (Rawls 1993, 66). If we are less sanguine about this problem, we can see that Rawls glosses over serious difficulties, especially the need to take appropriate steps in the first stage of construction to make sure the resultant principles will fit with society's views. Because of his emphasis on the pluralism of liberal societies and the burdens of judgment, the burden of proof is clearly on Rawls to show that justice as fairness would fit. He notes that his claims can be "verified only by actually elaborating a political conception of justice and exhibiting the way in which it will be supported" (Rawls 1987, 6–7; similarly, 1993, 15). But Rawls never attempts to meet this challenge. One commentator characterizes his view as "wildly optimistic."[7] *Political Liberalism*—and the articles leading up to it—are strikingly lacking in detailed examination of the comprehensive views of actual liberal societies.[8]

I do not contend that a fit between Rawls's principles and liberal culture is impossible. But Rawls's particular method of construction, pursuing as it does the best possible principles that can be drawn from selected intuitive ideas, is defensible only if his principles will fit. Because of the strong possibility they will not, a more advisable procedure would focus on the need to generate principles that will fit and then select from these the ones which are normatively preferable. In other words, if the goal is to find serviceable principles, then the order of the two stages of construction should be reversed.

Because of the need to find principles that will be acceptable to different comprehensive views, a preferred method would aim first at generating a set of principles that are as uncontroversial as possible. This in turn creates a strong presumption against relying on controversial notions, including a specific conception of the free and equal person, in their construction. The alternative method I propose begins with an attempt to find areas of agreement between existing comprehensive views. Once such an area is identified, we would proceed to derive principles with the most robust possible normative content. Throughout this paper, I will concentrate on the first of these tasks, leaving aside complex issues concerning argument in the second. I assume that a variety of normative approaches could be employed, some of which are drawn from Rawls. The first stage of this alternative method, to which I refer indifferently as convergence or the method of convergence, can be represented visually as a Venn diagram, with a highlighted area of agreement—or overlap—between different comprehensive views, in spite of their other differences.

The convergence method attempts to avoid controversy as far as possible. Notion *X* is by definition uncontroversial, or as uncontroversial as possible, if it is adhered to by the different groups in liberal society, even if members of each group interpret it differently from their own perspectives. Methodological rules concerning the need to avoid controversy are presented in Rawls's articles. Thus, in "Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," he writes: "The question is: what is the least that must be asserted; and if it must be asserted, what is its least controversial form?" (Rawls 1987, 8). Along similar lines: "The aspects of our view that we assert should not go beyond what is necessary for the political aim of consensus" (Rawls 1987, 14; similarly 1985, 229–30). Though we find nothing as strong as the first of these quotations in *Political Liberalism*, Rawls restates the second: "We do not put forward more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the political aim of consensus" (Rawls 1993, 153).[9] Because of the need to avoid controversy, Rawls argues in "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical" that one must "draw *solely* upon basic intuitive ideas" from the public culture (Rawls 1985, 225; emphasis added). In *Political Liberalism*, language concerning the need to rely solely on such ideas is not found, though Rawls does not explain whether this represents a change in his views or whether, in the process of construction, one can employ material beyond shared intuitive ideas—and where the line in this regard should be drawn.[10]

The success of the method of convergence depends on the existence of widespread agreement in liberal societies. But evidence for such agreement can be provided, while it is apparent that different groups are more likely to agree on the relatively bland principles such evidence supports than on the distinctively Kantian principles Rawls advances.

The existence of an important area of agreement is argued by Kurt Baier (1989) in a well-known article. Although he believes that consensus on a conception of justice of the kind Rawls posits does not exist in contemporary American society, Baier contends that a different one does, a "constitutional consensus." He describes this as general agreement on "procedures for making and interpreting law and, where that agreement is insufficiently deep to end disagreement, on the selection of persons whose adjudication is accepted as authoritative." As Baier notes, the constitutional consensus performs important functions akin to those Rawls assigns to the overlapping consensus, promoting stability in society and fostering essential civic virtues of "tolerance, respect and reciprocity." He also claims that agreement on institutions and procedures is supported by agreement on a general principle of justice associated with the proper functioning of institutions.[11]

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[7] Jones 1995, 526–7. To explain Rawls's belief that the views he regards as "reasonable" doctrines will be accepted as the content of the overlapping consensus, Jones argues that Rawls runs together two senses of "reasonable." Rawls bases his view of the overlapping consensus "on the wrong sort of reasonableness," that of the doctrine to be accepted rather than that of the people who are to accept it.

[8] For Rawls's empirical investigations of liberal societies in the articles leading up to *Political Liberalism*, see Klosko 1993.

[9] Aside from the insertion of a paragraph, Rawls 1993, 152, follows 1987, 14. Rawls does not indicate whether he still accepts the stronger injunction on 1987, 8.

[10] I do not find language of "solely" in Rawls 1987, 6–7; but it is used in 1989, 240.

Rawls's account (1993, 149 n15, 158 n24) of constitutional consensus is similar to that of Baier, and Rawls appears to accept Baier's contention that one presently exists in the United States (Rawls 1993, 149). Like Baier, Rawls believes that in American society there is greater agreement on political and civil rights than on matters of economic distribution. He includes the former but not the latter in his view of constitutional consensus, which he describes as consensus on "only certain fundamental procedural political principles for the constitution" (Rawls 1993, 149).

> While there is agreement on certain basic political rights and liberties—on the right to vote and freedom of political speech and association, and whatever else is required for the electoral and legislative procedures of democracy—there is disagreement among those holding liberal principles as to the more exact content and boundaries of these rights and liberties, as well as on what further rights and liberties are to be counted as basic and so merit legal if not constitutional protection (Rawls 1993, 159).

Even though Rawls notes these important limitations, it bears emphasis that the moral content of constitutional consensus is significant, emphasizing respect for certain rights, while willingness to put one's own preferences aside and accede to the results of decision procedures is an important political virtue and one central to the liberal tradition. Rawls also notes that the practice of constitutional politics fosters "the cooperative virtues of political life," reasonableness, a sense of fairness, and willingness to compromise (Rawls 1993, 163).

Despite these virtues, and the respects in which constitutional consensus is similar to overlapping consensus, Rawls views the former as inadequate. His reasons are as we have seen. Constitutional consensus falls short in not addressing questions of economic distribution, that is, the subject of Rawls's second principle of justice. This is its most obvious deficiency. Constitutional consensus also has a weaker conception of rights, the content of which is unacceptably subject to "the shifting circumstances" of political bargaining (Rawls 1993, 161). Rawls also objects to the means through which constitutional consensus is derived. Its precepts do not stem from shared ideas of the person and the nature of society but are "accepted simply as principles" and so lack moral depth (Rawls 1993, 158). For these reasons, then, Rawls argues for overlapping consensus and his method of constructivism.[12]

Once again, however, Rawls's reasoning can be criticized. Though overlapping consensus is doubtless desirable—and constitutional consensus not morally ideal—Rawls's movement to this higher form of consensus (Rawls 1993, 164–8) is difficult to defend, absent convincing evidence for its existence or at least its plausibility. But as we have seen, Rawls does not provide this. His criticisms of the way constitutional consensus is derived presuppose the superiority of his method. We will examine Rawls's defense of his method in the next section.

To close out this section, I present brief empirical evidence that a constitutional consensus, unlike an overlapping consensus, currently exists in American society. This evidence is obviously only a sketch and requires further elaboration. But it should suffice to establish at least the plausibility that a constitutional consensus exists in American society at the present time. As Baier notes, the core of constitutional consensus is agreement on procedures for making laws and means of adjudication. The evidence that interests me bears on a certain type of agreement, on what David Easton calls "diffuse political support." Easton describes this as "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton 1965, 273) In other words, diffuse support correlates closely with support for decision-making mechanisms—"procedures and arrangements through which demands are negotiated and compromised" (Easton 1965, 272)—without immediate regard to specific decisions.

A series of national surveys indicate strong support for the American political system, for the decision-making mechanisms in the United States. This was confirmed by a telephone survey of 1,443 people conducted in 1992 under the direction of John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (1995). They inquired into support for different political institutions, opinions which they attempted to keep separate from those concerning people serving in the offices in question. The results are striking. Congress was approved or strongly approved by 88% of respondents, the Supreme Court by 94%, and the Presidency by 96% (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 44–5). Only 8% of respondents disapproved of the "basic constitutional structure of the U.S. government." Only nine individuals (.06%) strongly disapproved (p. 59).[13] James Hunter and Carl Bowman (1996), in their 2,047 face-to-face interviews conducted in early 1996 by the Gallup Organization, did not concentrate on having their respondents distinguish between support for the political system and for individuals officeholders, but their results are similar. In response to "Do you feel you should support our system of government?" The responses were 80% positive, 11% neither positive nor negative, and 9% negative; only 2% were strongly negative (Hunter and Bowman 1996, Table 12D).[14]

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[11] Baier 1989; all references are to 775. For Rawls's response to Baier, see 1993, 158–68.

[12] Rawls's arguments against constitutional consensus are discussed in more detail in the conclusion.

[13] These results obtained despite the declining levels of "political trust" found in American National Election Studies. A main contention of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, esp. chapter 5) is that people distinguish between political figures—the Washington sys-

This evidence obviously only broaches the surface. But it suggests the likelihood of general acceptance of basic American political institutions and the decisions they produce. The method of convergence would focus on this, identifying it as an area of constitutional consensus, despite wide differences among citizens' comprehensive views. Once the relevant areas of agreement are identified in the first stage of this modified process of construction, one can argue in the second for different versions of specific principles it supports.[15] We will see in the next section, through detailed examination of Rawls's political constructivism, that the convergence method is preferable.

CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Fuller consideration of Rawls's political constructivism can center on the two problem areas noted in the first section. We will examine his ground for focusing on two, and only two, intuitive ideas and his claim that justice as fairness is a freestanding view.

Rawls is clearly aware of the method of convergence. At one point, he describes two ways in which principles can be constructed, using as his example an index of primary goods. The first way is "to look at the various comprehensive doctrines actually found in society and specify an index of such goods so as to be near to those doctrines' center of gravity, so to speak" (Rawls 1993, 39). This obviously corresponds to convergence. In contrast, justice as fairness "elaborates a political conception as a freestanding view . . . working from the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and its companion ideas" (Rawls 1993, 40). Rawls's hope is not that his principles "are fair to comprehensive conceptions of the good associated with such doctrines, by striking a fair balance among them, but rather fair to free and equal citizens as those persons who have those conceptions" (Rawls 1993, 40; cf. 1985, 228; 1993, 8). Our questions, of course, concern why Rawls proceeds in this way and whether his procedure is justified.

Intuitive Ideas

Reliance on intuitive ideas, even ones that people hold, is not without costs. If a central aim of political liberalism is to address each group according to ideas to which it subscribes, then it is difficult to understand why Rawls believes in selecting from people's overall moral views two—and only two—intuitive ideas from which to generate principles. People should be more likely to accept ideas drawn directly from views they hold, as opposed to constructed implications, some attenuated implications, drawn from only some of their intuitive ideas. If these are truly *intuitive* ideas, people may not be aware of holding them and are unlikely to recognize that they are committed to their implications.[16]

Rawls would respond by appealing to the pluralism of liberal societies. The fact that people do not agree on fundamental matters of justice makes it necessary to organize public culture around particular focal points: "If we are to succeed in finding a basis for public agreement, we must find a way of organizing familiar ideas and principles into a conception of political justice that expresses those ideas and principles in a somewhat different way than before" (Rawls 1993, 9). "Since no political agreement on those disputed questions [concerning matters of justice] can reasonably be expected, we turn instead to the fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public political culture" (Rawls 1993, 150). Once again, justice as fairness focuses on free and equal persons cooperating in society.

But Rawls never presents evidence to support the claim that people agree on the intuitive ideas though disagreeing about substantive principles of justice. In "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," he describes the ideas as "conjectured to be implicit" in liberal culture (Rawls 1980, 569). One must wonder if the ideas on which Rawls focuses are appropriate bases for popular consensus. He notes that the intuitive ideas chosen must be the most central possible; justice as fairness must be based on "more central fundamental ideas" than other conceptions (Rawls 1993, 167–8). But he does not demonstrate that this is true of his two basic ideas. He does not explain why public culture should be organized around them rather than others.

The lack of adequate explanation is especially troubling because Rawls's view of the person is not particularly plausible. Choice of intuitive ideas is limited by the circumstances of public culture. In order to fulfill their function, the particular ideas on which Rawls focuses must actually be basic features of public culture, common to its different comprehensive views.[17]

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tem—and institutional structures, strongly disapproving of the former while strongly approving of the latter.

[14] The important study by Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982) presents similar findings and also provides data concerning diffuse support in West Germany and in Guadalajara, Mexico, and San Jose, Costa Rica.

[15] Discussion of specific principles the method would establish must be set aside for another paper. Very briefly, since the method identifies consensus on support for democratic political institutions, preferred principles will center on support for democracy and on strong preconditions for effective democracy, though in normative content, these must fall well short of Rawls's overlapping consensus; see below, in the concluding section.

[16] On intuitive ideas, see Klosko 1993, 350.

[17] Since the practical goal is to derive principles that will fit with society's comprehensive views, it is possible that one can do this by employing intuitive ideas less central to public culture, as long as principles that will be accepted can be generated through them.

Central to the conception of the person Rawls employs is a strong measure of moral autonomy. He argues that the ability to examine one's moral beliefs and revise one's conception of the good "is not a means to but is an essential part of a determinate conception of the good."[18] He continues:

> The distinctive place in justice as fairness of this conception is that it enables us to view our final aims and loyalties in a way that realizes to the full extent one of the moral powers in terms of which persons are characterized in this political conception of justice (Rawls 1993, 314).

We can refer to the ability to revise one's conception of the good as "moral revisability."

Once again, it is striking that Rawls never explores liberal public culture in detail to demonstrate the centrality of this conception of the person. It is especially important that he do so, because religious conservatives do not place at the center of their view of the person the ability to revise and change one's conception of the good. For instance, according to James Hunter (1990), central to the moral outlook of religious conservatives is belief in "an external, definable, and transcendent authority." This has profound implications for their view of personal identity, which centers upon the need to pursue and live according to moral truth. Belief in such a moral standard "defines, at least in the abstract, a consistent, unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, and identity, both personal and collective." "Orthodox communities order themselves, live by, and build upon the substance of shared commitment to transcendent truths and the moral traditions that uphold them" (Hunter 1990, 44, 126). According to Hunter, about 36% of Americans do not view the ability to think and reason as "the most important feature of human life," but the fact that man is created in God's image (Hunter 1994, 94). One person interviewed by Hunter said:

> God tells me what's right and what's wrong. I may attempt in a limited capacity to try to understand that, but I have to start off from the point that I am surrendering my personal intellect to God. If something doesn't make sense to me, that has no bearing on the reality of it or my obligation to respond to it (Hunter 1990, 121).[19]

Rawls is clear that the conception of the person he discusses is intended as a political conception, as opposed to a philosophical or metaphysical account. One sense in which ability to change one's view of the good is essential to a political conception of the person is that changes in what one values, even sudden and dramatic changes of the kind experienced by Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus, do not affect one's "public or institutional identity" or standing in society (Rawls 1993, 30–1). For instance, the fact that a person becomes a devout member of some religious sect rather than an atheist does not affect his rights as a citizen or her ability to hold property. We can concede that, in this sense, the ability to revise one's conception of the good probably is central to the conception of the person found in liberal political culture.

Rawls goes well beyond moral revisability in this sense, however, making it central to the choice of moral principles.[20] Because the two moral ideas are modeled by the constructivist procedure pursued in *Political Liberalism*, religious conservatives could well have strong doubts about Rawls's resultant principles of justice. It is open to Rawls to dismiss this criticism. Religious conservatives may not be "reasonable" in his sense, as that requires one to recognize the burdens of judgment (Rawls 1993, 54–66). Rawls argues that he is justified in excluding unreasonable doctrines from consideration because his theory is intended to produce an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines (Rawls 1993, 36, 63–4). For the sake of argument, we can grant that the views of religious conservatives are not reasonable in Rawls's sense. There are, however, obvious disadvantages to excluding such groups. A central purpose of the overlapping consensus is to promote social stability. At one point Rawls notes that he is optimistic in assuming that, aside from certain forms of fundamentalism, all the main historical religions are reasonable comprehensive views (Rawls 1993, 170). The problem, however, is the likelihood that views Rawls would classify as fundamentalism, that is, different forms of religious conservatism, are adhered to by about 20% of the U.S. population.[21] Moreover, as Leif Wenar points out, Rawls's conception of the person would be rejected by adherents of many nonreligious comprehensive views, such as followers of Bentham, Hume, and Hobbes (Wenar 1995, 50). Further reflection probably would identify additional groups.[22] In the

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Though we cannot rule out this possibility, it is clearly an unlikely procedure, unless one could show how it would work. Rawls would have no easy time defending such a procedure as the best way to derive principles that are likely to be widely accepted.

[18] Though Rawls relies on a strong conception of autonomy, his view should be distinguished from the "comprehensive liberal theories" of Kant and Mill, which are explicitly based on controversial, strong notions of autonomy (Rawls 1993, 78, 199–200). Rawls's position is that his conception of autonomy is not rooted in a comprehensive view. It is found, rather, in intuitive ideas widely shared throughout society, though it appears that this contention would be difficult to sustain.

[19] Similar points about the clash between Rawls's view of the person and the religious views of many Americans are made by Galston (1989, 714; 1992, 130–1), Wenar (1995), and Exdell (1994, 447; I owe this last reference to Exdell).

[20] There is little doubt that Rawls goes beyond autonomy in the first sense (political autonomy) to identify autonomy in the stronger sense as central to liberal culture, but it is not clear that this plays an important role in his derivation of the principles of justice. See Rawls 1993, 311 n23; compare sec. 82 of *Theory of Justice*, which does not rely on autonomy in the strong sense. Thus, it is unclear why Rawls presents so strong and controversial a view of the person, despite the injunction to avoid controversy in construction, discussed above. For related criticisms of Rawls's view, see Wenar 1995.

[21] This is Hunter's estimate (1990, 159). Hunter and Bowman (1996) identify between 20% and 25% of the American population as Evangelical, which they define as someone (among other things) to whom at least two of the following apply: s/he has a personal relationship with God, believes scripture should be taken literally, and prays daily (Hunter and Bowman 1996, 52, 98 n13). Using a slightly different description, Jelen and Wilcox (1995, 37) identify 33% of the U.S. population as Evangelical. Exactly what constitutes an Evangelical Protestant need not be discussed here. It is unlikely that people falling under either description subscribe to Rawls's view of the person.

[22] Members of many other religious groups would probably also

absence of strong evidence to the contrary, then, it seems likely that Rawls's view would not be recognized by a large percentage of the American populace. Obviously, if social stability requires consensus, as many of these people as possible should be accommodated. This can be done immediately by drawing on ideas that they already accept, instead of principles derived from controversial intuitive ideas.

A Freestanding View

Questions concerning Rawls's use of intuitive ideas lead directly into the second main question about his method, his two-step procedure. Because justice as fairness is a freestanding view, its construction is in two stages. In the first, as we have seen, principles of justice are worked up from intuitive ideas latent in the public culture. Only in the second stage is the question of stability raised. What interests us here is that only at this stage do society's different comprehensive views come into play. As they are derived in the first stage, the principles' content "is not affected in any way by the particular comprehensive doctrines that may exist in society" (Rawls 1993, 141).

Rawls does not explain exactly why comprehensive views must be excluded in the first stage but not the second. For the most part, discussion of his method centers on contrasting it with other possible methods, though not defending its superiority.[23] It seems that Rawls's main argument is that convergence would make political liberalism "political in the wrong way." In two contexts in *Political Liberalism*, Rawls uses this language (1993, 39–40, 142). Though he does not elaborate on this problem in this work, Rawls presents more of his reasoning in "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus" (1989). In this article, which introduced the two-stage model, Rawls expresses "misgivings" that the view of overlapping consensus advanced in his previous articles had suggested that political philosophy is "political in the wrong way."[24] He developed the two-stage method to avoid this problem (see Rawls 1989, 250–1). Rawls writes:

> We must, however, be careful that a political conception is not political in the wrong way. It should aim to formulate a coherent view of the very great (moral) values applying to the political relationship and to set out a public basis of justification for free institutions in a manner accessible to free public reason. It must not be political [i] in the sense of merely specifying a workable compromise between known and existing interests, nor political [ii] in looking to the particular comprehensive doctrines known to exist in society and in then being tailored to gain their allegiance (Rawls 1989, 250).

The reasons for rejecting the first sense are evident. As Rawls says in *Theory of Justice*, "to each according to his threat advantage is not a principle of justice" (1971, 141). But considerations against the second sense, which corresponds to the method of convergence, are less apparent. Because Rawls does not present his arguments clearly, I must attempt to reconstruct them.

Rawls apparently views a consensus based on convergence as inherently precarious. As his contrast between overlapping consensus and modus vivendi makes clear, he is worried about principles derived from agreements based on an existing balance of power, which are subject to renegotiation as the balance shifts. Hence it is likely that Rawls fears that if principles were chosen through negotiations between existing comprehensive views, then their substance "would be affected by the existing balance of political power between comprehensive doctrines" (Rawls 1993, 142). He obviously wishes to avoid such a bargaining situation, presumably because of concern about the stability of the resulting principles, which recalls the modus vivendi: "social consensus founded on self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining: social unity is only apparent, as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests" (p. 147).

If this is Rawls's main ground for preferring the two-step procedure, then it is unsatisfactory for three main reasons. First, the image of different people, or proponents of different groups, engaged in political bargaining recalls Rawls's initial presentation of his social contract theorizing, in "Justice as Fairness" (1958). This model was found to be unsatisfactory because people who are aware of their interests have no reason not to hold out for concessions.[25] One reason Rawls introduced the veil of ignorance in *Theory of Justice* was to get around this problem, as people who do not know their particular interests are not able to bargain in the usual sense (Rawls 1971, 139–41; also 1993, 23). Similar considerations should hold for the "bargaining" that would generate liberal principles in a pluralist society under the method of convergence. Throughout *Political Liberalism*, Rawls employs the veil of ignorance (especially 1993, 23–5), the existence of which should not be affected by whether the material used to construct liberal principles is drawn from selected intuitive ideas or society's different comprehensive views. A modified veil of ignorance can allow knowledge of the range of comprehensive views present in a given society while still excluding which one a given person holds. In deriving liberal principles from the area of overlap between comprehensive views through the method of convergence, representative individuals should work impartially and not be influenced by the particular comprehensive views to which they happen to subscribe. They

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object to Rawls's conception of the person. It should be noted that these groups, and the ones mentioned in the text, are clearly *excluded* from Rawls's consensus, while, once again, he presents no evidence as to the percentage of the population that would be included. In contrast, the surveys cited above show far fewer members of society clearly excluded.

[23] See Rawls 1993, chapter 3, especially the list of topics to be discussed, on p. 89.

[24] Throughout *Political Liberalism*, Rawls draws relatively little on "Domain" in comparison, for example, to "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus" (1987). But there is nothing in *Political Liberalism* to suggest that he has rejected its arguments. Barry (1995, 891–2) also uses "Domain" to flesh out certain points in *Political Liberalism*. The "previous articles" mentioned are, apparently, Rawls 1985 and 1987.

[25] For discussion of Rawls 1958, see Wolff 1977, chapter 5.

should not attempt to promote their own good but should work toward a compromise that would be fair to adherents of all comprehensive views. In regard to something akin to convergence, Rawls speaks of striking "a fair balance" among different comprehensive views (1993, 40). Accordingly, because some semblance of the veil of ignorance is retained with this method, proponents of different views should accept resultant principles as fair and not withdraw allegiance once they step out from behind the veil. In fearing that principles based on knowledge of the comprehensive views in society would be the result of undesirable bargaining, Rawls seems not to take into account the effects of the veil of ignorance, which, once again, the method of convergence does not discard.

Second, Rawls's exposition raises questions about the extent to which the two stages are in fact separate and so whether the content of the principles is actually "not affected in any way by the particular comprehensive doctrines that may exist in society" (Rawls 1993, 141). As it stands, this claim is incorrect. Derivation of the principles in the first stage is not ex nihilo. Intuitive ideas rooted in the public culture, of course, play an essential role in their construction. Rawls does not explain why, if construction of the principles is inherently tainted by exposure to comprehensive views, intuitive ideas drawn from existing comprehensive views are admissible but beyond this point not allowed. Excluding other, possibly relevant aspects of comprehensive views is also counterintuitive because of the practical aims of political constructivism. Principles derived in the first stage are not intended solely to be as just as possible; they must also fit with society's comprehensive views. As we have seen, at times Rawls notes this (1993, 65, 78). He also notes that if the principles selected in the first stage would not fit properly, "acceptable changes" must be made (1993, 65–6). Accordingly, the stages are not as separate as Rawls asserts, and so there are clear reasons not to exclude knowledge of everything but the two basic intuitive ideas from the first stage.

A third consideration concerns another possible reason for excluding comprehensive views. Central to Rawls's idea of "political" liberalism is that people should be able to *endorse* the principles from their own points of view, according to their own comprehensive views. Rawls writes: "To attain such a shared reason, the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm" (1993, 9). Part of what he means by public justification is that, in a liberal society, coercive public power should not be used in ways that citizens cannot affirm (1993, 68). Yet, this entails that *justification* of the use of power not be rooted in a particular comprehensive view. It does not require that *construction* of the relevant principles be fully independent of conflicting comprehensive views, as long as principles constructed by working from different existing comprehensive views can be justified to each citizen in his or her own terms, on the basis of his or her own comprehensive view.

It seems, then, that Rawls's reasons for fearing that principles worked up from existing comprehensive views would be "political in the wrong way" can be countered. As long as the method of convergence preserves the veil of ignorance, so people are unaware of their own comprehensive views, it should be able to generate principles that can be generally endorsed—without the problems we have seen in working from selected intuitive ideas.

FURTHER ELABORATION AND CONCLUSION

Having discussed Rawls's method of political constructivism, contrasted it with the simpler method of convergence, and seen the alternative principles to which the latter gives rise, I will now consider two possible objections. One concerns the large degree of overlap between constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus; the other centers on implications of their areas of difference. To begin with the overlap, the principles that convergence develops, centering on support for the political system, are quite close to support for the "constitutional essentials" that Rawls's method derives as the central component of his conception of political justice (see Rawls 1993, 227–30). But if this is true, then it appears to blunt the foregoing criticisms of Rawls's method. Why criticize his method if it yields what we regard as essentially correct results?[26]

To this line of criticism, there is a response. The main focus of this paper is Rawls's method of political constructivism and how he justifies it. The fact that central components of the principles it develops are consistent with those that would stem from convergence does not provide support for the features that distinguish Rawls's method from convergence, for which, as we have seen, he does not provide strong grounds. We have seen that convergence allows a less cumbersome and less controversial way of deriving principles that center on support for the political system. Even though Rawls's method yields similar results, convergence would still appear to be preferable, for these reasons.

More important is the area in which Rawls's constructivism and convergence yield different principles. Though both methods develop principles centering on support for the political system, Rawls's method *is* required to derive the full content of his conception of justice, which also includes principles bearing on distribution, in Rawls's case, the difference principle.

I will not contest the claim that it is *desirable* to add economic principles to society's principles of justice (though, in a pluralistic society, not everyone will agree). Instead, we must ask if Rawls's method is the best way to develop these. He notes that the necessary consensus in society must be "consistent with plausibly realistic assumptions" (Rawls 1993, 149). We have seen reasons to doubt certain assumptions underlying his employment of his method. Accordingly, there is little reason to think that principles derived in this particular way are those most suited to become the focus of widespread agreement throughout society. Once again, Rawls provides little reason to think that they are, and he does not demonstrate that they would come to be agreed upon as components of an overlapping consensus.

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[26] I assume that what Rawls identifies as constitutional essentials (1993, 227–30) basically form the core of constitutional consensus, though the particulars of the essentials will differ between constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus (see 1993, 164–8, 227–30).

Empirical data provide little support for the difference principle. As David Miller (1992, 578) writes in a recent survey of empirical studies of attitudes about distributive justice, to the extent that people were seen to hold common views on the subject, they were not supportive of the difference principle. Instead, "the overwhelmingly popular choice was to maximize the average income subject to a floor constraint."[27] Miller notes strong support for desert "as a major criterion of income distribution" (1992, 580), though researchers found some disagreement among members of different economic classes on the extent to which questions of distribution should turn on talents and abilities (Miller 1992, 584–5). Accordingly, direct evidence of public culture does not support Rawls's preferred principles of distribution, while, once again, throughout this paper we have seen reasons to be skeptical about his method's ability to develop the most appropriate principles.[28]

The second criticism takes a different tack, centering on differences between constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus. If the method of convergence gives rise to only the former, and this can be shown to be inadequate to achieve central goals of liberal theory that the latter is able to accomplish, then Rawls's method perhaps can be defended as required by the goals of liberal theory. In order to be persuasive, an argument along these lines must provide a convincing account of how the areas of difference between overlapping consensus and constitutional consensus are not only desirable but also necessary. It must show that constitutional consensus falls short in crucial ways, so that remaining at that level is not a viable option. Though Rawls's ideas on this subject can be found in different contexts in *Political Liberalism*, they are somewhat unclear; once again, I will attempt to reconstruct them. His direct discussion of the contrast between the two kinds of consensus is largely unhelpful, because it is concerned to show that overlapping consensus is not "utopian" (1993, 168, 158), rather than that it is necessary.[29]

At first sight, it would be difficult for Rawls to show that constitutional consensus is obviously unsatisfactory. He notes that overlapping consensus is not necessary "for certain kinds of social unity and stability" and that constitutional consensus is "satisfactory for less demanding purposes and easier to obtain" than overlapping consensus (Rawls 1993, 149; and see also 230). Presumably, Rawls believes that constitutional consensus contributes to the forms of social unity and stability found in existing liberal societies, in which the requisite agreement can be found. He adds, moreover, as we saw above, that the smooth functioning of political institutions itself encourages "the cooperative virtues of political life," reasonableness, a sense of fairness, willingness to compromise, and "willingness to cooperate with others on political terms that everyone can publicly accept" (Rawls 1993, 163). If all this is true, then one must ask how constitutional consensus falls short.

Rawls holds that the two forms of consensus differ mainly in terms of breadth and depth.[30] In regard to the former, overlapping consensus encompasses a wider range of principles, basically more secure views of substantive rights, and more developed principles of economic distribution. Its superior depth lies in the fact that participants trace their views back to fundamental intuitive ideas rooted in the political culture. The principles that constitute a constitutional consensus are less firmly grounded.

Rawls believes that, as a result of these differences, overlapping consensus will be superior from a normative standpoint and also possess greater "stability." The essence of the former criticism has been discussed above. Even if we concede Rawls's belief that principles which provide more substantial economic protection are morally superior to those in a constitutional consensus (though, again, not everyone will accept this), he has not shown that the difference principle will be the focus of agreement throughout society, or that his method is the one best suited to develop principles that will be able to secure agreement.[31]

More important to Rawls are considerations of stability. We have seen that he faults the modus vivendi because, owing to its lack of moral depth, its participants will withdraw their allegiance in accordance with shifts in the balance of power. Rawls apparently believes that something similar holds in regard to constitutional consensus. Though he never discusses this matter directly, he apparently believes that it, too, is lacking in stability.[32]

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[27] It bears mention that the general opinion of scholars is that a principle along these lines, rather than the difference principle, would actually be the choice of Rawls's representative individuals behind the veil of ignorance in *Theory of Justice*. As Barry says of Rawls's derivation of the difference principle, "no other aspect of the theory has met with such uniform rejection" (Barry 1989, 214; and for further references see p. 411 n1).

[28] Discussion of the economic principles to which convergence would give rise—if any (see below, footnote 31)—falls beyond the scope of this article, though it is apparent that the principles it would produce would differ substantially from Rawls's.

[29] See also Rawls 1996, xlvii–xlviii. In addition, Rawls's main account of the differences between the two kinds of consensus (1993, 144–68) is less clear than it might be, because much of this discussion is drawn, with only slight revisions, from Rawls 1987, which was written before Baier's seminal article had brought the idea of constitutional consensus to Rawls's attention. Section 7, on the movement from constitutional consensus to overlapping consensus, is new, but the context into which it is inserted is not sensitive to the relationship between the two forms of consensus.

[30] He also discusses differences in specificity (Rawls 1993, 164–8), though these seem less significant (see the following note).

[31] Rawls notes the unlikelihood that there will be a set of principles of distribution upon which everyone will agree. Rather, it is "more realistic and more likely" that there will be a number of competing distributive principles, which will include justice as fairness (Rawls 1993, 164). If this is true, then the difference between overlapping consensus and constitutional consensus in regard to principles of economic distribution is narrowed, and Rawls's grounds for rejecting the former are also narrowed.

In order to assess Rawls's argument, we must discuss the nature of stability and the distinctive way Rawls employs this concept. As encountered generally in discussions in political science and sociology, the term refers to attributes of a system of political institutions, namely, that it functions smoothly and is not plagued by large-scale, extralegal political opposition (see Lipset 1981, 30). For ease of reference, I will call this stability in the usual sense or political stability.

The idea of stability plays a significant role in Rawls's theory. For instance, he writes that "*all* differences" between *Political Liberalism* and *Theory of Justice* can be traced to problems in the view of stability put forth in the latter (1993, xv–xvi; emphasis added).[33] Thus, it is important to realize that Rawls discusses an unusual sense of the term, a psychological sense, which centers on the way in which the inhabitants of a regime hold their moral principles. In keeping with his view of moral psychology (Rawls 1993, 81–8), Rawls argues that people are more likely to act on their moral principles when they believe that their political system functions in accordance with them and that other citizens are also likely to behave in accordance with them (Rawls 1993, 86, 163; 1971, 138, 177, 454–5). It is because overlapping consensus has a superior ability to generate stability in this sense that we should prefer it to constitutional consensus.

There are several problems with this argument. Rawls is aware that considerations of stability (as he construes this) have gone largely undiscussed by previous theorists (Rawls 1993, xvii). I believe this neglect is justified. One can ask whether considerations of stability, in Rawls's sense, are sufficient to bear the weight he places on them.

It would be difficult for Rawls to argue that stability in his sense is necessary for the smooth functioning of liberal societies—for political stability. As we have seen, his criticism of modus vivendi centers on the claim that it will lack political stability. But a similar argument is not convincing in regard to regimes characterized by constitutional consensus. A striking fact of post–World War II political life is the obdurate stability of liberal democracies. This has been true in virtually all cases (with rare exceptions, such as Northern Ireland) for more than fifty years. Accordingly, if we assume that these regimes are characterized by constitutional consensus, which probably plays some role in their political stability, then it would be difficult for Rawls to argue that lack of stability in his sense undermines political stability. Moreover, Rawls's claim that stability in his sense contributes significantly to political stability is supported by little or no evidence and is not intuitively convincing. Rawls says that he is interested in a specific kind of political allegiance: "the bases of allegiance [a liberal conception of justice] generates in virtue of the distinctive content of its principles" (Rawls 1993, 161 n26). In his latest discussion, Rawls refers to this as "stability for the right reasons" (1996, xxxix n5) In comparison to other factors that political observers since the time of Plato and Aristotle have identified as sources of political stability—for example, absence of economic, religious, racial, and ethnic differences—one wonders how great a role is played by specific aspects of the contents of liberal principles. Accordingly, though once again, overlapping consensus is not undesirable, Rawls has not made a strong case that its superior contribution to stability in his sense is sufficiently important to the functioning of a liberal regime to justify jettisoning a method of political construction that can generate constitutional consensus in favor of one that is otherwise lacking support but possibly able to generate overlapping consensus.

It is still open to Rawls to argue that stability in his sense is inherently valuable. Considerations along these lines are more important to him than political stability. Briefly, he claims the superiority of a regime with moral principles that encourage the cooperative virtues, thereby helping people fully develop their moral powers—in this case, specifically, the "reasonable." Rawls describes this as an ability "to understand, apply, and to act from the reasonable principles of justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation" (1993, 103–4) Yet, Rawls does not provide evidence for his crucial claim that the motivating force of moral principles with particular content is greater than that of other factors. Even if we concede that the factor he notes plays a role in influencing behavior, he does not address the question of how this factor interacts with others that also influence conduct, such as self-interest, religion, and national identification. In order for stability in his sense to be a central consideration in the representative individuals' deliberations, it must play a significant role in stimulating cooperative behavior, but this Rawls has not shown.

It is likely that the prominent role Rawls accords this factor is bound up with his conception of the person, as possessing the two moral powers. It appears that Rawls's postulation of the "reasonable" is less controversial than the aspects of his conception of the person discussed above. As we have seen, however, he presents little evidence that his particular conception of the person is deeply rooted in the public culture of liberal societies. Absent convincing arguments that inhabitants of liberal societies would accept this conception of the person, Rawls would find it difficult to demonstrate that a society in which moral principles are held in accordance with his notion of stability is significantly superior to one in which they are not.

In sum, even if we concede that a society with an overlapping consensus is preferable in various ways to one with only a constitutional consensus, Rawls does not make a convincing case that the latter is radically defective, and therefore it is necessary to move to overlapping consensus. The point bears repeating that, even if Rawls did make this case, it still would not demonstrate that his particular method is the one best suited to develop an overlapping consensus. The possibility would remain that some other method is better suited to this task, and without the severe flaws in Rawls's overlapping consensus.

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[32] See footnote 3.

[33] For stability's crucial role in derivations of principles of justice in Rawls's works, see Cohen 1989.

In conclusion, distinctive features of Rawls's method of constructivism are difficult to defend. The method employed by political liberalism should be the one most likely to generate principles that will satisfy the two conditions of being normatively robust and acceptable to diverse groups. Even if the first of these requirements takes clear precedence over the second, there do not appear to be strong grounds for concentrating on selected intuitive ideas and rigidly separating the stages of construction. A more advisable procedure would be to explore society's comprehensive views for areas of overlap and then work from these toward the best principles possible in the normative sense.

We have seen that Rawls pursues his constructivist strategy because he does not want political liberalism to be "political in the wrong way." One conclusion of this paper is that a proper method of political construction must be heavily political. In being worked up from existing comprehensive views, political liberalism must have a strong empirical basis. But we should note that the tasks of "political" liberalism do not exhaust the role of political philosophy. Though principles of justice upon which different groups are most likely to agree are closely related to those they already accept, another and more traditional endeavor of political philosophy is to defend what one can regard as true principles of justice (if only, perhaps, from the perspective of one's own comprehensive view) and to attempt to bring other members of society around to one's view. But this dual task of philosophical construction and persuasion should be distinguished from "political" liberalism. Different forms of construction that one can envision here are closely related to what transpires in the first stage of Rawls's constructivism. But because these are not hampered by the requirements of Rawls's second stage, they are able to proceed with less attention to unsettling aspects of the existing political world.

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Christianity and Republicanism: From St. Cyprian to Rousseau

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Contrary to a prevailing wisdom, the Christian ethos was at least as sympathetic to republicanism as it was to monarchy, especially to the primacy of the public welfare but also to corporate decision making. This can be seen in the early church, especially in the writings of St. Cyprian, in the medieval civic-communal movement, in conciliar constitutionalism, and in political Calvinism. Significant aspects of Rousseau's thought may be seen as a restatement of a Christian political dynamic.

In the late twentieth century the relationship between republicanism and Christianity may not be problematic. A common view among intellectual historians (notably Pocock 1975, Skinner 1978, Ullmann [1961] 1966, and their followers) is that in Europe not only did republicanism develop separately from and somewhat in opposition to the Christian tradition, but also there was a natural affinity between Christianity and hereditary monarchy, including its absolutist variant. This is supported by a view of the Middle Ages as a period of dogmatic authoritarianism dominated by tradition. Wilks (1963) discovered intrinsic, nonaccidental connections between Christian belief and monarchical, hierarchical principles. Behind this lie the scripts of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, so gloriously stated for historians by Gibbon and Burckhardt: Christianity, with its otherworldly quietism, brought about Rome's decline; the civic spirit revived under the breath of Hellas and antiquity, in the city states of Renaissance Italy.[1] Behind this also stands Machiavelli, whose effect on historiography was as decisive as it was on political thought. Christianity was discredited by the alliance of throne and altar. The tacit assumption is that republicanism is related to secular humanism. Scores of lesser scholars are now sedulously fleshing out this interpretation; a new historiographical orthodoxy has emerged.

In topics such as human rights this view of the Middle Ages has been transformed, notably by Tierney (1989; Nederman 1996). The argument of this article is that republicanism was present in the early church and that in Europe it was promoted by persons, of whatever rank or intellect, who were neither more nor less likely than their contemporaries to be believing and devout Christians. The city states of Italy, the Netherlands, and German-speaking Europe appealed to religious principles in support of their constitutions, just as much as royalists did. At times Christianity promoted republicanism: Behind Machiavelli stood Savonarola.

Neither Pocock nor Skinner defines *Republic* and *republicanism*, and that is seldom enough done in recent historiography. (The terms are absent from The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.) This is convenient because it can, for the unobservant reader, mask differences between premodern (medieval and early modern) and modern (post–French Revolution) republicanism. As Schilling (1992, 28, 29) tellingly points out, "old European republicanism . . . practically presuppose[s] an élite."[2] Until the midseventeenth century, *respublica* (commonwealth) was a word for "state" in general; those who rejected authoritarian monarchy commonly used other terms, such as *politeia*, *democratia*, *regimen mixtum*, and *regimen ad populum*. I will define *republic* (as an ideal type) to mean: (1) an institutional order in which rulers are elected and subject to law, major decisions are taken by groups, and the people are assigned some part in the polity; and (2) a political ethic according to which citizens have a duty to serve the common good and a right to fair and equal treatment by public authorities. I will not attempt to define *Christianity*.

THE EARLY CHURCH

I argue that the Christian community started as a variant form of republic. First, the New Testament and the early church taught that all human persons share the same moral status before God. The republican ethic of common, mutual rights and duties followed from this and was grounded in cosmic order. Christianity gave Hellenistic universalisms added urgency and emotional appeal by tying them into a cosmic story; Christians endorsed and gave a theological and eschatological cutting edge to *cosmopolis*. The absolute duty and validity of reconciliation through forgiveness—a distinguishing feature of Christianity—was central to the liturgy. Love (*agape*, *caritas*), which like patriotism had a nonsexual but emotional content, meant reconciliation plus mutual aid.

Christians established a new type of association, the *ekklesia*. This was designed as an actually functioning universal community of all the baptized. What was new was not the explicit discounting of biological and social referents but the cosmic and eschatological significance of this *koinonia* (association) as the socially and, in-

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[1] The *Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, for example, after outlining Roman republicanism, proceeds: "After being overshadowed for many centuries by Christian monarchism, republicanism revived in the later Middle Ages in the city-states of northern Italy" (Miller 1987, 434).

[2] The *Oxford English Dictionary* has (1) the state or common weal and (2) "a state in which supreme power rests with the people or their elected representatives." See Brunner, Conze, Kosellek 1984, 549–654; Venturi 1971, 24–6, 70–3.

deed, juridically active continuation of the incarnate word of God. "The empirical Church is, as it were, a foretaste or a prophetic but imperfect prototype of the Church of the future" (Goguel 1964, 26). Along with social and biological inclusiveness went credal and behavioral exclusiveness. Yet, the church was republican not only (as we shall see) in certain organizational respects but also as an identifiable association transcending class and race, open to all, in which some fundamental rights and obligations were equal for all.

This community was, and was clearly intended to be, visible and public. Membership was acquired through the public act of baptism. Worship and ritual were avowedly corporate. Visibility and membership were of supreme importance, partly because of otherworldly objectives, since these required open witness, even martrydom.

This was the city of God (*civitas dei*), and there was concern for civic order. Roman experience entered Christian perceptions as soon as Pope Clement I (c. A.D. 96), in the lapidary style of a practical man, warned against "sedition" and "disorder" and appealed for unity, concord, and submission to bishop and presbyters (Stevenson 1957, 10). Christians were also quick to present themselves as defenders of *secular* public order.[3] Roman political thought and institutions, with a deep commitment to a public sphere, entered the church through the language of *potestas*, *honor*, *dignitas*, *maiestas*, *fas*, *ius*, and *gravitas* (Campenhausen 1969, 274n),[4] as well as through a diocesan structure modeled on civil provinces.

Christian theology referred unambiguously to a public life and a common good. The absolute priority of the divine heightened group loyalty and commitment by locating them beyond as well as within the immediate social environment—a collective conscience. Service (*leitourgia*, liturgy) of God was conceptually related to service of humans and especially of fellow believers. These were elements of a new republicanism, built around Roman and even Ciceronian values. Here, too, as for the elder Brutus, ties of blood must be sacrificed for the greater good. The very self-sacrifice required of the Christian was in a sense a republican ideal; and one point of martyrdom was to attract new members.

The early church adopted an organizational strategy in which we find elements of constitutional republicanism.[5] These data have been known and debated for centuries by theologians and ecclesiastical historians but seem a closed book to historians of political thought. Christians believed with the intensity of new faith—an intelligent intensity difficult to recapture because their faith ran with, rather than against, the intellectual grain of the age—that they were the new chosen people of God. *Ekklesia* meant a group of persons "called out" from the sinful world and brought together by God; at the same time it meant a physical assembly of persons. Christians "gather together" and "do their service" (*leitourgousin*) (Bettenson 1956, 35).[6] *Ekklesia* quickly acquired the dual meaning of (1) the ideal, transcendent, cosmic, and eschatological community of the saved and (2) the assembly of Christians in one town or district (Goguel 1964, 26). The church was the "ship" of salvation, and its well-being and good order mattered no less than individual virtue and purity. It was necessary to the integrity and credibility of the faith that this church be recognizably united.

At first, since Christ's return was imminently expected, many paid little attention to constitutional matters. "The most striking feature of Paul's view of the Christian community is the complete lack of any legal system, and the exclusion on ground of principle of all formal authority within the individual congregation" (Campenhausen 1969, 70). In the writings of Ignatius (d. 115?), elders and bishops appear as those whom others ought to obey and as authorized to settle disputes; the cosmic is united with the public and the everyday because the bishop stands for Christ, the presbytery for the apostles (Ignatius, *To the Trallians* 2–3, in Bettenson 1956, 42, 44). Other believers play a legitimating role by being present, giving their consent to the leaders' actions. The election of a bishop required the presence and consent of the people; and "the bishop and his presbyters play an outstanding part in the excommunication of a church member, a judicial act which takes place before a full assembly of the whole congregation as the court of last instance" (Campenhausen 1969, 216).[7]

The need for organization was driven by several disputes. The catholic (worldwide, ecumenical) type of Christianity was challenged by Gnostics, who claimed to have secret access to mystical teachings, and by Montanists, who claimed a "new prophecy." Such movements impelled the proto-Catholics, such as Irenaeus (fl.180), to formulate a version of holy associational order which, first, established the open and public nature of true doctrine and, second, appealed to the consensus of all churches founded (supposedly) by the original apostles. The question of the readmission of those who lapsed under persecution (*lapsi*), involving as it did the issue of membership, was important in the third century. Such disputes impelled churchmen to develop a notion of juridical order and a constitution. In particular, readmission of the lapsed required a judicial process, and this acted as a spur to constitutional development.

Throughout the early Catholic writers, above all Ignatius, Irenaeus, the early Tertullian (fl.200), and Cyprian (bishop of Carthage, 248–58), there is a deep concern for orderliness plus consensus. That was their ideal for the church; it was part of their faith that the church could and would combine consensus with order, liberty with obedience (as Rousseau would say of *La République*).

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[3] For example, Tertullian, *Apologeticus* 38, in Bettenson 1956, 156; Kopocek 1974.

[4] See also Cyprian, *Epistolae* 55.7–8. John Chrysostom (archbishop of Constantinople, d. 407) called the apostles a spiritual consulate and magistrates (*archontes*) whose decisions are valid in heaven (Migne 1862, 93).

[5] On what follows, see Campenhausen 1969, especially 245, 265–70, and Goguel 1964, especially 26, 175–7.

[6] In Greek city-states, *leitourgia* was the service rendered by wealthy citizens.

[7] See also Origen and Cyprian in Bettenson 1956, 246, 267.

One element peculiar to Catholic constitutional thought was the apostolic succession: The bishops, especially those of certain major sees, step into the place of the original recipients of the divine revelation by continuity of official succession and by direct transmission of their teaching. This was designed especially to counter claims to knowledge of a secret message.[8] This doctrine of apostolic succession, which triumphed in the Catholic church, filled the need for dogmatic clarification and certainty in such a way as to require some kind of constitutional structure. (This part of the Catholic option was subsequently upheld by the magisterial Reformation.)

Thus, the constitutional debates about bishops, presbyters, congregations, synods, and the Roman see followed directly from the view of revelation as something given in one precise historical milieu and now closed. It became imperative that a constitution be found and agreed upon. This gave rise to a particular kind of political endeavor. The church, furthermore, had the peculiar problem that this constitution itself was supposed to form part of the revealed doctrine it was designed to uphold. It could not, therefore, just be invented; it had to be "found" in a common-law sense.

All Catholic authorities and writers agreed about the need for a public, civic order in the church. Episcopal authority, the monoepiscopate, apostolic succession, and the primacy of the Roman see were all attempts to establish an effective juridical and decision-making order in the church. It is often difficult to distinguish between rhetoric and an intention to indicate precise roles.

In these debates certain republican constitutional ideas emerged. Bishops were normally elected by presbyters and congregations and, from the early second century, with the consensus of neighboring bishops. Regional synods, which may have developed out of such meetings, emerged at about the same time. By the latter half of the second century such councils were the recognized means for resolving major disputes. They communicated their decisions to one another to widen the consensus and unmask disagreement, which could then occasion a further synod.

> Throughout Greece these councils of the representatives of all the churches are held at appointed places. By means of these synods all the more important questions are dealt with by common discussion; and this representation of the whole Christian community is celebrated with great solemnity (Tertullian, *De Jejunio* 13, in Bettenson 1956, 152).

In a major controversy from 251 to 256 A.D. over the lapsed, St. Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, and his correspondents gave an extraordinary exposition of the relationship between episcopal authority and voluntary consensus, which has a partially republican character. First, St. Cyprian (*Epistolae* 66.8) notes the intimate, metaphysical identity between bishop and church: "the bishop is in the church and the church in the bishop (*episcopum in ecclesia esse et ecclesiam in episcopo*)" and he adds that if anyone is not with the bishop he is not in the church. This became one of the principal proof texts of medieval constitutionalism. Second, the basic unanimity (one-spiritedness) of the church requires actual, known, felt, expressed union among all bishops and churches (Cyprian, *De Ecclesiae*, 257–8; see also Campenhausen 1969, 278; Grossi 1958). This was put into practice at the regional level through regular annual meetings, most famously among the bishops of Africa. Cyprian (partly in opposition to Roman primacy) proclaimed both the individual liberty of bishops and their solidarity and actual consensus.

> We should each put forward our own opinion, . . . not excluding anyone from the right of communion if they think differently. For none of us has set himself up as a bishop of bishops, nor driven his colleagues to compulsory obedience by tyrannical terror; for every bishop has the right to make his own decisions in liberty and authority; he can neither judge nor be judged by another (Cyprian, *Epistolae*, in Migne 1865, 1091).

Cyprian thus emphasized collective episcopal authority.

The bishop of Carthage and others believed in the legitimating authority of consensus among a large number of persons, in elections and in the resolution of disputes through synods. Cyprian (*Epistolae* 55.8) wrote of a bishop newly elected at Rome, after a local schism, that he stands

> by the testimony of his fellow bishops, whose whole number throughout the world has given their agreement with concordant unanimity [*quorum numerus universus per totum mundum concordi unanimitate consensit*] . . . he was made bishop by the majority of us [*plurimis nostris*] who were present in Rome at that time . . . by the judgment of God . . . by the testimony of almost all the clergy, by the vote [*suffragio*] of the people who were then present, and by the corporation [*collegio*] of ancient bishops and good men.

Similarly, the Roman clergy, writing to Cyprian during that schism, said he had approached them not as judges but as partners ("*non tam iudices . . . quam participes*"), and they agreed that the right policy was

> to discuss the actions of the lapsed by bringing together the opinions [*collatione consiliorum*] of the bishops, presbyters, deacons, confessors and laymen who stood firm. Indeed it would seem to us invidious and onerous not to have what seems to have been committed by many examined by many, and [not to] arrive at one judgment when such a heavy charge has been brought against so many; because no decision can be firm which will not be seen to have had the consent of the majority [*quod non plurimorum videbitur habuisse consensum*] (Cyprian, *Epistolae* 30.5).

The bishop of Carthage readily endorsed this:

> Since you have written that I should discuss this as fully as possible with a large number of colleagues, and since such a weighty matter requires the bringing together of greater and more careful advice from many [*maius et impensius de multorum collatione consilium*], . . . I will discuss it with each more fully so that on this . . . a firm judgment directed

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[8] Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, III, iii.1–iv.1, in Bettenson 1963, 68–9; Tertullian, *De Praescriptione Haereticorum*, xx–xxi, in Bettenson 1963, 70–1; Campenhausen 1969, 158–63.

> by the counsel of many bishops, may be returned to you (Cyprian, *Epistolae* 50.5).[9]

Right decisions, then, are achieved by the widest possible consultation among bishops and by participation of "many"—presbyters and others, including lay people. Numbers demonstrate common witness and therefore help define truth; the aim is genuine unanimity. This marked a new attempt, undertaken for ecclesiological reasons, to involve as many people as possible in the decision-making process. Again, just as clergy and people mirrored senate and people, the collegiality of bishops suggests a senatorial attitude in the early church. (St. Jerome declared that priestly councils are "our senate"; see note 12 below.)

We may conclude that early Christianity contained elements of republicanism. Indeed, it generated the entirely new idea of a general consensus achievable by representatives of all peoples in an ecumenical council of bishops. This became the common aspiration of the Catholic Church from the Council of Nicea (A.D. 325) onward. It was without precedent and turned out to be of central importance for the history of political thought and institutions.

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE EUROPE

The image of the period from Constantine to Luther as one of papal monarchy needs to be modified. Until the final East/West schism (A.D. 1054), councils and patriarchs, including the pope, were generally conceived as twin-track methods of achieving juridical order and resolving disputes.[10] The Council of Nicea regularized existing practice by making provincial councils courts of first instance for excommunication and episcopal misconduct and so an integral part of the juridical structure; they were to convene twice a year.[11] The development of the Roman see as final appellate court was certainly a monarchical phenomenon (Jedin 1967–73, vol. 3, part 2).

During the European Middle Ages up to the Reformation, republicanism was best exemplified in city governments, but elements of republicanism, both ancient and modern, were present in other political phenomena. Within the church, popes were elected and regularly summoned representative councils for legislation. Papal claims to legislate and determine doctrine without a council were contested until the nineteenth century. The general view was that final rulings on doctrine and discipline required both an ecumenical council and the consent of the Roman bishop. In the *respublica Christiana* prior to the Reformation, centralism was balanced by localism and papal powers by a complex web of actual and theoretical constitutional constraints. Seriously aberrant popes could be deposed (*Decretum Gratiani* d.40.6)

Cathedral and monastic chapters (*collegia*) had important powers within the clerical order, particularly in the disposition of church property. Procedures for the election of bishops and pope and the bishop's obligation to consult his clergy were carefully drafted (*Decretum Gratiani* d.24.6 and C.15.7.6; *Decretals* 3.10–11).[12] New religious movements had a tendency to become self-governing religious orders. Many, notably the Dominicans and Franciscans, adopted collegiate, conciliar methods of self-management and conducted regular elections. From the twelfth to the early fourteenth century, general councils of the Western church were held with unparalleled frequency (Le Bras 1959, 333–40). Canon law prescribed the biannual provincial synod (*Decretum Gratiani* d.18); indeed, it was through such synods that Gregory VII (A.D. 1073–85) implemented his radical, centralist reform program.

In secular government, representative assemblies were for the first time adopted as a regular feature from the thirteenth century onward (Marongiu [1949] 1968). This probably owed something to the example of the church, since representative church councils were the obvious and, indeed, the only precedent. Nicole Oresme (d. 1382), the first theorist to write extensively on this subject, referred to them (Black 1992, 167–8). The general view of theorists was that the best form of government was the *regimen mixtum*, combining king as monarch, his counsellors as the wise, and parliament as representing the many (Blythe 1992).

Theological arguments for monarchy were based on the Old Testament, but hereditary monarchical rule, although generally practiced, was very seldom defended in principle. Thomas Aquinas and Bartolus—leading theologian and jurist, respectively—said that divine law prescribed election (Black 1992, 147–8).

The phenomenon of self-governing cities from 1100 to 1500 has been widely misrepresented by English-speaking historians of political thought. These cities did not exist only in Italy but throughout the manufacturing areas and along the commercial pathways of Europe. They were not systematically antifeudal or antiseigneurial (Dilcher 1996; Planitz 1954; Reynolds 1984). They were part of a wider culture of self-government, extending to villages (Blickle 1986) and including Christian alongside neoclassical features. The institutional basis was the collective oath of mutual aid and corporate allegiance, corresponding to and displacing feudal homage. The use of the oath as a tool of social organization and discipline was a feature of Germanic feudal, chivalric society; the oath (*sacramentum*) was also commonly used by the church, both in the religious sacraments of baptism, marriage, and ordination and in the Peace movement (Prodi 1992, chapters 3–4; Weber [1968] 1978, 1,248–60). The confluence of these sources is demonstrated by the statement of a twelfth-century French commune that

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[9] See also Cyprian, *Epistolae* 55.7; compare Synod of Carthage (A.D. 424) in Mansi 1759–98, vol. 3, 839–45; and Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431) in Mansi 1759–98, vol. 4, 1,442. Firmilian, bishop of Caesaria in Cappadocia, informed Cyprian that there, too, "the senior and chief members come together every year to deal with matters committed to their care, so that . . . important issues may be determined by common counsel" (Migne 1865, 1,204–5).

[10] See, for example, Bettenson 1963, 21–3.

[11] Munier 1974, 34, 106, 124, 139–40; Mansi 1759–98, vol. 2, 669–70, and vol. 9, 997–8.

[12] St. Jerome was quoted in canon law as saying on this subject: "The church has its senate, the assembly of priests without whose advice the monks may not undertake anything. . . . The Romans too had a senate on whose advice they undertook everything" (*Decretum Gratiani* C.16.1.7).

> certain of us, not wishing to destroy, but to fulfil the law, have elected to be governed by a common oath association [*communem coniurationem elegerunt*], so that each one may sustain his neighbor as his brother as need arises (Michaud-Quantin 1970, 130n., 179–81).

Towns and city states couched their claims in the language of liberty and rights (Black 1984, chapter 3; Harding 1980). The concept of rights derived from a Christian extension of the Stoicized principles of Roman law (Tierney 1989). In pursuit of their commercial and craft-industrial ends, cities, like the guilds before and within them, appealed to "justice" (by which they sometimes meant their own, in their view, superior legal system) (Black 1984, 16–17, 63). Liberty was on the whole a Germanic rather than a classical value; it also owed something to the theology of St. Paul. At the time of the first communes, much use was made of "liberty" by the Gregorian reformers in their bid to free the churches from feudal dominion (Tellenbach [1940] 1979, chapter 5).

The governmental language of towns derived partly from the Latin past, partly from Germanic institutions, and partly from the example of the church (Michaud-Quantin 1970). Thus, their officials and ruling bodies were designated as *consules*, *senatus*, *Schöffen* (lit. jurors), and *concilium*, and the town community as *civitas*, *commune*, *Gemeinde*, and *universitas civium*. Their practice of electing their rulers could also have come from, or be justified by, each or any of these sources (Moulin 1953). Their tendency to invoke the counsel and consent of citizens is again difficult to ascribe to any one specific origin; but precedents and contemporary parallels were offered by church government, as was the notion that the community is superior to its ruler (Schilling 1992, 15). The truth is that Christian and other ideas and languages were completely fused in medieval European culture; for example: "All belonging to the friendship of the town have agreed by faith and sacrament [or oath] that each will help the other as his brother in what is useful and honest" (Wilda 1964, 148).[13]

The friendship of the village invoked the Germanic tribal oath association; faith, neighborly mutual aid, and possibly sacrament invoked Christianity: useful and honest was a Stoic paradox popularized by Cicero (Black 1984, 70).[14] The debt of republicanism to the communal movement as a whole has in general been underestimated.

Not only were non-Renaissance values present and sometimes dominant in civic, republican milieux, but also Italian neoclassicism in arts and letters flourished in autocratic Milan and the papal lands just as readily as in republican Florence and Venice. It was partly a patriotic affair, so that Caesar and Augustus were as presentable as the Scipios, Vergil as much loved and imitated as Cicero. The civic humanism—or neo-Ciceronian rhetoric—of Florence around 1400 (Baron [1955] 1966, Seigel 1966) showed that a Renaissance-republican alliance was possible. But this was not typical; there was no systematic connection between neoclassicism and republicanism. Furthermore, humanist rhetoricians in republics such as Florence and Venice espoused ancient, not modern, republicanism, not being particularly favorable toward the more democratic aspects of republics. Moves for enlargement of the citizenry came from the lesser craft guilds (Najemy 1982) and, in the case of a Savonarola, Christian idealism. Neoclassicists found communal institutions quaint and followed their intellectual forerunners in a healthy disrespect for the unlettered rabble. The sociopolitical thought inspired by the revival of antiquity became anti-Christian only with Machiavelli.

Conciliarism

The strongest evidence for convergence between republicanism and Christianity is in the conciliar movement (1378–1440s). The attempt to reform the church by imposing the will of the council on the pope brought together the ancient belief in the authority of councils, medieval corporation theory, the ideals of the civic communes, and the parliamentary culture of Europe (Black 1979, Crowder 1977). Its significance for the present discussion lies primarily in the assertion of the sovereignty of the church community, represented in a general council, over the ruler. This constituted an important development in republicanism: Not only must rulers be elected and consult, but also—when push comes to shove—the citizenry can override the ruler. Conciliarists located sovereignty (the concept of unitary, unlimited authority had been worked out for the papacy) not just in the council but in the church community as a real whole: This could only—and therefore must—act through a council.

It is difficult to say where this comes from and how much of it was original to the conciliarists. It was not part of ancient republicanism. It probably came out of the view that groups can act as legal persons (corporation theory) as well as the canon lawyers' understanding that—on specific occasions—the college can override its ruler (Tierney [1955] 1968). Corporate sovereignty had been stated by Marsiglio, who encapsulated the practices of civic communes and redrafted Aristotle. This idea was propelled into early modern political thought by Salamonio (c. 1450–1532), who based his argument mainly upon Roman law (D'Addio 1954). Conciliarists proclaimed communal sovereignty to be the essence of the church constitution. It differed from later popular sovereignty (the view that a majority of all has the final say) in that authority was ascribed to the church as a whole as represented in the council, however little say most people had in the selection of council members (Black 1979).

Implementation of such a theory required very careful drafting of constitutional laws; it was precisely by legal means that the councils of Constance (1414–18) and of Basel (1431–1440s) sought to assert their sovereignty over the pope. In this view the ruler was accountable and limited not only by existing laws but also by the council as supreme judicial and legislative body. The Council of Basel also upheld the right to take over the executive powers of the papacy (Black 1979, 49–51). But the crucial point was that the council could depose the pope.

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[13] "*Omnes autem ad amicitiam pertinentes villae per fidem et sacramentum firmaverunt quod unus subveniat alteri tamquam fratri in utili et honesto.*"

[14] For this combination see also the *Weavers' Chronicle* by Clemens Jaeger (c.1500–61), an Augsburg shoemaker, Lutheran, and largely self-educated humanist (Black 1984, 114–20); it is the first known political writing by a manual worker. See Bolgar, 1958, 124–5.

Some conciliarists took the step, unprecedented for republicans, of asserting that their constitutional model was the only correct one and therefore should be applied to all communities, ecclesiastical and secular. They did not thereby become political revolutionaries, although Pope Eugenius IV was quick to portray them as such; Segovia, Cusa, and others believed that Christian monarchies were already parliamentarian (Black 1970, chapter 3, and 1979, 191–3). Segovia, possibly aware of the distinctiveness of what was being said, called these views *doctrina synodalis*.

The model of secular republicanism was invoked, both by the neo-Ciceronian Aeneas Piccolomini (1967, 32) and by other, non-Italian, authors. Parallels were seen with contemporary republican city-states; Segovia took the trouble to rephrase the council/pope relationship in the language of contemporary city-states as *communitas/executor sive potestas, dictator aut gubernator*. A significant number of the clergy attending the Council of Basel actually came from self-governing cities (Black 1979, 36–7, 99–100, 173).

This explicit connection between Christian doctrine and republicanism was contested by the papacy with widespread success. The throne and altar alliance in the form familiar to modern historians was initiated in the 1430s in response to conciliarism (Black 1970). The new monarchical structures of postmedieval states were indeed very frequently justified on theological grounds. This gave rise to the belief that there was an intrinsic affinity between monarchy and Christianity (in particular Roman Catholicism, but also Lutheranism).

The Reformation

But the potential connection between Christianity and republicanism was once again immediately activated. Thwarted in the late-medieval (subsequently Roman Catholic) church, republicanism entered a new partnership with Christianity during the Reformation. This has been recognized in Calvinism by historians of political thought, but it goes farther than that, and the extent of the relationship has not been fully stated. Before Calvin, the Lutheran Reformation in the majority of German cities was accompanied by a desire, especially among artisans and guildsmen, to return to the original principles of the constitutional community (*Gemeinde*, *universitas*) and of civic brotherhood (Moeller 1972; Ozment 1975). This was one possible application of Luther's notion of the church as a community (*Gemeine*), which Luther himself applied to the parish.

We can see in the early Reformation a revival of the communal movement. The rights of self-governing communities were asserted in the *Reformation of the Emperor Frederick III*, written in 1523:

> All free, imperial and royal cities and other communes and communities in the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation shall be granted . . . their just rights and proper government . . . in accordance with the principles of Christian freedom (Schapiro 1909, 104–5).

Conversely, Bucer saw the church as "the most perfect, most friendly and most faithful brotherhood, community and union" (Moeller 1972, 81). Communal and Reformation institutions converged in, for example, the distribution of poor relief out of a common chest.

Hereafter, the main vehicle of the Christian-republican alliance was Calvinism. To this there were two aspects: the application of republican principles (1) to the government of the church and (2) to Christian polities under Calvinist direction. The first is clear in Calvin's *Institutes* (1961, 1217–18):

> Administration of justice in the ancient church was not the function of an individual. . . . This power . . . was not in one man's possession to do whatever he pleased but in the hands of the assembly of the elders, which was to the church *what the senate is to the city* [emphasis added].

Calvin went on to cite Cyprian's association of clergy and people with the bishop in judicial authority (Calvin 1961, 1217–18; Schilling 1991). This was implemented in the synodal and electoral order established by Calvin. He invoked the senatorial order of the early church, partly by emphasizing elders (*seniores*). Cyprian was the unsung hero of the Reformation period, widely cited by different schools: editions of his works included six issued in Paris between 1512 and 1726, five in Basel from 1521 to 1558, five in Lyon between 1535 and 1550, three in Antwerp from 1542 to 1589, two in Amsterdam (1691, 1700), and one each in Cologne (1522), Rome (1563), Geneva (1593), and Oxford (1682).[15]

One link with civic consciousness lay in Geneva itself. Calvin and his supporters threw out the bishop and remodeled the city commune, not in a democratic direction but in such a way that, in an age of creeping principality, Geneva remained one of very few self-governing city-states with an elected magistracy and functioning councils.

From this conjunction, republican Christianity developed in France, Scotland, and the Low Countries (Koenigsberger 1988); and the stage was set for the final moment in our story. The French Calvinists laid down (1559) a structure of representative government with provincial synods (to be held at least once a year), a national synod, and *conciles généraux*. (The Basel reformer, Oecolampadius, had stipulated in 1529 that synods of pastors should meet biannually.) A similar regime was set up for the Netherlands in 1578 (Kidd 1911, 673–7; Kingdon 1963–4; McNeill 1954, 82, 246–7, 261–2). Calvinists and others were here replicating the model briefly established by the Council of Basel in the 1430s. The important role given to provincial synods in the appointment and disciplining of ministers also reflects early church praxis.

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[15] Cambridge University Library catalog.

The influence of Calvinism on theories of secular government usually has been seen as focusing on the right of resistance. Skinner (1978, ii and chapter 7) has rightly argued that, so far as neo-Calvinists advocated this, they were neither original nor unique. In any case, advocacy of republicanism and the right of resistance were not necessarily connected; republicans tended to replace resistance with constitutional deposition, which is perhaps why Pocock does not refer to the right of resistance.

Over the next hundred years, representative and limited government, and government under the law and dependent upon popular consent, arose time and again from an application of neo-Christian principles to the polity. This was achieved in close alliance with regional political traditions and with arguments already established in philosophy and jurisprudence. First in France and then in England, those seeking to limit royal power by parliamentary means also appealed directly to the fifteenth-century councils and to conciliarist theory (Black 1979, 194–8; Oakley 1962; Tierney 1982, 97–102).

The type case was the Netherlands, where the development of republican forms was simultaneously influenced by traditions of medieval constitutionalism, conciliarism, neo-Calvinism, and neoclassicism (Cicero's *De Officiis* being now translated into Dutch) (Gelderen 1992, 284, and 1993, 85, 172–4, 177–8). Appeals to liberty (Gelderen 1989, 147, 152) and concord (Gelderen 1992, 282; Althusius 1932, chapter 31) could equally well be inspired by Cicero or the New Testament. Dutch arguments for the corporate sovereignty of the people seem to derive especially from Salamonio (Gelderen 1989, 143).

Johannes Althusius (writing 1603–10 in northwestern Germany), the last great exponent of early-modern communal—as distinct from modern popular—sovereignty, was also a neo-Calvinist. So was John Locke. Locke did not call himself a republican, but his constitutional views—that men first establish a "legislative or supreme authority," that the monarch is "ministerial and subordinate to the legislative," and that all government is under the law (Locke 1967, 11.134–8,143; 12.153)—place him close to the republican end of the spectrum. The dependence of his political philosophy upon "a series of theological commitments" is now well recognized (Dunn 1969, xi).[16]

In the North American colonies, the idea of popular self-government was inspired by the neo-Calvinist covenanted community, as this spilled over from church onto civil society. There is a wealth of evidence from Massachusetts to support the view that, "when New England was settled the two covenants, the religious and the social, had become one in the minds of their leaders" (Miller 1939, 414, and chapter 14; Gooch [1927] 1967, 70–4; Pocock 1975, 512–3). Yet, Rhode Island records of the 1640s suggest that corporation theory and the tradition of the communes were still alive and well:

> And now [since] our charter giveth us power to govern ourselves and such others as come among us, and by such a form of Civill government as by the voluntary consent etc., shall be found most suitable to our estate and condition, It is agreed by this present assembly thus incorporate, and by this present act declared, that the form of government established in Providence Plantations is democraticall; that is to say, a government held by the free and voluntary consent of all, with the greater part of free inhabitants (Bartlett, 1968, 112, 156).

The republics of early modern Europe were thus either survivors of the medieval communal movement (Venice, Genoa, Lucca), or imbued with Calvinism (Geneva, the United Provinces, some North American colonies), or indeed both (the Swiss cantons and cities).

ROUSSEAU

The relationship between parts of Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1966) and Christian ecclesiology, on the one hand, and the communal-corporatist tradition, on the other (Venturi 1971, 76, 85), have scarcely been perceived. Yet, several key ideas in *Social Contract* are secular versions of Christian community and become more intelligible, if not more plausible, if so viewed.

The transition from the state of nature to the civil state is presented as a moral and intellectual conversion. Rousseau, finding the Lockean contract too legalistic, insisted that, for a social contract to be effective, there must be a profound change of moral understanding:

> This passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions a moral quality [*la moralité*] which they lacked before. Only then does the voice of duty replace physical impulse, and right replace appetite; man, who till then considered only himself, finds himself forced to act on other principles, and to consult reason before listening to his inclinations . . . his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas enlarged, his sentiments ennobled; his whole soul elevates itself to such a point that, if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him below the condition he has left, he ought to bless unceasingly the happy moment . . . which turned him from a stupid, restricted animal into an intelligent being and a man (*Social Contract* I.8, author's translation).

What a new creature indeed. The simultaneously individual and social character of this act may draw upon the notion of baptism as incorporation into a new society. The act itself creates the bond. The result is presented as an organic and essential union, not altogether unlike a church:

> In an instant, this act of association produces, in place of the particular person of each one who contracts, a moral and collective body composed of as many members as the assembly has voices; this body receiving by the same act its unity, common self [*moi commun*], life and will (*Social Contract* I.6).

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[16] Republicanism goes unmentioned in Ashcraft 1986, Dunn 1969, and Tully 1993.

The social contract sometimes looks like a reenactment of the oath-association of city, guild, or village: All assemble together and swear to one another. One purpose is, as with membership in a commune, to release the individual from ties of dependence (*Social Contract* I.7, II.12). As in the corporation of citizens, sovereignty lies in the assembled people (III.12–14).

The ecclesiological ideas of inerrancy and unanimity reappear in the concept of the general will and may explain its elusive character. The similarity with the language of St. Cyprian and John of Segovia is striking. Segovia, too, had argued the need for face-to-face discussion (Black 1979, 156–60). It may be that the peculiar kind of authority vested in the general will (*Social Contract* I.7, II.4) derives from the model of the church. The terms *generalis voluntas* and *intentio omnium* occurred in communal documents and conciliar writings,[17] albeit without many of the ideas associated with them by Rousseau (Black 1979, 163–4). Mutual aid and the coincidence of private and common good, of interest and duty, are fully endorsed by Rousseau (I.7). The language of friendship and fraternity is, to be sure, replaced by that of *citoyen*; but reconciliation and warm feeling are retained. What above all connects Cyprian, the communes, and Rousseau is the ideal of spiritual union.

In Rousseau, to be sure, there is a different kind of Christian-republican connection, in that *La République* is a nonChristian, though theistic, community. Rousseau's personal history, from Calvinist upbringing through Catholic profession to personal theism (Grimsley 1973, chapter 6), gave him a deep familiarity with the ideas involved and a motive for innovation. His thought, like that of Kant, bore the imprint of Christianity.

CONCLUSION

Both Pocock and Skinner have in their different ways associated republicanism closely with liberty, "humanism," and Machiavelli. Insofar as liberty is taken to mean modern intellectual liberty, and insofar as it remains difficult for the modern reader to disassociate humanism as belief-pattern from humanism as Renaissance genre, this may imply that Christianity had nothing to do with republicanism and that these two were mutually opposed. This article demonstrates that both these implications would be false. As for Machiavelli, what evidence is there that he or those who thought like him were more inclined to republicanism than were medieval guildsmen and burghers or Calvinists? A generation ago, Meinecke (1957) expressed a very different but no less plausible interpretation of Machiavelli's influence on European statecraft and thought; indeed, it is strange that one searches the writings of both Pocock and Skinner in vain for any sustained discussion of *raison d'état*.

The erroneous views which both Pocock and Skinner in their different ways propagate derive to a considerable degree from too close an association between a genre (or "language") and a specific ideology or political program, in this case between either the language of liberty, or humanist rhetoric, or a Machiavellian perspective and the belief in republican government. The historical fact is that republican ideas could, just like monarchical ones, be put about in a variety of languages (Black 1992, 7–12), in terms of corporation theory and neo-Christian ecclesiology as well as in neo-Roman or Machiavellian terms. The "Machiavellian moment" was one important aspect of early-modern republican thought, but so, of course, was Calvinism. Indeed, it would seem that the politicians and intellectuals who—in France, the United Provinces, Scotland, England, and North America—promoted republicanism were drawing upon combinations of regional constitutionalist traditions, Calvinist Christianity, and neoclassical ideas. I know of no evidence that, prior to the eighteenth century at least, they were less or more likely to be Christian in belief or sentiment than were nonrepublicans. The new historiographical orthodoxy seriously distorts the record.

This article has demonstrated, first, that there was no *necessary* connection between Christianity and monarchy. Monarchical thought was not implicit in Christianity. Serious-minded persons were not bound sooner or later to derive the one from the other. There was, rather, a *potential* connection: One could use theocentric, Christocentric, and other arguments to support monarchy, and on several occasions in ancient, medieval, and modern history people did so. Second, it has been demonstrated that there was no less a *potential* connection between Christianity and republicanism. This is clear both in early church history and in the use made of Christian doctrine as a basis or justification for republicanism in medieval and early-modern Europe. Again, this was not a necessary connection: Christianity flourished in societies where republicanism never appeared (notably, Byzantium and its successors). But this potential connection was actualized in several different sets of circumstances in ancient, medieval, and modern times.

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[17] This eludes Riley 1986.

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Gender and Justice in Plato

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Plato's proposal for the equality of the sexes remains one of the most controversial aspects of his argument in the Republic. *I explore this argument with special emphasis on locating it within larger themes of the work, themes whose relevance to the argument on gender equality have often been ignored. On this basis, I find that Plato's defense of gender equality is serious, but that the foundation and the consequences of that argument have not usually been well understood. Plato's argument for gender equality rests on a distinctive view of human nature, and his elaboration of the consequences of pursuing gender equality reveal that a price would have to be paid for it that few are willing to accept. His argument should be considered by contemporary advocates of gender equality.*

No part of Plato's outline of the perfectly just society in the *Republic* has generated more controversy than its arrangements regarding the role of women and the family. Plato's proposals in Book 5 of that work to confer equality on women and dissolve the family have been examined and debated, attacked and defended, from ancient times to the present. Controversy is fueled partly by the radical character of these arrangements in themselves, partly by the difficulty of interpreting their meaning and deciphering the philosophic intention behind them. The proposals have been seen sometimes as ironic satire, sometimes as fully serious practical recommendations. Within the past generation, intense scrutiny has settled on Plato's proposals for the equality of women in particular. Modern feminism has been especially interested in these; but the dispute among feminist writers as to the meaning and significance of the proposals has been nearly as far-ranging as that among other interpreters. Plato has been portrayed as a bold precursor to modern feminism, as a ruthless suppressor of women and the "female voice," and as a complete ironist.[1] There is no consensus on whether feminism can legitimately claim Plato as part of its heritage and, if so, which of its strains is actually foreshadowed by the radical arguments of the *Republic*.

Susan Moller Okin (1979, 31, 42) has argued that Plato can properly be seen as a pioneer with his argument that women are equal, although in her view Plato sees equality as a political possibility only under conditions of complete communism such as those introduced in Book 5 of the *Republic*. To her, the argument of the *Laws* demonstrates that for Plato the reintroduction of private property immediately returns women to the household (Okin 1979, 44). This fact, together with elements of misogyny she finds in other parts of his argument, in her view limits the relevance of Plato's argument to contemporary feminists. Arlene Saxonhouse (1992, 151) contends that Plato establishes sexual equality in his ideal society at the expense of women, by essentially expunging the female. She believes that, actuated by a "fear of diversity" characteristic of Greek intellectual culture, Plato expelled the bodily from human nature, then simply absorbed the female into male nature. In fact, Saxonhouse (1992, 153, 157) argues, the family, the female, and the bodily are all expelled from the universe of the *Republic* in a quasi-tryannical drive to political and theoretical unity. Jean Bethke Elshtain (1981, 37) maintains that Plato creates gender equality by destroying both male and female identities, but especially the female. In her view Plato does succeed in rationalizing political life but only by annihilating all that is private and falsely expelling whatever is not rational (including gender) from human nature (pp. 37–8, 40–1).

Julia Annas (1976, 1981) rejects the notion that Plato can be seen as any sort of feminist on the basis of his argument in the *Republic*. She finds a potentially liberating argument in Plato's suggestion that sex is irrelevant to an individual's talents, but she accuses Plato of failing to follow up this insight (p. 185). In her view, the preponderance of his remarks shows instead that he does not believe women are equal at all (p. 184). She concludes that women are made equal in Plato's ideal city not out of any concern for their fate, or any solicitude for their own preferences, but only because Plato sees them as a pool of talent that can be put to work for the city (pp. 182, 183). It is less a question of justice than of the efficient use of resources. Allan Bloom (1968, 383) also argues that Plato does not believe women to be equal and that he treats them equally in the city of the *Republic* only for the political good. He contends that no women would likely be included in the highest class of the guardians on their merits and that they are placed there to allow for the reproduction of that class. They must share in the austere and relentlessly public life of the guardians precisely because the natural female tendency to the private and the particular would otherwise corrupt the guardians themselves (pp. 382–3). Due to the false premise of equality on which the scheme rests, the whole presentation in this part of the *Republic* is in Bloom's (pp. 380–1) view a type of comedy.

No new attempt to navigate these muddy and contested waters can realistically hope to produce consensus where better than two millenia of exegesis have yielded only discord. Nevertheless, the importance of the subject, and the prospect of receiving some illumination on an issue with which contemporary society is

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[1] The most useful survey of the literature up to its publication date, both feminist and otherwise, is Bluestone (1987).

struggling, continue to inspire fresh attempts. Some of these, driven by the urgency of the problem, have lacked the detachment to approach Plato's argument with sufficient care and subtlety. The *Republic* as a whole, and Book 5 in particular, are very complex and nuanced texts, and many contemporary interpretations, in their rush to fit Plato into one political camp or another, have suffered from insufficient attention to detail. Still more common has been the tendency to treat Plato's arguments on women and the family in isolation from the rest of the text. Yet, these proposals cannot be properly understood without seeing their place in the overall argument of the *Republic*.

The temptation to treat Book 5 in isolation is encouraged to some degree by the dialogue itself. A specific challenge from his interlocutors at the beginning of Book 5 unleashes what Socrates calls the three "waves" of argument—on equality of women, community of women and children, and philosopher-kings—that occupy all of books 5, 6, and 7. At the beginning of Book 8, the earlier thread is resumed almost seamlessly, with Socrates calling the intervening argument a "detour" or "digression" (543c; cf. Glaucon's reply, 543d–544a). The intervening section thus has the appearance of a free-standing discourse. But this appearance is misleading. Most of the revolutionary proposals of Book 5 are only the culmination of arguments developed earlier in the *Republic*. In retrospect, for example, it is clear that only the philosopher is equal to the tasks assigned to the rulers in books 3 and 4. These tasks included the censorship of poetry, music, and even architecture, making them conform to the true models of human virtue in order to shape the souls of the citizens in the best way possible. Only in the third wave of argument do we discover the philosophic nature capable of this.

The second wave, concerning the abolition of the family, is likewise implicit in the educational scheme of Book 3, a scheme that replaces parental control over education with public supervision of its every detail (cf. Nettleship 1951, 164; Barker 1961, 213). The rulers who supervise this education are to penetrate the soul of each child and place him or her at the proper position in the city, with exclusive attention to merit. Socrates manufactures an oracle according to which the city will be destroyed if the rulers indulge in nepotism (415b); but the severity of the imprecation only underscores the extreme difficulty of overcoming the natural, but unjust,[2] preference of parents for their own children—so long as they know who those children are. It is visible in Book 3, though only between the lines, that equal education and justice according to desert can be brought about in practice only through the dissolution of the family, the suppression of some natural impulses, and the rule of philosophers.

This obviously raises a number of important questions, but it also points to a theme I wish to emphasize, one that becomes visible early in the *Republic* but receives its culmination in the section beginning in Book 5. This is what I shall call the price of justice. Few readers have gotten through Socrates' discussion of the educational curriculum in Book 3 without becoming uneasy about certain aspects of it. That uneasiness stems in part from a sense of the sacrifices that must be made for justice. Confining ourselves to the passages just reviewed, those sacrifices include freedom of the arts, music, and poetry as well as the freedom of parents to educate their children as they wish.[3] Socrates argues in each case that justice requires these sacrifices, and it is a testament to his candor that these sacrifices are outlined with great clarity. But this candor is also an important part of Plato's intention in the dialogue.[4] Properly understood, the *Republic* is not just an investigation into the nature of justice but into the price that would have to be paid to achieve it. This is especially important to understanding the *Republic*'s teaching on gender equality. It leads us to the conclusion, I believe, that rather than being purely ironic Plato is as serious about gender equality as he is about any element of the perfectly just regime in the *Republic*. But we do not know yet how serious that is, for one of the lessons conveyed by the book as a whole is that justice, at least the justice attainable in politics, is itself only a qualified good, precisely on account of the sacrifices it requires. This lesson is conveyed by the pervasive consideration of the price of justice and by the resistance to Socrates' proposals exhibited by his interlocutors.

EQUALITY AND "FEMALE HUMAN NATURE"

It is ironic that the whole series of arguments in books 5, 6, and 7, including the argument on gender equality, is one that Socrates wanted to avoid. He hoped that the account of justice and the just city given through Book 4 would satisfy his interlocutors. But they have not forgotten an earlier remark of his that in the city the treatment of women and children will be governed by the principle that friends hold things in common (423e). At the beginning of Book 5, they press him to explain this apparently radical suggestion. Socrates resists their pleas, insisting that this will force him in effect to undertake the whole discussion as if from the beginning (450a). It is doubly surprising, therefore, that when he finally agrees to the task, he begins by taking on even more controversy than his companions have asked. They have questioned him about the community of women and children, but before addressing that issue Socrates launches into the difficult subject of gender equality. His motivation for introducing this subject is quite mysterious at the outset, for the community of women and children does not require gender equality.[5] The introduction of this subject surely comes as a complete surprise to the interlocutors. Even when Socrates returns to the community of women and children, in the second wave of argument in Book 5, he does not make clear the relation between the two waves or his reason for introducing gender equality in the first place. For the present, we may just note that the fact Socrates pursues the theme of gender equality unprovoked and unsolicited suggests he is serious about it, rather than simply ironic. Sexual equality is not necessary to the community of women as such, but it proves to be necessary to that community as Socrates conceives of it.

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[2] As we shall see, the relation of nature and justice turns out to be a complex and paradoxical one.

[3] Obviously, there are differences between our understanding of these goods and that of Plato's contemporaries. Nevertheless, there are enough similarities to make Plato's discussion highly relevant to reflections on justice today. As we shall see, Socrates' interlocutors—and Socrates himself—clearly see these things as sacrifices (e.g., 398a–b, 399e, 449d).

[4] I make no distinction in this article between the views of Socrates and those of Plato in the *Republic*. No incontestable basis for such a distinction has ever been found. I will simply treat Socrates as a creation of Plato in this dialogue.

It is not that the theme of sexual equality has received no preparation to this point in the *Republic*. To the contrary, Socrates has throughout the book been subtly leading his audience away from a narrowly male understanding of human excellence to an understanding that embraces humanity in a wider sense (Bloom 1968, 383–4, 441–2). From Book 1 onward, Socrates has emphatically spoken of "human virtue," not male virtue, when discussing the character of human excellence. If there is such a virtue, it would by definition be genderless (cf. *Meno* 71d–73a). Curiously enough, though, when the discussion of gender equality in Book 5 takes up this theme, it does not make use of the simple syllogism just described (especially 456d–e). Indeed, Socrates begins by speaking not of human virtue at all but of animals. Dogs, he notes, participate in the work of guarding flocks, regardless of gender; their different roles in reproduction do not disqualify one sex from the task of guarding (451d). Hence, Socrates concludes, both men and women in the perfectly just city will qualify as guardians. Furthermore, they will exercise in the nude together, no matter how ridiculous this looks to the eyes of current convention (452). After all, dogs of both sexes work perfectly well together, without benefit of clothing.

Socrates' interlocutors appear to go along with this, but the weakness of the argument from analogy is clear enough. Socrates himself, surprised perhaps by the lack of resistance, raises the obvious objection: Are not male and female different in their natures? And was it not laid down at the foundation of the city that people with different natures must perform distinct tasks (453b–c; cf. 370a–b)? Socrates pauses to underline the seriousness of this objection: This is precisely the kind of difficulty he was attempting to escape by passing over this whole section of the argument (453c–d).

Given this trepidation, the ease with which Socrates overcomes the problem he has raised can only be described as amazing. He begins by claiming that, while male and female obviously do differ, the difference is no more significant than that between bald and nonbald men (454c). But this analogy, if anything, is less conclusive than the one before it. Socrates therefore follows with a more substantial argument, one focusing on knowledge and the arts. He notes that a woman as well as a man may be skilled at medicine, and he asserts that male and female doctors share the same "nature" by virtue of their shared art.[6] He soon extends the same argument to music, gymnastic, war, and other arts. On the basis of this logic, Socrates now claims that "it is not at all hard" to overcome the objection based on the notion that male and female natures are distinct (455a).

It is this argument from knowledge and the arts, rather than the two analogies that precede it, which represents Socrates' serious argument for the equality of the sexes (Saxonhouse 1976, 199; Scaltsas 1992; Smith 1983, 472; Strauss 1977, 79). But it is neither so easy nor so conclusive as Socrates seems to present it here. Knowledge and the arts have been central to his investigation of justice from Book 1 onward (e.g., 332c ff.). The division of labor, which is the founding principle of his city's justice, rests on the notion that different natures are suited for different tasks. As interpreted by Socrates, this principle entails that a person's nature is defined by the art for which he is suited. But this means that nature and art or the capacity for art (i.e., reason or intellect) are essentially one (370a–b; cf. 455b–c). The argument for gender equality in Book 5 merely follows this principle, in the process bringing out some of its far-reaching consequences. Indeed, one of the purposes of the argument for gender equality in the *Republic* is to make the radical consequences of this understanding of nature explicit, in preparation for its ultimate expression in the nature of the philosopher. For now, we must take care to appreciate the implications of this premise as the foundation for gender equality. One of these is that gender is irrelevant to justice only to the extent that human nature can be reduced, or purified, to the rational or intellectual. The analogy to sheep-dogs was misleading, then, at least to this extent: The equality of genders in that species is not dependent on any art or knowledge, whereas Socrates' argument about the equality of the human genders depends decisively on the uniquely human trait of reason. We know that animal analogies are always dangerous, but this one also points ahead to the difficulties that will lie in separating art and rationality from the body, for it appears that human, as opposed to canine, equality will have to abstract rather ruthlessly from the body. It will also abstract from any nonrational parts of the soul.

This is far from the only place where the argument of the *Republic* depends upon forgetting the body (Pierce

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[5] Women could easily be held in common without being equal. They could be kept in a collective harem or breeding-stable for the male guardians (cf. Annas 1976, 308n; Jacobs 1978, 30; Pierce 1973, 10; Saxonhouse 1976, 201; Smith 1983, 471; Vlastos 1989, 289), which is almost what the phrase "community of women" implies, after all. Socrates does speak of the "possession of women" when he first introduces the concept (423e), but this is when he is trying to slip past his auditors without provoking a response. The actual institution as elaborated in Book 5 should strictly be called "community of spouses" rather than community of women only (Pomeroy 1975, 116; Vlastos 1989, 276).

[6] 454c–d. The language Socrates uses here should be noted, though it is difficult to render in English. Literally, he proposes that a male and a female who are "doctors in soul" or "with respect to soul" (τὴν ψυχήν) have the same nature.

1973, 5; Saxonhouse 1985, 38; Strauss 1977, 109, 115, 116–7, 138). The omission is especially instructive here because it shows us more clearly just what it means to abstract from the body. Many modern feminists have concluded that gender equality requires "overcoming biology"; abstracting from the body in the *Republic* can be seen as a similar exercise. There, the bodily or nonrational part of human nature, which is the locus of gender difference (and doubtless of much else), must be discounted or circumvented in order to establish equality of men and women. Both the modern and the ancient arguments raise two crucial questions: Where does the line between biology or the bodily and the rest of human nature lie, and how can the former be overcome in practice? This may require not just a separation of soul and body but of different parts of the soul. As raised by Socrates, the question becomes just how much must be excised from human beings in order to leave us with a nongendered nature, the nature that the male and female doctor share and that can be a basis for the type of equality he envisages.

Socrates is aware of the great difficulty of making this determination. The task involves nothing less than full knowledge of human nature, its parts, and the priority of those parts. Close attention to the way Socrates develops his argument at this juncture reveals a complex problem indeed. To begin with, we need to notice that he does not in his defense of sexual equality deny that there are differences between the sexes nor that these are natural. He refers at points to "female human nature" and "the nature of the female" (453a, 466d). He implicitly admits that this nature is as such different from male human nature (453a, c). His argument for sexual equality is therefore not that there are no differences between male and female nature but that, in comparison with nature interpreted as art or intellect, these differences are no more significant than that between bald and nonbald men.

It is in validating this position that one would have to sort out the parts or aspects of human nature, deciding which are significant and which are not, and indeed making sense of the notion that acknowledged elements of human nature may be discounted in this way. Abstraction from the body or "overcoming biology," properly understood, points to precisely this most daunting of philosophical tasks. Socrates alludes to this task, and to the difficulties that lie hidden in it, by making natural differences proliferate in this part of the *Republic* (cf. Benardete 1989, 116). If male and female doctors have the same nature on account of their art, a male doctor and a male carpenter will have different "natures" (454d; cf. 453e, 370a–b). Bald and nonbald are even described by Socrates as diverse "natures" here, as once again are male and female (454c; 453a). Each of us, it seems, is made up of a great variety of cross-cutting "natures." Yet, the upshot of this is that no simple appeal to "nature" can settle the argument about gender equality, or any other aspect of justice. Nature is too complex and ambiguous a thing.

This does not mean that nature properly understood is not at the heart of the matter for Socrates, or that the choice of what parts of nature are to be "privileged" is arbitrary. To the contrary, his position is clearly that, once we recognize the complexity of nature, our task becomes one of distinguishing its essential from its inessential aspects. Justice or human virtue will then require perfecting the former while suppressing any of the latter that may interfere. But since things can only be distinguished as essential or inessential with a view to some specific function or task, Socrates' argument points ultimately to the need for a reliable account of the true human function or avocation (cf. 456e, 353a–b). As Socrates describes it in this context, the task is to divide the forms or kinds in ways that are appropriate rather than inappropriate (454a). But this is nothing other than a description of the philosophic dialectic as Socrates understands it (cf. Findlay 1974, 178; Friedländer 1969, 104–5). Socrates thus indicates that nature's complexity, uncovered by the issue of gender equality, calls for philosophy as the proper way of approaching the questions with which it confronts us.

Philosophy and the philosophers will respond to this call in the third wave of argument in Book 5. In the interim, we have at least caught a glimpse of the daunting set of problems opened up by the issue of gender equality—the very problems, no doubt, Socrates foresaw when he attempted to avoid this section of the argument altogether. The first wave of argument raises but cannot definitively settle the question as to what human nature really is and which of its parts is essential or inessential. The *Republic* as a whole does not settle this question in any final way, but it does provide us with a set of very serious reflections on the matter, and it comes to at least a provisional understanding of the main issue.

The understanding of nature, and hence of true human virtue, at which the *Republic* ultimately arrives differs in some important respects from the one outlined in the early books and reflected, for example, in the well-known account of virtue in Book 4. Book 4 makes virtue out to be the proper ordering of the three parts of the soul—reason, anger or spiritedness, and desire—produced by the type of education described in Book 3. This account of human nature is widely associated with the *Republic* as a whole, though Socrates admits it is not entirely satisfactory even while propounding it (435d; cf. 443d; Guthrie 1978; Shorey 1978, 8–9). In Book 6 he makes the same point even more strongly (504b), and in Book 7 he becomes explicit: Next to the fully rational virtue that has been uncovered by the discussion of philosophy, the virtues outlined earlier can be seen as bodily in nature, mere products of habit (ἔθος, ἄσκησις, 518e; cf. 619c–d). Rather than being based on a fully formed and authoritative rationality, they were produced by the habituation or training of the nonrational parts of the soul. This kind of training contrasts with persuasion or knowledge, which is the root of true, rational virtue. "Habituation" is bodily, dealing with the parts of our nature that are immune to persuasion (Bruell 1994, 271). By contrast, Socrates says, rational virtue could be called "divine" (518e; cf. Guthrie 1978, 232–3), and in Book 9 a new image of the soul is proposed that reflects this perspective. The three parts of the soul are now portrayed as a human, a lion, and a many-headed beast, all within an exterior shell having a human appearance (588c–e). This image retains the basic tripartite structure of human nature, but unlike the earlier account of the soul, it suggests strong doubts as to whether its three parts really constitute a coherent whole. In his description, Socrates emphasizes that each part has its own separate form or "idea" (588c–d; cf. 434b, 435c). And of the three parts of the soul, this new account makes reason literally its only "human" part. It also makes much more palpable how it may become necessary to suppress some parts of our nature in order that others may flourish, those whose perfection constitutes true human virtue.

These arguments or suggestions, scattered throughout the second half of the *Republic*, are in some respects the progeny of the first wave of argument in Book 5. They represent new and more serious attempts, prompted partly by the questions that arose there, to think through the problem of human nature's different parts and the relation of those parts. The image in Book 9, in suggesting that reason is the only "human" part of man, suggests as well that the only true human virtue or perfection is rational perfection. Even if we were to resist this suggestion and regard the human being as the complex of things brought together in that image—the human, the lion, and the beast—the nonrational virtues still would have to be seen as virtues in only a secondary sense, mere habits imposed on the nonrational aspects of our nature (591b, c). The purely rational part of the soul and its virtue then may have to be described as superhuman or divine, an idiom Socrates employs more than once (589d, e, 590d). But if the highest virtue accessible to man is identical to the divine, if to perfect humanity ultimately means to transcend humanity and become divine, we would seem to be left with no human nature at all, strictly speaking, but only a divinely rational soul thrown together with beasts in a human shell (cf. *Phaedrus* 237d, 246b et seq.). To decide among these alternatives, we would need the knowledge alluded to already, knowledge of each of the parts of human nature, a grasp of the way they fit together, and a way of deciding whether some of these parts are not essential to our humanity. It is not clear that we have such knowledge at our disposal.

In Book 10, Socrates makes his clearest declaration of uncertainty about the human soul, but it is coupled with a firm suggestion as to how he thinks it most likely to be constituted. The soul as we know it in this life, he says, is too burdened with accretions associated with the body to allow its true nature to be easily recognized (611b–d). In particular, it is difficult to know whether its nature consists of many forms or of one (612a; cf. *Phaedrus* 230, 270d–271a). Nevertheless it is likely, he speculates, that in itself the soul is simple and homogeneous rather than differentiated (611b) and that its true nature is rational (611e). If any part of the soul is immortal, he says, then it is likely to be only this quasi-divine, rational part (611b–e; cf. *Phaedo* 80b–82b; *Timaeus* 69c–70a; Grube 1980, 139; Guthrie 1978, 233–4; cf. Aristotle *Nicomachaen Ethics* 1177b30–1178a25). The soul as we know it is likely similar to Glaucus, a god whose true appearance was disfigured almost beyond recognition by being worn down in some places and overgrown in others, due to submersion in the sea (611d). If this analogy holds, then the "bodily" parts of the human soul are only disfigurements it has received by its association with the body.

This is the end of the line of speculation opened up by Socrates' reluctant foray into the subject of women and equality in Book 5 of the *Republic*. We may seem to have strayed far from the subject of gender equality, but our trajectory has been faithful to Socrates' argument for equality, which rested on the essentially rational view of human nature. And it bears repeating that Socrates chose to put the equality of women at the beginning-point of the trajectory. The progression of the three waves of argument in books 5 and following, beginning with sexual equality and culminating in philosophy, is a movement away from the body or the bodily and toward purely rational nature. This progression indicates that the gendered parts of nature are the first, or perhaps the most emblematic, parts that must drop away in the course of this movement. The progression is far from easy, and gender is not, of course, the only thing that drops away. The dependence of Socrates' argument on a specific view of nature is confirmed by his scorn for the sexual equality found in democracy (563b). Democratic equality, including the democratic equality of the sexes, is based on anything but rational excellence, and it is a leveling rather than a distributive equality (558c).

The whole of this discussion amply bears out Socrates' warning at the beginning of Book 5 that the arguments upon which he and his interlocutors are about to embark not only are difficult but also admit of many doubts (450c). Though the argument of the *Republic* is built on the rational view of human nature, taken as a postulate or hypothesis, the book as a whole does not dogmatize on this question. The possibility of building on an alternate hypothesis, and the implications of this for gender equality in particular, is demonstrated by Plato's other great political construct, the *Laws*.

THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN THE *LAWS*

The *Laws* is Plato's description of a city not as perfect as that of the *Republic* but more practicable. This difference of intent, rather than any fundamental change in Plato's own thinking, dictates the different arrangements regarding women in the *Laws* (Okin 1977, 346, 368–9). The *Laws* retains private families, an arrangement of acknowledged inferiority (*Laws* 739c–e, 807b). Women are not given the same roles as men, and certainly no explicit argument is made for their equality. To the contrary, the only explicit statements on the subject in the *Laws* make women out to be different from men and inferior to them (e.g., 781b, 802e, 917a).

Women are treated more equally in the city of the *Laws* than they were in any of the actual communities of Plato's day (cf. 805d–806c). They are made more a part of public life than they were in those communities. But the Athenian stranger who directs the discussion of the *Laws* argues that a primary obstacle to giving women this public role will be the resistance of the women themselves (781c; cf. 834d). He seems to trace this resistance to a "natural" secretiveness and cunning that he detects in women (781a). These certainly sound like the kinds of traits that might be stereotypically associated with women. But are they truly natural? In the same breath, the Athenian stranger makes them secondary effects of another female trait, weakness (τὸ ἀσθενές, 781a). Relative weakness compared to men was one difference Socrates was willing to admit in women in the *Republic* (ἀσθενέστερον, 455e; see also 456a, 457a), but he refused to admit that it had any serious consequences for the equality of the sexes. Indeed, he used women's relative weakness in all activities paradoxically to bolster his argument for equality: It proves there are no distinctly female talents or arts (455d–e; Benardete 1989, 116; Pierce 1973, 2–3; Tovey and Tovey 1974, 596; cf. Averroes 1974, 57). In the *Laws*, women's weakness is said to lead to their natural secretiveness (thus suggesting, in accord with the *Republic*, that "weakness" is the root of the distinctively female traits), secretiveness that makes it at once imperative to transform women into public beings and difficult to do so. The solution of the *Laws* is to draw women out into public, though not nearly so far as in the *Republic*. Through it all, the natural status of the distinctive female traits remains obscure. At the conclusion of this section of his argument, the Athenian stranger says simply that women will resist publicity because they have been "habituated" to life indoors (εἰθισμένον, 781c).

Ambiguity over whether "female nature" is truly natural or is the product of culture or habituation pervades the argument of the *Laws*. One of the work's strongest assertions of natural difference between men and women is in the middle of an extensive discussion of education straddling books 7 and 8, a discussion which also contains significant statements to a contrary effect. At issue in these contexts is whether boys and girls should share the same education. According to the *Laws*, they will do so until age six—including common dances in the nude, to the extent that shame allows (772a). This institution is reminiscent of the *Republic*'s nude exercises, except for the important and open-ended concession to "shame" and the age limitation. Special difficulties arise after that age. On the one hand, the Athenian stranger says that males and females should be taught different songs because of the way the genders differ in nature, even going so far as to mention the virtues that are distinctive to each gender (802e). But this compartmentalization is artificial at least to the extent that the "female" virtues listed here—order and moderation—are obviously to be cultivated by the men as well. The converse can be said about the "male" virtues, though to a lesser extent.[7] And a later passage on education reveals a less confident attitude toward nature and gender altogether. On the other hand, the Athenian stranger has the young men of his city participate in martial contests on horseback and would like the girls to do the same. But he fears the young women will resist, unless perhaps their "nature" accepts it on account of a "habitual disposition" (ἔθος) produced by parts of their earlier education (834d). This passage echoes the earlier statement on female resistance to entering public life, along with its deep ambiguity about female nature. Both passages portray a distinctly enigmatic relationship between nature, on the one hand, and habit or social conditioning on the other. Habit seems to be capable of molding natural predisposition, perhaps even of forming the traits we know as "nature" themselves. It seems that what we call "nature" is partly at least a product of education, conditioning, or habituation. The precise line between habit and nature, however, and thus the true extent of habit's power, remains somewhat mysterious in the *Laws*.

The discussion of female nature in the *Laws*, far from revealing a dogmatic view of gender differences, leaves us uncertain as to the status of nature in general. Its portrayal of gender and nature is actually much closer to that of the *Republic* than is often recognized (cf. Guthrie 1978, 239–40). One of the clearest signs of this is a passage in the *Laws* devoted to ambidexterity, a topic introduced as an analogue to the problem of gender and nature (794d). The Athenian stranger advocates ambidexterity, asserting that right-handedness is the product of habituation, not of nature. This habituation, moreover, is "mindless" because it needlessly wastes some of our natural capacity (794d–795a). His argument is filled with references to "nature," all of them intended to show that developing the skills of only one hand is a betrayal of nature. In the context, the praise of ambidexterity is clearly meant to impugn the "mindlessness" of an education that is segregated by gender and thus wastes natural talents (Okin 1979, 61; Pangle 1980, 480–1). But after thus preparing the way for an egalitarian argument, perhaps along the lines of the *Republic*, the Athenian stranger pulls back. The argument is never made, because the conventionality of his interlocutors—and the limitations of the second-best regime—prevent it from being acted on (cf. Okin 1979, 63; Pangle 1980, 481). It is also more than possible that the Athenian stranger does not wish to address forthrightly the question whether ambidexterity and its analogue are perfections or disfigurements of nature. His discussion has already revealed the immense difficulties of this issue.

The discussion of ambidexterity, abortive as it is, still gives us insight into the character of the *Laws* and indirectly into the argument of the *Republic*. Concern-the *Laws*, it suggests that the dialogue, in conceding to convention and habit in the matter of gender, concedes to "mindlessness." This would be one of the important measures of the inferiority of the *Laws* in comparison with the *Republic*, where this concession is not made. But precisely in making the concession, the *Laws* demonstrates the great power of the forces to which it bows. Moreover, the way the Athenian stranger deals with the conventions and habits he is compelled to admit in the city suggests that these have a certain predisposition or bent of their own—that, once allowed to develop, the habits will develop in a single direction, the direction of the familiar or conventional gender roles. Thus, the Athenian stranger speaks of humoring habit in the women of his city, or of resisting it, but never of giving it a fundamentally new direction. "Habit," it seems, has a nature, or a natural tendency, of its own. The same conclusion is suggested by the *Republic*, where the decline of the perfectly just regime follows a predictable path once its rational virtue is lost. Women, moreover, play a key role in the initial stage of that decline (549c–d). It may be that "habit" has a greater potential hold over female than male nature.

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[7] The male virtues identified here, magnificence and courage, seem to be cultivated in both genders, at least to a much greater extent than was common in Plato's day. A particular effort seems to be made to produce courage in the women of the *Laws*, even against Greek cultural norms (the Greek word for courage, ἀνδρεία, literally means "manliness"). In one striking passage, the Athenian stranger states that his city will make a good "man" (ἀνήρ, 770d) out of each of its citizens, women included (see Pangle 1980, 465, 482–3). In the same place, though, he describes a "good man" as one possessing the virtue appropriate to a "human being" (ἄνθρωπος, 770d1).

The "natural" tendencies of habit seem to be rooted in the association of habit and the body or the bodily parts of human nature (including nonrational parts of the soul). The treatment of habit and nature in both the *Laws* and the *Republic* point to this association. The *Republic* ultimately depicts nonphilosophic virtue (including the virtue depicted in Book 4) as little more than a taming of the nonrational parts of nature by habituation (*Republic* 518e, 591b, c). For all those citizens of the *Republic* who are not philosophers, the burden borne by this habituation becomes great indeed, as ever larger portions of human nature need to be brought under control in the first two waves of argument in Book 5.[8] The *Laws* resigns itself to the expression of many of these traits, but its ambivalence as to whether they are more properly understood as "nature" or "habit" is more reminiscent of the outlook of the *Republic*. The two dialogues taken together seem to suggest something like the following explanation of this ambivalence. From the viewpoint of rational nature, nonrational nature appears as simply a realm of habit. If nonrational nature submits to the dictates of rational nature, as happens most extensively in the *Republic*, then it is tamed by habituation. But if it is allowed to follow its innate inclination, then this is mere habit as well, or will appear so to rational nature. This accounts for the idiom of the *Laws*. Thus, in dealing with the nonrational parts of human nature, the choice is not so much between nature and habit as between rational habit and "mindless" habit, the latter being habit that results from nonrational nature taking its course. To call them both habit is simply to imply that the parts of human nature with which they deal are its nonessential parts, to express an ambivalence about whether they should be dignified with the title "nature."

This does not, of course, minimize the difficulty faced by anyone who would overcome those habits that represent an assertion of nonrational nature, particularly in the matter of gender. Given the link between habit and the body, overcoming habit could be assimilated to "overcoming biology," which can only be done by circumventing, suppressing, or otherwise abstracting from the body and the bodily. The *Laws*, unlike the *Republic*, does not take this path. Yet, its more conventional treatment of women does not stem from a fundamentally different conviction as to female nature. Neither the *Laws* nor the *Republic* is built on the presumption that the female traits perceived by convention are simply "natural"; nor does either assert they have absolutely no basis in nature. Just as the *Laws* acknowledges that the predispositions of nonrational nature can be viewed as mere habits, so the *Republic* acknowledges that the nonrational elements of humanity are indeed parts of our "nature." Neither work rests on a dogmatic view of nature and gender. In effect, Plato leaves unresolved the question of "essentialism" that has agitated contemporary feminist writing. The question whether there is an essential female nature that is inseparable from the female human being is seen by Plato as one of the deepest and most perplexing of human problems. It is a part of the larger problem of the parts of human nature and of whether its bodily parts are essential or nonessential to human beings in general. Plato's analysis, spread across the *Republic* and the *Laws* (and, of course, the other dialogues), is an attempt to comprehend this problem in all its complexity.

The *Republic* and the *Laws* show us two ways this problem can be resolved in the matter of gender. The *Republic* works from the highest, rational view of human nature. This gives us a nongendered humanity, but its realization requires the taming if not the suppression of nonrational nature. In the *Laws*, the decision is made to concede more to the nonrational parts of nature—or (to state the same point somewhat differently) to honor other aspects of humanity. It is Plato's argument that the place of women in society will be decisively affected by which of these two views of nature is chosen.

The *Laws* takes a broader view of nature than the *Republic*, but in embracing nature's nonrational parts, the *Laws* also embraces gender difference. There is no question that, for Plato, the approach of the *Laws* is inferior to that of the *Republic*. But that is not simply the end of the story. At the beginning of Book 5 of the *Republic*, Socrates expresses frank doubts regarding the measures he is about to advocate. It may be doubted not only whether these things are possible, he warns, but also even whether they are best (450c). This doubt is echoed in provocative fashion at the conclusion of the argument about female nature. There, Socrates claims he has established that gender equality is according to nature, but he implies that this still leaves open the question whether it is "best" (456b–c). Remarkably, nature provides only a dubious standard for the good. The reason would seem to be the ambiguity and uncertainty of human nature itself. Human nature in its most authentic sense may be the wholly rational nature of the *Republic*, but we have seen enough of the difficulties surrounding the question of human nature to recognize that claims on behalf of other elements of human nature have legitimate reason to be heard. These might, indeed, prevent gender equality, despite its agreement with true human nature, from being unambiguously "best." When Socrates turns, briefly, to argue that it is indeed best, he does so on the basis of the simple claim that it produces the best women and men at the upper levels of the city; the men and women who undergo the guardians' education will necessarily be the best men and women, which in turn is best for the city (456e). But though the women in the ideal city may be the best of women, they will not be the best women (Benardete 1989, 116). As Socrates says, his education will "produce" neither men nor women for the city (456c). Within the limits of the possible, the women of the ideal city are prevented from becoming gendered beings at all (457a; Barker 1961, 259; Tovey and Tovey 1974, 600). The same must be said of the men.[9]

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[8] It is not actually clear whether all classes of the city participate in the institutions outlined in Book 5 (see Barker 1961, 245, 278; Strauss 1977, 113–4). If nonphilosophers are exempt from them, their habituation will be limited to the education and the virtues of books 3 and 4, an arduous enough training in itself.

It has been argued by more than one commentator that Plato's advocacy of the equality of women is not motivated by a concern for the just treatment of women but by social benefit. This is unnecessarily harsh; after all, the argument for equality is a part of the *Republic*'s overall treatment of justice (Spelman 1988, 20). But it is true that the rational view of human nature on which the argument for equality is based is chosen not primarily for its effect on the position of women but for its harmony with the view that philosophy, the perfection of the rational faculty, is simply the true human perfection. The argument for the equality of women in the *Republic* is an opening wedge for that theme. In itself, the defense of equality is similar to the Socratic dictum that "to know the good is to do the good." Though this proposition is supported by a wholly rational view of human nature—once reason grasps the good, there will be no effectual resistance from any other part of human nature to doing it—it is nevertheless a paradox, because the complexity of human nature prevents it from being always true in practice. It is a puzzle rather than a "doctrine," an occasion for the contemplation of its own limitations and of the ambiguities of human nature that impose those limitations.[10] Gender equa in the *Republic* presents the same kind of puzzle.

WOMEN AND THE FAMILY

In the *Laws*, the Athenian stranger declares that a city which practices communism of women and children and makes public what is by nature private would have to be a city inhabited by gods or the children of gods (739c–e). The *Republic* is that city, based on a radical purification of human nature that brings it in proximity to the divine. Whether this is best for a city of human beings is a question raised by the *Republic* itself.

The first wave of argument in Book 5 of the *Republic*, concerning the equality of women, is a milestone in the process of purification. The second wave, following immediately upon the first, dissolves the family and in effect abolishes private life altogether for the guardians of the perfect city. The outlines of Socrates' proposal are familiar enough. "Marriages" in the perfectly just city will in reality be only temporary couplings arranged by the rulers according to the principles of a breeding-farm and carried out under cover of a "divine lottery" (459a–460b). The offspring of these "sacred marriages" (458e) will be taken from their mother at birth and reared in such a way that neither mother nor child will ever learn their natural connection. In this way, the city's children will regard all adults as their parents, and adults will look on all the children as their own. Throughout, the aim is to replace the family as the center of citizens' attachment with the community as a whole. We recall that this entire discussion originated in Socrates' invocation of the proverb that friends must have all things in common (423e).

Socrates' argument is that the abolition of the family is a necessary part of the perfect city because the family, with its private attachments and preferences, is unjust. It became tolerably clear in the discussion of education in Book 3 that the family is an obstacle to equal education and equal opportunity for all.[11] In the second wave of Book 5, much of Socrates' argument is devoted to showing how the abolition of the family results in a unified and seamless community. His postulate, a compelling one on the face of it, is that the perfectly just community would be bound together by the greatest solidarity among its citizens, the greatest degree of concern of each for the others, and thus the greatest dedication to the community as a whole. But more than the destruction of the family is required to bring about this good, for to leave it at saying that Socrates destroys the family in this section of Book 5 is to give an insufficient idea of the radical nature of his proposal. Clearly, children and parents must be separated to prevent private attachments from forming. But such attachments among adults also must be forestalled, a fact that has received relatively less attention from interpreters. This is in many ways a more difficult task than the other, for it puts the city directly at odds with human eroticism, a force that is both broader and more clearly natural than the family.

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[9] This point is made by Elshtain (1981, 37), though she points out that the sacrifice may be seen as more severe for the women than for the men, primarily because the public life of the guardians is farther from the life traditionally allotted to women than to men. Warfare, for example, a traditionally male occupation, must of necessity be part of the guardians' skill (cf. Saxonhouse 1985, 44–5). To the extent that the traditional life for men and women is grounded in the natural predisposition of each, as the *Laws* implies, this suggests that women must travel a greater distance than men to arrive at the nongendered life of the citizens of the *Republic*.

[10] Socrates never states the principle "to know the good is to do the good" in so many words in Plato's works, though historically he was famous for maintaining it. The Platonic Socrates makes many arguments that presuppose "virtue is knowledge"—and many that call it into question. For a more extensive discussion of Plato's consistent treatment of this as a paradox, see Shorey 1968, esp. 9–11, and 1978, 10, 13 (also cf. Brumbaugh 1989, 36–7).

[11] This argument has been rediscovered by some contemporary social theorists, though none has considered it worthwhile to explore the implications of the fact that families are unjust in this respect. See Fuchs 1983, 45; Rawls 1971, 74. Although there are significant differences between our understanding of equality and that of Plato, justice as "equality of opportunity," entitling one to occupy the place in a "meritocracy" for which one's talents qualify one, is a strong common thread. It is on this thread that my discussion relies.

The need to forestall every kind of particular erotic attachment is the only thing that can explain the amazing sweep of Socrates' regulation of sexual behavior in this part of the *Republic*. His regulation is directed not only against the family but also against those erotic attachments that form prior to the family and are ordinarily the natural foundation of the family. The "sacred marriages" Socrates mandates must be short-lived precisely to prevent the reproductive necessity of coupling from leading to private emotional attachments between the two prospective parents. For the same reason, these couplings must be continuously rearranged by the rulers. Everything connected with the reproductive function in the city is deliberately treated as would an animal breeder, with an eye to eugenics. Socrates' awareness of the problematic nature of this arrangement is sufficiently shown by the "throng of lies" (459c) that he says must accompany its institution among even the guardians, the best-educated and most thoroughly conditioned group in the city (459e). Indeed, the politicization of *eros* and reproduction that Socrates carries out here is no less distasteful to ordinary sensibilities than his abolition of the family, as the reactions of Socrates' interlocutors to his proposals demonstrate.[12]

What makes it problematic is not simply the difficulty of forcing eroticism to run in channels dictated only by eugenics, but the disfigurement this requires of *eros* itself. For, in addition to channeling reproductive desire, this arrangement suppresses completely another aspect of *eros*, the aspect expressed in particular attractions and attachments. From the ordinary point of view, this might well be regarded as the distinctively *human* side of *eros*, the aspect that elevates it above purely physical sexuality.[13] It is this side that makes marriage and the family more than just a sexual combine. Socrates' implicit argument is, however, that from the point of view of community it is precisely this side of *eros* which is unjust (Lange 1979, 9–11). The city cannot get along without reproduction, but the particular or private attachments that grow naturally from this function must be banished. Once this logic is accepted, and sexual *eros* is stripped of its tendency to form particular attachments, there is no reason its remaining aspects should not be handled according to the principles of a breeding-farm. The remaining aspects are purely physical, devoid of the human content that would normally be violated by this kind of treatment.[14]

These measures are made necessary according to Socrates by justice understood as communal concord and unity. But they are also required for at least one other reason of great interest to us, namely, the equality of women. The exact relationship between the equality of women and the abolition of the family, the first two waves of argument in Book 5 of the *Republic*, has been the subject of a lively and long-standing debate. Some interpreters maintain that the second wave necessitates the first, others that causation operates in the opposite direction. Still others see the two as mutually conditioning.[15] Valid arguments can be made for all these interpretations, but from the point of view of our theme, I would suggest that the second wave must be seen as a necessary consequence of the first, necessary because required for its implementation. The notion that the equality of women may require destroying the family as we know it hardly seems novel today; but, once again, in the second wave of argument Socrates goes considerably beyond dissolving the family. Indeed, the trenchancy of the second wave is fully appreciated only if we apply its radical thinking to the project of bringing about sexual equality as we see it taking shape today.

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[12] There is disagreement among interpreters as to whether Plato's proposal to abolish the family and its private attachments is intended to be as shocking as it seems to us. Some have argued that the emotional center of life in ancient Athens, at least for men, was not the family in any case, so its abolition would not be considered to be so great a loss as it seems today (Barker 1961, 253; Brown 1988, 607; Okin 1979, 34–6). But the alarm shown by Socrates' interlocutors over the proposed elimination of marriage and the family belies this argument. Socrates' inobtrusive remark in Book 4 about holding women in common (423e) so riveted Polemarchus that he waited patiently for Socrates to explain himself, then forced the discussion in Book 5 when it became clear that Socrates was avoiding the issue.

[13] It must be noted that in Socrates' view the highest form of *eros* is not particularistic—and not connected directly with sex or reproduction. His strict purging of eroticism is in part a preparation for the advent of this higher form of *eros*, in the life of philosophy. This is why I confine myself here to speaking of the "ordinary" perspective. We should note that the extremely austere treatment of *eros* found in the *Republic* is not matched in other Platonic dialogues. Dialogues like the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium* take a much more positive, not to say permissive, view of *eros*. This is largely due to the themes of these dialogues, especially their exploration of the relation between *eros* and philosophy. Something of the same attitude can be detected in Socrates' discussion of the philosopher-kings in the *Republic* (e.g., 475b–c, 485b, 490b; see also Averroes 1974, 60). But the overall tone of the dialogue is contrary to this. The tone of the *Republic* is dictated by the requirements of political justice, as explained in the text. Erotic austerity must be reckoned as part of the price of this justice in the dialogue.

[14] This may help account for the bizarre fact that after controlling his guardians' sexual behavior so strictly during their reproductive years, Socrates allows them unrestricted promiscuity thereafter (461b–c). He also uses erotic attraction as an occasional incentive in the regime (468b–c). Perhaps once sexuality has been completely tamed it will no longer pose a threat to the regime (cf. Saxonhouse 1976, 200–1). These features of Socrates' proposal nonetheless come as a surprise, to say the least.

[15] Okin (1977, 349, 356–7, 359–60, 362; 1979, 31, 38, 42) argues that the second wave necessitates the first; Jacobs (1978) contends the causation works in the opposite direction. Strauss (1977, 116; see also Bluestone 1987, 106) calls the dissolution of the family a "consequence or presupposition" of the equality of the sexes. Other statements relevant to this issue include Barker 1961, 252; Rosenthal 1973, 36; Smith 1983, 471; and Vlastos 1989, 289.

Socrates' argument for the equality of the sexes has two major premises. The first is that both genders share certain rational capacities or virtues. The second is that these are the essential human capacities, and that next to them other parts or aspects of human nature are insignificant. Justice then requires that the latter be suppressed or subordinated, however legitimate their claims otherwise may be. On these grounds Socrates is able to argue that there is a single, genderless human virtue, and justice requires that it be developed and made use of wherever it is found. The first wave of argument makes it clear enough that this depends on neglecting the body, if not certain parts of the soul. One of the things the second wave does is show precisely what it means *in practice* to "abstract from the body" in this way. It does not mean literally ignoring the body, since certain physical necessities, including those of reproduction, are inescapable (e.g., 464d; cf. Bloom 1968, 382; Okin 1979, 40; Pierce 1973, 5). Rather, it means restricting, regulating, and controlling these as much as possible and, in the end, suppressing many things that are ordinarily, and not wholly without justification, regarded as legitimate parts of human life. This is done in the name of liberating, of doing justice to, the more essential or higher-ranking parts of human nature, whose expression otherwise would be inhibited.

This train of thought provides a key to the logic connecting equality of gender and the abolition of the family and of erotic attachments generally. Whatever we may say in defense of the family, or of the private erotic attachments that spring up between men and women, they are rooted in those aspects of our nature which are distinctively male or female, aspects that are not rational and that *distinguish* the genders.[16] These are precisely the aspects of nature that must be abstracted if the common, rational human nature is to exhibit itself fully. In this way, the progression from the first wave to the second suggests that the family must be done away with not only because it detracts from citizens' devotion to the common good but also because it is based irredeemably on those parts of human nature that prevent the expression of rational perfection. As such, it inevitably serves to nurture and perpetuate these. The same is true of erotic relations between the sexes that go beyond the purely physical. Physical differences are unavoidable and necessary for reproductive purposes; but relationships that invoke any other aspects of "female human nature," and its male counterpart, perpetuate difference. In the language of contemporary feminism, they are gendered relationships, entered into by gendered beings, on account of their gender differences. It is worth emphasizing that the problem with these relationships is not merely that they foster invidious *perceptions* of gender difference; they allow such differences to develop at all, which does not happen in Socrates' scheme. If we wish to cultivate this side of our nature, we may do so, but it will take us down a path closer to the *Laws* than to the *Republic*.

Once the matter is seen in this light, we can understand how far-reaching are the implications of Socrates' arguments in the *Republic*. Attempts to create gender equality in today's society often focus on hierarchical relationships in which authority is abused for sexual favors. But this does not get at the root of the problem. Socrates' argument is that, entirely apart from any relations of subordination or domination which may characterize families or erotic relationships in specific cultural settings, the mere fact that these relationships are predicated on gender, on what is distinct rather than what is shared in human nature, is enough to ensure that equality, rooted in rational nature, will be frustrated by them. The family, and particularistic eroticism generally, cannot be made just by a mere reform of their structure or cultural surroundings; they must be abolished entirely.

Socrates' proposal to do just that, viewed as a statement of the preconditions for gender equality, may at first seem both arbitrary and extreme. That impression is softened by looking at some of the practical problems that have actually beset attempts to institute gender equality in contemporary society. Where such attempts have been vigorously pursued, even in such limited venues as the university or other places of work, efforts to create equality between the sexes have shown a tendency to resolve themselves into efforts to ban sexuality outright. The reason is that, in practice, sexuality per se is at odds with equal treatment. So long as people *have* sexual identities, this will unavoidably color their perceptions of and reactions to one another in ways large and small. The effect will be to prevent their being treated solely in accordance with their capacities or talents as human beings. Socrates at least would not find it surprising that professional codes of conduct whose goal is equal treatment of the sexes have come closer and closer to mandating in effect that workers, or soldiers, or university personnel, shall be asexual, nongendered beings.[17]

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[16] This obviously does not apply to homosexual love, though Greek homosexuality typically was based on sexual differentiation between the lover (a mature man) and the beloved (a boy). In Plato's ideal city, homosexual love would be subject to at least as strict a regimen as heterosexual love, inasmuch as it is based on the sexual aspect of human nature, can lead to particular attachments, and is not necessary for reproduction. It is used as an occasional incentive for the regime (468b–c), a paradox discussed above in footnote 14. The homosexual love that Plato praises in some contexts is *eros* divorced from its carnal elements. Its ordinary form is just as reliant on the bodily parts of human nature as is the heterosexual eros discussed in the text.

[17] This has become a continuously percolating controversy in American life and politics. A rehearsal of some of the arguments for a nongendered environment in the university, citing, for example, campus codes of conduct that ban even consensual sexual relationships, can be found in Roth 1994. See also Mooney 1993; Hitt and Abelard 1993; Iannone 1993; Gilligan 1993, xv; Klatt 1995. A brief review of research on the way university students' reactions to faculty members are colored by their awareness of gender is found in Basow 1995. Yet, how can students look at a faculty member and take no cognizance of that person's gender? Merely reforming university rules will never fully achieve this goal. Even those who deny in principle that equal treatment requires going as far as Socrates' argument suggests have sometimes found to their surprise that this is exactly where the logic of their actions leads. One poignant account is given in Gallop 1994. An interesting discussion in the context of the medical profession was recently carried in the *New England*

Yet, as reformers have learned, effectively segregating people's sexual and nonsexual sides is difficult at best. Efforts to banish sexuality from such limited arenas as workplaces are made difficult if not impossible by the fact that none is sufficiently insulated from society at large to make the ban fully effective. Perceptions and attitudes learned elsewhere show a strong tendency to color behavior in these venues as well. What, then, could make such bans effective? This is one of the questions that the second wave of argument in Book 5 helps clarify. Its focus is precisely on the segregation of the gendered and the rational parts of human nature, and the suggestion it makes is that full equality of men and women cannot be achieved so long as the gendered part of human nature is allowed to develop or express itself at all. So long as sexuality retains a significant presence anywhere in our lives, its effects will be felt in all social institutions. Eroticism cannot simply be left behind as one crosses the threshold of one's place of work. If sexuality is a source of injustice, only its virtual eradication will allow justice to be done to the shared forms of human excellence.

Some modern feminists have come to similar conclusions. Plato's elaboration of the argument nevertheless needs to be pondered for what it can contribute to the contemporary debate. The *Republic* supports the view that sexual equality requires a nongendered society but challenges us with the philosophical undergirding it gives that argument, and with its vision of what exactly would have to be done to create such a society. Clearly, the society would have to "abstract from gender," but what does this mean? Many modern feminists speak of separating the biological from the social or conventional—"sex" from "gender"—and achieving equality by accepting the one and rejecting or radically reforming the other. Socrates' project may also be described in these terms, but unlike most who rely on this distinction, he argues that in order to achieve the desired result, sexuality must be stripped to the purely physical level and all other aspects of gender suppressed, for the sake of rational nature. His argument, again unlike many contemporary arguments, is not based on the view that "gender" is a pure social construct. Rather, it has a nature, which unfortunately conflicts with other and more important parts of human nature. This is one reason the process of abstracting from gender would have to be so ruthless. It is only Socrates' view of the hierarchy of the parts of human nature that justifies this ruthlessness, suppressing the lower in the name of the higher. His proposals are undoubtedly extreme, but again, the more we reflect on our practical experience with the problem of sexual inequality today, the more Socrates' argument looks prescient, rather than mad or overwrought (cf. Bluestone 1987, 47, 166). The question remains, however, whether Plato seriously intends us to carry out this scheme and to what extent it can or should inform our action today.

THE PRICE OF JUSTICE

One hallmark of Socrates' argument about sexuality and the family is its unmitigated radicalism. Throughout, he insists that justice be fully and completely realized, without compromise or qualification of any kind. Thus, gender as we know it must be eliminated from every aspect of life, because its presence anywhere in society will detract from justice as equality. Yet, we need to recognize that in pursuing his argument so uncompromisingly, Socrates is only following the procedure he has followed from the beginning of the dialogue. Extremism in the pursuit of justice is characteristic of the *Republic* as a whole, a fact that plays an important role in the overall teaching of the work. The *Republic* is a kind of thought experiment, designed to explore the nature of justice by constructing a perfectly just city in speech. This much is obvious, but it is not always recognized how the rules of this kind of intellectual inquiry shape the work's argument. Since it is an exercise in speech, designed to uncover justice so far as possible in its pure or ideal form, everything that detracts from that object may and must be eliminated to the extent possible. The very nature of the investigation precludes compromise (cf. Nettleship 1951, 169, 171). Thus, Plato's banishment of every source of disharmony from his ideal city is not the manifestation of a "paranoid" fear that the slightest breach of public discipline will result in chaos (Barker 1961, 272; cf. Elshtain 1981, 35) but the logical consequence of the type of intellectual exercise the *Republic* represents. In that exercise, every other good must be subordinated to justice in order to uncover justice's true nature—and to explore the consequences of pursuing justice so single-mindedly. As a result, the *Republic* is an inquiry into not only the nature of justice, but also the price that would have to be paid in order to realize justice perfectly (Randall 1970, 166; Saxonhouse 1992, 234).

This side of the *Republic*'s argument is visible well before sexual equality becomes the theme in Book 5. It is evident, as I have noted, in Socrates' discussion of education in Book 3, when he and his interlocutors censor the music, art, and poetry that will be allowed in their city. The freedom of artistic creation from political control may have been valued on different grounds in Socrates' day than in ours, but the proposals of Book 3 contravene both understandings. In fact, to the extent that the Homeric epics, and poetry in general, were believed to proceed from divine inspiration, the proposals may have shocked the ancient Athenians more. Socrates is not a philistine who runs roughshod over art that he regards as "subversive," being incapable of appreciating it himself. To the contrary, he draws attention to the magnitude of the sacrifice he is asking us to make. We are told that this city in effect has expelled a poetry that is "sacred, wonderful, and pleasing" in favor of one that is much more "austere" (398a–b; cf. 607c). But Socrates and his fellow legisla-

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Journal of Medicine (Phillips 1994, Phillips and Schneider 1993, Shurin 1994, Van Sande 1994). A discussion of the implications for U.S. military codes of conduct is found in Firestone and Harris 1994. The series of sexual scandals that rocked the U.S. armed forces in 1996 and 1997 has brought the issue forcibly to the fore once again.

tors have no choice: The creation of the maximum degree of justice within the souls of the citizens, the achievement of communal concord, and the realization of equal opportunity for individuals on the strict basis of natural talent all require a perfectly tailored and uniformly administered curriculum. Justice in all these senses—political justice—requires the absolute subordination of artistic beauty (and eventually, as we know, of the family and of human eroticism as well) to considerations of "benefit" for the city (398b; cf. 457b).

In all these instances, Socrates is remarkably frank about the sacrifices to be made in the name of justice. This is why the price of justice has to be counted among the chief themes of the *Republic*, considered as a political dialogue.[18] For each of the major features of the perfectly just city, the *Republic* presents us with a remarkably detailed balance-sheet of gains in justice set against sacrifices of other human goods necessary to make these gains possible. As a result, one of the most important lessons we learn from the *Republic* is that not all the things ordinarily regarded as goods are compatible with one another, that justice in particular does not come free. It is in pursuing this theme above all that the *Republic* becomes a book of supremely practical reflections, showing us not only the outlines of justice but also the sources of resistance to the establishment of a truly just community (cf. Bruell 1994, 273–4). Considered as a blueprint for an actual political order, its practicality is minimal at best. Socrates concedes that his ideal can be realized only under the rarest of circumstances, if at all (472c–473b; 592a–b). But what effect is the *Republic* calculated to have upon readers living under ordinary circumstances? This can best be gauged perhaps by considering what effect the dialogue will have on Socrates' interlocutors, who in this respect can be considered stand-ins for the intelligent but nonphilosophic readership of the *Republic* (cf. Bruell 1994, 268). We may ask ourselves what practical lessons they are likely to draw from Socrates' outline of the perfectly just community.

Socrates' interlocutors apparently are persuaded that this is indeed the perfectly just city and, therefore, that justice requires the sacrifices he has outlined. But as many commentators have remarked, most of them, like the vast majority of readers of the *Republic*, will not find this community an attractive place in which to live (Bluestone 1987, 149; Elshtain 1981, 30; Randall 1970, 162–3; Rosenthal 1973, 36–7). Socrates knows that his proposals, especially those in the second wave of argument in Book 5, will be repugnant to most human beings. The elaborate steps he takes in the dialogue to overcome the resistance of his interlocutors, and his analysis of the sources of this resistance in human nature itself, adequately demonstrate his awareness of this fact. We have already reviewed in some detail his admission that aspects of the regime outlined in Book 5 may not be "best," despite their justice and their grounding in the very highest understanding of nature. By examining not only the nature of justice but also the price at which it must be purchased, the *Republic* leads us gradually to the awareness that not only is perfect justice extremely difficult to attain, and rarely if ever to be found in practice, but also the deepest reason it is so rare is that we as individuals and as a society *do not want it*. We compromise justice for the sake of other goods we want, such as families and private erotic attachments. At this level, the service of the *Republic* is to make us aware that this is what we are doing, that we are ourselves responsible for a measure of the injustice in society, and that, on balance, we do not want things otherwise.

By the standard erected in the *Republic*, every society that has ever existed is unjust, yet the *Republic* has not inspired radical attempts at reform. It is the most famous "utopia" ever devised, but its effect in practice is to dampen utopian impulses (cf. Bloom 1968, 409). It does not destroy our devotion to justice—it is not a "satire"—but its lesson is a sobering or chastening one. The two waves of argument in Book 5 support many of our intuitions about justice, but at the same time they confront us with our unwillingness to do what is necessary to achieve justice in its fullness. Once we absorb this lesson, our attitude toward justice and injustice in society is necessarily altered. We do not abandon the quest to make society more just than it is, but our zeal is tempered by the knowledge that we will not achieve perfect justice and by the knowledge of why we will not. Above all, the indignation that fuels the most radical attempts at reform will inevitably be lessened.

One reason the *Republic* cannot be seen as a satire is that this is not the sole or final teaching of the work on justice. The *Republic*'s full and final account of justice is found not in the first two waves of argument in Book 5 but in the third, which inaugurates Socrates' discussion of philosophy and the philosophic life. Socrates' view, anticipated in the argument about sexual equality, is that the flowering of the highest human talents and the development of human virtue as such take place apart from the nonrational and bodily side of human nature. Ordinary humans may find this undesirable once they are shown in detail what it means, but it is important to recognize that the attitude of the highest type of human being as envisaged by Socrates would be different. In the philosopher's exclusive thirst for knowledge, all other desires shrink to relative insignificance in the economy of his soul (cf. *Phaedo* 84a: Grube 1980, 136; Guthrie 1978, 233–4; Shorey 1978, 30). In his exclusive attachment to wisdom, all attachments to particular persons, places, or communities wither to nothing or practically nothing (*Republic* 486a). The philosopher is the only human being who genuinely would not mind giving up the family ties that are sacrificed in Book 5 of the *Republic* in favor of association with the few who are good.

Still, as we have seen, even in the *Republic*, the subphilosophic point of view whose resistance to justice is such a key theme is not dismissed completely by Plato. The *Republic* takes the rational view of the soul as a hypothesis, a hypothesis that Plato clearly prefers to all others. But the contrasting outlook of the *Laws* is enough to show his awareness of the claims that may be made on behalf of competing hypotheses. Indeed, the *Republic* itself makes the suggestion that the purely rational soul and its perfection may be divine rather than human. Ordinary human beings and ordinary political life—perhaps all political life—remain attached to the nondivine parts of nature and so are riven with tensions among in the conflicting goods they seek. Perhaps these tensions can only be surmounted by transcending the realm of the human and the political altogether. This seems to be the gist of Aristotle's critique of the *Republic* (*Politics* II.1–5; cf. Leys 1978), a critique that Plato might well have acknowledged (cf. *Laws* 739c–e).

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[18] The *Republic* is also an exploration of justice in the individual soul, and on that level many of Socrates' proposals, such as the institutions outlined in the first two waves of argument in Book 5, need to be taken metaphorically. But this cannot prevent us from evaluating the perfect city constructed in the *Republic* as a political proposal, for the dialogue is also an investigation of the nature and limits of specifically *political* justice. Some themes, such as the "price of justice," operate at both levels, though in different ways.

Even for the philosopher, the teaching of the *Republic* on the best regime is not simple. It is not likely that a man such as Socrates would be perfectly happy to live in the regime he outlines here. The duty it imposes on the philosopher to return to the cave after having lived in the light of the sun is, at a minimum, a distraction from his exclusive devotion to wisdom and perhaps constitutes an outright injustice (519d; cf. Bloom 1968, 407). Moreover, in this city he is deprived of the rich diversity of artistic beauty and of novel religious entertainments such as those which led Socrates to the Piraeus in the first place (327a). Indeed, he is deprived of the whole spectacle of humanity as it can be seen in places like democratic Athens—all because most human beings cannot behold this spectacle without being corrupted by it. In other words, Socrates' reluctance to live in this city is vastly different from ours. His is dictated by his love of wisdom, while ours stems from our unwillingness to devote ourselves wholly to rational justice.

This serves to put a point on the profound differences between Plato's understanding of justice and our own. The modern notion of justice is rooted in rights, based on an egalitarian interpretation of the human condition. Plato has no notion of rights in our sense and is far from being an egalitarian. In fact, since equality of the sexes rests on the rational perfection and the suppression of the bodily, it seems unlikely that it can apply to any but the top class or classes of citizens in the *Republic* (cf. Barker 1961, 245, 278; Strauss 1977, 113–4). Despite this, timely insights may be gleaned from Plato's reflections on gender equality. On the purely philosophic level, his sifting of human nature for elements that can form the basis of a nongendered human perfection, though he may not believe this perfection to be within everyone's grasp, provides us with a model that merits serious consideration as we seek answers to the problem of gender and justice today. Feminists who base their pursuit of equality on the frank acknowledgment of fundamental differences of character or of role between men and women are challenged by Plato's argument that equality cannot be achieved, as a theoretical or a practical matter, on the basis of difference. The very justification of equality between the sexes may in fact be inseparable from the notion of a common humanity and a shared human excellence (Bluestone 1987, 16–7; Grant 1993, 161). At the same time, feminists who agree that gender equality must be based on what is shared by all human beings must reflect on Plato's approach to the matter. They must consider his view that this kind of approach needs to confront the real differences between the sexes and to produce an argument that the human traits shared by the genders are somehow more worthy or important than those that separate them. They also need to reflect on Plato's assessment of what it means, again as a practical as well as a theoretical matter, to pursue equality in defiance of the gendered aspects of human nature, to "overcome biology" in the matter of gender.

This may be the most provocative thing about Plato's presentation of gender equality, his argument concerning the ruthlessness with which the noncommon elements would have to be suppressed to bring it about and the political implications of such an approach. For the extremism of the measures found in Book 5 of the *Republic* derives not so much from views idiosyncratic to Plato as from his uncompromising pursuit of some of the ideals that our age shares with him. The vast majority of readers will find this extremism repugnant, but I maintain that the repugnance is itself part of the education provided by the *Republic*. In the end, we may decide to cherish some of what distinguishes the sexes as well as the things we share, and we may decide to compromise with injustice in the institutions of our common life. But we should learn from Plato that that is what we are doing and learn to make our compromises in full awareness that we cannot have it all.

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Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values in the Former Soviet Union

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The attempted coup in August 1991 provides an acid test of whether a democratic political culture is emerging in the former Soviet Union. This paper considers the hypothesis that active resistance to the coup was partly a function of attachments to democracy. Relying heavily on earlier models of collective action, and based on a 1992 survey of mass opinion in all the republics, this hypothesis is tested within a broader theory of rational choice and expectancy theory. Generally, it seems that reactions to the coup were not based on strictly rational calculations and that basic commitments to the collective good of democracy motivated resistance. My general conclusion is that a mass culture has emerged in Russia that nurtures democracy. The 1991 coup demonstrates that for many people in the former Soviet states there is little alternative to democratic politics.

On August 19, 1991, a small band of leaders of the Soviet Union attempted a coup d'etat against the government of Mikhail Gorbachev. Claiming that the then-president Gorbachev was ill and unable to govern, the eight-man State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (the GKChP) imposed a six-month period of emergency rule, including a ban on strikes, demonstrations, and rallies; severe limits on the activities of political parties and mass movements; and censorship of the press. Tanks appeared on the streets of Moscow, but, led by Boris Yeltsin, the people of Moscow greeted the arriving troops with protest, in some instances forming human chains to block the path of the military vehicles. The coup was not a day old when Yeltsin declared it illegal and urged the people of Russia to resist the overthrow of democracy through mass demonstrations and a general strike. Protesters began to assemble around the Russian "White House," the seat of the parliament of the Russian SSR. The mayor of Leningrad also challenged the coup and began to organize resistance. Demonstrations erupted throughout the country. On August 20, 200,000 people demonstrated outside the Moscow City Soviet; 50,000 gathered in front of the Russian White House; 200,000 rallied in Leningrad's Palace Square; and 50,000 protested in Kishinev (Moldavia). By August 21, the turning point in the coup, even the Communist Party of the Soviet Union spoke out against the seizure of power, and the coup leaders were apprehended and arrested. The next day, a huge crowd celebrated "a Rally of Victors" outside the Russian White House. By the end of this extraordinary week, democratic government had been revived in the USSR.

The coup marked a sea-change in the fate of Soviet democratization.[1] The coup and its failure ended the reign of Mikhail Gorbachev; consolidated the growing political power of Boris Yeltsin; exacerbated and accelerated the dissolution of the USSR, resulting in the emergence of each republic as a sovereign nation state; and, among many other things, precipitated the banning of the Communist Party within Russia. Indeed, the coup may well be the point in the process of democratization at which the political system emerged from the fragile and hesitant initiation of democratic reform into a process of consolidating democratic institutions and processes.

The failure of the coup surprised many observers, especially those who had long and consistently argued that the order-loving Soviet people would welcome attempts to restore the political and social stability that seemed to have crumbled under perestroika and glasnost. A small legion of experts predicted that, when given the choice, the Soviet people would opt for the return of order, even at the expense of individual liberty.[2] The coup leaders themselves expected wide-

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[1] For instance, Dunlop (1993, 186) claims: "If democracy proves capable of taking root in Russia, then the failed coup of August 19–21, 1991, is likely to be seen by future historians as a major twentieth-century turning point. Indeed its significance may come to be viewed as rivaling and, in a sense, reversing the effects of the Bolshevik coup which occurred nearly three quarters of a century previously. If, on the other hand, democracy should be replaced by an authoritarian or proto-fascist form of rule, then the democratic aftermath of the failed putsch will, like the February 1917 revolution before it, be seen by historians as a brief democratic blip against the dark background of an authoritarian continuum." Useful historical accounts of the coup can be found in Dunlop 1993; Gorbachev 1991; Hellie 1991; Remnick 1993, 435–530; and Yeltsin 1994.

[2] For a sampling of those skeptical about post-Soviet democratization, see Fleron 1996; Greenfeld 1992; Grey et al. 1995; Obolonsky 1995; Sergeyev and Biryukov 1993; and Wyman 1994. Whitefield and

spread popular support for their actions, believing that the Soviet people had grown weary of the chaos associated with democratization and were ready to follow iron-fisted leaders who would reimpose order and social control. To the astonishment of many, a very important (but by no means the only) reason for the collapse of the coup was the unwillingness of the people to mobilize in support of the GKChP. As it turned out, this was perhaps the most ruinous miscalculation of the putschists.[3]

Some observers of Soviet political culture were not surprised at the degree of popular resistance to the coup. Based on surveys conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several research teams claimed that a nascent democratic culture was emerging within the mass public (the literature ranges from Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992 to Gibson 1996). Even some long-time Sovietologists agreed that large-scale secular changes—such as urbanization, widespread education, and the development of a communications infrastructure—had laid the groundwork for the emergence of a democratic political culture (e.g., Lapidus 1989). To these scholars, the August putsch stood as an arresting confirmation of the results of their meticulous empirical inquiries.

The coup testifies generally to the significance of political culture for democratization. But it also allows testing of some important hypotheses about individual political behavior. In particular, the week of August 19 provided the opportunity for democrats in the USSR—those supporting democratic institutions and processes—to act on behalf of democracy. Almost all mass surveys conducted before the coup suggest strong *attitudinal* support for democracy, but evidence of *behavioral* support was scarce until the putsch. Thus, the events of that August provide an acid test of the meaning and political significance of mass attitudinal commitments to democratic institutions and processes.

The purpose of this article is consequently to test the hypothesis that the active defense of democracy in August 1991 was a function of political values supportive of democratic institutions and processes in Russia. On its face, popular reaction to the coup seems to be prima facie evidence of behavioral commitments to democracy, but this issue needs to be explored more rigorously. Fortunately, a broad social scientific literature on mass protest behavior offers a variety of hypotheses about this sort of political action. That literature, especially theories of rational choice, plays a central role in my analysis. Thus, in addition to its immense practical importance for democratization in the former Soviet Union, the coup also provides an invaluable context for assessing dominant theories of the origins of political protest.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONNECTING DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES AND PROTEST BEHAVIORS

My central hypothesis is that attitudinal commitments to the preservation of democracy in Russia motivated people to take action against the August coup. As in so many areas of social science, rational choice theories provide the dominant theoretical framework for understanding individual protest behavior.

The central paradox of social protest is the "irrationality" of participation. Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989, 885–6) describe this paradox well:

> In large groups, such as those involved in collective political protest, the contribution to the action of each ordinary member . . . has no discernible impact on the group's overall success; therefore, the rational individual will not absorb the costs of participation (such as time, financial resources, or the threat of physical injury), since he or she will enjoy the public good in any case if others provide it.

Thus, the incentive structure encourages free riders.

Yet, scholars have long recognized that simple calculations of the costs and benefits of individual participation provide a woefully inadequate explanation of protest behavior, and they have generated a host of supplementary explanations. One of the more useful is expectancy theory, developed most recently by Muller, Dietz, and Finkel (1991). Following them, I assume participation in opposition to the coup was a function of the utility (U_c) derived from such participation. Utility I define in terms of the relative magnitude of costs and benefits. The benefits of participation include both selective benefits and benefits associated with the collective good (G), in this case the maintenance of democracy in the Soviet Union. Of course, the value of the collective good must be discounted by the expected probability of successful opposition to the coup (E), as represented in the quantity ($G*E$). To the extent that citizens believe mass opposition is unlikely to save democracy, they will be unlikely to participate. G may also be discounted by the perceived likelihood that the individual's own participation will influence the outcome of the protest (I). Whatever may be the economist's logic, people often believe their participation makes a difference, and those who subscribe to this belief are more likely to protest. Hence, $[(G * E) * I]$ is a crucial quantity in the expectancy model.

Private benefits and costs are important as well. I assume that the direct material benefits (B_m) of opposing the coup are best represented by whether people feel they have profited directly from democratic reform. Other important utilities are the social network benefits (B_s), which accrue by responding to the expectations of participation emanating from significant others. To the extent that people acquiesce to encouragements to protest, they gain the esteem of the recruiters, which is of value. Important as well are personal normative benefits that accumulate from ful-

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Evans (1994) also point to the important role of order-related issues in the 1993 Russian elections. For a more recent analysis of the supposed Russian penchant for order, see Gibson 1997. As evidence of surprise at the extent of resistance to the coup, Dunlop (1993, 238) notes that 250,000 pairs of handcuffs were ordered by the plotters only *after* the coup began.

[3] According to Dobson and Grant (1992, 302), "the attempted coup . . . might never have occurred if the conspirators had a better understanding of public opinion."

filling one's self-expectation—duty—to make a contribution to the common good (B_p) (Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991, 1265). These two benefits can be realized, of course, irrespective of the perceived likelihood of the success of the protest.

There are also costs associated with political protest. Material costs (C_m) are mainly associated with the dangers of opposing the authorities but also include opportunity costs, for example, lost pay due to a work boycott. Protest behavior also involves transaction costs. Those who had no prior experience with such activity might not have known how to go about protesting the coup. Their transaction costs involved talking to friends about what to do, observing other people's behavior, spending additional time with the mass media, considering whether protest was a legitimate form of political activity, and considering whether they were psychologically or physically capable of the behavior required to protest. Thus, the utility of anti-coup protest may be represented as follows:

$$U_c = (E^*I^*G) + B_m + B_s + B_p - C_m - C_t \qquad (1)$$

In sum, I hypothesize that opposition to the coup is a function of how much one values democratic government, the perceived likelihood of successful opposition to the coup, and the perceived importance of one's own contribution to successful resistance, as well as the miscellaneous direct costs and benefits of acting.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This research is based on a survey of mass opinion carried out in the former Soviet Union in spring 1992 (details are provided in Appendix A). To summarize, 4,309 people, selected through a multistage probability sampling method, were interviewed face-to-face by trained interviewers. Representative oversamples were included in Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). In light of the fairly complex sample structure, and especially the unequal probabilities of selection for different respondents, these data must be weighted. The scheme I employ weights respondents by their (proportional) probability of selection while maintaining the actual number of completed interviews (an advantage for tests of statistical significance).

The survey was conducted roughly six months after the coup. Since many events intervened between the coup and the interviews, it is important to try to distinguish between attitudes at the time of the coup and at the time of the interview.[4]

It may be advantageous that interviews were separated from the coup by several months. Had we interviewed people immediately afterward, our indices of participation likely would have been more heavily tainted by social desirability effects. That is, in the afterglow of the putsch, opposition to the coup and its leaders seemed strong among every segment of the population. With time, and the accumulation of social and political problems, the putschists appeared perhaps not so completely misguided and opposition perhaps not so heroic and socially desirable. With some distance from the event, the respondents may have felt greater freedom to express their true views.

The respondents claimed to have strong and clear memories of their activities during the coup: 41.5% said they remembered very clearly what they did that week, while another 36% remembered generally if not in detail.[5] Only 15.3% asserted they did not remember very well, 5% claimed not to remember at all, and 2.2% said they did not know what they remembered. Moreover, the percentage of "don't know" responses to the coup questions was smaller than for any other set of items in the questionnaire. Therefore we have some confidence that our questions elicited reasonably truthful responses from the subjects.[6]

POPULAR REACTIONS TO THE AUGUST PUTSCH

What sort of reception did the coup receive from the Soviet people? Since some took action in *support* of the coup and others took action *against* it, I must consider not only what people did but also their motives for acting. These data are shown in Table 1 for the entire Soviet Union and for the Moscow and Leningrad oversamples.

The activities listed in Table 1 reflect varying degrees of both activism and public commitment to opposing the coup, so I have categorized them according to the intensity of the behavior. High activism involves such activities as demonstrating or a work boycott (Yeltsin and the democrats called for a strike soon after the coup started). These require a public expression of one's viewpoint as well as considerable personal effort. Moderate activism is denoted by participating in discussion groups or trying to persuade others how to react to the coup. I scored those who only followed the

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[4] For an insightful analysis of a nearly identical research design problem in East Germany, see Opp 1994, especially 108–11, and Opp and Gern 1993.

[5] Details on the operationalization of the various measures can be found in Appendix B.

[6] We also asked the respondents about change in their views since the coup—we asked them to report their reactions when they first learned about the coup and whether their views had changed in the ensuing months. At the time of the interview, both support and opposition had increased, mainly as a function of fewer respondents expressing uncertainty about their attitudes. Roughly two-thirds opposed the coup, and only a small fraction expressed support. During the six months between the coup and the survey there was not much change in attitudes: 71.4% reported feeling the same at both points in time; the remainder experienced some change. Much of this was opinion crystallization (or inability to remember one's original position)—14.2% of the respondents had an opinion at the time of the interview, although they could not report their view at the time of the coup. Among those reporting substantive opinion change, change was roughly bi-directional—4.9% of those originally opposing the coup became supporters, while 5% of the August coup supporters became opponents. Thus, opinion reversal was rare; generally, then, attitudes toward the coup were fairly stable (the Pearson correlation between attitudes at t_1 and t_2 is .43; gamma is .67). In the analysis that follows, I examine the relationship between political action during the coup and various attitudes and attributes of the respondent at the time of the interview. The intervening six months most likely have little effect on the findings, except perhaps to reduce the magnitude of the correlations.

TABLE 1. Protest Behavior during the August Putsch by Geographic Location and Attitude toward the Coup

	Attitude toward the August Coup							
Percentage Engaging in Each Activity[a]	Former USSR		Moscow		Leningrad		Former USSR, Outside Moscow and Leningrad	
	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti
Defined as low activity								
Followed events in the media	85.9%	85.2%	89.4%	90.6%	89.8%	89.3%	85.8%	84.8%
Defined as medium activity								
Participated in discussion groups	8.8%	14.0%	19.1%	24.5%	13.6%	19.5%	8.5%	13.5%
Tried to persuade others	10.1%	12.5%	14.9%	20.7%	20.3%	18.2%	9.8%	12.0%
Defined as high activity								
Participated in demonstrations	1.5%	2.3%	0.0%	7.5%	1.7%	8.5%	1.5%	1.9%
Stayed away from work	1.1%	2.1%	4.3%	9.6%	1.7%	7.1%	1.1%	1.6%
Signed a petition	2.0%	3.8%	4.3%	6.4%	1.7%	10.0%	2.0%	3.5%
Expressed views to political officials	2.8%	3.7%	4.3%	8.2%	6.8%	5.6%	2.8%	3.4%
Expressed views to the mass media	.9%	1.3%	2.1%	.9%	1.7%	2.7%	.8%	1.3%
Distributed leaflets and letters	.3%	1.2%	2.1%	2.8%	1.7%	2.7%	.2%	1.0%
Average number of activities	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.2
Standard deviation	.8	.9	.9	1.2	.8	1.4	.8	.9
N[b]	620	3,080	47	425	59	411	597	2,893
Summary measure of activity								
None	10.1%	9.2%	6.4%	5.2%	5.1%	7.8%	10.3%	9.4%
Low	70.9	63.9	59.6	49.2	59.3	56.7	71.3	64.7
Medium	13.4	16.0	19.1	21.2	20.3	12.9	13.2	15.9
High	5.6	10.8	14.9	24.5	15.3	22.6	5.3	10.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N[b]	620	3,080	47	425	59	411	597	2,893

[a] In the top portion of the table, the percentages indicate the portion of the sample (or subsample) engaging in the activity. Thus, the figure 85.9% means 533 of 620 procoup respondents throughout the former Soviet Union followed the events in the media. Since people could engage in many different activities, each figure in the top portion of the table is completely independent of every other figure. In the summary measure, the respondents were assigned a score based on the highest level of participation in which each participated (see footnote 7 for additional details). The percentages in the bottom portion of the table total to 100% down the columns, as shown.

[b] The figures reported for Moscow and Leningrad are based upon unweighted data since these oversamples were designed to be representative of the respective areas. The figures for the entire country and for the territory outside Moscow and Leningrad are based upon weighted data. The weights are derived from the inverse of the probability of selection for each respondent, with an adjustment so that the total number of weighted respondents equals the total number of actual respondents. Thus, the Moscow and Leningrad respondents constitute a very small proportion of the total USSR sample, just as they should, based on population totals.

events in the media as engaging in low levels of activity. Finally, I considered those engaging in none of the activities to be inactive. Each respondent received a score indicating her or his highest level of activity.[7] The lower portion of Table 1 reports the distribution of scores on this index, according to the respondents' initial attitude toward the coup.

As expected, political activism was somewhat more common among those who opposed the coup than among coup supporters. For instance, across the country as a whole, 10.8% of the coup opponents engaged in a high level of opposition to the coup; only 5.6% of the supporters engaged in substantial procoup behavior. Still, it is noteworthy that many Soviet citizens took supportive action (Dunlop [1993, 200] reports that procoup emergency committees formed in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere). The gap between pro- and anticoup activism is larger in Moscow and Leningrad than in the country generally, as might be expected.

With the exception of following the events in the media, which virtually everyone reported doing, most of the activities were rare indeed. Across the USSR, about 10% of the respondents participated in discussion groups and/or tried to persuade others how to react to the coup, but other sorts of activity were uncommon. For instance, only 1.5% of the coup supporters and 2.3% of the opponents claimed to have participated in a demonstration; on average, 1.1 pro-coup and 1.3 anticoup action was undertaken. These figures are not atypical; protest behavior in virtually all polities is confined to a narrow slice of the population.

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[7] Since it would be inappropriate to treat each action as having the same political significance, simply summing the number of acts in which the respondent engaged would be quite misleading. Instead, I created an ordinal variable that represents the degree of behavioral engagement in response to the coup. The activities *within* each level of engagement are assumed to be roughly equivalent. For a similar approach to measuring unconventional political participation, see Barnes and Kaase 1979, especially the "Technical Appendix."

Activism was indeed greater in Moscow and Leningrad than in the USSR as a whole. More than 20% of the coup opponents in these two cities engaged in a high degree of behavioral opposition to the coup (and the differences between the two cities were small). Even among coup supporters, activism was considerably higher in Moscow and Leningrad than elsewhere. Still, political activity clearly was not confined to Moscow and Leningrad, even if the proportions of respondents engaging in political protest were smaller elsewhere (see Dunlop 1993, 234–8, for a similar conclusion).

This analysis differs from earlier studies of protest behavior in that the ideological objectives of the activists are heterogeneous. Unlike a study of protesters against, say, nuclear energy, in which protest occurs only among those who oppose nuclear plants, in this case the protesters include both supporters and opponents of the coup.[8] It is quite possible that the determinants of these two sorts of behavior differ, and, at a minimum, I would not want to prejudge this issue. Consequently, I created three indices of protest behavior: one measuring activity in support of the coup among supporters of the coup, another measuring activity in opposition to it among opponents of the coup, and a consolidated variable that ranges from pro- to anticoup activity (for all respondents).[9]

OPERATIONALIZING THE MODEL

In equation 1 a fairly simple model of protest behavior is depicted. To test the model empirically, however, requires considerable explication of each variable within the context of the Soviet coup.

Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes (G)

Those who struggled against the coup were probably motivated by the ideology of democracy and/or political reform. The August putsch was a decidedly antidemocratic event, one widely perceived as attempting to restore the less democratic status quo ante. When commitment to an ideological objective is strong, the psychic benefits of protest can overcome the costs of action. Thus, those most strongly supportive of democratic institutions and processes are expected to be the most active opponents of the coup.[10]

Considerable research has been devoted to measuring democratic values in the USSR (e.g., Gibson 1995). Based on that work, and following Dahl (1971; 1989, 262), a democratic citizen is one who believes in individual liberty and is tolerant of political enemies, who may distrust political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes (cf. Dalton 1994). In our empirical work, we focus on several specific attitudes toward basic democratic rights, liberties, and institutions. Support for democratic institutions and processes is a factor score based on a second-order factor analysis of indices measuring (1) the valuation the respondent attaches to liberty; (2) support for competitive elections; (3) support for a multiparty system; (4) support for pluralistic media; (5) rights consciousness; (6) support for dissent; and (7) political tolerance. (See Appendix B for details.)

The Likelihood of Successful Opposition (*E*)

I earlier noted the emphasis in the literature (e.g., Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989) on perceptions of the efficacy of protest activity, that is, perceptions that the group (not the individual effort) will have its desired effect. According to theory, people who believe that protest is unlikely to be effective are loath to incur the risks and actual costs of participation.

But as Klandermans (1984, 585) has argued, people must decide whether to protest (or continue to protest) without knowing whether others are going to participate (or continue to participate). This limits the ability to perform rational calculations. Klandermans (1984, 585) solves this problem by pointing to the crucial role of expectations: "Based on their expectations about the behavior of others, people assess the probability of success and their own contribution to it." Therefore, expectations about the breadth of popular support for the coup are an important component of the behavioral calculations.

A simple way to measure the perceived probability of successful opposition to the coup is to assess perceptions of the breadth of opposition, under the assumption that people believe an increasing proportion of opponents enhances the probability of ousting the plotters. A more sensitive indicator compares the degree of support for the coup with the degree of support for the anticoup demonstrators. I hypothesize that those who perceived that opposition to the coup was more widespread among their fellow citizens were more likely to have participated in resistance to the coup. Consequently, we asked the respondents to estimate the percentage of people supporting the coup and the percentage of people supporting the demonstrators.

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[8] Another important difference is that the opportunity to protest lasted only one week. Moreover, opposition was not well organized, most activities were sporadic, and they were done on the initiative of small groups of citizens.

[9] It is difficult to judge the degree to which this measure of activism is inflated by social desirability effects. As Table 1 amply reveals, a considerable number of respondents did not hesitate in talking about the actions they took in support of the coup. Two tests of the survey data both suggest that the problem is not particularly worrisome. First, the responses to the behavioral measures were unrelated to those on items measuring the psychological propensity to present oneself in a favorable light. Second, the honesty of the respondent, as judged by the interviewer, was unrelated to responses to the coup items. (Details of these two tests are available from the author.) Obviously, neither test is dispositive, but neither provides a scintilla of evidence of any serious problems with the measure.

[10] Care must be taken in describing the political program of Yeltsin as entirely democratic, since some of his first acts after achieving political power were to close newspapers and ban political parties. Nonetheless, it is not too difficult or controversial to assign ordinal positions to the putschists, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin on a continuum of support for democratic institutions and processes.

About one-third of the respondents asserted that they did not know the views of others toward the coup. Among those venturing an estimate, most perceived substantial support—the average percentage thought to support the coup was 38.2% (standard deviation = 21.2). Approximately one-fifth of the respondents thought a majority of the Soviet people supported the coup. However, the average percentage perceived to be supporters of the demonstrators was 59.4 (standard deviation = 23.2). There is, as expected, a negative correlation between the two perceptions, but it is not inordinately strong given that these two perceptions ought to be mirror images of each other ($r = .44$).

To indicate the perceived likelihood of coup success, I employ the relative size of the perceived support for the coup and for the demonstrators.[11] Among those able to produce both estimates, the average score was −21.4, indicating a balance of 21 percentage points in favor of the demonstrators. The simple correlation between this measure and the total measure of coup activism is .28, that is, as perceived mass opposition to the coup increased, so did the likelihood of resistance.[12]

The Irrationality of Nonparticipation (*I*)

Did the Soviet people view their own participation in response to the coup as irrational? If not, why did more of them not protest, especially since the fate of Soviet democracy seemed to hang in the balance? According to some rational choice models, the objective efficacy of individual action is always zero. Yet, citizens often believe their behavior to be efficacious, and these beliefs may be important. Consequently, we asked the respondents for their own accounting of their failure to participate in the demonstrations.

The main reason given for not demonstrating was the lack of perceived opportunity, cited by nearly four in ten respondents. Roughly one-quarter of the respondents demurred out of fear, just as a quarter cited the belief that their behavior would be of little or no consequence. Only a very small proportion claimed they did not care enough about the outcome to participate.

But the central theoretical purpose of this question was to gauge the respondents' views of the efficacy of their own political action. Therefore, as the measure of *I*, the perceived efficacy of one's behavior, I used the item asking whether failure to participate in the protest activity was due to the perception that their own participation would have little effect on the outcome. Slightly more than a fourth of the respondents agreed with this statement; most people rejected the proposition that their behavior did not matter.

The perceived efficacy of one's behavior is also partly a function of whether one believes the political system is responsive to the demands of citizens. Thus, I also included the traditional measures of external political efficacy as an indicator of the generalized belief that citizens can affect government.

The Benefits of Acting (*B*)

My model posits that collective protest is in part a function of the benefits of participation. Several sorts of benefits may be realized, ranging from the material to the satisfaction gained from contributing to the common good. One set of theories argues that self-interest is the prime motivator for political action (e.g., Sivacek and Crano 1982, Walsh and Warland 1983). The changes in Soviet society over the last decade have directly benefited the intelligentsia, the professional middle class. More than any segment of society, it felt the yoke of the dictatorial state under Communism. With perestroika, these individuals, who had the resources necessary to enjoy freedom, took full advantage of the new opportunities for personal liberty available under democratization. Thus, it is expected that those who perceive themselves as having directly benefited from democratization actively protested the coup.

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[11] In the analysis that follows, I postulate that these estimates of the views of others are surrogates for perceptions of the likely success of opposition to the coup. While this is not an unreasonable assumption, some individual differences no doubt exist in how perceived support for the demonstrators gets translated (psychologically) into estimates of the likelihood of success of political action against the coup. People may share perceptions of the views of others, but they may disagree on how effective the mass public can be in influencing political events. This caveat must be borne in mind when interpreting the following results. All other things being equal, it is reasonable to assume that those who thought opposition was more widespread were more likely to believe that the plotters could be defeated.

[12] It is quite undesirable to exclude from the analysis the large proportion of the sample unable to estimate mass opinion. A reasonable strategy for estimating their views relies on the assumption that those who cannot estimate the views of their fellow citizens were uncertain whether the coup would succeed. A similarly uncertain group is those who perceived support as equal to opposition, that is, those who scored zero on the relative support index. Thus, I scored the portion of the sample unable to judge both the size of the supporters and the size of the opposition to the coup as zero, or uncertain about the outcome.

This still leaves more than 600 respondents who estimated either the proportion of supporters or opponents but not both. The missing estimate makes it difficult to derive a relative support score. For these people, I derived an estimated value by subtracting the single observed proportion from 100. If a respondent estimated that 75% of the population supported the coup but did not know what percentage opposed it, then I estimated the latter at 25%. The means of these estimated percentages closely resemble the means obtained for respondents who made both estimates. Only 35% of the respondents making guesses at both figures gave estimates that exactly totaled 100% (although the estimates of 61% summed to between 90% and 110%). Fully 77% gave estimates totaling less than 100% (responses which are still plausible), but 23% gave responses totaling more than 100%. Yet, the mean of the sums is 96% (standard deviation = 23%), and the median is 100%. Thus, the technique I employed in essence subtracts the observed opinion estimate from the median estimate of those who judged the proportion of both supporters and opponents. As a psychological variable, the only thing that really matters is the relative size of the two percentages. Using these assumptions and estimation techniques, I was able to score 97% of the respondents as to their estimated likelihood of coup success. The correlation with coup-related behavior changed little; the coefficient for the adjusted estimate and coup behavior is .28.

A great deal of collective action is the result of ordinary people being recruited by their friends and associates. Research suggests that one benefit protesters accrue is to satisfy the expectations emanating from these peers, which Opp (1990, 217) refers to as the "normative expectations of reference persons." Peers can provide reinforcement for those inclined to protest, which is a selective incentive for participation (see especially Kaase 1989; see also Knoke 1990; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). Satisfying such expectations likely generates the benefit of enhanced interpersonal relations, including increased esteem. Thus, I hypothesize that protest will be more common among those who are asked to join in protest activity. The activities about which we inquired are listed in Table 1. Overall, little more than one-third of the respondents were not asked to engage in some sort of behavior in response to the coup. Protest activity was more likely to be self-initiated than recruited in Moscow and Leningrad.

Finally, a benefit of participation may be to satisfy one's internal sense of duty. I expect those who feel obligated to assert their views to be more likely to participate in coup activity.

The Costs of Acting (*C*)

An obvious cost of resisting the coup was physical danger. People can be killed or injured in demonstrations. Furthermore, a public declaration of one's position involves certain risks, risks all too well known to those who have lived in a repressive society. Thus, I hypothesize that those who perceived participation in demonstrations as dangerous were more likely to refrain from protesting the coup.

There also were transaction costs associated with opposing the coup. The most direct way to represent these is to determine whether a respondent had engaged in political action in the past. Such experience at unconventional political participation may well predict whether specific action was taken in response to the August putsch.

Attitudes toward protest activity in general also may be of some importance (cf. Barnes and Kaase 1979). Most Soviet citizens did not approve of violence in response to the coup. Indeed, nearly half the respondents strongly opposed constructing barricades, an action surely perceived as a revolt against the government. Demonstrations and strikes were supported by only a minority of the Soviet people.

Individuals differ in the degree to which they are willing to engage in any political action, irrespective of the specific context. For instance, personality variables such as risk aversion can affect aggressive political participation. Certainly, one's generalized sense of personal political efficacy influences the willingness to participate. As Finkel, Muller, and Opp have observed (1989, 888), "those with a strong sense of general political efficacy may believe that they make a difference because of their resources and political expertise." Those who consider themselves incompetent at political activity, as having low internal political efficacy, are unlikely to join in collective protest, a demanding and costly sort of political action.

TESTING THE MODEL OF COUP PROTEST BEHAVIOR

Table 2 reports the data necessary to evaluate the hypothesized relationships. I report the results for coup opponents, using as the dependent variable *Anticoup Action*, which ranges from 0 (low activism) to 3 (high activism). Because opposition was centered in Moscow and Leningrad, and because the samples drawn from these two oblasts are in fact representative, I confine this portion of the analysis to respondents from those two areas. The data do not require weighting.

The regression equation is reasonably effective at predicting anticoup action, with more than 28% of the variance explained. Yet, the data support the rejection of a number of the hypotheses. For instance, there is no evidence whatsoever that responses to the coup were directly influenced by beliefs that individual action makes a difference *Efficacy of Individual Behavior*). Those who thought so were no more or less likely to act than those who believed their own behavior was of little consequence. The belief that citizens can influence government also was unrelated to action. Thus, the hypothesis that the perceived efficacy of individual behavior affects protest—a key supposition of the rational choice model—must be rejected.

One measure of the perceived direct benefits of action—*Fulfilling the Duty to Act*—is completely ineffective at predicting behavior. However, the variable measuring *Perceived Direct Benefits from Democracy* has a weak direct influence on action. The effect is not stronger because the variable is connected ($r = .35$) to one of the strong predictors of action, *Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes*. Those who perceive that they have benefited from democracy are supporters of democratic institutions and processes, and the latter has the strongest influence on behavior.

Being subjected to *Peer Expectations* to participate influenced anticoup behavior, and this is the strongest variable in the model. One of the key motivators to action had little to do with the larger political context of the event—it was simply responding to the exhortations of friends and associates to do something to express one's views about the coup. Such expectations were effective irrespective of the other variables in the model (e.g., duty, *Perceptions of Danger*, support for democracy, etc.).

Residents of Moscow and Leningrad seem to have been affected to some degree by the danger of protesting. But those who perceived more danger were *more, not less*, likely to have acted. Danger may have translated into necessity: Those who perceived protest as more dangerous felt it imperative to resist those creating the danger—the plotters of the August putsch. Danger does not, therefore, seem to have been an important cost of opposing the coup and its plotters.

Approval of Protest Activity had little influence on

TABLE 2. Multivariate Analysis of Anticoup Behavior, Moscow and Leningrad Respondents

	Anticoup Behavior			
	r	*b*	s.e.	Beta
Benefit from the collective good				
Support for democratic institutions and processes	.253	.008	.003	.110***
Likelihood of successful opposition to the coup				
Relative support for the coup and the demonstrators	.027	.003	.162	.000
Efficacy of individual behavior				
Belief that action makes a difference	.008	−.063	.059	−.033
Belief that government is responsive	.193	.043	.034	.043
Benefits of acting				
Perceived direct benefits from democracy	.260	.198	.061	.115***
Social benefits—expectations of protest participation	.354	.212	.025	.264***
Psychological benefits—sense of duty	.091	.004	.033	.004
Costs of acting				
Material—perception of physical danger	.193	.287	.057	.156***
Transaction—experience at unconventional participation	.345	1.819	.304	.198***
Transaction—approval of protest activity	.259	.076	.029	.089
Transaction—personal political efficacy	.116	.032	.034	.030
Intercept		−.067	.228	
R^2				.284***
Adjusted R^2				.274***
Standard error of estimate		.783		
Standard deviation		.920		
N	786			

***$p < .001$

anticoup action. Generally, disapproval of protest is not a significant cost of acting. *Inexperience at Unconventional Participation* was, however, a highly significant cost. Those who had protest in their behavioral repertoires were more likely to use it when the occasion arose, most likely because the costs of new protest were reduced. Those who felt generally efficacious when it comes to politics were no more or less likely to act in opposition to the coup. The slight bivariate relationship of this variable with protest was reduced to insignificance in the multivariate equation, largely because the efficacious are also experienced at unconventional participation.

Thus, the most significant benefit of opposing the coup was satisfying the expectations of others, while the most significant cost was not danger but inexperience at protest.

Support for democratic institutions and processes and perceptions of the likelihood of successful opposition remain to be considered. The results are somewhat complicated; I begin with the linear effects.

Support for democratic institutions and processes was significantly related to efforts to defend the Soviet democracy from the conservative plotters (even in this multivariate model, in which several of the other variables are significantly related to these attitudes). This finding confirms that democratic attitudes are of some consequence. The attitudes that so many researchers have attempted to measure and explain, in fact had important consequences for political behavior during the coup and ultimately for the character of the emerging post-Soviet polities. The effect of this variable is both direct and indirect, via the perceived benefits of democracy. Furthermore, respondents who support democratic institutions and processes were more likely to be experienced at unconventional participation (r = .24), more likely to approve of protest activity (r = .24), and slightly more likely to have been recruited to protest (r = .10). (They were also more likely to feel a sense of efficacy and duty, although these variables do not directly influence protest behavior.) The direct and indirect effects of this attitude is indeed impressive.

Another significant finding in Table 2 concerns the effect of the perceived likelihood of the coup's success. The hypothesis is that action is less likely if the putschists are perceived as probable winners. Among opponents of the coup this hypothesis received absolutely no support—beta = .00. Therefore, people apparently acted without regard to rational calculations of the likelihood of succeeding. This finding is damaging to the rational choice hypothesis.

An important issue remains. The equation in Table 2 does not actually model equation 1 (above), in that it includes only linear effects of G (collective good), E (the expectation that the collective good will be realized), and I (the efficacy of one's own actions). The bivariate correlation between anticoup behavior and ($G * E$) is .18; for ($G * E * I$) it is .10. Both these correlations support the hypothesis that the effect of benefits from the collective good is discounted by the improbability of the collective good being realized.

When the multiplicative terms are included in an hierarchical model, however, the incremental effect on anticoup behavior is entirely insignificant and trivial. That is, the statistical effects of G, E, and I can be wholly represented as linear effects: At any given level of support for democratic institutions and processes, the likelihood of anticoup activism was *not* enhanced by the belief that the coup could be defeated. Although interactive effects in fully hierarchical models are always difficult to establish, I nonetheless take these findings as generally *not* supportive of expectancy theory.

Since this issue is of considerable importance for expectancy theory, I have searched long and hard for some evidence of an interactive effect. For instance, I examined the relationship between support for democratic institutions and processes and coup behavior within each of nine categories of the variable measuring the probability of the coup's success. The hypothesis is that the greater the likelihood of success, the greater will be the connection between the collective good (attitudes) and behavior. The standardized regression coefficients within each category (ranging from virtually certain that the coup would succeed to virtually certain it would not) are: .21, .27, .27, .25, .28, .35, .22, .08, and .06. The unstandardized coefficients vary from .005 to .016. There is absolutely no evidence that the effect of democratic attitudes on protest behavior is contingent upon the perceived likelihood of coup success.

There is another term in the expectancy quantity, the perception that one's own behavior matters. To investigate its conditional effect on protest behavior, I conducted the same analysis as above, but I split the sample into those who thought their behavior would make a difference and those who did not. The data reveal some interactive effect of the $(G * I)$ term. Among respondents who believed they could not affect the outcome, attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes were only weakly related to protest activity (beta = .160, b = .011, s.e. = .004). But among those who believed their behavior mattered, the influence of attitudes was twice as strong (beta = .308, b = .023, s.e. = .003). Thus, although the belief that individual action makes a difference had no direct effect on protest activity, the interactive effect was not entirely trivial.

These findings have implications for rational choice theory. Resistance to the coup was in some sense rational: Those who directly benefited from democracy were more likely to act, and those who had to incur the transaction costs of learning unconventional participation were less likely to act. But in another sense, resistance was irrational. Residents of Moscow and Leningrad were motivated to resist the coup by their commitment to a collective good—democracy—and they failed to discount this benefit by the likelihood that democracy in Russia would be saved. Their behavior was somewhat affected by whether they thought they could make a difference, but a large majority believed—mistakenly, according to rational choice theory—that their own political behavior was of consequence. Fortunately for Russian democratization, resistance to the coup was not undermined by the problem of free-riders.

As Table 1 makes plain, much of the action in response to the coup was in Moscow and Leningrad. Nonetheless, it is important to determine how well this model describes reactions to the coup in the rest of the Soviet Union. Since a sufficient number of respondents took action in support of the coup, the national data allow me to analyze the determinants of both pro- and anticoup activism. These results are shown in Table 3.

With respect to opponents of the coup, the results from outside Moscow and Leningrad are remarkably similar to those from these two cities. For instance, the best predictor is still the social benefits variable (although its effect is somewhat weaker outside Moscow and Leningrad). Support for democratic institutions and processes is significantly related to protest, and the expectancy hypothesis receives little direct support. In general, it appears that the findings from the rest of the country are not at odds with those from the two hotbeds of activism.

There are a couple of interesting exceptions, however. First, considerably more variance is explained by the equation in Moscow and Leningrad (in part due to more variance there). Second, the perceived direct benefits of democracy are not significantly related to protest outside of Moscow and Leningrad. This may reflect the fact that outside of these two cities people have enjoyed fewer of the tangible fruits of democratization and therefore were less motivated by calculations of direct self-interest in democratic government.

Most important, these data do not support the view that people living outside Moscow and Leningrad behaved in accord with the expectancy model. Perceptions of the likelihood of successful opposition remain insignificant. In additional analysis addressing this hypothesis the interactive effect of democratic attitudes and the expectancy variables was completely insignificant. The hypothesis that calculations of the discounted benefit from the collective good influenced decisions to protest must be decisively rejected.

It also must be noted that support for democratic institutions and processes is *positively* related to procoup activism in the country at large. Those who support democratic institutions and processes were slightly more likely to take action in favor of the coup than were those who oppose democratic institutions and processes. The sign of the coefficient is rather surprising.

This finding may be a function of a political empowerment that flows from (or is connected to) believing in democracy. Supporters of democratic institutions and processes are those who believe in individual rights (including the right to protest) and who think that government ought to be accountable to the people. Thus, even among supporters of the coup, support for democratic institutions and processes is related to the perceived benefits of democracy (r = .25), belief in the responsiveness of government (r = .14), approval of protest activity (r = .10), and experience at unconventional participation (r = .18). These correlations are generally weaker than those for opponents of the coup, but it seems that belief in democracy has produced people who feel they have a right (and perhaps even some obligation) to express their political preferences.

But how is it possible for democrats to take action *against* democracy? First, I should reiterate that the effects are weak, and the general tendency (among all

TABLE 3. Multivariate Analysis of Behavioral Reactions to the August Putsch Outside Moscow and Leningrad

	Behavioral Reactions							
	Procoup Action				Anticoup Action			
	r	b	s.e.	Beta	r	b	s.e.	Beta
Benefit from the collective good								
Support for democratic institutions and processes	.109	.006	.002	.102*	.262	.008	.001	.126***
Likelihood of successful opposition to the coup								
Relative support for the coup and the demonstrators	.018	.060	.152	.017	.080	.121	.079	.027
Efficacy of individual behavior								
Belief that action makes a difference	−.023	−.045	.061	−.032	.024	−.004	.031	−.003
Belief that government is responsive	.075	.036	.035	.045	.148	.031	.016	.036
Benefits of acting								
Perceived direct benefits from democracy	.016	−.077	.064	−.054	.160	.038	.030	.024
Social benefits—expectations of protest participation	.197	.151	.037	.172**	.243	.154	.017	.163***
Psychological benefits—sense of duty	−.035	−.032	.034	−.039	.084	.055	.016	.059***
Costs of acting								
Material—perception of physical danger	.004	.058	.066	.038	−.025	−.057	.031	−.033
Transaction—experience at unconventional participation	.158	.842	.373	.098*	.271	1.248	.157	.149***
Transaction—approval of protest activity	.089	.035	.034	.045	.225	.092	.014	.125***
Transaction—personal political efficacy	.110	.058	.032	.076	.185	.098	.016	.114***
Intercept		.931	.216			.148	.110	
R^2				.078***				.179***
Adjusted R^2				.059				.176
Standard error of estimate		.637				.690		
Standard deviation		.657				.760		
N	564				2,743			

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

respondents) is for support for democratic institutions and processes to be connected to greater behavioral *resistance* to the coup (r = .27). Second, it is always unwise to attribute the sins of the leaders to all the followers. No doubt, some favored the coup not because it was an antidemocratic counterrevolution, but out of disenchantment with the Gorbachev regime. Democrats were certainly more likely to hold attitudes opposing the coup, but the relationship is far from overwhelming (r = .18). And perhaps imperfect understandings of democracy account for these findings. Unfortunately, no questions in the survey asked about perceptions of the coup and its leaders, so I cannot evaluate this argument empirically.

CONCLUSION

This analysis offers serious challenges to rational choice theories of protest. It is true that some of the reasons people acted in response to the coup are related to the costs and benefits of acting. But the costs and benefits which seem to be important in this case are not those theorists ordinarily investigate. An important benefit was not so much the material payoffs of democracy but rather satisfaction of the expectations of friends to do something. The power of these expectations is documented by the finding that they were capable of mobilizing both pro- and anticoup behavior. Given the strength of Russian social networks (Gibson 1993a), this is not so surprising, but these data nonetheless reinforce the view that collective action is *collective*. Furthermore, the findings suggest that a few dedicated activists can have disproportionate influence by recruiting others. These psychological or interpersonal factors have not received sufficient attention in the rational choice literature.

Nor are the costs of action revealed in this study entirely orthodox. It was not the fear of danger that dissuaded people from acting but their inexperience at engaging in such behavior. Protest is cumulative—once a citizen has done it, it is easier to do again. This important finding suggests that the numerous protests associated with the demise of the old Communist regime may have had a lasting effect. Protest seems to empower people. And since so many Soviet citizens now have protest in their behavioral repertoire, it seems all the more unlikely that they will easily return to authoritarian government.

I must emphasize the finding that commitment to democracy matters, perhaps crucially, for the maintenance of democracy. Support for democratic institutions and processes had a direct effect on protest, even in the multivariate equation. But I also should emphasize the pervasiveness of the effect. Those more supportive of democratic institutions and processes perceived more direct benefits from democracy and felt more efficacious, both externally and internally. They were more likely to approve of protest and to have experience at unconventional political participation. They were also more likely to believe that the coup would fail. Thus, being a supporter of democracy had numerous direct and indirect effects on behavior in response to the August putsch.

Finally, this analysis seems to indicate that people's reasons for taking action in response to the coup cannot be found in the usual categories of rational choice analysis. The most specific evidence is that the decision to act seems not to have been contingent upon the expected efficacy of action. Many people felt they had to do something, anything, to oppose the coup, even if those actions were futile, even if their expected value could not be calculated. There is surely some rationality in these decisions, but it does not seem to be the rationality of expectancy theory. Had the Soviet people waited until rational calculations of coup success could be made with any certainty, it may well have been too late.

The popular reaction was a crucial determinant of the outcome of the coup. Yet few would argue that mass attitudes, values, and even behaviors determine the course of political development of a society. The August putsch failed in part due to the ineptness of the plotters, in part due to the role of the military, and in part as a function of systemic variables that had little to do with the preferences of the mass public. Furthermore, institutional structures have changed dramatically since the coup, especially the emergence of relatively homogeneous, independent states. Homogeneity, especially when reinforced by political boundaries, is rarely the friend or ally of democracy. Institutions and structures matter, perhaps even more than political culture.

Moreover, it is not clear that ordinary people in the former Soviet republics will maintain their commitment to democracy indefinitely. The economic chaos of the postcommand economy era is exacting a perilous toll on the patience of the Soviet peoples. The defeat of the August coup is certainly a hopeful event for friends of democracy; but, eternal vigilance is the price of democracy. It is important to remember that though the events of August proved that antidemocrats can be beaten, they do not prove that they are unbeatable.

APPENDIX A: THE SAMPLE AND SURVEY

This analysis is based on a survey conducted in February/March 1992 that is representative of the entire territory of the former USSR, as constituted in late 1991, except the Baltics.[13] Thus, the sample is representative of the eleven republics that in 1992 comprised the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) plus Georgia.[14]

We designed our survey well before the break-up of the Soviet Union. We anticipated that the Baltic States would leave the union and, since they are so small, we made an early decision to exclude them from the survey population. In addition, anticipating some analysis at the republic level, the sample was designed to be representative of the Russian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR. In the case of Russia, with its large population and hence large number of survey respondents, this simply required increasing the number of sampling points (although oversamples were included, in order to have representative samples of Moscow and Leningrad—see below). In the case of Ukraine, this meant both increasing the number of sampling points and selecting an oversample. The unweighted number of respondents in Russia is 2,536[15]; in Ukraine, it is 1,006. It is also possible to aggregate the survey respondents living in Soviet Central Asia (Kazakastan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenia) and draw inferences about opinion in that area of the country ($N = 443$). Thus, the 1992 sample supports inferences to (1) the entire former USSR, excluding the Baltics; (2) Russia; (3) Ukraine; and (4) Soviet Central Asia.

The 1992 survey was comprised of two distinct components: reinterviews of respondents from our 1990 survey and interviews with respondents from a newly drawn sample. Both subsets of respondents must be analyzed in order to have a representative sample in 1992.[16]

The nonpanel sample was then selected to be representative of the entire territory of the former Soviet Union except the Baltics. The sample is a multistage stratified sample. At the initial stage of the sampling, geographical units were classified according to four statistical indices: (1) the level of industrial development (e.g., the number of plants and factories); (2) the level of well-being of the population (e.g., income per family); (3) ethnocultural peculiarities (e.g., the degree of homogeneity of the distribution of nationalities); and (4) accessibility of cultural amenities (e.g., the numbers of libraries, cinemas, and theaters). These criteria were selected due to their assumed importance in structuring the beliefs of ordinary respondents. The geographical units classified were the oblasts in Russia and Ukraine and the republics elsewhere. A total of 85 units was classified within these 18 homogeneous strata.

At the second stage of the sampling, eight substrata were identified: (1) capitals of the union republics with a population of more than one million; (2) capitals of the union republics with a population of less than one million; (3) regional centers with a population of more than one million; (4) regional centers with a population of less than one million; (5) centers of the autonomous republics, regions, and districts; (6) peripheral towns of the autonomous republics, regions, and districts; (7) Moscow and Leningrad; and (8) villages. Each geographical unit fitting within the 18 * 8 matrix was then enumerated, and units were sampled. Sampling points were drawn from each cell in the matrix. If there was discretion about which of several units to select, then experts on the area were consulted in an effort to select the most representative unit. The strategy resulted in 62 sampling points.

The nonpanel Russian sample also had two oversamples, one in Moscow and the other in Leningrad. The purpose of these oversamples was to allow more careful examination of reactions to the putsch of August 1991. The enlarged sample size in Moscow is 515; in Leningrad, it is 511.

Within each of the sampling points, respondents in the nonpanel subsample were selected through random procedures. Using the records of the address bureaus and farm records, respondents were identified.

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[13] This is an abbreviated version of a technical appendix found in Gibson 1995, 89–101. That appendix provides considerable additional details about the survey, as well as justifications for various decisions made and analyses of various aspects of the representativeness of the sample.

[14] Though it did not join the CIS, Georgia was sending observers to CIS proceedings at the time of the survey.

[15] This number includes special oversamples in Moscow and Leningrad. Details on these are provided below.

[16] Details on the 1990 sample are available in numerous published papers (e.g., Gibson 1993b) and in a technical report available as part of the data set archived at ICPSR, Study #6099 (Gibson and Duch 1990).

The response rate for the nonpanel portion of the 1992 survey was quite high: 85.6%.

A comparison of the sample attributes with population characteristics on age, gender, marital status, education, and employment status revealed few significant differences between the sample and the population. Like most surveys (e.g., Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992, 872), however, the better educated are slightly overrepresented.

The survey instrument was pretested in Moscow and significantly revised by both the American and Soviet research teams working closely together. The interviews asked a broad array of questions on many topics. The survey instrument was back-translated twice, and every effort was made to ensure that the questions, though mainly Western in origin, were tailored to the Soviet cultural context. Special attention was given to training the interviewers in techniques commonly used in surveys in the West. The respondents had no idea that the survey was in any way connected with an American research project.

APPENDIX B: MEASUREMENT AND QUESTION WORDING

Clarity of Recall of Position at the Time of the Coup

The question reads: "As you know, the State Committee on the State of Emergency was formed on August 19 for the purpose of seizing political power. How well do you remember what you did on these days—from August 19th, when they announced the creation of the (GKChP), until the return of M. S. Gorbachev to Moscow?"

The response set was: "very clearly remember, remember in general, without details, cannot very clearly remember, and remember nothing."

Protest Behavior during the August Putsch

The question reads: "For the majority of people it was difficult to do anything to show their attitude toward the coup because it lasted only three days. We are interested if you, personally, did anything to express your attitude toward the coup and its leaders. On those days did you . . . " [see Table 1 for the list of activities].

Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes

For a complete discussion of this scale see Gibson (1995). There were seven subdimensions of the overall index. All items used a five-point response set.

(1) The valuation the respondent attaches to liberty. (Agree strongly-Disagree strongly)

"It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive."

"Free speech ought to be allowed for all political groups even if some of the things they say are highly insulting and threatening to some segments of society."

"Society shouldn't have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority."

"Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist political views."

"Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and extremist political groups shouldn't be allowed to demonstrate."

(2) Support for competitive elections. (Agree strongly-Disagree strongly)

"There are better ways to select our leaders than elections from several candidates."

"People should try to do everything possible so that any proposal about the abolition of competitive elections is never accepted."

"If the leaders who were elected cannot improve the situation in the country, then it is better to abandon competitive elections."

"Those supporting competitive elections are doing harm to the country."

(3) Support for a multiparty system. (Agree strongly-Disagree strongly)

"Our system of government would work better if we abolished political parties."

"Strong political parties will improve the way democracy works in our country."

"Political parties complicate questions more than they help clear them up."

(4) Support for independent and pluralistic media. (Agree strongly-Disagree strongly)

"The government ought to see to it that all political movements in this country have the opportunity to publish their manifestoes and polemics in newspapers, pamphlets, and books."

"Newspapers, radio, television should be responsible for themselves in order to reflect all points of view, even those that certain people could consider to be subversive and dangerous."

"The mass media should be protected by law more than they are now from the authorities."

"Private radios, television, and newspapers should exist alongside state-owned media."

(5) Rights consciousness. (Very important-Not at all important)

"How important is it to observe the following rights and freedoms?

Freedom of Speech
Guarantee of personal safety and protection
Freedom of associations, groups and unions
Right of a nation to its own language and culture
Religious freedoms and freedom of conscience
Equality before the law
Right to work
Right to personal property
Right to education and instruction
Right to receive information
Right to confidentiality of personal correspondence, of telephone conversations, etc.
Right to emigrate"

(6) Support for dissent and opposition. (Agree strongly-Disagree strongly)

"It is wonderful that people today have greater freedom to protest against things they do not like."

"It is best to treat dissenters with an open mind, since new ideas are necessary for progressive change."

"People should be able to participate in any organization, even if this activity opposes some current laws."

(7) Political tolerance. This scale is based on the "least-liked" technique for measuring intolerance. The following questions were asked of the two political groups named as most disliked by the respondent. (Agree strongly-Disagree strongly)

"[Members of the (GROUP)/NAME OF GROUP] should be prohibited from occupying elected positions in your community."

"[NAME OF GROUP] should be officially banned in your community."

"[Members of the (GROUP)/NAME OF GROUP] should be allowed to make a public speech in your community."

"[Members of the (GROUP)/NAME OF GROUP] should be allowed to hold street demonstrations in your community."

The Likelihood of Successful Opposition

"In your view, about what percentage of the people in the country supported the coup?"

"About what percentage supported the demonstrators in Moscow and Leningrad?"

External Political Efficacy

Responses to these items were collected using a Likert response set. The item-to-scale (factor score) correlations are shown in parentheses at the end of each statement. When factor analyzed, these items form a unidimensional scale. (High scores indicate greater degrees of efficacy.)

"People who run the country are not really concerned with what happens to people like me." (.79)

"If public officials are not interested in hearing what people like me think, there is really no way to make them listen." (.85)

"People like me cannot influence the activities of the authorities." (.61)

"In our country, all political power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people and it is impossible for the rest of us to influence what the government does." (.65)

Perceived Benefits of Democratization

The measure was simply the average number of times the respondent agreed with the statements about the positive benefits of democracy and disagreed with propositions expressing costs of democracy.

"The emergence of democracy in the country

changed very little or nothing at all for me.
gave me more freedom.
made me feel less safe.
made me feel that I can no longer influence the government.
made me worry more about whether I will keep my job.
increased my respect for our country.
made me more pessimistic regarding our future."

Duty to Participate

The average response to these items was used as the measure of a perceived duty to participate. The item-to-scale correlations were .75 and .80, respectively.

"Our problem today is that everyone acts according to their own personal interest, without considering the welfare of the society as a whole."

"When it comes to politics, people should put aside their personal interests and work for the good of the society as a whole."

Experience at Unconventional Participation

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they had ever participated in each of the following activities.

Sign a petition (appeal, statement).
Join a boycott.
Participate in a meeting opposing the authorities.
Organize a strike against the actions of the authorities.
Deliver a speech criticizing the actions of the authorities.
Participate in the work of an informal political organization.
Publish an article criticizing the actions of the authorities.
Participate in a protest group.
Organize public meetings for criticizing the authorities.
Organize a strike against the actions of the authorities.

Attitudes toward Protest Activity

The question read: "Your opinion interests us about what ordinary people could do to join in the events and express their attitudes toward the coup. Do you support the following kinds of activities?" The activities included: participation in demonstrations, strikes, violent actions, the construction of barricades, and arming the population.

Internal Political Efficacy

When factor analyzed, a single strong dimension emerged, accounting for 57.3% of the interitem variance. The eigenvalue of the first factor extracted was 2.29; the eigenvalue of the second factor was .79. The strongest factor loading was the simple statement about being well prepared to participate in politics (loading = .79); the weakest loading was for the item about politics being too complicated (loading = −.45), which was worded so that agreement with the statement indicates *low* political efficacy.

"I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country."

"I think that I have enough information about political life and the actions of the government."

"I feel well prepared for participating in political life."

"Sometimes political and state affairs seem so complicated to me that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

Distributions of the Variables

For the combined Moscow/Leningrad samples, the variables used in the regression analysis had the characteristics shown in Table B-1.

For the remainder of the country, the variables had the characteristics shown in Table B-2.

TABLE B-1.

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Support for democratic institutions and processes	59.175	13.278	11.574	96.215
Relative support for the coup and the demonstrators	.609	.179	.000	1.000
Belief that action makes a difference*	.652	.477	.000	1.000
Belief that government is responsive	.050	.903	−1.556	2.717
Perceived direct benefits from democracy	2.904	.536	1.429	4.571
Social benefits	.786	1.160	.000	10.000
Psychological benefits	2.641	.882	1.000	5.000
Material costs*	.442	.497	.000	1.000
Experience at unconventional participation	.044	.099	.000	.700
Approval of protest activity	2.724	1.075	1.000	5.000
Personal political efficacy	.007	.870	−1.798	2.758

*The variable is a dichotomy.

TABLE B-2.

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Support for democratic institutions and processes	55.268	12.805	.994	99.995
Relative support for the coup and the demonstrators	.575	.174	.000	1.000
Belief that action makes a difference*	.726	.446	.000	1.000
Belief that government is responsive	−.004	.856	−1.556	2.941
Perceived direct benefits from democracy	2.865	.476	1.143	4.714
Social benefits	.733	.754	.000	10.000
Psychological benefits	2.519	.817	1.000	5.000
Material costs*	.240	.427	.000	1.000
Experience at unconventional participation	.034	.087	.000	1.000
Approval of protest activity	2.422	1.006	1.000	5.000
Personal political efficacy	−.001	.891	−1.798	2.758

*The variable is a dichotomy.

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The Long-Run Advantages of Centralization for Collective Action: A Comment on Bendor and Mookherjee

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Institutional design can affect the logic of ongoing collective action in groups with heterogeneous members. This article corrects a mathematical error in a seminal article by Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) and shows how the amended result strengthens the case for centralized monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. In solving their original model, Bendor and Mookherjee neglected that groups under centralized control will become increasingly talented over time, as headquarters detects and replaces untalented members. Expected improvements in the talent of the group should heighten the incentive for its members to work and curtail the incidence of costly free riding, as well as reduce the average per-worker cost of production. These gains in efficiency will not materialize in decentralized regimes, where the fraction of talented members will remain constant over time. Depending on the effectiveness of monitoring in the centralized group and the level of patience and talent in society as a whole, centralized regimes can produce greater group welfare than decentralized ones, even when decentralized institutions operate flawlessly.

Problems of collective action pervade social and political life. As Mancur Olson (1965) observed three decades ago, self-interest can lead rational individuals to exploit the benefits of cooperative activity without contributing to the collective endeavor. The potential for rational free riding exists in administrative bureaucracies, labor unions, interest groups, and other settings involving voluntary cooperation to produce a common good. Whether free riding actually takes place will depend, in part, on institutional structures.

The case for hierarchical solutions to collective action problems has a long intellectual pedigree. Against the backdrop of civil war in England, Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1968) perceived what modern theorists call the prisoner's dilemma and proposed absolute monarchy as the best means of monitoring and enforcing cooperation among egoists (Hampton 1986, Kavka 1986). David Hume likewise recognized that large groups have difficulty collaborating for the common weal, because each member "seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the whole burden on others." Government, Hume insisted, "easily remedies . . . these inconveniences" ([1739] 1978, 538). More recent advocates of centralized institutions include Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), William Bianco and Robert Bates (1990), Garrett Hardin (1993), Bengt Holmstrom (1982), and William Ophuls (1992).

Against Hobbes and his intellectual successors, some political scientists (Axelrod 1984; R. Hardin 1982; Taylor 1976, 1990) and economists (Friedman 1971, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986, Rubenstein 1979) have noted the potential to overcome collective action problems without the aid of centralized institutions. When a prisoner's dilemma is repeated indefinitely, they argue, individuals can adopt conditional (trigger) strategies designed to reward cooperation and punish defection. In the context of trigger strategies, an individual who behaves opportunistically today must forego the fruits of cooperation in subsequent periods. Provided that actors do not discount the future too heavily, there exists an appropriate trigger strategy that will sustain cooperation perpetually. By this logic, individuals can surmount the prisoner's dilemma in a completely decentralized setting.[1]

Since administrative arrangements sometimes fit the hierarchical Hobbesian model and at other times appear more decentralized and collegial, it is important to understand under what conditions one organizational form is more efficient than the other. In a seminal article, Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee (1987) compared centralized and decentralized methods of monitoring and enforcement, asking which is more likely to deter free riding. They modeled an interest group containing both talented and untalented players, who must decide between contributing to a collective effort and free riding on the work of others.

To examine the effects of hierarchy, Bendor and Mookherjee posited a central headquarters possessing authority to monitor members and expel shirkers from the group. The authors identified a separating equilibrium in which the untalented members, who would suffer a greater cost for their effort, free ride on the contributions of their more talented colleagues. In the Bendor-Mookherjee model of the decentralized case, by contrast, no overarching monitor exists, but individual players can observe the output of the group as a whole. If aggregate output falls below acceptable levels, then all members will abandon the enterprise for a

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[1] There is no guarantee that individuals *will* overcome the dilemma, since perpetual cooperation is not the only sustainable equilibrium of an indefinitely iterated game. For a discussion of the fundamental game-theoretic result (often called the "folk theorem") that many equilibria are possible with repetition, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, 150–60) or Morrow (1994, 262–79).

given number of periods, thereby punishing the shirkers and everyone else, including themselves. The threat of mutual sanctions produces a pooling equilibrium in which both talented and untalented members work.

Bendor and Mookherjee applied this analysis to evaluate various institutional solutions to collective action problems. They concluded that, when players in a decentralized setting monitor the relationship between individual contributions and group payoffs with considerable accuracy, decentralized systems with trigger strategies (which elicit cooperation from everyone) produce greater group welfare than centralized systems (which allow free riding by untalented members). Introducing uncertainty, they claimed, reverses the conclusion. If, for example, individuals mistakenly attribute an accidental shortfall in collective output to intentional shirking by one or more members, then the punishment phase of the decentralized scheme may be triggered inadvertently, resulting in substantial welfare losses. This effect grows with the number of players, making centralized regimes superior to decentralized ones whenever monitoring is poor and the group is large (1987, 136–40).

Bendor and Mookherjee committed a mathematical error, however, in calculating the payoffs under a centralized regime. This paper corrects their error and shows how the amended result actually strengthens the case for centralized monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The Bendor-Mookherjee calculations, which treat the fraction of talented players as a constant value, neglect that the hierarchically structured group will become more talented over time as central authorities expel the untalented shirkers. Such an improvement in the talent level of the group is not possible under a decentralized regime.

Two important consequences follow from correcting the error in the Bendor-Mookherjee paper. First, expected improvements in the talent of the group increase the incentive for untalented players to work and curtail the incidence of free riding. This heightened desire to work arises because the cost of shirking, understood as the future earnings forgone by any member who is caught free riding, becomes larger if the group promises to become progressively more talented and productive. By the same logic, anticipated increases in group output over time make talented members more willing to work. These parallel changes in the incentives of talented and untalented members shift downward the range of monitoring intensities consistent with a separating equilibrium.

The second consequence concerns the group welfare produced under each regime. As the level of talent in the centralized group increases, the average per-worker cost of production will decline, since talented workers suffer lower costs for their effort. Eventually the proportion of talented members will become large enough that the per-period net output of the centralized group will exceed per-period net output in the decentralized one. The relative desirability of the two regimes will depend, therefore, on the effectiveness of monitoring in the centralized group (which determines how fast untalented shirkers are weeded out) and the level of patience and talent in society as a whole.[2] While a decentralized system may be desirable for certain configurations of parameters, a centralized system is preferable for others.

In summary, our mathematical correction reveals that, contrary to the conclusion of Bendor and Mookherjee, a centralized system with increasing numbers of talented members can produce higher levels of group welfare than a decentralized system whose talent level remains static, *even when decentralized enforcement mechanisms operate flawlessly.* We therefore accept the Bendor-Mookherjee argument that, when decentralized enforcement mechanisms operate poorly due to uncertainty, centralized institutions are often preferable. We add, however, that even without such uncertainty, centralized regimes will prove superior whenever centralized monitoring is effective enough to detect the shirkers and members are patient enough to await the eventual benefits of the weeding process.

The first section of this paper presents the assumptions that Bendor and Mookherjee employed to model the logic of ongoing collective action. In the second, we show that the level of talent within the centralized group will rise over time. This analysis provides a foundation for the third section, in which we demonstrate, without modifying a single postulate of the original model but simply by performing the calculations correctly, that free riding under a centralized regime is less tempting than Bendor and Mookherjee suggested. The fourth section applies these insights to a corrected comparative analysis of centralized and decentralized schemes, and the fifth section concludes the paper.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL

The Bendor-Mookherjee model considers an interest group of constant size n, containing members of high or low ability.[3] The group begins with $(1 - f)n$ highly able or talented members and fn less able or untalented ones. Each member can either work or shirk. Working involves costs for the member, whether talented or not, but an untalented member must work harder than talented colleagues to produce the same quantity of output on behalf of the group. Thus, the cost of working incurred by an untalented player in one period (c_1) exceeds the cost of working incurred by a talented player in a similar period (c_2). By assumption,

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[2] Patience operates through the discount rate. Although the centralized group will eventually overtake the decentralized one in per-period net output, it remains an open question whether it is worth waiting the necessary periods for that to happen, during which a decentralized arrangement would have been more efficient. The more patient society is (higher discount rate), the more likely that the centralized regime will be superior in present value terms. The higher the level of talent in the underlying population, the more likely that an untalented member, once expelled, will be replaced by a talented one.

[3] This group also may be thought of as a team working within an administrative agency, political party, church, labor union, firm, or local community. Our analysis also could apply to franchisees who produce and protect the value of a trademark, subject to monitoring and enforcement by a central franchisor (Rubin 1978).

TABLE 1. Important Parameters in the Bendor-Mookherjee Model

Parameter	Definition	Range
n	number of members in the interest group	$n \in [2, \infty)$
f	fraction of untalented members in the group	$f \in (0, 1)$
b	collective benefit from a single unit of output	$b \in (0, \infty)$
c_1	cost of working incurred by an untalented member	$c_1 \in (0, \infty)$
c_2	cost of working incurred by a talented member	$c_2 \in (0, \infty)$
q	probability of being monitored by the central authority	$q \in (0, 1)$
δ	discount rate of member	$\delta \in (0, 1)$

all workers produce the same quantity of output in a single period, regardless of differences in talent among them.

Each working member generates one unit of output, whereas shirking members produce nothing at all. Working produces a collective good, and collective benefits increase linearly in the contributions of the members at a rate of b per unit of output. Thus, cooperation by everyone will guarantee n units of output and bn benefits for the group as a whole. The group exhibits rival but equitable consumption, so each member receives b/n benefits for every unit of output.[4] To ensure that the situation is a prisoner's dilemma,

$$b > c_1 > c_2 > \frac{b}{n}.$$

Given this transitive inequality, shirking is a dominant strategy for each member in a one-shot game, since the personal gain from working (b/n) is smaller than the private cost of doing so (c_1 for the untalented and c_2 for the talented). Nevertheless, unanimous shirking constitutes a Pareto-deficient outcome, because each member would receive a positive benefit ($b - c_i > 0$) if everyone were working. Under repeated play, the parameter δ discounts the benefits accruing to each member in periods beyond the first round.

As noted above, Bendor and Mookherjee compared two organizational regimes: centralized or hierarchical, and decentralized or collegial. The results derived for the decentralized case are correct, so we focus here on the centralized arrangement. The Bendor-Mookherjee article posits a central authority that monitors individual members and expels observed shirkers from the association. For each member, the probability of being monitored in a given round is q, which remains stationary and independent over time. "If the member is observed and found to be shirking, [then] he or she is expelled and randomly replaced by someone from the outside population" (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987, 135). Expulsion permanently deprives the ostracized individual of any benefits produced by the group.[5]

A summary of the important parameters appears in Table 1.[6]

RISING TALENT UNDER A CENTRALIZED MONITORING AGENT

Our correction begins by demonstrating that hierarchically organized interest groups will become more talented over time, as central authorities expel the untalented shirkers and replace them with potentially talented candidates. As Bendor and Mookherjee (1987, 135) point out:

> Observing a member shirking even once reveals with certainty that he or she is of low ability. Since such members will never contribute to the common weal, all other members will agree to expel the deviant forever, for there is a chance that the replacement will have high ability and will participate.

Thus, only untalented members are ever expelled under the separating equilibrium, but their replacements will sometimes be talented, guaranteeing a progressive increase in the talent of the group.

To see precisely how talent rises under a centralized scheme, suppose that the central authority randomly draws a group of constant size n from a national population of talented and untalented candidates. Further suppose the population is large enough that removing n individuals will not perceptibly change the ratio of talented to untalented candidates. If f denotes the fraction of untalented candidates in the general population, then a random draw of n candidates should yield an interest group composed of $(1 - f)n$ talented members and fn untalented ones. This initial distribution of talented and untalented members accords with the foundational assumptions of the Bendor-Mookherjee paper.

Under the separating equilibrium, talented members work and untalented members shirk. According to Bendor and Mookherjee, the central authority will expel shirkers with a probability of q and replace them with candidates drawn from the general population. Given the scenario outlined in the previous paragraph, each replacement will be talented with a probability $(1 - f)$ and untalented with a probability f. As headquarters makes the replacement, the fraction of

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[4] The equitable condition also implies nonexcludability: It is not possible to prevent a group member from enjoying the benefits of the group's collective labor, so long as she remains a member of the group.

[5] Importantly, Bendor and Mookherjee assume that an expelled individual is never rehired (p. 135). Therefore, the expected future payoffs to an expelled worker fall to zero.

[6] Bendor and Mookherjee did not explicitly provide admissible ranges for all the parameters in Table 1, but we have stipulated intervals that are consistent with their model and common usage.

TABLE 2. Changes in the Composition of the Group over Time

Round	Number of Untalented Members	Number of Talented Members
1	nf	$n - nf$
2	$nf(1 - q + qf)$	$n - nf(1 - q + qf)$
3	$nf(1 - q + qf)^2$	$n - nf(1 - q + qf)^2$
4	$nf(1 - q + qf)^3$	$n - nf(1 - q + qf)^3$
⋮	⋮	⋮
∞	$nf(1 - q + qf)^\infty = 0$	$n - nf(1 - q + qf)^\infty = n$

Note: Entries in the table represent expected values.

FIGURE 1. Rate of Change in Composition of the Group

The greater the intensity of monitoring (within equilibrium bounds), the more rapidly the group under centralized control will rise in talent.



Note: $n = 50$, $f = 5$; other parameters are set to sustain a separating equilibrium.

talented members in the interest group will rise.[7] Table 2 reveals how the group's composition is expected to change over time.

Groups under centralized control can improve in talent at a remarkably rapid rate. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon for a reasonable set of parameter values. When the probability of being monitored by the central authority is 0.5 per round, a group initially split evenly between talented and untalented members will become 79% talented within three periods and 91% talented after three more. Within only 12 periods, nearly every member of low ability will be ejected and replaced by a more talented individual. Figure 1 also shows that the rate of improvement depends on the intensity of monitoring. Ceteris paribus, and provided that other parameters remain inside the range required to support a separating equilibrium, the greater the intensity of monitoring, the more rapid is the rise in talent of the group under centralized control.

A CORRECTED SET OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS

In this section, we prove that progressive increases in the number of talented members will weaken the temptation for members to free ride. Knowing that membership in the group will become more valuable over time, both talented and untalented individuals will be less willing to risk expulsion by shirking and more willing to contribute to the collective endeavor. Such changes in the incentives of talented and untalented members will shift downward the range of monitoring intensities consistent with a separating equilibrium.

To calculate the conditions under which talented members work and the untalented members shirk, we employ the same equilibrium concept that Bendor and Mookherjee used. First, we find the conditions that will motivate each untalented member to shirk in every round. Then we derive a complementary set of conditions that should deter talented members from ever shirking. Combining these results reveals a critical range for the probability of monitoring that will make the work-shirk equilibrium possible. Values of q extending above this range should induce everyone to work for at least one period, whereas values falling below the range should lead both the talented and the untalented to shirk.

According to Bendor and Mookherjee, the work-shirk outcome will remain stable so long as no member can improve her welfare by deviating unilaterally from the candidate equilibrium for a single period. Consider an untalented member who knows that her colleagues are behaving according to the separating equilibrium. This member will also adhere to the separating equilibrium if she cannot reap greater payoffs by working instead of shirking in a single round of the game. Likewise, a talented member will follow the identified equilibrium if she cannot attain greater welfare by shirking for one period. These conclusions follow from a well-known premise of discounted dynamic programming: "Strategies that are unimprovable in one step are optimal" (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987, 147). Establishing the conditions for a separating equilibrium, therefore, depends on comparing the payoffs from playing the postulated equilibrium strategy against the payoffs from deviating for a single round.

Recalculating the Incentives of Untalented Members

To recalculate the incentives of untalented members, we need information about the number of talented workers they could exploit across repetitions of the game. Table 2 slightly overstates this number. The

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[7] A more general consequence of centralization is that interest groups like the ones Bendor and Mookherjee describe will become more talented over time, so long as the general population contains at least some talented candidates.

TABLE 3. Changes in the Composition of a Group with $n - 1$ Members

Round	Number of Untalented Members	Number of Talented Members
1	$nf - 1$	$(n - 1) - (nf - 1)$
2	$(nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)$	$(n - 1) - (nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)$
3	$(nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)^2$	$(n - 1) - (nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)^2$
4	$(nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)^3$	$(n - 1) - (nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)^3$
⋮	⋮	⋮
∞	$(nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)^\infty = 0$	$(n - 1) - (nf - 1)(1 - q + qf)^\infty = n - 1$

Note: Entries in the table represent expected values.

values in the third column rise over time due to expulsions by the central authorities. A shirker who leaves the game will make room for more talented replacements, but that shirker will never realize the benefits that his own expulsion makes possible for others. Consequently, we must recalculate the table from the perspective of a shirker who remains in the game.

Table 3 supplies the requisite information for deriving the correct incentives of an untalented member. If he behaves according to the stipulated equilibrium, enjoining shirking in every round, then he can expect to receive the following discounted payoff over infinite repetitions of the same game:

$$\frac{b(n-1)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)]} - \frac{b(nf-1)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)(1-q+qf)]}. \tag{1}$$

The payoff includes contributions from all talented members, discounted exponentially by the per-period discount rate δ and $(1 - q)$, the latter quantity representing the probability that the untalented shirker will evade detection and continue playing in subsequent rounds.

Compare expression 1 to the expected payoff from working in one round and shirking in all others:

$$b(1-f) + \frac{b}{n} - c_1 + \frac{\delta b(n-1)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)]} - \frac{\delta b(nf-1)(1-q+qf)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)(1-q+qf)]}. \tag{2}$$

Provided that expression 1 is larger than expression 2, an untalented player will not deviate from the separating equilibrium by working instead of shirking in a single round of the game. The requisite condition is:

$$c_1 - \frac{b}{n} > b(1-f) + \frac{b(n-1)(\delta-1)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)]} + \frac{b(nf-1)[1-\delta(1-q+qf)]}{n[1-\delta(1-q)(1-q+qf)]}. \tag{3}$$

Despite its apparent complexity, the inequality captures a fairly simple intuition. An untalented player will not deviate from the stipulated equilibrium if the immediate cost of working for one period $(c_1 - b/n)$ exceeds the present value of future benefits, which the shirker is likely to forgo, given the probability q of being expelled for failing to work in a single period.

Contrast expression 3 with the inequality that Bendor and Mookherjee calculated, assuming that the number of talented workers remains stable at $(1 - f)n$:

$$c_1 - \frac{b}{n} > b(1-f) + \frac{b(n-1)(\delta-1)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)]} + \frac{b(nf-1)(1-\delta)}{n[1-\delta(1-q)]}. \tag{4}$$

If the right side of inequality 3 exceeds the right side of inequality 4, then expected improvements in the talent of the group heighten the incentive for untalented members to work and therefore make free riding less likely. Free riding by untalented members will occur less often than Bendor and Mookherjee indicate if

$$\frac{1-\delta(1-q+qf)}{1-\delta(1-q)(1-q+qf)} > \frac{1-\delta}{1-\delta(1-q)}.$$

This condition simplifies to $(1 - q + qf) < 1$, which holds for any admissible combination of q and f. Compared to a situation in which talent remains constant, improvements in the quality of the group over time, therefore, make centralized institutions less vulnerable to free riding by untalented members.

Recalculating the Incentives of Talented Workers

Rising talent not only reduces the incentive for untalented members to free ride on the efforts of more talented colleagues but also heightens the work incentive for talented members. In this section, we derive the correct conditions under which a talented member will work in every period in a group whose ability improves over time. We show that increasing talent shifts downward the critical range of monitoring values consistent with the separating equilibrium.

If the group becomes increasingly able at the rate suggested by Table 2, then a talented member who works in every period can expect to receive the following payoff:

$$\frac{b-c_2}{1-\delta} - \frac{bf}{1-\delta(1-q+qf)}. \tag{5}$$

Suppose instead that the talented member deviates unilaterally from the separating equilibrium for a single period. The payoff from shirking in one round and working in all others is

$$b(1-f) - \frac{b}{n} + \delta(1-q)\left[\frac{b-c_2}{1-\delta} - \frac{bf(1-q+qf)}{1-\delta(1-q+qf)}\right]. \quad (6)$$

The separating equilibrium will be Nash-stable if the benefits of working in every period (expression 5) exceed the benefits of shirking once and working otherwise (expression 6). Stated mathematically,

$$c_2 - \frac{b}{n} < q\left[\frac{\delta b(1-1/n)}{1-\delta(1-q)} - \frac{\delta bf(1-\delta)(1-q+qf)}{[1-\delta(1-q)][1-\delta(1-q+qf)]}\right]. \quad (7)$$

Thus, a talented member will work in every period if the immediate gain from shirking once is less than the present value of future payoffs that the talented player is likely to lose, given the probability q of being ejected for an isolated attempt to free ride. Our corrected inequality contrasts with the result derived by Bendor and Mookherjee:

$$c_2 - \frac{b}{n} < \frac{q\delta b(1-f-1/n)}{1-\delta(1-q)}. \quad (8)$$

If the right side of inequality 7, is greater than the right side of inequality 8, then improvements in the quality of the group should heighten the incentive for the talented to work. The relevant condition is

$$\frac{(1-\delta)(1-q+qf)}{1-\delta(1-q+qf)} < 1.$$

This condition simplifies to $(1 - q + qf) < 1$, which holds for any permutation of q and f. An important conclusion follows: Given that talent will rise over time, eliciting cooperation from talented members will prove easier than Bendor and Mookherjee contended.

Taken together, these subsections demonstrate that increasing talent makes both untalented and talented players more willing to work. Consequently, some rates of monitoring (q) that would have induced separation had the original Bendor-Mookherjee calculations been correct will actually support universal cooperation under our revised estimates. By the same token, certain levels of q that, according to Bendor and Mookherjee, would have encouraged everyone to shirk will actually support a separating equilibrium in our corrected version. In short, the range of q consistent with the separating equilibrium has shifted downward. If monitoring is costly, then by our estimates it will be relatively less expensive to implement a monitoring system that induces the desired separation of types, with talented workers contributing and untalented ones shirking, than the original Bendor-Mookherjee calculations would have led one to believe.[8]

THE RELATIVE DESIRABILITY OF CENTRALIZED INSTITUTIONS

The foregoing analysis has normative implications. The Bendor-Mookherjee article (1987, 136) maintains that, when monitoring is highly accurate, decentralized systems (which elicit cooperation from every player) will produce greater welfare than centralized systems (which allow free riding by untalented members). Our correction reveals, to the contrary, that a centralized system with increasing numbers of talented members can produce more group welfare than a decentralized system whose talented population remains static, even when the decentralized monitoring and enforcement mechanisms operate perfectly.[9] The relative desirability of the two regimes will depend on the effectiveness of monitoring in the centralized group and the levels of patience and talent in society as a whole.

For decentralized systems with trigger strategies, the Bendor-Mookherjee article presents a pooling equilibrium in which both talented and untalented members cooperate.[10] If everyone plays the stipulated strategy, then the decentralized system produces the following measure of expected aggregate welfare:[11]

$$\frac{n[b - c_2 - f(c_1 - c_2)]}{1-\delta}. \quad (9)$$

Centralized systems, by contrast, permit a separating equilibrium in which the talented work and the untalented shirk. If it were possible for the number of talented workers to remain stable at $(1 - f)n$, a centralized system would produce collective welfare at a level of

$$\frac{n(1-f)(b-c_2)}{1-\delta}. \quad (10)$$

The following inequality must hold for expression 9 to exceed expression 10, demonstrating the alleged superiority of a decentralized regime:

$$n[b - c_2 - f(c_1 - c_2)] > n(1-f)(b-c_2).$$

Simplifying this inequality leads to $b > c_1$, which is true by stipulation. Consequently, expression 9 is greater than expression 10 for groups in which the

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[8] Bendor and Mookherjee did not explicitly include the cost of monitoring in their model. We believe that it may be relevant, however, when comparing the desirability of the two types of regimes from an aggregate welfare perspective. We revisit this issue in some depth below.

[9] We, like Bendor and Mookherjee, confine our attention to the welfare of the group. What is good for group members may not, of course, be good for society overall.

[10] See Bendor and Mookherjee (1987, 132–4, 146–7) for their derivation of the decentralized pooling equilibrium, involving a finite trigger strategy.

[11] Recall that there are n members, each producing b units of output, with a proportion f of them exerting effort at cost c_1, and the remainder $(1 - f)$ exerting effort at cost c_2. Expression 9 assumes that all parameter values are within the equilibrium range. The requisite conditions are:

$$\frac{1-\delta^{T+1}}{1-\delta} \geq \frac{b - b/n}{b - c_1}, \quad \delta \geq \frac{c_1 - b/n}{b - b/n},$$

where T is the duration of the punishment phase in the trigger strategy (see Bendor and Mookherjee 1987, 133, slightly modified here to account for two different talent levels). When these conditions are not satisfied, aggregate production drops to zero.

fraction of talented members remains constant over time.

The results look different when one accounts for a centralized group that becomes increasingly talented. The values in Table 2 supply the basis for deriving the present value of aggregate welfare produced by such a group when it achieves a separating equilibrium:[12]

$$n(b - c_2)\left[\frac{1}{1-\delta} - \frac{f}{1-\delta(1-q+qf)}\right]. \qquad \textbf{(11)}$$

Compare expression 11 to a manipulated version of expression 10:

$$n(b - c_2)\left(\frac{1}{1-\delta} - \frac{f}{1-\delta}\right).$$

Intuition suggests that centralized groups of increasing talent produce more in-group welfare than similarly centralized groups whose compositions remain stable. The mathematical proof is simple. For all admissible values of q and f, the quantity $(1 - q + qf) < 1$. Thus $1 - \delta(1 - q + qf) > 1 - \delta$. It follows that expression 11 is greater than expression 10.

Having derived values of aggregate welfare produced under decentralized and centralized institutions, we can find the correct conditions for preferring the latter. A centralized regime that achieves a separating equilibrium will yield greater group welfare than a decentralized regime that elicits universal cooperation, provided that expression 11 is greater than expression 9. Equivalently,

$$\frac{c_1 - c_2}{b - c_2} > \frac{1-\delta}{1-\delta(1-q+qf)}. \qquad \textbf{(12)}$$

Higher levels of q, the rate at which untalented shirkers are weeded from the group, make the condition easier to satisfy.[13] A more patient society, exhibiting higher levels of δ and therefore less discounting over time, also enhances the likelihood that a centralized system will produce more group welfare than a decentralized one.[14] Larger shares of talented members in the general population $(1 - f)$ similarly favor the centralized regime,[15] as do higher costs of working incurred by untalented individuals (c_1).[16] Yet, higher benefits per unit of output increase the attractiveness of a decentralized scheme.[17] Therefore, when trying to decide what type of system to implement for any particular collective enterprise, the answer will depend on the values of these parameters.[18]

One parameter that is clearly important, and often at the discretion of the interest group or agency in question, is the monitoring rate, q. The Bendor-Mookherjee article correctly points out (p. 136) that if headquarters monitors members with sufficient vigilance, then everyone, regardless of ability, will contribute to the collective enterprise. The risk of expulsion from shirking will simply be too great to bear. When monitoring reaches this level of intensity, per-period and aggregate payoffs for the centralized and decentralized regimes will be identical. If monitoring is too lax, then even talented members will shirk, and aggregate output will plummet to zero. Between these two extremes lies an interesting, intermediate monitoring range, capable of supporting a separating equilibrium. If the actual rate of monitoring lies near the lower end of this intermediate range, then untalented members may not be replaced by talented ones fast enough to make the centralized regime more efficient than the decentralized one. When q is raised above q^*, however, untalented workers are weeded out fast enough for the centralized regime to deliver more aggregate group welfare than a decentralized trigger strategy. Figure 2 illustrates this effect for sample values of the other parameters.[19]

Given the configuration of parameter values listed at the bottom of Figure 2, there exists an equilibrium

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[12] The expression presumes that the centralized group attains a separating equilibrium; that is, conditions 3 and 7 hold. If condition 7 holds but 3 does not, then even the untalented members will work, and the centralized regime will produce a pooling equilibrium whose aggregate welfare is given by expression 9. If neither 3 nor 7 holds, then output will drop to zero as both talented and untalented players shirk in every period. This expression also presupposes that a group which separates at time t will continue separating for all future periods, even as the proportion of talented members increases. A proof of this proposition is available from the authors upon request.

[13] Since $f < 1$, $(1 - q + qf)$ is decreasing in q. Therefore, $1 - \delta(1 - q + qf)$ is increasing in q. This expression is the denominator, so the right-hand side of inequality 12 is decreasing in q, making the inequality easier to satisfy as q gets larger.

[14] Since $(1 - q + qf) < 1$, the right-hand side of inequality 12 is decreasing in δ, making the inequality easier to satisfy as δ increases.

[15] Note that $(1 - q + qf)$ is increasing in f, the proportion of the population that is *untalented*. Therefore, the denominator of the right-hand side is decreasing in f, and the entire right-hand side of the inequality is increasing in f. This makes the inequality harder to satisfy as f increases but easier to satisfy as $(1 - f)$, the proportion of talented members, increases.

[16] The left-hand side of the inequality is increasing in c_1, making the inequality easier to satisfy when the cost of effort for untalented workers rises. This makes intuitive sense, because the separating equilibrium induced by the centralized regime involves these untalented workers shirking and, therefore, never incurring the cost c_1, which they would suffer every period under a decentralized regime. As this cost saving increases, the centralized regime becomes relatively more desirable.

[17] Note that the denominator of the left-hand side of the expression is increasing in b, the per-unit benefit from effort. Hence, the left-hand side is decreasing in b, making the condition harder to satisfy as b becomes large. This is also intuitively appealing, since an increase in the value of additional worker contributions increases the magnitude of benefits that members of a centralized group must forgo while waiting for their group to become more talented.

[18] Converting inequality 12 to an equality, we can calculate the critical values at which a centralized system overtakes a decentralized one in producing aggregate welfare. Three examples are:

$$q^* = \frac{(1-\delta)(b-c_1)}{\delta(1-f)}, \quad \delta^* = \frac{b-c_1}{(b-c_1)+q(c_1-c_2)(1-f)},$$

$$f^* = 1 - \frac{(1-\delta)(b-c_1)}{\delta q}.$$

[19] The parameter values satisfy the equilibrium conditions for universal cooperation in the decentralized case and separation in the centralized one. While this figure represents only one combination of values for n, f, c_1, c_2, b, and δ, it illustrates a general phenomenon. When a separating equilibrium exists, it is often possible to monitor at a rate that makes the centralized regime more efficient.

FIGURE 2. Welfare under Centralized and Decentralized Regimes

For certain levels of monitoring, centralized regimes produce greater group welfare than decentralized ones.



Note: $n = 50$, $f = .5$, $c_1 = .6$, $c_2 = .3$, $\delta = .9$, $b = 1$.

range $q \in [.09, .58]$ that would enable the hierarchically structured group to sustain a separating equilibrium. At the lower end of this range, monitoring is intense enough to elicit work from talented members but too lax to guarantee the superiority of centralized institutions. The centralized regime finally overtakes the decentralized one at $q = q^* = .30$ and widens its lead until $q = .58$, the upper bound of the monitoring range consistent with the separating equilibrium. Increasing q beyond .58 actually worsens the performance of the centralized regime, making it equal in efficiency to the decentralized one, because all members of the group will work, and no replacement of untalented individuals will occur.

At least two conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2. First, the Hobbesian approach will, for certain parameter values, produce a higher level of group welfare than decentralized trigger strategies, even when decentralized mechanisms operate perfectly. Second, centralized regimes can improve their performance by fine-tuning the intensity of monitoring. Conventional wisdom holds that hierarchical institutions should, whenever possible, reduce the incidence of free riding by increasing the intensity of monitoring, but our analysis proves that overmonitoring can prove highly counterproductive, at least from the perspective of aggregate group welfare. Where excessively strict monitoring is supporting a pooling equilibrium, it may be advantageous for headquarters to give members a bit more slack, thereby encouraging a separating equilibrium that would help supervisors distinguish between talented and untalented members.

At this point readers may object that our model ignores the costs of monitoring. In other words, overseeing group members at a level high enough to support a separating equilibrium may require so many resources as to tip the scales in favor of a decentralized approach. But this objection presupposes that centralized monitoring costs more than decentralized procedures. Suppose, as in Figure 2, that the interest group contains 50 members. In centralized institutions, headquarters must watch the members individually, amounting to 50 monitoring dyads per period if $q = 1$ and far fewer dyads for most sensible values of q, such as the equilibrium range given in the previous example. By contrast, each member in the decentralized case must decide for herself whether collective output has attained adequate levels, requiring a full 50 monitoring dyads per period.[20] Thus, decentralized monitoring requires as many dyads of observation as centralized procedures, if not more.

Critics may rejoin that monitoring one worker requires more effort than assessing aggregate output. In our model, however, headquarters need only determine whether a member is working at all, and this measurement does not seem any more demanding than tallying the production of the group as a whole. More nuanced evaluations of the *quality* rather than the mere fact of participation would, of course, require advanced monitoring techniques, but determining the quality of group output presumably would prove more difficult as well. Finally, even if we concede that monitoring an individual worker costs twice as much as verifying total group output, the centralized monitoring technology still will be less expensive than its decentralized counterpart, provided that q is less than 0.5, a value well within the equilibrium range of Figure 2. Thus, it is not clear that incorporating the costs of monitoring into our model would undermine the case for a centralized regime. At the least, it would be informative to perform the exercise with some explicit function for monitoring costs as a function of q.[21]

CONCLUSION

Does our mathematical correction invalidate the conclusions of Bendor and Mookherjee? Quite to the contrary, our work reinforces their fundamental claim that, under most scenarios, a centralized regime for monitoring and enforcement will prove superior to a decentralized one. We do, however, provide new and important grounds for recommending centralization.

To develop a case for centralized institutions, Bendor and Mookherjee introduced uncertainty in the form of an imperfect relationship between effort and output: Exerting effort only succeeds in making a contribution with some probability less than one. Under this arrangement the decentralized regime, which employs trigger strategies to enforce cooperation, runs a risk of entering the punishment phase due to unfortunate random events rather than intentional shirking. Since punishment phases are costly to the group, a centralized monitoring arrangement will sometimes be preferable, particularly as the number of members becomes large (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987, 136–40).

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[20] Appointing a single worker to assess the collective output and report findings to the other members would cut monitoring costs, but it would also be a form of centralization.

[21] If the production function for monitoring were to exhibit the standard feature of increasing marginal costs, then the optimal monitoring rate might no longer be the highest value of q capable of supporting the separating equilibrium ($q = .58$ in Figure 2). That is, beyond some level of q, the marginal cost of increased monitoring would exceed the marginal benefit.

We argue, by contrast, that centralized regimes can outperform decentralized ones, even under informationally rich conditions. Our argument rests on the fact, overlooked by Bendor and Mookherjee, that interest groups with centralized structures will become more talented over time as authorities expel the untalented shirkers. Anticipated improvements in the talent of the group should enhance the desirability of continued membership, thereby reducing the prospects for rational free riding. Increasing talent also should reduce the average per-worker cost of production. Decentralized regimes cannot attain such gains in efficiency because the trigger strategy required to enforce cooperation does not permit the selective identification and expulsion of untalented shirkers. Depending on the effectiveness of monitoring in the centralized group and the level of talent in society as a whole, centralized regimes therefore can produce greater social welfare than decentralized ones, *even when decentralized monitoring and enforcement apparatuses function flawlessly*. Hence, the case for centralized institutions is even stronger than Bendor and Mookherjee contend.

The comparative statics derived from our corrected version of the Bendor-Mookherjee model could be tested empirically. The monitoring rate could be measured in terms of manpower devoted to supervision, investment in monitoring equipment, and the like.[22] Education levels could be used as proxies for the talent level of the population, and data on interest and inflation rates could provide bases for estimating the level of patience, δ. Therefore, we believe it is possible, and would be very enlightening, to test across organizations or even countries the propositions that centralized regimes are more efficient and likely to be used when (1) monitoring is fairly inexpensive, (2) discounting is minimal, (3) the population is heterogeneous with regard to talent level, (4) average worker contribution to collective output is fairly low (b is small), and (5) untalented individuals are at a very substantial disadvantage (c_1 is high).

Two additional and somewhat counterintuitive implications stem from our corrected version of the Bendor-Mookherjee model. First, free riding can make centralized groups more efficient than decentralized ones. Whenever a separating equilibrium exists, the occurrence of free riding should enable central authorities to expel the untalented members while retaining those of higher ability. The functionality of free riding once again illustrates a potential trade-off between fairness and efficiency (Arneson 1982). A second surprising implication of this paper concerns the optimal probability of monitoring in a centralized institution. We often hear that administrative bureaucracies, labor unions, interest groups, and similar organizations would be more effective if central authorities were to observe their members more closely. On the contrary, this paper demonstrates that excessive monitoring can preclude a separating equilibrium with the potential to make the group more efficient. An additional empirical question, then, is whether organizations may monitor their members so closely that performance can improve over time.

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[22] For an extended version of the model that incorporates the costs of monitoring, researchers also could collect data on the wages of monitoring personnel, the dispersal of workers, and the availability of technology.

Comparing Centralized and Decentralized Institutions: A Reply to Schwartz and Tomz

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Schwartz and Tomz (1997) have correctly pointed out an error in our 1987 article: We had neglected to analyze how changes in group composition improve the performance of centralized institutions over time. The change affects only the case of perfect monitoring, however. We argue, moreover, that even in this special context, our main qualitative conclusion—that the centralized structure has no positive advantage over the decentralized one—continues to hold. We reach different conclusions about the relative roles of the two institutions, partly because we had in mind a positive *interpretation, whereas Schwartz and Tomz select a* normative *interpretation of the issue of institutional choice. Finally, we believe that imperfect monitoring is essential to the theory, in order to derive conclusions that are not driven by artifacts of the model or by arbitrary equilibrium selections.*

Schwartz and Tomz (1997) reanalyze our (1987) evaluation of the provision of collective goods by decentralized and centralized institutions, in the specific case in which group members can perfectly infer collective effort by observing how much collective good was supplied. They argue that our paper underestimated how well centralized structures can perform in this setting. Our paper argued that the case for the decentralized regime was unambiguously favorable in such environments: It eliminated free riding, did not need to monitor individual contributions, and required no centralized authority. Because, however, we suspected that this successful supply of collective goods by decentralized means was highly sensitive to the informational assumption, the 1987 paper then introduced uncertainties in supplying the collective good, or small departures from perfect rationality. We argued that the presence of such small uncertainties or irrationalities would generate a significant tradeoff between the performance of centralized and decentralized structures, and that this tradeoff would depend on group size. In large groups the decentralized regime is prone to instability, which would out-weigh the advantages of reduced free riding and monitoring expenditures, rendering the centralized system superior. For small groups the decentralized institution would be stable and thus preferred to the centralized regime. In this way Mancur Olson's hypothesis would reappear in a dynamic setting. Morever, this analysis suggested the superiority of nested structures (decomposable hierarchies, in Herbert Simon's sense [1969, chapter 4]) that combine elements of both regimes.

Schwartz and Tomz's main point is that one need not invoke any uncertainty or irrationality to allow a meaningful tradeoff between centralization and decentralization. Even in the perfectly deterministic world with fully rational players, there are situations in which the centralized structure is superior, and others in which the decentralized regime is. They go on to suggest that this version of the theory may be empirically more useful as well.

Schwartz and Tomz's specific criticism is that in analyzing the deterministic setting we erred by neglecting changes in the skill composition of the centralized regime. In so doing we overstated the free-riding tendency in this system, hence underestimating its resulting performance. From a formal point of view, this is entirely correct. Nevertheless, it does not alter the main points of our paper; we clarify below the precise senses in which we believe this to be so. Why, then, do Schwartz and Tomz reach such discrepant conclusions from ours? This is the more substantive issue raised (implicitly) by their paper, so we think it worthwhile to dwell on this question hereafter in some detail.

We should mention at the outset that the effects of changing group composition *were* explicitly incorporated in our 1987 paper for the case of uncertainty: See the proof of Proposition 5, which explicitly calculates the expected number of untalented members at different stages of the game. These expressions reduce exactly to Schwartz and Tomz's calculations for the case of zero tremble probability (Table 2, p. 688).

Where we had erred was in not incorporating this for the benchmark context of zero uncertainty (Proposition 2). To see why this does not change the essential results, note the following.

First, technically, the only modification needed to correct Proposition 2 is that the expression for L_1 in assumption 6 should be replaced by

$$\frac{1 - \delta + \delta q + \delta q n}{1 - \delta + \delta q}.$$

This ensures that low-ability individuals will always shirk, regardless of group composition. (The intuition is that if a low-ability member would shirk when everyone else in the group is of high ability, then s/he would also shirk when there are fewer talented peers, since group membership is then less valuable.) The expression for L_2 requires no change to ensure that high-ability individuals will always work: If they want to

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work at the beginning (as condition 6 ensures), then they will also want to work at later dates when the group has more talented members. With the above modification, our analysis would stay exactly the same in all other details. Note also that the modification is slight if the initial fraction of talented people, *f*, is high.

Second, even if assumption 6 is retained in its original form, the *qualitative* conclusion about the centralized regime's performance is unchanged (because the talented players will always want to work, per the argument above). The only change may be that untalented persons may also wish to work in some later period when more high-ability players have entered the group. (Low-ability types may or may not shirk at the outset.) So there may be some free riding by the untalented, though this may be negligible and will vanish eventually. But the decentralized system has no free riding at all. Hence, a centralized regime can never induce more cooperation than a decentralized one. Furthermore, centralization also requires the monitoring of individual contributions. So our original argument that "there is no positive reason to turn to the [centralized regime]" (p. 136) continues to hold.

To see this in the simplest possible way, consider the extreme case of monitoring in the centralized structure that is good enough to permit an equilibrium in which everyone, talented or not, contributes. This compares to the decentralized equilibrium of Proposition 1, in which everyone works. Thus, the two systems would generate exactly the same amount of cooperation in every period. It is important to emphasize this equivalence, because our main point in the benchmark section of zero uncertainty was to question the *necessity* of centralized authority and selective incentives. Echoing the ideas of Axelrod (1984) and Taylor (1976), among others, Proposition 1 showed that under suitable conditions decentralized reciprocity can secure universal cooperation. Therefore, the classical argument for centralized authority—that a decentralized system cannot provide a collective good, and hence centralization is *necessary*—is not merely weak, it is simply wrong, even if centralized monitoring is free and $q = 1$.

Third, how then do Schwartz and Tomz obtain the result that the centralized regime may be *superior* even when information about aggregate cooperation is perfect? In trying to understand this we are led to the first substantive difference in the interpretation of our results. Specifically, we had in mind a *positive* theory, aimed at predicting what kinds of structures one would expect to observe: "Our aim in this paper is to formalize these intuitions about the fragility of cooperation in the repeated game involving large numbers and to show that this instability has implications for the institutional structure of interest groups and other organizations striving for collective benefits" (p. 131). In contrast, Schwartz and Tomz interpret the theory in a normative vein, asking which of the two regimes would produce higher welfare in utilitarian terms. Let us explain why these two interpretations give such different answers.

Suppose we are interested in *predicting* which of the two systems will be selected. Consider, then, a stage of institutional choice in which the members vote on structural alternatives, based on the payoffs that a member expects to receive in different regimes.[1] A member's vote will depend only on (1) the number of peers who will work in each structure and (2) the person's own work-shirk decision. A member would *not* care about the efficiency of colleagues' work, that is, whether a contribution came from a talented or untalented player. Thus, improvement in the skill composition of the centralized regime, per the Schwartz-Tomz correction, would by itself not affect a member's preferences over institutional forms. In particular, for the parametric range described by Schwartz and Tomz, *all high-ability members prefer the decentralized institution*, precisely because it solves the classical problem: It enforces universal cooperation in every period, whereas the centralized regime only moves toward that benign state (and a talented member works in either structure, so the personal costs are identical). Furthermore, because in a stage of institutional choice everyone would understand that high-ability members prefer the decentralized regime, and because everyone would also understand that low-ability players would vote for centralization only because that form lets them free-ride, any votes against decentralization would be considered tainted, since only would-be shirkers would oppose it. So voting for the centralized system by open ballot would reveal one's type. Indeed, even a procedural vote for a secret ballot would reveal one's type, for talented members prefer a procedure that reveals this information. Given these strategic considerations, it is unlikely that one would observe the selection of the centralized regime in a world of perfect information about the aggregate level of cooperation.

In contrast, Schwartz and Tomz explicitly interpret the model in normative terms. They state that "the foregoing analysis has normative implications" (p. 690) and then evaluate the two institutions by a utilitarian welfare criterion: the discounted sum of group members' expected utilities.[2] With this measure of performance, the centralized system possesses one advantage over the decentralized structure: The former's expected proportion of low-cost members steadily rises, whereas the latter's stays fixed. Hence, while the two groups' total amount of cooperation is similar in the long run, the lowered contribution costs ensure that the aggregate *net* benefit is higher under centralization.

Clearly, the performance ranking yielded by utilitarian welfare criteria can differ substantially from what the group might democratically select. Suppose, for example, that one ranks the regimes by the aggregate social welfare they produce, instead of using Schwartz and Tomz's group welfare measure. Then the outcome of democratic voting and the utilitarian ranking can conceivably diverge; people currently outside the organization cannot vote on which institution will be selected by the group (even if they may later join to replace expelled members), yet their interests count in the calculation of social welfare. Alternatively, the group utilitarian criterion incorporates the benefit that untalented members derive from free riding, but this will play no role in group decisions for the intrinsic strategic and informational reasons described above.

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[1] We briefly touched (p. 136) on such a collection choice process and the induced preferences that members would have over institutional forms.

[2] Our 1987 paper *never mentioned group welfare*, contrary to what Schwartz and Tomz suggest in footnote 9. Indeed, we never discussed any utilitarian index. Hence, aggregate quantities, such as Schwartz and Tomz's expressions 9–11, played no part in our analysis; for example, they did not appear in any of our equations.

Fourth, there are still broader differences underlying our respective perspectives, concerning how we view the model and what we learn from it.

If one thinks about the possible advantage of the centralized system in Schwartz and Tomz's interpretation—the better matching of individuals with groups—it is apparent that this property is not intrinsic to centralization. Indeed, if this issue were important enough, the decentralized regime may, by other means, also allow group composition to change. For example, membership could be marketable, and because it is more valuable to talented people than to the untalented, the former could then purchase membership rights from the latter. The model of the decentralized institution in our 1987 paper did not admit this possibility, but it could be naturally extended to yield the benefits of changing group composition. Thus, the changes in group composition—the basis of the centralized regime's superiority in Schwartz and Tomz's interpretation—seem to result from an artifact of the model.

Think of another modification of the model, whereby detected free-riders are punished in the centralized system not by expulsion but by imposing a fixed penalty (social ostracism, fines, temporary exclusion from benefits, incarceration, and so forth). Such methods clearly apply to many collective action contexts. Then the centralized group's composition would not change, and the decentralized structure would again dominate it, given no uncertainty.

We turn, finally, to a deeper divergence between our respective interpretations of the model, concerning the essential difference between centralization and decentralization. This issue pertains also to our respective views about the importance of introducing uncertainty into the theory.

A major problem in comparing the performance of the centralized and decentralized regimes is that each is characterized by multiple equilibria. For instance, both systems have equilibria where everyone shirks perpetually. And many other equilibria exist as well, by virtue of suitable extensions of the Folk Theorem for repeated games. In identifying the performance of each structure with a particular equilibrium, one needs some selection criterion. Our 1987 paper did this for the case of zero uncertainty by comparing the *maximal* amount of cooperation sustainable by either regime as a self-enforcing equilibrium. It is not true, however, that centralization necessarily entails more free riding than does decentralization: There are equilibria in each institution for which the opposite holds. Indeed, for suitable discount rates, there always exists in the decentralized regime an equilibrium with the same amount of free riding (on average) as any equilibrium in the centralized one, absent any uncertainty. Hence, in the deterministic world, comparisons between the two structures are somewhat arbitrary. That is why we did not dwell much on this case in the 1987 paper.

When there is some uncertainty, however, the amount of cooperation sustainable in *any* (trigger-strategy) equilibrium of the decentralized structure tends to become small, especially in large groups. In contrast, the centralized regime's performance is independent of group size; it is free of the instability inherent in decentralized reciprocity when information about the number of cooperators is imperfect. *So it is in this setting that one can say something more definite in comparing the performance of the two regimes*: For large groups, there exist levels of cooperation that can be sustained in the centralized system but that cannot be supported by *any* (trigger strategy) equilibrium of the decentralized regime. This appears not to be driven by artifacts of the model; we think it reflects a fundamental difference between centralization and decentralization.[3] It is for this reason that we view the case with imperfect information about aggregate cooperation to be essential for the theory.

In summary, we are indebted to Schwartz and Tomz for raising an issue that our 1987 paper neglected, but we believe their correction does not significantly alter the lessons of that paper. It does, nevertheless, suggest useful extensions of the model that are interesting in their own right. For instance, the insight that centralized institutions may rationally seek to moderate the degree of monitoring even when it is costless, in order to weed out free-riders, is a valuable one.

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[3] It is worth noting that this difference is also consistent with the strong empirical regularity that cooperation based only on decentralized reciprocity is rarely observed in large groups.

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Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay

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Nationalism and Rationality. Edited by Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 323p. $54.95.

Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. By Youssef Cohen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 186p. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Model. By Josep M. Colomer. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1995. 134p. $70.00.

Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Edited by Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 292p. $59.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. By Timur Kuran. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 423p. $46.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. By Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 301p. $59.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution: East Germany 1989. By Karl-Dieter Opp, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 280p. $49.50.

In a review of the literature on comparative politics, provocatively entitled "Paradigms and Sand Castles," Barbara Geddes (1991) bemoans the transient nature of the field. Rather than being rejected, theories are being discarded, she declares; as new phenomena capture our attention, so do new approaches to the study of politics. The field thus appears to be driven by fads. Geddes concludes her unflattering portrayal by pointing to a series of new entrants into the study of comparative politics, including rational choice theory.

As evidenced by the books under review, in the short time since the Geddes essay, the rational choice approach has indeed infiltrated the field. Consistent with the tendies that Geddes described and decried, compelling political events provide the impetus for its invasion: the fall of communism, the rise of democracy, and the resurgence of ethnic conflict. The questions this reviewer therefore confronts are: Do these books constitute evidence of further faddism? Or do they represent efforts to contribute to the cumulative creation of knowledge? And what are the strengths and weaknesses of rational choice approaches to the study of politics, as exemplified in these volumes?

THE BOOKS

In addressing such questions, I begin with Breton et al., *Nationalism and Rationality*. I then turn to works on the fall of communism, then to studies of the rise, fall, and practice of democracy. I conclude with a critique and evaluation.

Ethnicity

For individuals, the costs of violence often appear to outweigh the benefits; and, for society as a whole, violence, though costly, merely redistributes rather than creates resources. Violence is therefore destructive, and ethnic violence particularly so. For these and other reasons, ethnic conflict poses fundamental challenges to any theory based on the premise of rationality. Thus, the recent reassertion of ethnic claims stands as a challenge to the recent rise of rational choice theory in the comparative study of politics (as was recognized by Weiner and Huntington 1987).

In earlier works, Breton (1964) and Gellner (1979) deployed the tools of political economy, as they understood them, to address the phenomenon of ethnicity. *Nationalism and Rationality* celebrates their contributions and provides new ones. As the arguments of Breton and Gellner have since long been absorbed by other scholars, I concentrate on the contributions by others.

One is by Russell Hardin (whose own recent book, *One for All*, 1995, fully warrants independent review). Arguing against so-called primordialist theories, Hardin agrees that ethnic groups promote socially irrational behavior; but, he insists, ethnic identification is the result of individually rational decisions. Within ethnic boundaries, individuals find it beneficial to cooperate, that is, to take actions beneficial for the group, since they expect other members to engage in such behavior. But this logic may not apply across groups. The gains of one group may come at the expense of another, and what members of one group may regard as cooperation, members of another may experience as predation. The boundary of group membership may form a locus of conflict, and in the midst of antagonism, expectations of hostility may become self-confirming. Hardin thus views ethnic identification as a result of choice making in environments in which expectations need not be revised. "The group may [then become] instrumentally good for its members, who may tend . . . to think it is inherently, not merely contingently, good," he argues (p. 41), while nonmembers may come to view the group, and its loyalists, as arrogant, privileged, and threatening. Beliefs about good and evil, cooperation

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Note: The author wishes to thank David Laitin, Mark Lichbach, Susan Stokes, Barry Weingast, and two anonymous referees for their comments and criticisms. The faults that remain are his alone.

and defection, become rational beliefs. Ethnic coordination therefore leads not only to inclusion but also to exclusion and conflict.

Wintrobe's paper also deserves a wide audience. Building an ethnic community, Wintrobe stresses, requires investments in human capital. Property rights are costly to create and enforce; by investing resources in relationships, people, in effect, render themselves vulnerable, thereby offering assurances that they will honor their commitments to others. An ethnic group contains a dense set of such relationships; defection from its ranks would trigger costly responses; and membership therefore provides the underpinnings for trust and honorable behavior. The result is that it often becomes easier to transact within rather than across ethnic groups. Their subjective properties as communities thus become objectively valuable. And this is particularly the case when other means for enforcing contracts, such as the state, weaken or disintegrate, as has taken place in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.

In his essay, Coleman interprets membership as an entitlement: Ethnic groups, like nations, allocate rights, he argues, and people seeking to defend their entitlements make private sacrifices for the collectivity. In another essay, Congleton applies club theory to the study of ethnic groups. Taken together, the papers in this volume provide a series of analytically motivated insights into the rational foundations for the formation of ethnic groups and for the contemporary resurgence of ethnic nationalism.

The Fall of Communism

As revealed in earlier works (e.g., Weiner and Huntington 1987), the rise of ethnic nationalism provoked a reaffirmation of the power of cultural approaches to politics. Applying rational choice techniques to this phenomenon, Hardin, Wintrobe, and others contest ground already occupied by others. No received wisdom dominates the interpretation of the fall of communism, however. In *Origins of Spontaneous Revolution*, a very able group of scholars ventures into this open terrain; deploying standard social science methods, they explore the role of citizen activists in the overthrow of the government of East Germany. In *Private Truths and Public Lies*, Timur Kuran, an adventurous theorist, joins them. The first ponder, and the second uses, forms of rational choice theory while exploring the collapse of communism.

Origins of Spontaneous Revolution represents a lucidly conceived and presented examination of citizen participation in the "Monday Demonstrations" that precipitated the collapse of Communist Germany. In methods and purpose, the book resembles Inkele's (1961) study of public opinion in the Soviet Union. While inspired by the classics in political sociology, *Origins* addresses key issues in rational choice. It seeks to explain why citizens participated in acts that were costly, potentially ineffective, and subject to free riding.

Origins rejects the sufficiency of structuralist explanations. The authors adduce persuasive counters to arguments based upon external constraints, such as the power of the USSR, or domestic structures, such as the power of the church or the weakness of the Communist Party. Drawing upon 1,200 interviews with randomly selected subjects and 200 purposefully selected respondents, the authors instead stress the central significance of individual choice. The revolution, they argue, represented the cumulative effect of individual decisions to embrace the risks of public opposition to an incumbent regime.

Although endorsing methodological individualism, and therefore breaking with a central element of the sociological tradition, the authors remain unwilling to subscribe to an instrumentalist perspective. They stress, for example, that people who faced greater risks of sanctions nonetheless participated more frequently in demonstrations. More telling is their evidence against free riding: Endorsing a norm of political unity and the belief that each individual's behavior can make a difference, the participants were impelled to revolutionary acts, they find, by a sense of moral obligation.

Persuaded by the evidence that while people acted as individuals, they were normatively driven, the authors flirt with a notion of "thick" rationality (Ferejohn 1991), in which the participants behave rationally, given their normative commitments. Alternatively, they appear to reason in terms of "meta-norms" (Axelrod 1986, Taylor 1987), by which it becomes rational to act, knowing that others subscribe to a norm of sanctioning failures to do so. When the authors explore the strategic setting within which the revolution transpires, they slip farther into the logic of rational choice. As their analysis makes clear, the strategic setting did not necessarily define a prisoners' dilemma; rather, it defined a coordination game. The more others took part, the stronger were the incentives for additional individuals to join. The implication is clear: Failure to respond to incentives to free ride is perfectly reasonable when such incentives do not exist.

While addressing the same events as *Origins*, Kuran unabashedly marshals the methods of rational choice. Despite its subtitle, the force of *Private Truths, Public Lies* does not derive from the analysis of individual preferences; it derives, rather, from the analysis of information. When dissidents remain uncertain of the true preferences of others, Kuran argues, they may well dissimulate regarding their own; they may behave as if they support the incumbent regime. When they learn that others also are disaffected, however, they may then judge it safe to act in accord with their true, underlying preferences and to turn against the government.

If *Origins of Spontaneous Revolution* calls to mind Inkele's *The Soviet Citizen* (1961), Kuran's book recalls Schelling's *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (1978). It is relentlessly creative; playful, but with a seriousness of purpose; and boldly devoid of the rigorous positivism that informs the more sociologically minded study of *Origins*.

The information cascades so lucidly exposed by Kuran provide a mechanism that generates the processes described and probed in *Origins*. In doing so, they account for the way in which public demonstrations can build, even in the absence of explicit organization, and thereby result in powerful waves of collective dissent. In addition, they offer insight into the circumstances in which such demonstrations fail. The initial starting point can be such that the dynamics will dampen, rather than build; or the distribution of preferences may be such that only demonstrations of an improbably great magnitude will trigger further conversions. Kuran's model thus not only accounts for revolutions that occur but also those that do not. While covering the empirical analysis of *Origins*, it also accounts for other observations: specifically, for revolutions that fail.

Indeed, Kuran's major objective is to explain political arrangements that, while manifestly illegitimate, nonetheless remain intact. He analyzes Stalinist regimes in Europe and political correctness in the United States. He addresses, in addition, racial discrimination, affirmative action, McCarthyism, and the caste system. Sure to offend, his work also informs. It informs us not only about the subjects that he addresses but also about ways in which to think about them. A model, he shows, provides an abstract account; erasing "proper names" it highlights the logic of explanation. It therefore can be applied not only to the data from which it was derived but also against "out of sample" cases. And, indeed, it is the latter in which it is truly tested. (See King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Bates et al., n.d.).

Democracy: Its Rise and Demise

Ethnic nationalism and the fall of communism animate much of the politics of our time. As Geddes forecast, and we have witnessed, they also animate much of our scholarship. Accompanying these forces is a third: the rise of democracy. As evidenced by the work of Colomer and Cohen, it also has attracted the interests of scholars committed to the use of rational choice theory.

Colomer's *Game Theory and the Transition* focuses on the transition to democracy in Spain, one of the seminal events, according to Huntington (1991), in the third wave of democratization. While the work of *Origins* brings to mind the classics in political sociology, that of Kuran and the writings of Schelling (1978), it is the work of Riker (e.g., 1982) with which Colomer's book most strongly resonates. As did Riker, Colomer focuses on discrete episodes to explore the way in which political leaders picked their way through unpromising political terrains. Like Riker, he reveals a keen sense of paradox. Extreme outcomes, he illustrates, were avoided, even though preferred by large numbers; for the political agenda was crafted by sophisticated elites, who maneuvered to secure moderate outcomes.

In *Origins*, Karl-Dieter Opp and associates start with a case and search for a general framework; they lodge, albeit uncomfortably, in the realm of "thick" rationality and coordination games. Kuran starts with a general framework and searches for additional applications.[1] Colomer, for his part, addresses a single case and employs but a single framework, based on the analysis of majority rule in a single-dimension issue space with complete information. The strength of Colomer's approach is that it yields a sense of the significance of microlevel details. We see the players clearly, grasp the tactics they employ, and, like them, emerge surprised by the outcomes resulting from their choices. Colomer's approach also reveals how macroevents are generated—often in ways that have not been foreseen—by small, discrete decisions.

While Colomer focuses on the rise of democracy, Cohen focuses on its collapse. Drawing on studies of Brazil in the 1960s and Chile in the 1970s, Cohen argues that moderate leaders in Latin America became trapped by tactical advantages that accrued to political militants. Political preferences and the strategic environment were such that moderates found themselves locked into positions that were collectively irrational but not alterable (i.e., that were in equilibrium). So great were the pressures emanating from the radicals that moderates would surely have faced betrayal had they sought an alliance with conciliatory counterparts in the opposition. Lacking the ability to enforce cross-party alliances, then, the political leadership refrained from moderate settlements. The result was an outcome—the rise of extremists and the collapse of democratic regimes—that they did not choose.

Cohen offers a positive theory of democratic breakdown; he also offers a critique of alternative approaches. Joining Elster (1989) and Przeworski (1985), Cohen criticizes political economic theories for failing to specify the causal mechanism that links economic crisis to political outcome; without such a mechanism, economic theories of politics remain functionalist, he argues. So, too, do noneconomic theories of politics, based upon reified actors, like the state (e.g., Skocpol 1979). Where, as in the case of O'Donnell (1973), such mechanisms are specified, Cohen calls for explanations based not on classes or sectors but on the actions of *politicians*. Joining Kaufman and others (Collier 1979), Cohen calls for putting the politician, or at least the party system, back in. To explain macroevents, such as the fall of democracy, he argues, the analyst must focus on micropolitics: the choices of politicians and the strategic dilemmas they face in democratic settings.

THE OPERATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Rational choice theory enters the study of politics in several forms. One is Madisonian. As developed at the University of Rochester, it applies the tools of rational choice to the study of the self-interested behavior of politicians who seek to fulfill their ambitions for office in the context of democratic institutions. Perhaps the most mature of the several traditions of rational choice analysis, the Madisonian tradition is represented here by two books. The first is *Structure and Policy*, edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins; the second is *Making and Breaking Governments*, by Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle.

Structure and Policy explores the relationship between political institutions and policy outcomes during the era of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan. The book focuses upon the incentives created for legislative incumbents by the rules under which they strove for reelection. On the one hand stood Japan's parliamentary system; on the other was, the system of multimember districts and nontransferable votes. Policymaking in Japan, the contributors argue, reflected the mixture of motives created by these two institutions.

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[1] Both Opp et al. and Kuran could have greatly benefited from the important contribution of Lohmann (1994).

The institutions produced a tension between party leaders and legislators in the Diet. The two groups possessed a common interest in securing majorities for their party at the polls; but they also possessed interests that conflicted over the allocation of these majorities. For a legislator, the larger the vote from the party faithful, the greater was the likelihood of reelection; for the party leaders, the narrower the majorities for each of the candidates, the greater were the number of seats controlled in the Diet. The result of this mixture of motives, the contributors argue, was a characteristic pattern of policymaking: Those policies were preferred that enabled the party leaders to build disciplined political blocs of delegates in the legislature.

As behooves a mature tradition of research, the analysis rests on a formal model (Cox 1990). Building from a theoretical result, Cox, McCubbins, and Rosenbluth document the effect of electoral rules on electoral strategies and party organization. A series of empirical studies then follows, focusing on budgetary expenditures (by McCubbins and Noble) and industrial regulation (by Noll, Cohen, Rosenbluth, and McCubbins). Chapters on foreign policy by Cowhey, Fuki, and Weatherford sustain the point: Public policy is fashioned in ways that reflect the efforts of the political class to manage the tensions within the political organization that keeps them in power.

The progression from problem to model to empirical test marks as well the trajectory of Laver and Shepsle's *Making and Breaking Governments*. The problem is that of coalition governments: Laver and Shepsle seek to uncover the logic that underlies the stability and composition of cabinets in the postwar democracies of Western Europe. The model represents an adaptation of the winset technology crafted for the analysis of legislative politics in the United States. In parliamentary settings, political parties rather than individual politicians constitute the basic units of analysis, Laver and Shepsle contend. They therefore adapt the conventional specifications of spatial theory, recasting the issue space as a lattice rather than a continuum. Within this new representation, Laver and Shepsle show, winsets that in conventional specifications may contain majority-preferred governments instead stand empty; thus the stability of coalition governments. Moreover, within given configurations of preferences, certain parties become "strong": They reside in the set of cabinets that can overturn the incumbent regime. As strong parties can make—or break—governments, politicians seeking to form governments encounter compelling reasons to give them key portfolios. The model thus offers a theory of the composition of coalition governments as well. Laver and Shepsle analyze an impressive array of data from postwar governments to test propositions derived from their model. They characterize the results as "gratifying"; I would characterize them as impressive.

ANALYSIS

As argued by Geddes (1991), we should hope to find new contributions being inspired by intellectual debates rather than being triggered by political events. It is significant, therefore, that while addressing contemporary political phenomena, these works also address enduring issues in the discipline. They represent attempts to correct past errors and to achieve deeper understandings. Their authors are not contributors to fashion but rather to scholarship.

Hardin, for example, self-consciously positions his work within a broader research program: He uses the study of ethnicity to debate cultural approaches to politics. Colomer shares Hardin's dissatisfaction with preference-based explanations and provides perhaps the most persuasive rejoinder: Given identical preference configurations, he demonstrates, different outcomes are possible. For this (and other) reasons, then, collective choices cannot be explained on the basis of values. Behaving rationally, people will often end up choosing in ways that are not implied by their preferences. Cultural explanations—and all others that appeal to the sufficiency of values—are therefore unsatisfactory, these authors contend. They must be supplemented with accounts of the procedures by which individual choices aggregate into collective outcomes.

Other authors see rational choice theory as a corrective to "statist" approaches to the study of politics: They endorse a more decentralized model of politics. This position is best illustrated, perhaps, by Cowhey and McCubbins in their analysis of Japan. They provide both a forceful and subtle rejoinder to those who see policy as issuing from the farsighted vision of an elite bureaucracy. Their target is, of course, the statist interpretation that has thus far provided the dominant model of Japanese politics.

The critique of structuralism by Karl-Dieter Opp et al. highlights the significance of this turn; for structuralism, like statism, emphasizes the role of constraint, rather than choice, in political behavior. What makes the departure so striking, of course, is that they study politics in a so-called totalitarian society. Where others saw only binding constraints, political activists perceived room to maneuver, the authors find. Even in totalitarian systems, they contend, there is good reason to view politics as decentralized and manipulable. In the face of such findings—and the evidence provided by the subsequent collapse of the East German regime—the authors move from structuralist forms of sociological theory to an ambivalent embrace of rational choice as a means for studying politics.

The turn to rational choice also represents a reaction against functionalist forms of analysis. Thus, Cohen argues against dependency theory, capitalist logic, and the approach of O'Donnell (1979), each of which views authoritarianism as fulfilling a role necessary to the growth of capitalism. Motivating Cohen's criticism is his opposition functionalist explanation, with its emphasis on the social as the appropriate level of analysis. Authoritarianism did not happen in Latin America because the economic system required it, he argues; it was not socially rational. Rather, it resulted from the actions of those unable to transcend the limits of individual rationality.

While focusing on topical issues, the works thus suggest that the movement to rational choice theory represents the outcome of intellectual debate. The movement represents a search for deeper understandings and a reaction to the limitations of previous approaches. The authors address ethnicity, democratization, and the fall of communism; but they remain centrally concerned with the merits and defects of core theoretical positions. The authors seek a decentralized approach, based on microfoundations, in which the collective outcome is derived, albeit often perversely, from choices made by individuals.

EVALUATION

It is useful to group these works into two schools. One focuses on collective action and the other on collective choice. I would place in the first category the studies of ethnicity and revolution and Cohen's study of the collapse of democracy. In the latter, I would place the work of Colomer, Cowhey and McCubbins, and Laver and Shepsle.

The two schools possess different parentage. The canonical text in the first remains Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1977); the central issue, that of the incentives to bear the costs of political action; and the central analytics, the prisoners' dilemma game. In this school, progress has largely taken the form of broadening the analytics to include coordination games—something long advocated by Hardin, but also supported by Kuran and by Karl-Dieter Opp et al.—and of deepening them by exploring the prisoners' dilemma in extended form.

Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1951) stands as the canonical text of the collective choice tradition; the central issue is the relationship between individual preferences and collective outcomes; and the use of spatial models provides its basic analytics. Progress in this field has taken a variety of forms, the most relevant for this essay being the analysis of the effect of institutions in generating equlibria in otherwise indeterminate political environments.

Underlying each tradition are technical foundations. The concept of rationality in choice has been rigorously axiomatized, clarifying distinctions of great relevance for both normative and positive analysis (see, for example, Sen 1982). Collective behavior, either in institution-free (collective action) or rule-governed (collective choice) environments, has been studied by applying game theory. Beneath both decision and game theory lie theorems that establish what can and cannot in general be claimed. The rational choice approach can be deployed in a powerful manner, but it must be studied deeply before it can be employed effectively in the analysis of politics.

Colomer's initial chapters, to illustrate, cry out for theoretical clarification. By my reading, Colomer is exploiting the tension among three basic axioms in collective choice theory: the independence of irrelevant alternatives, universal admissibility, and transitivity in collective choice. Had Colomer explicitly grounded his work upon axiomatic foundations, he could have communicated those tensions with far greater clarity. He also could have advanced his arguments with far greater power. For he then could have argued that Arrow's theorem (1951) provides insight into the possibility of democracy in two senses: its ability to operate as a coherent form of government but also its ability to exist, that is, to arise in the first place.

Cohen, too, could have cut deeper. Realizing that socially rational outcomes are attainable in prisoners' dilemma games through (certain forms) of repeated play, Cohen makes a series of thoughtful arguments as to why political cooperation was not achieved in Latin American democracies. But he fails to explore the full implications of the extended form. A more thorough analysis would have led him to pay closer attention to the militant's threat. What benefits would have justified the costs the militants would have had to pay, should they undermine the electoral prospects of their own political party? Put another way: Why would the moderates treat the militant's threats as credible? Recasting the game in extended form not only would have highlighted the significance of such questions but also would have underscored the significance of the institutional setting. In particular, it would have focused attention on the internal structure of the political parties; for it was the inability of the parties to defend and sustain their leaders' pledges that appears to have undermined the credibility of interparty agreements. Moving from the analysis of single plays of the game to an analysis of strategic behavior over time thus would have exposed missing portions of Cohen's account and led him to an even deeper investigation of the collapse of democracy.

A last slap on the wrist, or perhaps confession of bias: On the basis of the evidence of these books, the literature on collective action needs, I feel, structure—indeed, much more structure. One way of making this point is by returning once again to the work of Cohen. As intimated above, insofar as Cohen's argument is correct, it then implies an internal party structure that renders party leaders unable to discipline militant followers. From where might this inability derive? By the reasoning of Cox and Rosenbluth (in Cowhey and McCubbins), party leaders in presidential systems face higher costs in achieving party unity than do those in parliamentary systems; and those who compete in open-list systems, which enable candidates to amass personal votes, confront higher costs than do those in closed-list systems. And, as shown by Geddes in *The Politician's Dilemma* (1994), the kinds of preference orderings studied by Cohen can be transformed to ones favoring cross-party cooperation, in certain competitive settings.

Phrased narrowly, Cohen's account could have benefited from a closer analysis of the institutional and political setting of his actors. Phrased more broadly, the turn to rational choice has in part reflected a resistance to structuralist accounts; but, clearly, the two are complements, not substitutes, in the analysis of politics. It would appear that rational choice theory can, indeed, provide informative insights. But it appears best able to provide the foundations for scientific inquiry when applied to highly structured settings. It is perhaps for this reason that I come away from my reading finding my thinking most shaped by the work of Cowhey and McCubbins and Laver and Shepsle.

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Small States and Big Alliances

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Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. By Audie Klotz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 183p. $29.95.

The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. By Robert J. McMahon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 431p. $17.50.

Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy. By Thomas Risse-Kappen. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 250p. $35.00.

Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim. Edited by W. Howard Wriggins, with F. Gregory Gause III, Terrence P. Lyons, and Evelyn Colbert. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 338p. $16.50.

Anthropology and comparative politics revel in diversity. International relations theory, especially in the security field, is built on a much narrower empirical foundation. Working within the dominant paradigm of realism, which emphasizes power as the means and end of international politics, scholars have based their theories—to the extent that they have any empirical referents—on interactions among the great powers. Some of these theories make universal claims, but others address questions only relevant to great powers. This bias may also reflect the political fact that so many international relations theorists live and work in the world's greatest superpower and are interested in understanding or influencing its foreign policy.

As comparative politics long ago discovered, diversity not only is valuable for its own sake but also is essential for theory-building and testing. Expanding the number of cases is not the only way to make research more rigorous, but it helps to provide more variation on the independent and dependent variables, control for the effect of extraneous variables, and allow for greater generalizability of results. The four books under review exploit some of these possibilities and illustrate the rich potential payoff for international relations theory of looking beyond the great powers. They also reveal some of the conceptual and methodological problems associated with such an enterprise.

Substantively, these books address relations between great and small powers, the character of regional political systems, and the ability of substate actors to influence great power foreign policies. Three of the books look at these problems from the perspective of the lesser powers. Collectively, they challenge two fundamental propositions of realism: that international anarchy prompts a self-help system in which states are motivated by relative gains; and that special circumstances aside, weaker states are relatively powerless in alliances dominated by hegemons.

In *Dynamics of Regional Politics*, Wriggins and colleagues analyze the character of four regional political systems (Arabian-Persian Gulf, South Asia, Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia) and the alliance behavior of participating states. These systems show a range of responses to anarchy. The Horn of Africa is the least cooperative system; its five members (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti) are in persistent conflict, making war and instability the norm. The ASEAN system in Southeast Asia is the most cooperative and institutionally developed system; member states share compatible values, generally accept one another's borders or set aside their territorial differences, and successfully maintain domestic order. Frequent consultation, some of it in formal institutional settings, reduces uncertainty and encourages accommodation. The Gulf and South Asia fall somewhere in between. The former has a constantly shifting balance of power and is prone to periodic conflict. The latter is characterized by a marked asymmetry of power, with India attempting to establish hegemony.

The book is based on a promising research design. The four regional systems operate within the same international environment, recently transformed by the collapse of a superpower. The contributors approach their cases with a common set of questions about the nature of regional politics and the role played by outside powers. Unfortunately, the conclusion by Wriggins is theoretically underdeveloped and fails to exploit the rich empirical findings of the narrative chapters.

Those chapters indicate that the degree of cooperation and conflict in each of the four regional systems is largely independent of bipolarity. The variation among systems persisted through much of the Cold War and has continued. Nor can these differences and their durability be attributed to a differential interest of the superpowers in the four regions; superpower involvement shows greater variation over time than across regions.

Regional politics appear to recapitulate global politics on a smaller scale. This raises the inevitable question of how much the politics of any region are determined by the character of the international system, the regional system, or state-level characteristics. The narrative chapters indicate that they all have a part to play. The variation in regional systems suggests that anarchy is not determining. The range of cooperation and conflict displayed by these systems is best explained by regional and state-level characteristics. Significant asymmetries in power among member states make a region prone to conflict. The Persian Gulf, dominated by the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, and South Asia, where India's neighbors resist its efforts to establish hegemony, are cases in point. Cooperative systems appear to require multiple players of roughly equal power or an established hegemony, such as that of the United States in Western Europe and the Pacific

Rim after World War II. Wriggins emphasizes the role of international institutions in providing stability, especially ASEAN in Southeast Asia. This is partly true, but ASEAN's success, like other regional efforts at cooperation, is probably also in part a reflection of underlying conditions in the region that make cooperation possible. Chief among these are stable states with complementary assets and interests and legitimate governments committed to economic development.

Wriggins observes that the superpowers become involved in regions for direct reasons (interests like oil) and derivative ones (preventing or offsetting the other's influence). Their interventions sometimes have decided local conflicts, as in the Ogaden, Angola, and Kuwait, but have had little overall effect on longer term policy alignments or realignments of regional states. Continually frustrated in their efforts to control and influence local politics, the superpowers were more often exploited by regional powers for their own ends. The Soviet experience with India, Somalia, and Vietnam and the American experience with Pakistan, Iran, and South Vietnam attest to this phenomenon. The realities of regional politics suggest that the characterization of the international system as bipolar was something of a great power conceit (Holsti 1985, Wagner 1993).

Realist theories have difficulty explaining the influence exercised by many of these weaker states on the superpowers. Neorealism would expect influence to reflect the balance of capabilities. Traditional realist approaches are more sophisticated and acknowledge that weaker powers can wield disproportionate influence if they hold more intense preferences than a more powerful ally, unite with other small allies, use issue-specific resources to increase their bargaining leverage, or exploit mutual fears of abandonment in periods of high tension.

Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (1979) offer multidimensional definitions of power that include such factors as size, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character, morale, and the quality of diplomacy and government. Some measure of these collective attributes may offer a gross index of power, but power is meaningful only in relationships. As Deutsch (1963) observed, power is the difference between the amount of changes imposed and accepted by the actor. It is the ability to get others to do what you want at minimum cost to yourself. Superpower-regional interactions indicate that such influence is best understood in terms of asymmetries. Among the most important asymmetries are resources, interests, justice, alternative policy options, time pressure, reputation, and willingness to suffer. Small states that possess advantages in relevant asymmetries, or convince superpowers that they do, can exercise influence out of all proportion to their relative capabilities. Pakistan's leverage over the United States thus increased to the extent that the Reagan administration supported Afghan guerrillas and relied on Pakistan to funnel arms and supplies to them.

Some asymmetries, like resources, ultimately rest on material capabilities. Others, like relative willingness to suffer and available alternatives, do so only indirectly, if at all. Asymmetries are relational and case specific. Realism properly emphasizes the centrality of power in international relations, but its analysis is stymied by simplistic theories that define power *in vacuo* and only in terms of capabilities and reputation.

In all four regions, local governments gained extraordinary leverage over the superpowers because the latter were so committed to gaining regional influence at each other's expense. Superpower leaders consistently exaggerated the benefits that would accrue from befriending local regimes and the loss they would incur if those regimes drew closer to their adversary. Pronounced and largely unjustified superpower fears of bandwagoning (Jervis and Snyder 1991)—the alliance of weaker powers with rising challengers in the expectations of making gains or limiting losses—were exploited by astute regional leaders to serve their parochial ends. If one or both superpowers had framed their interests differently, or had a more sophisticated understanding of regional political dynamics, then they would not have been so vulnerable to exploitation. Power ultimately derives from the ability to deny or help others gain what they think is important to them. Interests are subjective, at times irrational, and strongly influenced by strategic beliefs and domestic politics. To understand international relations, it is necessary to understand how actors construct their interests.

This is the subject of *The Cold War on the Periphery*, a careful historical study of the relationship of one superpower, the United States, with one regional political system, South Asia. McMahon argues that American policy from the early 1950s onward was based on a series of illusions about the putative benefits of alignment with Pakistan.

The Korean War triggered Washington's interest in South Asia. President Truman's advisors were divided between those who urged alignment with India and those who for political-military reasons found Pakistan a more alluring ally. The latter view prevailed, and the Eisenhower administration concluded a security agreement with Pakistan in 1954. This alliance was based on two false expectations: Pakistan and other "northern tier" states could mobilize sufficient military forces to deter or retard a Soviet sweep into the Middle East, and a closer, military association with the United States would reduce local anti-Western nationalism. The alliance was based on a grossly exaggerated fear of the Soviet Union.

None of these avowed goals were served. The alliance with Pakistan fostered a patron-client relationship that was unsatisfying to both sides, drained American resources, and bound Washington to an unstable and troubled country. It alienated India by making it impossible for Nehru to impose a favorable settlement in the Kashmir dispute and keep South Asia from being drawn into the Cold War. As Chester Bowles and other critics of the Pakistan alliance predicted, India responded by building up its armed forces and aligning with Moscow. The Kennedy administration's subsequent efforts to woo India did not go far enough to encourage it to break with Moscow, but antagonized Pakistan and pushed it toward China. President Johnson's attempt to use aid as a club intensified core problems in the region and contributed to the outbreak in 1965 of the Indo-Pakistani War.

From the beginning of the Cold War, the United States had two other policy choices: alliance with India or even-handed noninvolvement. McMahon contends that either policy, but especially the latter, would have been preferable. Alliance with India, especially in the early 1950s, would have isolated Pakistan and might have led to early resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which could have insulated the region from the Cold War. Noninvolvement would have achieved the same goal at much less cost. The former policy, but not the latter, had strong minority support within the national security establishment.

The Department of State and National Security Council were divided between proponents of alliances with Pakistan versus India. Each faction justified its preference as the most efficacious means of keeping the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in South Asia and of combating the spread of anti-American nationalism. Despite a consensus over foreign policy goals—more often the exception than the rule—different officials advocated diametrically opposed policies in support of these goals. Realism, defined as a policy intended to advance the national interest, was indeterminate. The ultimate choice of strategy was the result of an internal political struggle; advocates of alliance with Pakistan were more influential.

The more fundamental problem for realism is McMahon's indictment of American policy for consistently failing to achieve its intended objectives. He attributes this failure to the illusions, harbored by pro-India and pro-Pakistan factions alike, about Soviet power and motives, the context of regional politics, and the ability of American power to shape foreign policy choices of local governments. If the American failure in Southwest Asia was an isolated case, it could be dismissed as an outlier. But Wriggins and others make clear (Hough 1994, Lebow and Stein 1994) that the Cold War was a series of encounters involving serious miscalculations by great and small powers alike. Such miscalculation was rarely the result of lack of information but of more complex cognitive and domestic political causes.

Risse-Kappen's *Cooperation among Democracies* also addresses the question of power in alliances. It uses case studies of the Korean War, Suez, the Cuban missile crisis, and the test-ban treaty negotiations to assess the influence of the European allies and Canada in NATO. The cases make extensive use of primary documentation, including newly declassified materials.

Structural realism à la Waltz, according to which smaller states are not expected to exercise much influence on superpower decisions in a bipolar world, provides the null hypothesis of the book. Risse-Kappen also tests more traditional variants of realism as well as propositions from liberalism and institutionalism, including hegemonic stability theory. He finds no support for structural realism. In all four cases important American interests were at stake, but the European and Canadian influence on American policy was considerable during the Korean War, test-ban negotiations, and Cuban missile crisis. In each case at least one major European ally disagreed with Washington's approach to the problem. The resulting American decisions came close to the initial European demands or reflected a compromise. In the missile crisis, the only case in which the allies were not extensively consulted, American leaders still considered their interests and took them into account.

More traditional realist theories appear superficially consistent with the outcomes of the cases. Risse-Kappen contends that they cannot, however, account for the process by which the Europeans came to exercise so much influence over American policy. The two realist propositions that fared best—fear of allied defection and issue-specific power—are also compatible with liberal propositions about influence in alliances. On balance, Risse-Kappen concludes, liberal and institutionalist theories that focus on cooperation among democracies and two-level games that stress the importance of domestic politics and transnational coalition building provide the key insights to explain American policy and shifts in that policy in the four cases.

According to Risse-Kappen, NATO should be viewed as a community of liberal democracies that has deeply affected the collective identity of its members. The sense of community helped the Europeans influence American policies through three mechanisms: norms that committed the allies to timely and meaningful consultation; norms that frowned on the use of material power resources in intraalliance bargaining, but allowed leaders to invoke domestic pressures and constraints to gain leverage; and the penetrability of the American and allied political systems, which encouraged the formation of transnational and transgovernmental coalitions. Such coalitions, especially among societal and bureaucratic actors, frequently tipped the balance of power in Washington in favor of the Europeans.

The power of norms is also the central theme of Klotz in *Norms in International Relations*. This exceptionally well-crafted book examines why and how racial discrimination in South Africa became a global concern and led to the adoption of economic sanctions by international organizations and powerful nation states. Klotz contends that these sanctions stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of realism. Nonstate actors and weak states wielded influence out of proportion to their material capabilities. Most of the states that imposed sanctions also acted contrary to their self-perceived strategic and economic interests. That was the reason the United States and United Kingdom resisted sanctions for so long. The adoption of sanctions by international organizations and governments was due to the ability of nonstate actors and allied governments to create a global constitutive norm of equality and subsequently to make the case for sanctions on the basis of that norm. Antiapartheid activists then exploited these norms to change the policies of powerful states with vested interests in ignoring South Africa's domestic politics.

Constitutive norms (e.g., mutual understandings of sovereignty, property, equality) are social constructions that help shape the identities and interests of actors. Once equality became an entrenched international norm, it changed the context of American policy toward South Africa. The Reagan administration shifted its position on sanctions because it was moved by self-interest (response to domestic pressures), self-affirmation (feeling good about ourselves), and group interest (make our friends feel happy). For frontline states, sanctions were an important means of creating and strengthening their identity.

Reputation played an important role in this process. The degree to which actors are seen to conform to or violate existing norms will influence how others behave toward them. Reputation is, of course, another social construction, and much of the politics surrounding the struggle for sanctions was an attempt by actors to put the proper "spin" on their behavior. The Republic of South Africa and Margaret Thatcher—both deeply opposed to sanctions—lost out because they failed to convince others that apartheid and trade with a government committed to it were within accepted international norms.

Klotz's argument is avowedly political; the adoption of sanctions depended on effective political leadership and organization. The construction of the norm of equality enabled anti-apartheid forces to mobilize a transnational coalition to bring pressure to bear on relevant governments and international organizations. In the United States, a powerful domestic coalition helped to compel a reluctant Reagan administration to go along with sanctions. A less powerful coalition achieved only partial success in the United Kingdom; the Thatcher government committed itself publicly to sanctions but violated them in practice. There are striking parallels here to the transnational coalitions Risse-Kappen identified as so important in NATO.

Klotz concludes with a plea to students of international relations to consider international "communities" rather than the "international system" as the site of identity and interest formation. Changes in policy can then be analyzed as a response to changes in memberships and external norms. By analyzing reputations, defined in terms of prevailing norms, we can observe legitimization processes and their noncoercive constraining effects. By examining international and domestic discourse, we can trace the influence of norms on the foreign policy process. Such an approach, if conceptually developed, could provide a promising alternative to realism.

Realists are concerned with "hard power," defined in terms of material capabilities, and some "softer" forms of power, such as reputation, the shadow of the future, and signalling. Their emphasis on power led structural realists to dismiss the role of small states during the Cold War, on the assumption they lacked sufficient material capabilities to influence the struggle between the superpowers. The several books under review indicate that nonstate actors and small powers wielded considerable influence. Once superpowers became committed to a client, they became vulnerable to exploitation. They could also be influenced through transnational coalitions and the construction of and appeal to norms.

Liberals, here represented by Risse-Kappen and Klotz, attempt to explain why tails wag dogs. They interpret concessions by the United States to smaller allies as evidence of the existence of a pluralistic security community or an international community defined in terms of its adherence to certain evolving norms. There is much to these explanations, but they also encounter problems. Like the realists they criticize, Risse-Kappen and Klotz rely on post-hoc analysis. Their claims could be strengthened by advancing specific expectations about conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia, or Southeast Asia. Risse-Kappen's argument is overdetermined; it invokes so many propositions from liberalism and institutionalism that it is impossible to say what behavior is attributable to which explanation. His propositions are tested in what undoubtedly represents the best case for liberals; they need to be tested in alliances where the behavior Risse-Kappen documents would appear more anomalous. Did, for example, Sparta or the Soviet Union make concessions to smaller allies on issues in which the respective hegemons had important interests at stake? The Soviet Union, by no stretch of the imagination a liberal state or member of a pluralistic security community, consulted regularly with its allies and made concessions to them at the expense of its own perceived self-interest. Eastern Europeans received favorable economic concession, especially with regard to petroleum, and freedom to a certain degree to conduct quasi-heretical domestic experiments. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1969 was at least in part a response to allied pressure on Moscow. For purposes of testing liberal explanations, it is critically important to know the extent to which the difference between the American and Soviet behavior toward their respective allies was one of degree or of kind.

Some of the anomalies Risse-Kappen and Klotz attempt to explain may be accounted for by the Gramscian conception of ideological hegemony. According to this interpretation, the superpowers were not engaged in a normal struggle for power, but one driven by their clashing visions of the world. Morgenthau (1948) characterized the Cold War in this way and noted its remarkable parallels with the Napoleonic period and the Thirty Years' War. When great power conflict assumes ideological proportions, even the smallest defection is damning because it challenges a hegemon's claim that its ideology is superior and the wave of the future. Such anxieties were frequently voiced in both superpowers—see, for example, their post-mortems of the losses of China and Egypt—and may help explain their exaggerated fears of bandwagoning. The need to demonstrate adherence to principle, and to justify authority on some basis other than superior power, another consequence of the claim of ideological superiority, may also help explain the solicitude both superpowers demonstrated toward their allies, their need to offer tortured legal justifications for interventions, and their competitive and otherwise inexplicable search for allies in every corner of the globe. The concern for principle also may have made the United States more receptive to imposing sanctions on South Africa once apartheid opponents managed to bring the issue before the American public, the Congress, and the United Nations.

Despite their individual conceptual and methodological problems, these four books help to expand the field of security beyond the narrow confines of the great powers. They also hint at the rich theoretical payoffs such an expansion promises, especially if liberal and constructivist theories can specify their propositions in a way to make them falsifiable. The study of diverse regional systems opens a new window on the controversy surrounding anarchy and its consequences. To what extent do systemic and regional properties constrain or facilitate opportunities for small states to pursue independent agendas? What kinds of domestic resources and leadership skills influence their effectiveness in doing so? The foreign policies of less powerful states during the Cold War and other hegemonic conflicts can also be exploited to develop and test propositions about alliance formation, including but not limited to those concerning balancing and bandwagoning. Analysis of the interactions of less powerful allies with hegemons can similarly be used to test competing propositions drawn from realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The study of small states can help answer big questions.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory

Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Edited by Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 360p. $64.95.

Preferences, Institutions and Rational Choice. Edited by Keith Dowding and Desmond King. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 289p. $55.00.

The Theory of Institutional Design. Edited by Robert E. Goodin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 288p. $49.95.

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Institutions matter. The reemergence of institutional analysis as a central research program in the social sciences attests to this fact. This revival of interest in institutions has taken many forms and been characterized by many methods. One of the most important is the growing body of research that employs rational choice theory to study both the effects of institutions on social outcomes and the ways in which these institutions are created and changed. Variants of this research can be found in economics (industrial organization and economic performance over time), political science (political institutions, electoral institutions, constitutions, law), and sociology and anthropology (social norms, social practices). It has proved to be a rich and productive agenda for enhancing our understanding of the role of institutions in social life.

The three edited volumes under review present as a group a wide-ranging introduction to the research in this field. If one wants a good sense of the breadth of research that can be categorized as part of the rational choice approach to institutional analysis, then one can hardly do better than to read these three books. The various essays range across the disciplines of economics and political science. The Alston, Eggertsson, and North volume offers a representative introduction to the transaction-cost approach to economic institutions. Building on the theoretical insights of Ronald Coase and Douglass North, the essays focus primarily on issues related to property rights, economic organization, and institutional change. The Dowding and King volume places more emphasis on political institutions and reflects a slightly more critical view of the merits of the rational choice approach. These essays highlight the ways in which both political preferences and institutions are incorporated into rational choice analyses of politics. The Goodin volume offers the broadest perspective on institutional analysis in political science of the three books. The essays are more interdisciplinary in orientation and, in some cases, present variations on the standard rational choice framework.

Each book has considerable merit. As with any edited volume, the quality of the essays varies widely. A reader who wants to develop a thorough understanding of this literature would be best served by reading a selection of the essays from the three volumes as a group. In the remainder of this brief review I will (1) provide a general sense of the overall quality of the collection and (2) recommend what I think are the best essays from each volume. For this last point, my criteria are the following. First, the essay is representative of the primary theoretical perspective emphasized by the volume. For example, most of the essays in *Empirical Studies* share a basic commitment to transaction-cost economics. Second, the analysis extends the general theoretical framework beyond the standard work in the field. For example, are the authors asking substantive questions that are new and creative? Third, the authors attempt to broaden the basic explanatory framework to incorporate factors that have not been commonly addressed in standard rational choice analyses. For example, is the standard methodology modified to incorporate factors not normally associated with rational choice theory? The best essays in these three volumes attempt to extend the boundaries of the rational choice approach to institutional analysis.

The Alston, Eggertsson, and North volume offers a thorough introduction to the transaction-cost approach to economic institutions. That is both the strength and weakness of the collection. While the essays generally provide the state of the art in transaction-cost analysis, they seldom extend beyond the basic framework developed by Coase and North and generally fail to address seriously the range of criticisms leveled against it. The introductory essays by Alston and Eggertsson trace the basic logic of transaction-cost analysis. They do not offer anything new to the existing literature, but for the reader investigating the research for the first time, they provide a lucid and coherent statement of the approach. A very helpful feature of the volume is the set of short commentaries with which the editors introduce each essay and locate it within the more general literature. Most of the essays have one of two goals: (1) demonstrate how transaction-cost analysis can help explain economic institutional change or (2) use transaction-cost analysis to support the normative claim that state involvement in economic activities is inefficient and detrimental to economic growth. On this last point the most systematic treatments of the normative argument are offered by Jan Winiecki, Robert Higgs, and Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie.

There are two excellent essays in this volume. The first, by Douglass North and Barry Weingast, seeks to explain the evolution of political institutions in seventeenth-century England. By focusing on the effects of the credibility of the policy promises of state officials on aggregate economic growth, they offer a highly original account of the emergence of various constitutional provisions and governmental institutions. From a theoretical perspective the authors offer a compelling demonstration of how the transaction-cost approach can be extended to take account of the strategic dimension of economic exchange and, thus, of the importance of assessing the credibility of economic claims. The second, by William Riker and Itai Sened, incorporates political actors into the explanation of the emergence of property rights. Through an interesting case study of the property rights of airport slots, the authors illustrate the significant effects of state involvement in the creation of property rights. Their goal is not to demonstrate the alleged deleterious effects of the state, but rather to show how the transaction-cost approach is improved by a more systematic account of the role of state actors.

The epilogue, a published version of North's Nobel Prize lecture, is also highly recommended. North assesses the present state of research on economic performance over time and institutional emergence and change. His analysis of what the transaction-cost approach has accomplished and his proposals for new avenues of research in this field are provocative and engaging. One can hope that his recommendations will serve as the agenda for future work in this area of the discipline.

The Dowding and King volume adopts a more general perspective on rational choice explanations of political phenomena. While not focusing exclusively on political institutions, many of the essays present important insights into how rational choice incorporates institutional detail in explanations of political issues: democratic decision making, party competition, policy analysis (specifically welfare and railway regulation), international relations, and revolution. The introductory essay by the editors situates the collection in a general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the rational choice approach to politics. Somewhat similar to the Alston volume, this collection breaks little new ground, but it does provide an illuminating introduction with a healthy dose of skepticism about some of the claims in the existing literature.

Three of the essays deserve special mention. Alan Carling considers the role that formal coalition theory can play in understanding political party competition. In doing so, he highlights the importance of model interpretation in the translation from mathematical model to social explanation. He also illustrates how the models can be interpreted to identify the significance of institutional features for political competition. Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts challenge standard accounts of the implications of social choice theory for our understanding of voting in a democratic society. They juxtapose these standard interpretations of social choice models with a creative alternative that, while maintaining a significant role for social choice theory, redefines the underlying motivations that influence voting behavior. Ian McClean's focus is not on theoretical issues but on the use of rational choice results in substantive research in political science. He offers a textbook example of one important way in which political scientists can use a rational choice model to structure empirical analysis. In his examination of the politics surrounding the Regulation of Railways Act of 1844, McClean demonstrates how rational choice results can be subjected to actual empirical testing. Each of these essays reinforces the fundamental idea that the translation of the results of formal rational choice models into social scientific explanations requires subtle attention to questions of interpretation and empirical testing.

The essays in the Goodin volume share a primary focus on questions of institutional design, but beyond this common theme, they present diverse perspectives on the nature of institutional analysis in political science. Compared to the other two volumes, the authors in this collection go farther in their efforts to extend the existing boundaries of rational choice theories of political and social institutions. Their efforts are quite impressive. For theoretical insights into the basic role of rational choice theory in understanding issues of institutional design, the first three essays, by Robert Goodin, Philip Petit, and Bruce Coram, respectively, are highly recommended. Goodin offers an insightful overview and a fresh perspective on interdisciplinary work on institutional design. He provides the best introduction to the diversity of approaches in this literature that is to be found in any of the three volumes. Petit and Coram press the limits of the existing literature in rewarding ways and offer original arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of rational choice analysis.

In addition to these contributions, several other essays will definitely repay the time spent reading them. In some of these the authors investigate questions that take the rational choice approach to institutional design in new and creative directions. For example, Russell Hardin offers an insightful analysis of the problem of institutional morality, giving special emphasis to the difficulty of designing institutions that will foster moral behavior. David Luban challenges some of the dominant thinking on the implications of publicity for various issues in law and politics. In some of the other essays the authors make their contribution by demonstrating how to do high-quality political science using the basic tools of strategic analysis. I call special attention to Claus Offe's sophisticated account of transitions in Eastern Europe and Kenneth Shepsle's subtle analysis of the effects of various institutional arrangements on political deal-making.

As a set, these three volumes highlight the rich and diverse research agenda that can be generated by the rational choice approach to institutional analysis. Nonetheless, there is much in the literature that remains unrepresented by these collections. To get a more complete view of the breadth of the work presently undertaken under the general rubric of rational choice analyses of social institutions, we would need, at the very least, to include (1) the growing body of work that synthesizes the insights of the theoretical approach with detailed historical research and (2) the theoretical and empirical work on social norms and social practices (found primarily, but not exclusively, in sociology and anthropology). The insights emerging from these additional areas of research have important implications for the types of work in political science and economics that are represented in these volumes, especially on issues of individual motivation and social context. It is hoped that in future years, when additional volumes are published to showcase the importance of rational choice analysis for the social sciences, the essays will reflect greater attention to these fundamental concerns.

Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Edited by Seyla Benhabib. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 373p. $59.50 cloth, $19.95 paper.

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Theoretical understandings of democracy and democratic legitimacy are on the move, and the politics of identity and difference generates a good deal of that motion. Historically, political theory, and particularly liberalism, has sought ways of containing and limiting difference and the conflict it produces. But the current wave of democratic theory seeks to enable the expression of difference in politics and stresses the importance of recognizing difference for the ends of justice and legitimacy. These twenty essays, first written for the 1993 meeting of the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, represent some of the very best work in this newer wave of democratic theory.

The authors are an accomplished lot, many of whose contributions are drawn from their recently or soon-to-be published book-length discussions of these topics. They include Jürgen Habermas, Sheldon Wolin, Jane Mansbridge, Seyla Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Iris Young, Anne Phillips, Will Kymlicka, Carol Gould, Jean Cohen, Nancy Fraser, Chantal Mouffe, Bonnie Honig, Fred Dallmayr, Joan Landes, Carlos Forment, Richard Rorty, Robert Dahl, Amy Gutmann, and Benjamin Barber. Whereas conference volumes often fail to achieve thematic continuity across essays, this volume generally succeeds. (The one exception is the otherwise interesting essay by Joan Landes on gendered conceptions of citizenship in the French Revolution, whose historical approach distinguishes it from the other essays in this collection.) There is considerable dialogue among the pieces, which enhances the coherence of the whole. Benhabib's introductory essay elegantly summarizes the theoretical themes that cut across the different essays, the general lines of agreement and disagreement among the authors, and the distinctive contribution of each piece. Readers who wish for an overview of the individual articles would do well to look there, since the number of articles precludes me from summarizing each piece here.

Many of these essays are critical of traditional views of liberal democracy, along with its reliance on periodic elections as the mainstay of legitimacy. The democracy they promote has a livelier beat: It is more participatory, more inclusive (with respect to both persons and issues), and, above all, more deliberative. Despite the important differences among the authors, they would probably all agree that the heart of democracy is the participation of citizens in "public deliberations [aimed to] ... promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity" (Wolin, p. 31). They would further agree that the institutional "fences and hedges" by which liberalism has historically sought to contain conflict and secure a public good exclude too much from the domain of politics, and that democratic legitimacy is enhanced when politics is opened up to a broader array of issues, actors, and forms of expression.

This broadened view of democratic politics leads several of these thinkers to conceive of the "public sphere" as constituted not only by state institutions and processes (as liberalism tends to do) but also by many forms of associative and discursive activity that are situated in civil society. Although there are differences among their views, several authors—including Habermas, Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Jean Cohen, Mansbridge, and Fraser (whose conception of the public, developed elsewhere, has had considerable influence on some of these other authors)—defend a view of a "decentered public sphere" in which state institutions are just one forum for political deliberation, connected up with other sites of political discourse (particularly labor unions and the various organizations that comprise social movements) through "free and spontaneous processes of communication" (Benhabib, p. 74). As Habermas puts it, "the political system is *embedded* as only one among several subsystems" (p. 30). For some, these nonstate sites of politics play a crucial role in enhancing democratic legitimacy by providing ongoing sources of resistance to the always-contestable coercive power of the state (Mansbridge, Honig).

Of course, there are also important disagreements among these authors about the meaning of "democracy." As Benhabib notes in her introduction, the most important disagreement is between "procedural-deliberative" democrats, who have modified without abandoning the Enlightenment project of reason-grounded legitimacy, and "agonistic" democrats, who, following Arendt, locate the essence of "the political" in a human agency which is determined neither by nature nor by reason. Benhabib, Habermas, Joshua Cohen, and Gutmann are squarely situated within the former camp; Wolin, Honig, and Barber form the core of the latter camp. Benhabib suggests, rightly in my view, that the agenda of democratic theorists should give high priority to developing "a deliberative vision of democratic politics which can also do justice to the agonistic spirit of democracy" (p. 9), but that is an elusive goal. The essays by Mansbridge and Jean Cohen confront the challenge most directly but only briefly. As Mansbridge suggests, even deliberative conceptions of democratic legitimacy remain imbued with the taint of irrationality insofar as "the discursive base from which people make their decisions. ... is permeated with power" (p. 55). This insight implicitly calls into question the defensibility of standards of "reasonableness" applied to public argument that some, notably Joshua Cohen, would require in their conceptions of deliberative democracy; if nonrational forms of culture and tradition shape our willingness to recognize others' arguments as "reasonable," does that undermine the authority of deliberative decisions? And as Jean Cohen notes, "no single type of public space could conceivably" secure, simultaneously, (1) open-ended discursive reflection on public norms, (2) legally binding decisions, (3) the agonistic enactment of individual and social identities, and (4) the elimination of substantive inequalities among participants (p. 190). Without some more concrete specification of "the appropriate place for each in a highly differentiated society" (ibid.), deliberative and agonistic models of democracy will remain unreconciled, particularly with regard to the question of whether securing rights and the rule of law is an intrinsic aim of democratic politics.

What do these authors tell us about difference? Here there is less agreement than on the meaning of democracy. Honig comments that, in the book's title, "difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism"; she favors a reading of difference inspired by Derrida and Connolly, "a difference that troubles identity from with*in* its would-be economy of the same" (pp. 257, 258). But even for those to whom "difference" signifies pluralism, the content of that pluralism varies considerably across authors. They include the "reasonable pluralism" of moral views that is the starting point of Joshua Cohen's and other Rawls-inspired views of deliberative democracy; the cultural pluralism that motivates much of Kymlicka's, Dallmayr's and Forment's inquiries; gender difference, which forms the focus of the essays by Fraser, Jean Cohen, and Landes; and difference generated by structural injustice along the lines of, for example, race, class, and gender (the primary concerns of Young and Gould). I wonder whether the projects of democratic theory are hampered more than helped by the use of the term "difference" to signify all these things.

Questions concerning the appropriateness of a general category of "difference" become especially pressing when we turn to consider the relationship between democracy and difference. It may well be the case that different kinds of group difference require different conceptualizations of democratic equality and different strategies for realizing it. Are there forms of difference that constitute challenges which democratic theory must overcome, as in Joshua Cohen's view? Can we construe difference as a positive resource for democratic discourse, as Young, Mouffe, and Forment suggest? Some advocates of a "decentered public sphere" imply that the existence of multiple sites of discourse in civil society, connected in a communicative web with other associations as well as with state institutions, offers the greatest promise of reconciling democracy and difference (Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Mansbridge). But this remains an area of democratic theory which requires further work: What are the institutional mechanisms by which associational life can be connected to state action, which give appropriate recognition to difference, and which do not reproduce patterns of systemic disadvantage?

Given these concerns, it is not surprising that I found some of the most exciting articles in the volume to be those that tackle questions of institutional design head on. These include Mansbridge's account of the appropriate relationship between the deliberative and coercive functions of democracy; Kymlicka's account of the different institutional forms of group recognition in Canada; Phillips's essay on the relationship between group identity and political ideas in legislative representation; Fraser's exploration of the capacity of different conceptualizations of the welfare state to achieve gender equity; and Jean Cohen's project to redefine privacy rights in light of a democratic redefinition of the public sphere.

It is difficult to address the place of difference in democracy without also raising questions about the philosophic foundations of democracy. If difference signifies disagreement, does this mean that it threatens democracy's stability? Does democracy require shared moral beliefs among citizens? Four essays at the end of the volume take up these questions: those by Rorty, Dahl, Gutmann and Barber. Despite the marked differences in their views, they share the conclusion that some project of justification is necessary to sustain the vitality of democracy. For some, that project of justification is grounded in foundational claims of truth (a position none of these authors endorses, but to which Dahl comes closest); for others, justification has a more pragmatic form, aimed at showing that democracy is superior to alternative political forms (Gutmann, Rorty, and Barber come surprisingly close to sharing this view). It is difficult to disagree with Dahl's conclusion that without some ground of justification, "in times of serious crisis . . . those who try to defend democracy will find the going much harder" (p. 338). Those defenders will undoubtedly find much to assist them in the arguments contained between the covers of this book.

Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. By Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 272p. $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

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There are at least two potential sources of conflict in situations in which a good or goods must be divided between parties. First, the parties may disagree about the proportion of the good(s) to which each is entitled. Questions of fairness at this level must be answered by reference to the dictates of some normative theory. The theory may prescribe a solution that bears little resemblance to what the parties involved feel to be fair. It is easy, in fact, to imagine situations in which a normative theory of justice is applied to the division of goods such that none of the parties is satisfied. The subjective judgments of the claimants are irrelevant. In contrast, once the parties have agreed to the legitimacy of each other's claims, then the locus of potential conflict moves from distributional issues to questions about whether the outcome of the division procedure used produces outcomes that reflect the parties' concept of a fair division. Assuming honest assessments, procedures that divide a set of goods between claimants who have agreed to the proportion to which each is entitled can only be judged successful if all parties believe they received their fair share. Unlike assessing the fairness of entitlement, in assessing the fairness of division procedures the subjective judgments of the claimants are crucial. *Fair Division* focuses exclusively on this second type of fairness.

The book is divided into two parts. The first, chapters 1–7, provides a lucid and comprehensive review of existing division procedures. Brams and Taylor use a multidimensional framework in which the types of division problems are described based on the number of claimants (2 to n) and the nature of the good(s) in question (divisible/indivisible). More interestingly, the results of the division algorithms are assessed on four different dimensions of fairness: proportionality, equitability, efficiency, and envy-freeness. Tellingly, each dimension is defined by the parties' own assessments of the outcomes. Proportionality is achieved if, after the division procedure, all parties feel they have received at least $1/n$ of the whole. Equitability is achieved if each player thinks the portion s/he receives is worth the same, in terms of his or her valuation, as the portion that the other player receives in terms of that player's valuation (p. 241). Efficiency is defined as Pareto optimality. Finally, Brams and Taylor label the product of a procedure envy-free if all players assess their own portion as at least as valuable as that of any other. The authors argue that concerns over envy-freeness have been underemphasized in discussion of division procedures. The book successfully addresses this shortcoming.

Many of the more interesting discussions in the book examine the inherent trade-offs involved in the selection of division procedures. Much as in the adoption of voting systems, Brams and Taylor effectively demonstrate that one cannot choose a division procedure that satisfies a set of simple and desirable fairness criteria. For example, they show there is no division scheme that is simultaneously (1) algorithmic, (2) proportional, and (3) efficient. Any two of these properties can be obtained, but it can be shown that simultaneously obtaining all three is impossible (p. 48). Procedures that result in a combination of efficient and envy-free solutions are also shown to be maddeningly difficult to achieve.

In addition to an extensive review of how each algorithm works, the authors provide an historical framework of the work in the field. Within this framework the importance and originality of Brams and Taylor's contributions to the literature are impressive. Most people, for example, are familiar with the rule "you cut, I choose" to divide a cake between two people. This procedure is elegant because it guarantees an envy-free outcome. The problem of how to extend the rule to any number of claimants, however, had stumped mathematicians for decades. In 1995 Brams and Taylor solved the problem ("An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol," *American Mathematical Monthly*, January 1995, pp. 9–18). The solution is too involved to present here, but it hinges on having one person divide the cake into $n + 1$ equal slices and then having a succession of "trimming" take place by successive claimants. Chapter 7 of book presents the method in lay terms.

While this and other division solutions are built on elegant logic and are clearly achievements in their own right, many readers will find them unamenable to practical application. The authors, addressing this problem, successfully demonstrate the practical application of at least some of the procedures. For example, chapter 4 describes an original division algorithm called adjusted winner (AW), which the authors advocate for use in everything from international disputes to divorce settlements. AW is designed to divide a bundle of divisible goods between two people who value the goods differently. Each party is awarded 100 points which they allocate, according to their assessments of value, across the goods. Whoever bids the highest wins the good. If the point values of the goods that claimants have won is not equal, then starting with the item with the smallest ratio of scores, the items are divided between the players until the point totals of all they have won are equal. AW guarantees envy-freeness, efficiency, and equitability but only if the claimants are honest about their preference intensities.

To encourage honest assessment, Brams and Taylor suggest that claimants first be given the option of AW; if either feels that the other has manipulated the procedure and therefore feels dissatisfied with the division achieved through AW, then s/he can opt for the proportional allocation (PA) of the goods. Unlike AW, all goods in this procedure must be divisible. In PA each player allocates a number of points across the set of goods, and each receives the proportion defined by his or her allocation. PA is not open to manipulation but, unlike AW, does not guarantee efficient outcomes. Brams and Taylor successfully argue that, given each player's option of going to PA, manipulation in AW, while possible, will be relatively rare. In chapter 5 the procedure is applied to the Panama Canal treaty negotiations and divorce settlements.

Ironically, it is in demonstrating the applicability of the division algorithms that their limitations become most clear. For example, the authors claim that some of the methods could be used to determine the outcomes of international disputes. This could only be the case if the parties to the dispute had already agreed on what constituted a fair division. In divorce settlements each party usually agrees to what each is entitled, specifically, half the value of the goods accumulated throughout the marriage. When the parties to a dispute can agree on a clear definition of entitlement, the methods described by Brams and Taylor are of great use. Unfortunately, agreement over entitlements is relatively rare in most international division conflicts, and when parties disagree about what constitutes a fair division the algorithmic procedures described in the book cannot help.

The second part of the book (chapters 8–10) has only a tangential connection to the first. In chapters 8 and 9 the authors introduce a new, two-stage bidding procedure that protects bidders from the winner's curse. In the first stage, anonymous simultaneous bids are made. The amount of all bids but not who made them is then revealed. In the second stage, all players make another simultaneous bid; they can only use the bids made in the first round but are free to bid any of them. In chapter 10, Brams and Taylor introduce a revised version of Brams's approval voting procedure. Both of these contributions are clever solutions to specific problems, but they do not fit comfortably into the overall theme of the book. If markets and elections are instances of fair division, then the term is in danger of losing its meaning by encompassing too large a subject area.

Despite these criticisms the book is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in issues of fair division. Brams and Taylor's review of the literature is as skilled as their original contributions to it. While limited in scope by the nature of the procedures, the authors' attempts to apply the formal procedures they describe to real-world situations is admirable and should be of interest to anyone concerned with bargaining and negotiation theory. Finally, the original auction and election procedures introduced in the last three chapters are interesting contributions in their own right and deserve attention.

Max Weber and Democratic Politics. By Peter Breiner. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. 237p. $39.95.

Lawrence A. Scaff, *Pennsylvania State University*

Max Weber's politics generated substantial controversy during his lifetime. Such contemporaries as Troeltsch and Meinecke detected an increasingly independent and leftward drift as his commentaries became more critical of the Wilhelmine political scene. Others, such as Lukács and Landauer, deplored his nationalism and defense of power politics. In general, judgments about what exactly Weber proposed for the post-1918 order in Germany and elsewhere remained elusive. Assessments seem to have changed little since then, especially in relation to the standard problems and categories of liberal-democratic theory. Even the fact that Weber once referred to himself as among the "individualists and supporters of democratic institutions" (in his first 1906 essay on Russia) has made little difference. The view is still common that while Weber's analyses of bureaucracy and power are perhaps unsurpassed, his political commentaries and political sociology remain ill-equipped to handle the crucial issues faced in a democratic political order and modern democratic theory.

Following the critical work of such scholars as Mommsen and Beetham, Peter Breiner has written an important and thoughtful study that addresses this issue. The strategy of *Max Weber and Democratic Politics* is to treat Weber as "a theorist of political judgment," a perspective also taken up recently by Wilhelm Hennis in *Max Webers Wissenschaft vom Menschen* (1996, part 2). Instead of keying on Weber's notion of political education, the present study focuses on the kind of prudential knowledge found in Weber's work and important to the contemporary discussion of democracy because it "sets the conditions that a realistic participatory democrat has to answer" (pp. ix–x). Among the most significant modern conditions are numerous items from the Weberian corpus: the dominion of instrumental rationality and its forms, rule by bureaucracy, the professionalization of politics, the expansion of victorious market capitalism, the escape route offered by charismatic authority, and the last-ditch effort to justify an "ethic of responsibility." The author explores these themes and a few others in six densely packed chapters, some of which can stand on their own. The argumentation is philological in the best sense, with close attention paid to Weber's original conceptual language, and the overriding aim is to assimilate Weber's thinking to concerns central to the tradition of political philosophy from the theory of the polis to the present day.

The notion of "judgment" provides a standpoint for maintaining that Weber "uses his social science as a form of practical-political prudence" (p. 49) or, even more forcefully, that his thinking represents a "unification of sociology with political ethics" (p. 211). Against the view that "scholarship" and "partisanship" are carefully and provisionally separated in Weber's thinking, Breiner emphasizes the practical implications of the analytic sociological categories for judgment, decision, and action. Reduced to its essential features, Breiner's argument is that the famous category of purposive or instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) achieves a privileged dominance in Weber's thought, such that the "logics" of choice and action operate according to its imperatives. This starting point, in turn, has consequences for what Weber is able to say about agency (the concept of the autonomous person and the choosing individual), the nature of political ethics and responsibility, political economy, the modern state and politician, and participatory citizenship in "strong" democracy. Among these topics, the discussion of political economy in chapter 3 is especially welcome for recovering an aspect of Weber's work important in its own day but usually ignored until recently, except by an earlier generation (Talcott Parsons, for example) interested in developing the field of "economic sociology." In the last analysis, however, the author is most concerned not only about the prospects for radical democracy in the face of Weberian critique, a problem decades ago for Robert Michels as well, but also about the constraints placed on this critique itself by its rationalistic presuppositions concerning means and ends, impartiality, and the "logics" of social and political action. Thus, the final chapter juxtaposes Weber with Rousseau, as did J. G. Merquior in *Rousseau and Weber* (1980), with the aim of appropriating the classical normative formulations of a civic ideal to map the common ground for a Weberian "ethic of responsibility" suitable to the politics of the participatory democrat. The result is a synthesis of sorts, a recombinant hybrid for "those who hope to reverse the Weberian political expropriation process and recover democratic autonomy" (p. 232).

Is the Breinerian synthesis reasonable, stable, and convincing? For the reader seeking self-clarification, an answer probably depends not simply on complex judgments but on prior commitments. Unlike Michels' earlier Rousseauist encounter with Weber, Breiner's emerges with a faith in radical democratic possibilities still intact. One reason for this different outcome is the latter's refusal to accept the presuppositions of Weber's intentions, problems, and analyses. Such refusal can be a source of strength, but it also risks overlooking the rationale supporting a body of critical thought. As Breiner recognizes, Weber's questions were directed more centrally to modern capitalism, its paradoxes and circumstances and contradictions, than to democracy per se. Moreover, *Max Weber and Democratic Politics* is a sustained inquiry into political judgment, not an "empirical" study of the "real world" of modern democratic politics. It does not have the engagements of, say, Stephen Esquith's *Intimacy and Spectacle: Liberal Theory as Political Education* (1994), wherein Weberian "matter-of-factness" is exploited in connection with concerns that Weber shared about the demise of political education in our age of seamless corporate power and its rationalized "cultures." Such a glimpse into the faces of contemporary power and "irrational" rationalization can also be a point of entry for a Weberian critique more sympathetic to the aims of "democratic autonomy" than Breiner allows. There can be value, nevertheless, in bringing our own concerns into dialogue with contrasting voices, like those of Rousseau and Weber, who may well speak a language quite different from our own. That project is still the best way to acknowledge the vitality of Weber's many provocations and to continue the conversation of political philosophy.

The Ethos of Pluralization. By William E. Connolly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 243p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

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It is a daunting task to climb into the mind of a theorist and partake of her or his worldview, but this is especially necessary when a writer develops a conceptual vocabulary to architectonically theorize contemporary politics. William E. Connolly's writing is imposing, located at the juncture of postmodern theoretical practice with liberalism and fundamentalist challenges to the latter; the theory that results is invigorating in its process of unfolding. It takes us to the limits of our capacity to understand with the received analytical tools of political philosophy and introduces a new one—the concept of ethos and its usefulness for understanding contemporary political life.

Connolly's aim in his most recent book, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, is to supplant both liberal and fundamentalist conceptions of "the common good" with the concept of ethos. In the Introduction and the opening chapter, "Nothing Is Fundamental," he develops the nonfoundational albeit key terms of his theoretical vocabulary. Pluralization replaces pluralism (the latter presupposes fixed subjective identities and political interests). An ethos of critical responsiveness (which includes generosity and forbearance among unequals leading toward agonistic respect and reciprocity among equals) replaces the ethos of liberal atomistic individualism. In consequence, justice as grounded in theoretical fundaments and a corresponding normative code is replaced by genealogically bracketed codes subject to "democratic disturbance" as an effect of a "politics of enactment" of one's way of life or ethos of critical responsiveness *as* social and historical agency. Thus, for Connolly, ethos is more than individual character but not fully circumscribed by social normativity, and the ethos of pluralization is (one's, a collectivity's) critical responsiveness to what Connolly calls "the protean diversity of being" through a politics of enactment as called forth by contemporary conditions of political life. (Indeed, ethos is a concept I have used to theorize how a distinctive lesbian and gay politics has come into being.)

What are the contemporary conditions of politics that call for a democratic ethos of critical responsiveness to pluralization? Connolly characterizes political space as the globalization of the economy alongside retention of the state as the democratic rule-making forum, while political time is the speed in contemporary life through which pluralization occurs. Pluralization is furthered by social movements transforming individual identity and affinities as well as altering what a political issue is (aspects of contemporary life that can be named as just/unjust, thus mobilizing people to political action). Both liberalism and fundamentalism respond to these contemporary conditions of "the political." Liberalism ahistorically hypostatizes already recognized social identities as the only legitimate ones, thereby preempting justice understood through historical transformation of the terms of membership, power, and value. Closely related to this, American fundamentalism forgets the instability of the categories agency/responsibility in "individualism" and cloaks both their historicity and embeddedness in relations of power supporting dominance and exploitation through recourse to "a vocabulary of God, nature, reason, nation, or normality elevated above the possibility of critical reflection" (p. 106). Connolly's critique of American fundamentalism and of liberal democratic theory as well as his analysis of the contemporary conditions of politics—of political space, time, and energy—each comprise a chapter of the book.

In some respects, it seems that liberalism, in Connolly's view, is the theory but fundamentalism the practice of U.S. politics. Elaboration of Connolly's political ethos in comparison with liberalism and fundamentalism can be made through application to two specific issues, crime and punishment and the identity politics of rights. In the former, both fundamentalism and liberalism posit the seamless identity of a responsible criminal and allow for a social response based on *ressentiment*. For Connolly, beyond the laws and morality through which justice is encoded, an ethos of critical responsiveness must inform our relationship to both criminal and victim. He is thus theorizing an ethicopolitical stance that "calls into question the quest to find a solid ground of morality of justice" and that "pluralizes the sources and codes of ethics while acknowledging the contestability of its own presumptions" (pp. 187, 191). This enables decentering a revenge-based model of punishment and rethinking contemporary criminality and responses to it.

In a single chapter of the book, Connolly develops this view and applies it also to the identity politics of lesbian and gay rights. Here, it would eschew fundamental attributions of (even morally neutral) biological nature or intrinsic moral disorder (borrowing from Catholicism). They are symptomatic of our fundamentalist- and even liberal-inflected tendency to resist "the proliferation of affirmative individualities and positive associational styles" (p. 90) by treating them as needing translation into the categories of reason, nature, or the sacred grounding of hegemonic relations and identities, that is, by normalizing them. To be sure, Connolly does not equate liberalism with fundamentalism in this way but, rather, criticizes an amalgam he characterizes as "fundamentalist liberalism." Nevertheless, his theorization of the emergent political ethos retrospectively illuminates stark parallels between fundamentalism and liberalism, including the dead-end response of each to contemporary pluralization.

Liberalism can be conceived not only as a philosophical doctrine but also as the cultural construction of governable individuals through numerous relations of power. This is also a construction of an analytical perspective that the individual is the genetic unit of politics, allowing us to forget that individual freedom is always already "framed" by power relations. To the extent Connolly focuses primarily on personal cultivation of critical responsiveness, he is reconstructing liberalism. In his most original moments, Connolly acknowledges the "protean excess of being over identity" and theorizes ethos from a Foucauldian "work on oneself by oneself to create oneself." To push Connolly's ideas a bit farther, however, if this ethical work is conceived as, in practice, *relational*— creating oneself in chosen relations with others through which one becomes an agent of one's actions— then it has implications that point beyond liberalism.

Such a conceptualization of ethos prioritizes the kinds of *relationships* individuals have over intrinsic characteristics they may possess as individuals. Work on oneself therefore makes identity never fully determinate (or at least always dependent upon a relational context) and makes possible indefinitely plural relationships. This ethos of work on oneself through relational choice is the motor force for identity politics and pluralization. It can lead toward a new focus for contemporary political analysis: "What are the most admirable ethical relations to cultivate between carriers of contending ideals inhabiting the same territorial and cultural space when none holds a lock on the truth" (p. 92)?

Connolly sharpens this focus in some of the more policy-oriented analyses of his book, shedding light upon contemporary debates about promoting economic equality through coalition by means of "democratic assemblages" and upon what he sees as evil in pluralist societies (a drift toward hypostatization and naturalization of identity resulting in fundamentalist projects for punishment or in marginalization). In the last chapter, he threads together his critique of the pluralism of Tocqueville and the ethics of Thoreau with a political-economic critique from earlier chapters of the writings of Macpherson, Schumpeter, and Walzer. Throughout the book I found these canonical guideposts for theorizing less informative than Connolly's engagement with contemporary political debates, where his brilliance as a thinker and the innovativeness of his theoretical project shone. While Connolly's book is an avowed "postfundamentalist" reconstruction of liberalism, the terms of political discourse are there for a new public philosophy reflecting the ethos Connolly sees emerging. Its way, perhaps, may be well paved by American liberalism, but it may more likely be a hybrid arising from the very process of global pluralization Connolly is theorizing. With his theorization of a political ethos in which the common good is enacted through relationships of difference, Connolly contributes mightily to the development of this concept for political philosophy and to our understanding of the world in which we live.

Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible in *Leviathan*. By Paul D. Cooke. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 304p. $62.50 cloth, $23.95 paper.

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Paul Cooke criticizes *Leviathan* from a Christian perspective. This entails, first, rehearsing Hobbes's argument in a lucid, if familiar, way. Cooke maintains that Hobbes deduces man's obligations to sovereign authority from a materialistic, Godless conception of nature. The unfettered assertion of man's "natural right" to preserve himself leads to a war of everyman against everyman. War endangers everyone's primary interest, the avoidance of violent death. Reason teaches man how to avert this calamity. Bringing order and consistency to human passions, reason discovers that the individual's interests are best served by relinquishing natural freedom and undertaking, with all others, to obey the sovereign. Hobbesian reason thus has no purchase upon questions of man's ultimate purpose in the universe or of his relationship to his creator. The first half of *Leviathan* makes it seem that political theory can be complete without reference to those questions.

So why did Hobbes double the length of his work by adding two books of biblical interpretation? He realized, Cooke argues, that man has an ineradicable religious passion. Man yearns not only for life but also for a life beyond death. Since religious passion frequently disrupts public order, the natural science of justice could not succeed unless this passion were tamed. So Hobbes reinterpreted the Bible to make it seem that the revealed word was fully consistent with his scientific reasoning. He sought to make religion useful to public order by convincing Christians that their doctrinal texts supported his view of sovereignty. Readers who find these assertions surprising have much to learn from Cooke's study.

They should be made aware, however, that most of these ideas concerning Hobbes's science of justice have long been accessible in such works as R. S. Peter's *Hobbes* (1956) and J. W. N. Watkin's *Hobbes's System of Ideas* (1973). A. P. Martinich's *The Two Gods of Leviathan* (1992) more thoroughly reviews Hobbes's religious thinking in relation to its historical context. What is most distinctive about Cooke's interpretation is his insistence that Hobbes engaged in a "conspiracy" against Christianity (p. xiv). According to Cooke, Hobbes deliberately designed to deceive credulous Christians into thinking that their obligations to God and to the state could be easily reconciled. He achieved this effect by means of strained interpretations of the Bible, truncated readings, and "duplicitous" assertions. Unlike Martinich, Cooke maintains that Hobbes's theology is purely and simply at odds with "authentic Christianity."

Cooke's main foil in this interpretation is not the recent work of such scholars as Martinich and J. G. A. Pocock; it is Howard Warrender's *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (1957). Warrender argued that Hobbes's "laws of nature" receive their obligatory force from divine will; Hobbes's science of justice is therefore theistic. For Cooke, Warrender was duped by the wily theorist's interpretive strategems; he took Hobbes's "bait" (p. 82). With careful analysis of *Leviathan*, Cooke does cast doubt on Warrender's thesis. But that thesis, it should be added, never forged anything like a scholarly consensus in the first place.

It is particularly regrettable that Cooke fails to address David Johnston's *The Rhetoric of Leviathan* (1986). Cooke often converges with Johnston in interpreting Hobbes's religious views, but there is a crucial difference. Johnston argues that Hobbes aspired to contribute to a "cultural transformation." Realizing that his superstitious contemporaries did not value earthly life in the way needed to make his science of justice operative, Hobbes wished to foster an "enlightenment" that would expel certain magical elements from religious belief. Enlightenment would change citizens into more rational actors, thus laying the foundation of a lasting political order. Cooke argues that Hobbes was convinced that belief in religious mysteries and a yearning for transcendence are too deeply rooted in human psychology ever to be eliminated. Hence, the best option available to an atheistic proponent of scientific civilization would be to harness religion to sovereignty. Guided by Hobbes's biblical exegesis, sovereigns could transmute man's quest for transcendent meaning into temporal submission. This project requires preserving and manipulating religious belief, not transforming it through enlightenment. At issue between Johnston and

Cooke are two profound issues: one of interpreting Hobbes's work, the other of understanding the limits of man's psychological ability to adapt to a worldview devoid of transendent meaning. Unfortunately, Cooke pushes neither issue as far as he could if he had pitted his reading against Johnston's.

If Cooke stops short of grappling with the full range of contemporary Hobbes studies, perhaps it is because objectives other than scholarly thoroughness preoccupy him. His primary concern is to demonstrate the profound incompatibility between "authentic Christianity" and Hobbesian political reasoning. His most compelling passages occur when he contrasts the philosophy of "natural right" with his own view of the Christian calling. The Bible, Cooke believes, stresses man's powerlessness in the face of death, not his ability to generate forms of power that can master anxiety. Christ challenged his followers to embark on a path beset with inconvenience and danger, not to seek the security of "commodious living." Cooke is convinced that Hobbesian egoism can make no sense of Christ's love and selfless sacrifice.

An acolyte of Leo Strauss, Cooke also worries that contemporary liberal conceptions of rights lack sufficient moral grounding because they derive from Hobbes's view of a purposeless existence. Hints of this alleged connection, and consequent ethical deficiency, are scattered throughout *Hobbes and Christianity*. But they are never really argued. Never is it acknowledged that liberal conceptions of human rights have origins in Christianity itself, in feudal privilege, in Kant's conception of human dignity. No hint is allowed that others who contributed to liberal thought—including other contract theorists, such as Althusius and Locke—assumed that God's commandments obtained even in man's prepolitical condition of "natural" freedom. The degree to which there is tension between liberalism and Christianity can hardly be settled by reference to a single thinker.

The principal value of Cooke's work lies not in its assertions regarding an entire tradition of political thought but in its careful juxtaposition of two particular works: the Bible and *Leviathan*. This juxtaposition has the merit of allowing readers to judge for themselves the difficulty of making peace between, on the one hand, Christian devotion and, on the other, a philosophy dedicated to overcoming mankind's intractable tendency to turn opposing views of good and evil into violent conflict.

Free Public Reason: Making It Up as We Go. By Fred D'Agostino. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 203p. $45.00.

Mark E. Warren, *Georgetown University*

For political liberals it is always better to resolve conflicts through the medium of public reason than through coercion, economic blackmail, or tradition. Instead of stipulating what kinds of political outcomes are justifiable, liberals prefer procedures that enable people to arrive at publicly justifiable resolutions. Fred D'Agostino's book examines the concept of public justification itself, an important and timely task, since virtually everyone today holds that public justification is a good thing, but few agree on precisely what it requires. Procedures of justification are never neutral with regard to substance: Differing configurations privilege different sets of goods. For this reason, D'Agostino argues, it makes little sense to ask which approach is best unless we have a clear conception of the goods it tends to privilege. But since these goods differ and often trade off against one another, it may be that the concept of public justification is essentially contestable in Gallie's sense. D'Agostino treats this proposition as an "interim thesis" throughout most of the book, arguing only toward the end (pp. 179–82) that the notion of essential contestability does not get the problem quite right. It is possible to resolve disputes over concepts by means of rational argument—but we can only do so transiently, not once and for all.

Liberal political philosophers typically fail to get the problem right: They pursue what D'Agostino calls a "substitutionalist" strategy. That is, they seek to substitute for politics a set of decision rules, an algorithm, or some other conditions of interaction to ensure that the goods privileged by their conception will prevail. They seek to resolve what is itself a political issue—the question of the best procedure of justification—by prepolitical means. There are costs to substitutionalist strategies. D'Agostino accepts the view associated with feminism and postmodernism that imposed metanarratives of reason will tend to generate new forms of marginalization, exclusion, and domination. Because liberals fail to recognize the essential contestability of their conceptions of public justification, they can save their procedures from irrelevance only by hoping for political forces that would secure them through some kind of prediscursive, inevitably authoritarian means.

What is most impressive about this book is D'Agostino's care in detailing exactly what differing conceptions of public justification entail. He discusses Rawls, Gauthier, Ackerman, Habermas, Gaus, and a generic "utilitarian" approach, categorizing differences among them according to seven distinctions (pp. 30–52). (1) Does the approach seek consensus on or convergence of political values? (2) Does the approach seek positive reasons for accepting a regime? Or is it satisfied when individuals find no good reason to reject a regime? (3) Does the approach seek the satisfaction of desires or commitments based on beliefs? (4) Does the approach seek direct justification by those affected, or is it satisfied with indirect justification provided by a hypothetical consent? (5) Is the approach based on economic reasoning that seeks aggregated compromises among individuals, or is it based on political reasoning that seeks to develop common goods? (6) Should political structures reflect prior beliefs of citizens? Or is posterior consent to existing structures sufficient? (7) Does justification require interaction? Or is it available to individuals a priori?

These are important distinctions, not least because they tell us what kinds of goods are privileged by each approach. But D'Agostino also wants to show that because the goods privileged by different answers to these questions trade off against one another, there is no *philosophical* way of deciding which conception of public justification is best. This is why conceptions of public justification must, ultimately, be decided *politically*. Political philosophers should avoid stipulative principles and instead think about institutional designs that would enable reasonable discussions about how to rank differing good and, thus, differing conceptions of public justification.

What we need to imagine, then, is an institutional substitute for philosophy, a situation within which "reasonable" people can debate the goods implied within differing procedures of justification. D'Agostino postulates a one-time "constitutional convention" that would deliberate and decide about what conception of public justification to privilege within political institutions (chapters 9–10). Delegates would be elected in a way that ensures there are as many voices as delegates, thus representing an inclusive range of possibilities and interests. Although they may represent "unreasonable" people, the delegates themselves must be "reasonable," that is, they must be committed to the desiderata of public justification. Under these circumstances, D'Agostino argues, delegates could, through successive formulations (what he calls a "wave" model), articulate a political community's "founding concept" (pp. 136–7), a notion analogous to Kuhn's conception of a paradigm.

D'Agostino's reconstruction is less satisfactory than his critique. It requires that the toughest political issues have already been resolved sufficiently to keep nondiscursive forces at bay and that a people has already agreed on an inclusive system of representation. These conditions stand in for the philosopher's desire to legislate the domain of politics. And, in fact, the voice of a prepolitical legislator often finds its way into D'Agostino's texts, as when he says: "We try to arrange matters so that any individual who violates . . . rules of discursive interaction will suffer a loss of social esteem" (p. 160). Or "we shall simply arrange for delegates to be socialized to value the meta-justificatory discourse" (p. 161). In addition, it is hard to imagine an actual situation conducive to this one-time event. Even the few cases of constitutional conventions depended upon unique and unusual configurations of events; even then, they were far from ideal. Finally, many of the advantages of public justification stem from its inclusive, participatory nature, a link severed by the representative and one-time nature of the dialogue. A convention that "revolves" the question of what kind of regime is best fails to provide on-going means for public justification of these most fundamental questions. D'Agostino does not attend, in other words, to one important justification for democracy: that through participation in on-going dialogues, citizens come to understand the prevailing modes of public justification—and, perhaps, seek to alter it. Similarly, his solution makes no provisions for successive generations: My grandparents' resolutions may no longer be appropriate to the world in which I live.

While D'Agostino is right to emphasize the increasing importance of the concept of public justification, it seems to me that we can only think it through if we find ways of determining the goods and ideals to which people are always already committed through immanent criticism of existing institutions, social relations, and modes of discourse. This being said, D'Agostino's care in detailing the many dimensions of the concept of public justification moves us closer to being able to identify these goods and ideals as they are now exemplified and violated.

Citizenship in a Fragile World. By Bernard P. Dauenhauer. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 237p. $62.50 cloth, $23.95 paper.

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Recent trials have increasingly illustrated the disturbing gap between the highly technical scientific evidence used in the courtroom and the inability of jurors to comprehend the nature of this testimony. Yet, because jury duty is seen as both a right and an obligation of citizenship, the issue is seen as an affront to democratic inclusion and can be raised only with a certain degree of trepidation.

But the issue of citizen competence is of real import and deserves more attention than it has received. *Citizenship in a Fragile World* does not succeed as an exercise in persuasion, but it is a brave effort to confront a problem in democratic theory around which others too often merely mince. Today, the author argues, the good citizen is obliged "to acknowledge a far larger and more complex sphere of responsibility" (p. 195), and only citizens who possess both an adequate level of technical and political competence "are fully entitled to take part in the deliberation and decisions" of what he terms "democratic survival issues" (p. 130). The idea of democratic survival is the lynchpin of the entire book: Due to the rapid internationalization of ecological damage, which if unaddressed will "bring on vast human misery and will irreparably mutilate the planet," as global citizens we are morally obliged to make "a quick, thoroughgoing change in the way we live" (p. 11). And, because "only a recognizably democratic state can satisfy the demands of political justice" (p. 7), this change must not transgress broad democratic principles. Thus, good citizens must work harder at being "complex citizens" who appreciate individual identity (but also respect communal ties), who care for all individuals globally (but also recognize state authority), and who expressly demand citizen competence (but also protect the democratic liberty of all citizens).

Dauenhauer presents an attractive and inspiring view of citizenship. Good citizens must be willing to acknowledge the ambivalence of "everything political," to "engage in critical reflection" on their own society, to "respect other states' practices," and to "learn from the experience of others" (p. 110). Yet, it is never particularly clear just why we aspire to become good citizens at all and, more pointedly, what is to be done with those who refuse. The author recognizes that such individuals exist but is content to label them as "wicked" and tolerate them with the stipulation that they not be permitted to vote. There are two types of objections to this argument. The first is that the price of "competent citizenship" is too high: If my demanding job requires 50 hours a week, and my young family deserves a reasonable allotment of time as well, then the only way in which I can become a competent citizen is to forgo what very limited time I have for myself. Given the disenchantment with political participation that already manifestly exists, I would have to be superhumanly motivated to devote my few spare hours to a study of the effects of rainforest damage or international trade rather than to my friends, my family, or my inclination to read cheesy detective novels in the bathtub to soothe my nerves at the end of the day.

The author replies that while his demands for good citizenship are heavy, "the complexity and urgency of internationalization and the threat to the human habitability of the earth cannot simply be willed away" (p. 196) and require a concerted effort by the world's citizens to limit our inexorable progress toward environmental cataclysm. The obvious problem here is that we have a classic instance of a free-rider dilemma, with an enormous amount of relevant literature worth plumbing for insight; yet, the author at no point addresses the manifestly political dimensions of how to prevent some individuals from taking advantage of others' inclination to be good citizens. He is content to reiterate that good citizens "must" or "ought" to act in certain ways, without taking into account the complex political dynamics that prevent many people from doing so. In this way the book remains merely a hortatory plea to be virtuous in the face of ever increasing perils rather than a helpful guide to achieving political action.

The second objection addresses the author's limited appreciation of the dynamics of power that are said to exist in the "claim to know." Perhaps the most resonant message in the past decade of social theory has been that claims to neutrality and truth must be examined with extreme caution, as they frequently obscure opaque but entrenched attempts to limit the opportunities of certain classes or groups. Yet, Dauenhauer's account assumes that the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge is unproblematic: One merely assembles groups of experts who are "charged by law with developing reports that are intelligible to the citizenry at large on important, politically relevant scientific matters" (p. 140). Citizens are then tested on their comprehesion of these issues and issued voting licenses depending upon the outcome of their exams.

This account takes a great many things for granted. One is the assumption that the committees of experts will themselves agree on what "the issues" in fact are, let alone how they ought to be addressed. Canada's Royal Commission on Reproductive Technology, meant to be precisely a committee of sober experts charged with clarifying a complex issue for the citizenry and its governors, was wracked by intense and acrimonious disagreements on very basic issues. But were every committee to agree upon the fundamental nature of every problem, there would be a great number of citizens who would see this imposed agenda of "relevant political issues" (and the variety of proposed solutions) as itself highly political; and any attempt to limit citizen voting according to how well individuals could recount the experts' views would doubtlessly be regarded by more than just paranoid militia groups as a manifest transgression of democratic rights. Power lies in the ability to define political agenda, to establish professional paradigms, and to convince nonexperts of who has the best understanding of admittedly complicated problems. Any attempt to link the critical rights of citizenship with an examination of individual comprehension of political issues, however imperative, is likely impossible because of the politicization of the concept of "neutral knowledge" itself. Ecological damage may be relatively self-evident, but the causes of it (poverty? capitalism? socialism?) are manifestly not. Moreover, to what extent are individuals without the benefit of a good academic background made to shoulder a large part of the burden of complex citizenship? Even free education for all does not diminish the effort it takes to become intellectually engaged at the level required by the author; and it is likely that many of the working poor (and the gender and racial groups overrepresented in this class) would give up the right to vote rather than add still more tasks to their already exhausting lives (and especially if this academic agenda were set by a socioeconomic group perceived to be unrepresentative of their political interests at the best of times).

Nonetheless, the issue of citizen competence in an increasingly complex world that deems citizen participation to be beneficial, and possibly crucial, is a problem that ought to be addressed with some determination. Simply because the issue is redolent with suspicion and distrust owing to the relations of power involved does not mean that the problem should be nicely avoided so that toes, and political sensibilities, are not stepped on. It means, rather, that the best account of such an issue is one that examines the politics of the problem very carefully. What is required is not an earnest and well-meaning exhortation to become better citizens, but an examination of why it is that we do not, despite comprehending the consequences of our failure to do so.

Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom. By Thomas L. Dumm. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996. 167p. $18.95.

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The central proposition of Dumm's book is that Foucault elaborated a theory of freedom which escapes traditional categories of negative and positive freedom, and that Foucault achieved this by "concretizing the experiences of agency and situatedness otherwise left abstract by the articulation of freedom in negative and positive terms" (p. 18). Furthermore, the key to Foucault's insights into agency, situatedness, and freedom derives from his analyses of space. Therefore, much of this book, including what I think are the most important sections, is a discussion of Foucault's arguments about the construction of space. Dumm's focus upon space also plays a strong organizational role. The study of Foucault's philosophy is complicated by the shifts and ruptures in his thinking. There is now, and there may always be, disagreement about the relationship between his earlier "archaeological" works, his genealogical studies in the 1970s, and his final works on ancient ethics. An examination of Foucault's discussions of space, how it is constructed and monitored, allows Dumm to connect in an insightful manner a wide range of Foucault's works.

The heart of Dumm's examination of the relationships between space and freedom is presented through a Foucaultian critique of Isaiah Berlin's essay, "Two Concepts of Liberty." Dumm argues that Berlin always presents the space within which freedom occurs as homogeneous and neutral. For example, the division between public and private, which is crucial to Berlin's argument and to the liberal tradition more generally, is presented as something natural and apolitical. Dumm finds in this liberal understanding of space a submerged desire for metaphysical solidity, that is, a failure to confront fully the death of God. The liberal conception of space is simply inaccurate in that space is thoroughly political. The division between what counts as private and what is public is a human construct with important political ramifications. Nor is the private realm devoid of power. Foucault did an excellent job in documenting the variety of ways in which "private" space is partitioned and policed. Yet, beyond the charge of simple inaccuracy, Dumm criticizes the liberal conception of space, arguing that in order to stabilize space it is necessary to appeal to some form of ontological ground: Human beings are made in a certain fashion, or God established the private and public realms. Like other postmodernists, Dumm believes that the search for solid metaphysical or ontological ground is dangerous. It places artificial boundaries upon what a person should be and thus "gives us one more excuse for being violent in the name of the good" (p. 61). Liberal space becomes neutral space only through constructions, such as patriarchy or homophobia, that are not themselves neutral.

In contrast, Dumm's Foucault would have us understand space as thoroughly constructed. Yet, it is precisely this fact which creates the possibility of freedom. Transgressions of existing norms or categories constitute a pivotal aspect of Foucaultian freedom, yet, if space were truly neutral, then there would be no norms to violate. The overcoming of the liberal understanding of space and freedom would, Dumm contends, allow us to pursue a politics of self-constitution, which Dumm argues is at the heart of Foucaultian freedom. Freedom, in this view, is the practice of trying to refashion one's self in a way that recognizes the contingent nature of all identity, including one's own. According to Foucault and Dumm, such a care of the self, which is the exercise of freedom, will make one more ethical.

Dumm's descriptions of Foucaultian freedom, while textually plausible, give only a weak defense of Dumm's central claim that this understanding of freedom escapes the traditional categories of negative and positive freedom. There is a general lack of clarity in this book, which makes it difficult to decipher precisely what is new in Foucault's account of freedom. For instance, Foucault certainly shares with positive freedom theorists the idea that freedom is something which arises from the exercise of important human faculties. Dumm asserts that positive freedom theorists have strong teleological commitments, yet, he never bothers to show the reader why this must be the case. Also, Dumm does not engage the strongest versions of his opponents' positions. Some communitarians have articulated teleological theories with less metaphysical baggage than Dumm admits. Given Foucault's own late writings, which often seem to have implicit teleological commitments, the distance between Foucault and the communitarians is less than Dumm asserts. Likewise, some liberals, especially feminists, have put forward theories in which space is problematized. While Berlin never interrogates the public/private dichotomy, many liberals agree that this distinction is itself very political and also grant that the private realm is not neutral.

There is another way in which Dumm stacks the deck. He is strongly critical of those who, like the biographer James Miller, take a psychological approach to Foucault's work. He rightly argues that we should take Foucault's arguments as arguments, not as psychological symptoms. Yet, Dumm then turns around and reads his opponents' works as clues to their psychology. Those who criticize Foucault do so because "Foucault is a dangerous destabilizer of their own desires for security" (p. 14). Dumm unmasks communitarians as people who are motivated by a desire for stable identities. He also displays a lack of care in his arguments at a methodological level. Like Foucault, Dumm believes that many modern institutions have as their primary role the inculcation of discipline and normality. Yet, did the fathers of psychiatry, for example, intend for their "discipline" to have the function that Foucault finds in it? This seems implausible, so Foucault sought to avoid this problem through his arguments for "nonsubjective intentionality." Modern power plans and executes X, even though no one agent or group of agents thought "let's do X." As a consequence of this position, Foucault had to argue that we should not try to enter the heads of those with power: He has placed intentionality outside their head. Dumm is not constrained by such consistency. When it is convenient he uses nonsubjective intentionality, but at other times he writes about "our governors' perfidies," and he tries to deduce the intentions of those with power (p. 24).

Dumm's contribution is in his focus upon a neglected aspect of Foucault's work, the analysis of space, and the manner in which Foucault connected it to freedom. It is these sections of the book which are most valuable for Foucault scholars.

Political Analysis: An Annual Publication of the Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association. Volume 5. Edited by John R. Freeman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 228p. $47.50.

R. Michael Alvarez, *California Institute of Technology*

In the first review of the state of political methodology, Achen (Christopher H. Achen, "Towards Theories of Data: The State of Political Methodology." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ada W. Finifter, 1983, p. 70) stated that "political methodologists have expended much of their energies teaching the rest of the discipline new statistical techniques invented in other fields." He argued that they were too quick to look to techniques developed in other fields and to popularize these techniques without examining their appropriateness for political research. Last, Achen (1983, 71) lamented the fact that political methodologists have not done enough theoretical thinking about the unique problems posed by political data; this lack "has weakened intellectual structures across the discipline."

But much progress has been made since Achen's critique, as is evident in the fifth volume of *Political Analysis*. Each of the seven articles makes a strong contribution to both political methodology and different substantive subfields of political science. Taken as a whole, they show that new techniques for the analysis of political science data are being developed, not just borrowed from other disciplines. This volume provides strong evidence that a solid methodological foundation is now being constructed for empirical political research.

The first article, by Brady, uses aggregate models to understand individual behavior. Brady begins by developing a model of how voters, in the context of American presidential primaries, determine which candidate to support. He argues that two different processes may be operative—simple risk aversion or a more complex set of strategic behaviors—and that each process leads to aggregate models with different properties. Using computer simulations, Brady cleverly examines the aggregate behaviors of both models, which results in a set of new conclusions about how momentum in primaries occurs, how voters learn of it, and the role of the media in generating it. The contribution of this article to the study of presidential primary campaigns is clear; the contribution to political methodology is found in Brady's examination of an aggregated model, built from microfoundations, using computer simulation. This type of analysis is rare in political science research, but it is hoped that Brady's work will lead to more.

Three of the papers examine the survey response. The articles by Jackson, Jacoby, and Wilcox and Wleizen, all show current research in this area of political methodology. The primary difference among them is that Jackson develops a statistical model to differentiate uncertainty from guessing in survey responses, while the other two use survey-based experiments to determine how people answer questions about issue placements and political-economic perceptions. Jackson's contribution is very important, since his model provides researchers using discrete survey responses a way to separate individuals who truly have no opinions about the particular subject from those who have an uncertain opinion. This new model demonstrates that guessing is an important problem in responses to National Election Studies' attitude items about ending the Vietnam War in 1968 and 1970; the only drawback is that Jackson simply does not have enough space to examine other aspects of public opinion and more recent data. Given that the problem of guessing is quite severe in survey data, Jackson's work will be of great use in coming years.

The Jacoby article takes a much different approach, on a different type of survey question. The focus is on the seven-point scales common in many major academic surveys, particularly the possible effect of question wording on the quality of the survey response. For example, the seven-point questions are usually posed by providing the opposing viewpoint on each issue and asking respondents to place themselves somewhere in between. Jacoby presented to survey respondents each of the opposing viewpoints independently, asking whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement. Then he used a multidimensional scaling and unfolding analysis to demonstrate that the procedure did not lead to biased survey responses. This is a positive result, in that it provides a strong affirmation for the continued use of the seven-point format in future surveys.

Wilcox and Wlezien look at the same question but in a different substantive area. They show that the responses to questions on economic evaluations and presidential approval obtained from their experimental survey are very sensitive to the ordering of these items. Presidential approval responses are affected by the presence of economic evaluation questions immediately before them. This important finding meshes well with recent models of the survey response (John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response," *American Journal of Political Science* 36(1992):579–616) and should help guide the design of future academic surveys. But it would be interesting for some analysis to be done on how much this "contamination" influences the substantive results of the sort of models political scientists will estimate using these survey data. Does it lead to biased substantive results? And what is the extent of the bias?

The third methodological topic covered in this volume is time-series analysis, which is the subject of two articles. The first, by Kellstedt, McAvoy, and Stimson, introduces a new technique to political researchers: the dynamic, multiple indicator, multiple causes (DYMIMIC) model. It has been applied in both economics and political science, but the authors present a very lucid and useful explanation of the practical issues involved in estimating this model and offer a few interesting substantive applications. The DYMIMIC framework should see wider use in political science, since we often want to study the temporal dynamics of processes for which we have no direct measure and for which there is measurement error. This article is a splendid example of the best type of political methodology, since the authors spend considerable time discussing the practical details of estimating the DYMIMIC model and provide three substantive examples showing the power of this technique. It will be of great use to researchers in a number of areas of political science, and this paper provides an excellent introduction.

The second contribution on dynamic modeling is by Schickler and Green. Their substantive motivation is to rectify two contrasting sets of results in the literature on party identification in the United States. Early work found partisanship to be very stable over time and relatively insensitive to political factors; work in the late 1970s and 1980s challenged those claims (Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*, 1981; Charles H. Franklin and John E. Jackson, "The Dynamics of Party Identification," *American Political Science Review* 77(1983):957–73; John E. Jackson, "Issues, Party Choice and Presidential Votes," *American Journal of Political Science* 19(1975):161–85). In a careful reexamination of the work of Franklin and Jackson (1983), Schickler and Green argue that their results (partisanship is associated with political factors and is not stable over time) are very sensitive to certain exclusion restrictions made in their model. When Schickler and Green respecify that model, they find that partisanship seems very stable over time and is quite insensitive to issue preferences. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, Schickler and Green show that dynamic models are very sensitive to specification. Second, this is an important piece of work in an on-going substantive debate, since papers have been presented at a number of recent professional meetings on the dynamics and possible sources of change in partisanship.

The last area of political methodology represented in this volume is the study of event count data. This has received a great deal of attention in recent years and is an area in which methodologists have made strong contributions to political science. Winkelmann, Signorino, and King show that the commonly presented moments of a very well-known probability distribution (the continuous parameter binomial [CPB]) are incorrect. The CPB distribution has been widely used for decades, but not until it was adopted in the political science literature (to model event counts) were these errors in published forms of the moments found incorrect. The errors, however, are shown by Winkelmann, Signorino, and King to have few practical implications (which probably accounts for their not being spotted for decades). Nevertheless, this work is one of the most important contributions to the volume because it answers Achen's call to think theoretically about problems of political science and develop empirical models for those problems. That is exactly what motivated development of the event count model by King (Gary King, *Unifying Political Methodology*, 1989.) and what led to this correction to an important statistical distribution.

Political Analysis contains a great deal of useful information for scholars interested in empirical political research. It presents current work in several important methodological fields and provides a number of novel and useful substantive contributions. This volume and the four that preceded it should be on the shelves of all empirically oriented political scientists. While the stress is on original contributions, there is also great emphasis on clear exposition of the methodological approach and on the practical issues of how the analyses were undertaken and models estimated. Political methodology has come a long way since Achen's critique in 1983. The fact that *Political Analysis* exists and publishes such strong research is a strong affirmation of the substantial progress made in recent years.

Isaiah Berlin. By John Gray. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 189p. $19.95.

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Just as Isaiah Berlin's great essays on Vico, Herder, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Tolstoy, and Herzen revealed as much about the outlook and opinions of the author writing them as about the figures he was writing about, this account of Berlin's political thought is simultaneously a brilliant exposition of that thought and Gray's attempt to formulate an alternative political theory based upon it. In Berlin's essays the pursuit of his favorite themes sometimes led him to understate important aspects of thinkers who sat less comfortably with his own outlook: Think of the consideration of political evil in the essay on Machiavelli, spirituality in the essay on Tolstoy, providence and theology in the essays on Vico and Herder. Fortunately, the same is less true of Gray. The book appears to be a reliable exposition of Berlin's main ideas. Any distortions are more of nuance than of substance or arise from hesitations and vacillations in Berlin's own thinking. The final chapter of the book, "Agonistic Liberalism," is an original contribution in its own right and raises some of the most profound and challenging questions that ought to command our attention.

Gray's central claim is that "a single idea of enormous subversive force" (p. 1) gives unity to Berlin's thought. This idea, value pluralism, claims "that ultimate human values are objective, but irreducibly diverse, that they are conflicting and often uncombinable, and that sometimes when they come into conflict with one another they are incommensurable; that is, they are not comparable by any measure" (p. 1). Gray elegantly shows how this idea underlies Berlin's views on freedom, history, nationalism, and the history of ideas. Gray insists that for Berlin these rival and incommensurable values are objective. We create ourselves, so to speak, not in the Nietzschean sense of self-creation but by choosing among these objective values and making them our own. The value of negative liberty derives not as a means to want satisfaction or as a precondition for the cultivation of autonomy but as a precondition of self-creation through choice making. Berlin's views on liberty differ from those of Raz and Mill in that the value of freedom does not derive from the fact that it makes a contribution to good life, conceived in terms of the rational adoption of worthwhile ends. For Berlin, even whimsical, unreasonable, quixotic, and self-destructive choices remain choices, hence the source of the value of negative freedom.

Taking value pluralism seriously has radical implications. There is no reason on this account to privilege a cluster of negative liberties as being of overriding importance; these liberties themselves simply embody one value among many. This is especially true because in Berlin's account self-creation occurs both at the collective and individual level, and the creation of collective identities may involve imposing restraints on negative freedom. In Gray's account of Berlin, "there is no direct or universal road from the idea of man as a species whose nature is transformed through the recurrent exercise of powers of choice making to the ideal of a society in which choice making itself is conceived to be a central human good" (p. 160).

The book gives good reasons for supposing that liberalism and pluralism may be incompatible and that those who think they can be easily reconciled have understood neither. A standard move is to see liberalism as a response to pluralism. It is precisely because there is a diversity of goods, incommensurable with one another, that liberalism seeks regulative principles of justice and rights that do not presuppose any conceptions of the good but that can set the terms within which the pursuit of these goods may be carried out. For Gray this argument is plausible only if we suppose that principles of right, unlike conceptions of the good, can be shielded from the force of value incommensurability, but that is precisely what Berlin's value pluralism denies. Pluralism is committed to the view that there is no particular value, that in the case of conflicts with other values some always takes precedence over them. Liberalism, if it is to give itself any identity and content at all, has to argue for precisely such values that, in the case of conflict, trump others. Gray swiftly rejects arguments seeking to establish that liberalism and pluralism are allies rather than competitors. The first of these suggests that the thesis of value pluralism implies there can never be any good reasons for imposing one set of values based on their superiority. But many of the reasons that illiberal regimes offer to defend a set of restraints do not involve the presumption that some values can be ranked above others; they involve only the thought that a way of life may not survive without such restraints. And, Gray argues, there is nothing in the value pluralist thesis to block that move. The second argument suggests that only liberal regimes are likely to concede the truth of value pluralism. Gray rightly dismisses this argument. Many strands of Orthodox Judaism, Hinduism, and others have all defended the doctrine of value pluralism without being liberal. The third argument, that liberal societies are more likely to harbor within them a greater variety of values, fares no better. For that claim to be genuine, liberals would have to demonstrate that whenever the claims of diversity come in conflict with liberty in liberal societies, the claims of liberty do not predominantly triumph, and illiberal forms of life can flourish within liberal societies. Gray denies just this.

Gray's arguments seem often to obscure the two perspectives from which the problem of pluralism may be considered. One is the standpoint of any individual within a culture and the other is the standpoint of a theorist contemplating the panorama of different cultures. If any individual in a culture complains about the unjustness of the restraints that more orthodox member of the culture impose, then it does not seem quite the right thing to Gray's rhetoric often implies that I the theorist, contemplating the world, see in the actions of the orthodox a possible exemplification of some value, which will not survive unless imposed. If I give in to your demands for justification of those restraints, I will be privileging the claim that any form of life must survive the exercise of free choice by its members. Therefore, the orthodox have the right to impose upon you. Yet, individuals within any culture do not feel the force of value pluralism in the same way as the theorist contemplating the kaleidoscope of cultures.

The different implications of these two perspectives are not clearly spelled out either by Berlin or Gray. That is, it is not clear why the truth of the axiological thesis of value pluralism implies that the demands for justification put forward by any members of a culture are not legitimate; nor does it seem to have any bearing on how adjudication is to proceed from that point onward. Liberalism's strength is that it takes the force of this demand, which is now fated to arise in all societies, seriously, which Gray often does not. The real and perhaps tragic implication of Gray's argument is that the incommensurability of good reasons on offer may be such that the liberal project of trying comes with rules to which all those who live under them can freely consent is considerably more difficult to achieve than liberals characteristically realize; or that it may be sustained largely by a historical convergence of views and attitudes in a society, that is, some might say, by a diminution of diversity.

Why is value pluralism not simply a species of relativism? Gray swiftly dismisses Leo Strauss's charge against Berlin on three grounds. First, "the discovery of a pluralist universe is a real discovery; there really are many visions and many ways that are self-validating and uncombinable; second because the freedom that gives rise to these visions and ways is genuinely valuable" (p. 150). Third, Gray invokes notions like the "minimal universal content of morality" to defend Berlin from such a charge. These grounds, as stated, do not adequately refute Strauss's claims. The suggestion that diverse and incompatible goods are objective is not, as Joseph Brodsky once suggested, prima facie incompatible with the thought that, since there can be no adjudication between these values and no definable constraints on what is to count as such, virtually anything goes. That Berlin himself holds freedom as a genuine value and believes priorities can be established is evident. Whether he has good grounds for asserting them without diluting the force of the value pluralism thesis is much less so.

These questions are an invitation to Gray to elaborate the central themes of this book. Like Berlin, Gray's historical sensibility, lack of parochialism, and courageous and imaginative contemplation of vistas outside the narrow confines of academic liberalism make him, as this book abundantly demonstrates, ideally situated to reflect deeply on the predicaments of the modern world. Many see in the doctrine of value pluralism a monumental evasion of a theorist's responsibility to adjudicate between conflicting goods. Gray is right to insist that it is no such thing and that properly embracing it requires a heroism akin to Job's refusal to accede to false comforters. But whether this heroism of humility can have much purchase on the conflicts with which the world abounds needs to be further demonstrated.

Democracy and Disagreement. By Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. 422p. $27.95.

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How can controversial items of public policy be justified in polities marked by what John Rawls has called the "fact of pluralism"? Given fundamental moral disagreement on the values which ought to be reflected in laws and policies, how can we avoid political decisions appearing to constituencies on the losing end of political disagreements as the sheer imposition upon them of the will of those holding rival moral conceptions? The greater awareness of moral diversity that has marked the work of political philosophers in recent years has lent these questions renewed urgency. One route which many theorists have begun to explore in order to respond to them is that of deliberative democracy. The basic idea is intuitive and straightforward: Since the "fact of pluralism" prevents us from making reference in the justification of public policies to contested moral values, why not simply allow deliberation among citizens and their representatives to determine the content of laws? Democratic policy formation would prevent contested policies from appearing like the deductive implications of principles that some citizens simply do not affirm and might even give rise to the creation or uncovering of unexpected common moral ground. In order to respond to the pervasive moral pluralism of modern societies, according to deliberative democrats we should give more emphasis than recent liberal theorizing has done to the "democratic" component of the hybrid concept of "liberal democracy."

Despite the initial plausibility of this response to moral disagreement, it is clear that the deliberative democrat faces an uncomfortable dilemma. On the one hand, she can either claim that in a morally divided world, the outcome of democratic deliberation is simply all there is to the justification of laws and policies. But the risk of such a position is, of course, that the unfettered operation of democratic decision-making procedures could give rise to outcomes that offend against intuitively plausible moral first principles. On the other hand, she can argue that it is only a democratic process suitably constrained by antecedent moral principles which can be seen as giving rise to justified legal and political norms. The problem is then to justify these constraints in a way which does not end up collapsing the position into the kind of liberal "tyranny of principle" it was designed to overcome in the first place.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's *Democracy and Disagreement* is the most distinguished contribution to date to the rapidly growing academic literature on deliberative democracy. It is a humane, morally serious, and consistently thought-provoking work, and it deserves a wide readership both among academics and concerned citizens. It is unclear, however, that it successfully charts a course between the twin perils to which I alluded above.

Gutmann and Thompson argue that the democratic deliberation made necessary by moral disagreement should be constrained by six moral principles that apply both to the process and to the substance of democratic decision making. The procedural constraints are "reciprocity," which requires that citizens and their representatives abstain in reason-giving from claims that can only be justified from within a contested moral worldview; "publicity," which severely limits the extent to which policies can be based on grounds that are kept secret from the public; and "accountability," which requires that policies be justifiable to a representative's appropriate moral constituency. The substantive principles relate to "basic liberty," which defines the extent to which the state can limit the self-regarding and freely undertaken activities of adult citizens; "basic opportunity," which sets the content and the limits of the state's responsibility to provide citizens with the basic goods in the absence of which citizens are denied a fair chance at leading a good life; and "fair opportunity," through which the state sets the terms whereby citizens can compete for positions that enable them to pursue their individual life-plans. Each one of these principles is carefully laid out by the authors in contrast with opposing extreme positions from which they want to distance themselves. For example, the principle of "reciprocity" is equipoised between the rival extremes of prudence and impartiality; and the principle of basic opportunity is defined by means of a contrast with egalitarian and libertarian positions on welfare. And the authors illustrate each principle by using it to shed light on a public policy debate drawn from recent American history. We are thus very skilfully led through discussions of, among other issues, environmental protection, abortion rights, surrogacy, workfare, and affirmative action. In each case, the authors bring to bear upon the debate one of the principles constituting in their view deliberative democracy and show that it generates a reasonable resolution.

As this brief summary of the book suggests, Gutmann and Thompson resolutely opt for one horn of the dilemma I set out earlier. That is, they want to ensure that democratic deliberation will yield morally acceptable results by substantially constraining its operation. But this raises a number of uncomfortable questions. First, given that the authors are concerned to avoid the kind of foundationalist arguments sometimes relied upon by liberals, how do they justify their own first principles? Democracy itself cannot be invoked, since the principles are brought in to constrain democratic decision-making procedures. And moral considerations also must be avoided, since they might be disowned by some citizens. The six principles are thus left dangling uncomfortably in theoretical midair.

Second, should a book that purports to set out how decisions about public policy should be reached by citizens and their representatives (rather than, one assumes, by philosophers arguing from first principles) spend as much time as this one does coming to determinate conclusions about how the just society ought to deal with such questions as health care, affirmative action, environmental protection, and the like? Indeed, one feels that there are two books here which are actually in some tension with one another. The first lays out a procedure which deliberative democrats should attempt to realize in as many decision-making fora as possible and abstains from arriving at substantive, first-order conclusions about the outcomes such a procedure might generate, the assumption being that in the absence of actual deliberation, the just solution to any given public policy debate is indeterminate. The second brings the traditional, nondeliberative tools of the professional philosopher (deductive argument, analytic rigor, a grasp of fine distinctions often invisible to the untrained eye, and so forth) to bear in an often intelligent and thoughtful manner upon the burning issues of the day.

Both these books represent substantial contributions to contemporary political philosophy, but the second one belies the stated intention of the first, in that the authors seem unwilling at the end of the day to entrust the resolution of thorny issues of public policy to the vagaries of democratic debate. This becomes particularly clear when one considers the extreme precision with which the principles constituting deliberative democracy are specified. These principles sometimes rule out of court political positions that are in fact very much a part of the American political scene as it is presently constituted. For example, the authors maintain that a participant in a debate fails to respect the norm of reciprocity if her arguments "appeal to any authority whose conclusions are impervious, in principle as well as practice, to the standards of logical consistency or to reliable methods of inquiry that themselves should be mutually acceptable" (p. 56). Now, this principle will appropriately exclude from the realm of debate those reciprocally minded people who talk gibberish, or who contradict themselves from one sentence to the next; but it will also leave out those who, for example, view religious texts as reliable moral sources. Lest I be misunderstood, I hasten to add that there are very good reasons to exclude religious considerations from the formation, say, of school curricula. But Gutmann and Thompson would have us believe that this exclusion can occur in advance of deliberation, through the stipulation of an uncontroversial formal constraint on deliberation. It seems clear, however, that achieving this result requires the kind of controversial philosophical argument which their theory is officially designed to rule out of court. Gutmann and Thompson's position, therefore, yields the following paradox: Though it is officially committed to resolving controversial issues deliberatively, the theory leaves certain well-represented political positions out of the ambit of deliberation by definitional fiat, a result that is surely worse, from the point of view of the theoretical and practical ends which deliberative democracy was meant to serve, than engaging with them through the standard methods of philosophical argument.

Readers of *Democracy and Disagreement* will find much to admire within its pages, whether they are interested in it as a contribution to the growing field of deliberative democracy, or whether they look to it for its incisive discussions of some of the most controversial public policy issues of the day. But I think they will find that its central argument fails: Rather than convincing us that we ought to leave the resolution of these issues to deliberation among citizens and their representatives, the authors inadvertently make plain that there is still a place in societies marked by the "fact of pluralism" for the traditional, nondeliberative tools of the political philosopher.

Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.

By Juergen Habermas. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 631p. $40.00.

Seyla Benhabib, *Harvard University*

Juergen Habermas, postwar Europe's leading social and political philosopher, started his career more than three decades ago with a series of essays that critically examined the ideals of the bourgeois democratic revolutions of 1776 and 1789 from the perspective of Marxist class theory. Translated into English as *Theory and Practice* (trans. John Viertel, 1973), these essays were followed in 1962 by a landmark study, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (English trans. T. Burger and F. Lawrence, 1989), which has since appeared in 17 German editions alone. The kernel of Habermas's argument in *Structural Transformation* was that a free public of private citizens, exchanging views and opinions with one another about the common good and reaching some common understanding about the public interest, was the guiding principle of the democratic form of government under the rule of law. The sociological developments of postwar capitalist democracies increasingly rendered this idea irrelevant: The reasoning public of the early bourgeois republics became the consuming public of mass consumer societies; an unprecedented fusion of politics and economics created corporatistic interest groups that sought to become immune to legislative regulation; as more and more regulative acts were issued by administrative agencies and put into effect without legislative debate and deliberation, the legislative institutions fell into danger of losing their deliberative character and becoming empty chambers of power. The democratic public became a phantom public.

Thirty years later Habermas has returned to these concerns. Throughout his impressive peripetations in the areas of language philosophy, social action theory, cognitive moral psychology, and modernization and rationalization theories, this original concern with the fate of democracy in the contemporary world has not abandoned Habermas. Compared to *Structural Transformation*, the tone of *Between Facts and Norms* is less pessimistic. Whereas the earlier work exhibited a certain skepticism toward representative institutions and advocated the radical democratization of interest groups like trade unions from within, the later work rejects the Marxian critique of representative democratic institutions as utopian and philosophically ill-founded—wrong, then, not only in practice but also in theory. A two-track theory of democracy in which representative institutions exist alongside and contend with a vibrant and free public sphere and civil society of associations, social movements, and citizens' initiatives is sketched.

Habermas argues that this two-track view should replace the simplistic political sociology of much leftist critique of existing democracies, since it presupposes that a single principle of organization—radical democracy—can be appropriately applied to all institutions and all spheres of social life (pp. 306ff). Not only must we adopt the two-track view of democratic institutions but also we must accept the logic behind money and administrative power as mechanisms for coordinating and solving collective action problems. The free market in goods, labor, and services is here to stay as a distribution mechanism, as is the complex, and often for the citizen impenetrable, organization of administrative and bureaucratic power (p. 303). Are democracy and social complexity compatible? Is not the price of this enriched sociological understanding of contemporary societies the abandonment of the radical democratic ideal?

The nerve of Habermas's philosophical argument, as distinguished from his political sociology of democracy, is that the ideal of democracy—government for the people, by the people, and through the people—has to be reconceptualized without recourse to the faulty illusions of a united people, as if this were a single physical body in possession of one will, always clearly known to itself, assumptions which he has elsewhere characterized as representing a "philosophy of consciousness" (*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, English trans. F. Lawrence, 1987). "This is not to denounce the intuition connected with the idea of popular sovereignty but to interpret it intersubjectively," writes Habermas. "Popular sovereignty, even if it becomes anonymous, retreats into democratic procedures and the legal implementation of their demanding communicative presuppositions only in order to make itself felt as communicatively generated power" (pp. 301, 136).

Reversing Max Weber's query about how political legitimacy can result from legality, Habermas asks how we can justify the legitimacy of legality. A well-known answer to this question in the history of Western political thought has been provided by the natural rights and social contract tradition, which in some version extends from Hobbes to Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Habermas disagrees with the moral philosophy as well as theory of society of these early liberal predecessors. Instead of beginning with a system of rights which supposedly precedes human association, he begins from the perspective of consociates of a form of life who are embedded in structures of communicative action, that is, of linguistically mediated forms of interaction based on the ability of hearer and speaker to accept or reject the validity claims of mutual speech acts.

Applying to this model of communicative freedom the discourse principle, namely, the metanorm that "just those norms deserve to be valid that could meet with the approval of those potentially affected, insofar as the latter participate in rational discourses" (p. 127), Habermas derives a system of rights as well as shows how conditions for the exercise of political sovereignty can be institutionalized. The system of rights is not viewed, as it usually is, as analogous to property claims, which in some sense belong to the individual and which protect against the incursions of others. Rather, rights are understood as those very general norms that regulate the interaction of consociates in the practice of their communicative freedoms. These are the basic rights to the greatest possible measure of equal individual liberty, rights of participation and deliberation that accrue to one in voluntary associations, rights of legal protection, rights of equal opportunity to participate in processes of opinion- and will-formation through which citizens exercise political autonomy, and rights to the provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologially safeguarded (pp. 122–3).

Habermas's answer to Weber's query is that legality, or the system of law, is legitimate because the law is the most abstract medium through which consociates sharing a form of life can regulate one anothers' communicative freedom. That freedom can only be exercised through the practices of participation, legislation, deliberation, and contestation, through which consociates can see themselves as authors as well as addressees of the law. The facticity (*Faktizitaet*) of the law—its capacity to coerce, or the fact that "sovereigns without swords are but words" (Thomas Hobbes)—is based on its "validity" (*Geltung*), that is, on the democratic institutions, procedures, practices, and ultimately civic culture which precede the law, although these can only be exercised in the medium of the law. Habermas names this the "paradoxical emergence of legitimacy from legality" (pp. 130–1).

Much future debate about Habermas's work undoubtedly will center around this ambitious and complex argument, which ties together metaethics and democratic theory, rights discourse, and a reinterpretation of popular sovereignty in a novel and provocative way. The central argument that the system of rights and democratic sovereignty are not incompatible moves too fast and too smoothly. Even if one did not subscribe to a possessive individualist conception of right, conceptual as well as institutional conflicts and dilemmas exist between the protection of basic rights and the exercise of popular sovereignty. Think of the *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in which a particular interpretation of majoritarian sentiment left homosexual citizens of the United States without the protection of their basic civil and privacy rights. In the European context, one need only recall the bitter fight in Germany about the constitutionally guaranteed right of asylum of foreigners and its curtailment by a parliamentary majority. The language of "consociates of a form of life," which Habermas chooses carefully, may still not be complex enough to reflect the moral, sexual, ethnic, and linguistic cleavages of the democratic polity and the resulting dilemmas of majority rule versus the protection of the rights of unpopular minorities.

What has changed in the nearly thirty-five years since the publication of *The Structural Tranformation*? Has the world altered, or have our concepts become more attuned to detecting "existing reason" in the practices of democracies? A statesman-like optimism pervades the pages of *Between Facts and Norms*, which undoubtedly has to do with the euphoria of the democratic moment worldwide after 1989. What is missing in this work is a recognition of "democracy's discontent" (Michael Sandel). The rise of right-wing charismatic leaders such as Perot or Berlusconi, who exploit the circus of the electronic media; the surge of neofascist movements in Western Europe, which mobilize strong we-identities against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers; the dismantling of the welfare state by neoliberal governments on both sides of the Atlantic; the tremendous sense of apathy, cynicism, and disillusionment with the political process visible in so many democracies and as manifested in lower rates of voter turnout and civic membership; the eclipse of popular sovereignty through the rise of new financial, capital, and communications networks—all are missing from Habermas's account of democracy. Like the mature Hegel of the *Philosophy of Right* (1821), the Habermas of *Between Facts and Norms* dispenses retroactive wisdom in searching for the "particles and fragments of an 'existing reason' already incorporated in political practices" (p. 287) of existing democracies. The question is whether these particles and fragments are sufficient to reignite the flames of democracy, which either are burning tepid in the contemporary world or appear to be ignited by the wrong forces.

Liberalism and Community. By Steven Kautz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. 232p. $29.95.

Edward B. Portis, *Texas A&M University*

Despite its title, this volume is not an extended discussion of the relationship between liberalism and the notion of political community. Rather, it purports to be a defense of what the author calls "classical liberalism," which he identifies with Locke and Montesquieu, from the criticisms of those contemporary political theorists he labels "communitarians." Kautz is well aware of the diversity of meaning attached to these words and devotes substantial effort to clarifying and justifying his particular use of them. Classical liberalism is characterized in the familiar terms of austere individualism and sober appreciation of the dangers of individual passion and social aspiration. Humans are natural enemies; to achieve peace they must cultivate the virtues of moderation and toleration. The primary end of political association is security rather than justice, and security is attained by limiting the scope of politics and thereby facilitating accommodation. The primary benefit is liberty, whereby each individual may pursue his or her own definition of happiness as well as his or her circumstances permit. This is how many of us define classical liberalism, and if Kautz chooses to defend this version of the creed, so be it.

When it comes to communitarianism, however, his use of the term is less clear and more problematic. Although initially (p. 2) he stipulates that communitarianism is distinguished primarily by the mere fact of antiliberalism, he also acknowledges that his three chief targets, Richard Rorty, Benjamin Barber, and Michael Walzer, are not unequivocal enemies of liberal society. Their illiberalism stems primarily from two beliefs. The first is that human liberation can be extended beyond that achieved in liberal society by means of political engagement. The second is that the instrumental good of individual security must be supplemented with some notion of a genuine public good. Kautz argues that in each case the political aspirations of these theorists would threaten individual liberty and social accord, rather than go beyond these liberal achievements.

These three theorists fail in their attempt to go beyond liberalism because they all reject, each in his own way, the possibility of universal political knowledge. In the last analysis, they hold that political knowledge is contextual. For this reason, Kautz argues, often effectively, they can neither provide protections for individual dissent nor establish procedures for resolving cultural conflict. In fact, irrespective of how they may understand themselves, they are communitarians just because they believe that political knowledge and goals must be communal. It seems to me that this is the real, or at least the operative, definition of communitarianism in this book. I think it is an inadequate definition. The dispute between liberals and various kinds of communal democrats traditionally has hinged upon different notions of freedom rather than knowledge. Communal democrats are not necessarily tied to epistemological relativism, and liberalism has no monopoly on cognitive realism.

Whatever the validity of Kautz's criticisms of his chief targets, his attack upon communitarian democracy in general falls considerably short because he assumes that it must be based upon blind devotion to community and complete self-denial. He maintains, apparently by definition, that anyone who has reasons for devotion to a community is not a communitarian but an "individualist." Perhaps one could make this case without doing too much injustice to the likes of Sandel or MacIntyre, but if it were applied too rigidly I fear even such republican luminaries as Rousseau and Arendt might be forced into the liberal camp. But as Kautz reads Rousseau, people must be thoroughly brain-washed before they can be citizens (pp. 58, 117, 143–4). This reading seems to ignore the fact that Rousseau was a social contract theorist and to discount his explicit discussion of the personal advantages of civic freedom. Be this as it may, my "individualist" Rousseau is no less communitarian and no more liberal than Kautz's fascist Rousseau, and to my mind is a much more formidable figure for one attempting to establish the theoretical superiority of liberal over communal democracy.

Actually, Kautz does not attempt a theoretical defense of liberalism. His book is, in effect, based on the premise that classical liberalism is a practical necessity. It would be unrealistic to expect him to defend the inherent validity of liberalism because Kautz is not really (philosophically) a classical liberal. As he explains at some length in the opening chapters, he believes that modern societies are necessarily host to three political orientations, the democratic, the republican, and the liberal. The first is concerned with equality, the second with virtue, and the third, of course, with security. What we know as liberal societies are those in which the liberal orientation holds a balance of power and is able to moderate and constrain the immoderate partisanship of the other two orientations. Its great benefit is a mixed regime of the type, Kautz tells us, advocated by the ancient philosophers, where Socrates can safely ply his craft as long as he is prudent. The great danger of communitarianism, especially when seen as an expansion of liberalism, is that it may undermine liberal moderation and threaten the mixed regime.

These assumptions, explicitly derived from Montesquieu and Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., are essentially sociological. If one finds them plausible, this book may be useful as an insightful analysis of an influential and, from this perspective, dangerous group of contemporary theorists. Obviously, I did not find it so, even though I think much of Kautz's critical commentary is discerning. Kautz is clearly well read and intelligent. Unfortunately, I think he is preaching, so to speak, to the converted.

An Intellectual History of Liberalism. By Pierre Manent. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 128p. $12.95.

Frank Andreas Sposito, *University of Chicago*

Making sense of the history of liberalism has become as much a part of liberal thought as the more substantive analyses of power and institutions with which it traditionally has been occupied. It is hard to find a text of recent liberal theory that does not in some way assert the historical rootedness of its own ideas. Understood as a practical response to contingent social and political circumstances, contemporary liberalism is defined in terms of the crucial but frequently obscured distinction between historical practice and speculative philosophy. As Judith Shklar ("The Liberalism of Fear," in Nancy Rosenblum, ed., *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, 1989, p. 26) has argued, political liberalism is not the "party of hope" that philosophers and metaphysicians take it to be. It is rather the "party of memory" or, more precisely, the party of collective memory. As a political doctrine it is about our shared historical experience, about what we are and have come to be, and about how we can best accommodate that sense of ourselves from a practical (read: neutral) point of view. Without an appreciation for history, liberalism is in this view nothing *to us*—or at least nothing that can effectively distinguish it from its more metaphysically inclined antagonists.

In this context, Pierre Manent's *Intellectual History of Liberalism* (a new translation of the 1987 French text of the same name) offers a timely and potentially valuable reexamination of the categories that have traditionally informed the liberal project. Like Shklar, the principal intuition guiding Manent's work is that the history of liberalism is not so much a story of the past as it is a condition of the present: It is our collective memory in the strongest sense, a representation of who we are. Manent's contribution to this line of thought, however, lies in his contention that the political memory at the center of liberalism is a much more complex phenomenon than liberals would have us believe. Indeed, by Manent's account, liberals have participated in the construction of the very historical reality which they claim to accommodate from a merely neutral point of view. Thus, liberal political theorists have not just been representing the world for the past three centuries; they have been making it, too. As Manent expresses in his paraphrase of Hegel, "it was at dawn that the owl of liberalism took flight" (p. xv).

Given this context, Manent explains his work as an effort to capture the constructive dimension of liberal thinking through the practice of effective historiography. His intention is to provide a "scale model" (p. xv) of modern Europe, which he believes can be built most accurately from the conceptual blocks of its great intellectuals. In this sense his book is only indirectly about political theory (although the bulk of it is devoted to the traditional practice of textual interpretation). It is more accurately an effort to reorient the identity of modern European culture, which of course includes America, by rethinking its relatively short history in constructivist terms. As Manent suggests, "by placing ourselves in the perspective of the actors themselves, we unlearn what we know (or think we know) about our history" (p. 9). The impetus of the project is to articulate what we know (our collective memory) and explore how we may know it differently. Manent wants to reconfigure our understanding of ourselves as moderns and, consequently, as liberals. He wants to reshape our collective memory so that it includes a recognition of the fact that it is more than just simple, reflective memory, that it is more profoundly creative. He uses the history of political philosophy to achieve this end.

Despite its sensitivity to the historical sources of cultural identity, Manent's argument is, with the exception of a single chapter on the aftermath of the French Revolution, entirely philosophical—and self-consciously so. It is, after all, an *intellectual* history of liberalism, and for that reason Manent makes very little effort to fill in his story with contextual details about actual political actors and real (particular) political controversies. On this score the book can be seen as a philosophical alternative to the now standardized account of liberalism-as-historicism developed by the Cambridge School (*viz*., Skinner and Tuck). Ostensibly, Manent's argument takes seriously the well-established principle that liberalism was a polemical response to historical conditions, notably the collapse of the Roman Empire and the subsequent advancement of the Catholic Church. But it presents these conditions as intellectual paradoxes confronting great minds rather than as social conflicts confronting political actors. The connection between the intellects that produced liberal concepts and the political conditions in which they found themselves is largely undeveloped. Problems, in other words, are treated as puzzles—a methodology more suitable to philosophical analysis than historical narrative.

Like the historicist historians on the other side of the Channel, Manent locates the genesis of liberalism at the intersection of religion and politics in the sixteen and seventeenth century. Unlike his English counterparts, he does not describe this experience as a conflict between disparate religious worldviews but, rather, as a tension between revealed religion and secular humanism broadly conceived. Liberalism is in some sense presented here as a practical solution to a political problem, but this is not exactly the story we have been accustomed to hear. Instead, Manent argues that the intellectual categories of liberalism evolved out of a "theologico-political problem" that was born of the desire to rid the political world of the Church entirely. The challenge was how to conceive of a metric of political organization that would be free from universal (papal) authority, though not reducible to local (civic republican) forms of rule (which, like a minor premise looking for a major, would merely reinvite the universalism of the Church). The achievement, Manent argues, was the creation of a distinctively universal source of authority called "the individual," a metapolitical innovation that enable the juxtaposition of religious commitment and civic loyalty as alternative ends of personal will, rather than as competing goods for political societies as a whole. With this internalization of the sources of coercive authority, the Church could never again become a political player without "the individual's" consent. But this beginning of the politics of justification was not the end of it. The upshot of the liberal solution to the "theologico-political problem" was that there is no a priori way to constrain "man's" freedom at all once it is articulated from the subjective point of view.

Manent's history of liberalism moves swiftly through the various stages of this argument, describing how "the individual" and its subsequent crisis of authority developed over centuries of criticism and analysis by liberal and nonliberal philosophers alike. The story begins with Machiavelli's flirtation with evil and rejection of the notion of a *summum bonum*, a move which had the effect of precluding any otherworldly source of political authority, Church or otherwise. The defining moment of European history appeared with Hobbes and his institutionalization of the doctrine of liberal individualism in the absolutist state. According to Manent, Hobbes's heavy-handed solution to the theologico-political problem raised an entirely new set of puzzles regarding power, authority, and identity. The dilemma, simply put, was the following: How is it possible for liberal individuals to be free yet institutionally bound, sovereign yet naturally determined, distinctive yet universally equal? This question is, from a philosophical point of view, interesting yet essentially unanswerable. And for that reason liberals, viewed as philosophers and historical actors who thought about the world philosophically rather than historically, continuously wrestled with the instability of their own arguments. Manent writes that "the motivating force of modern history thus appears to be two-fold: the natural desire to escape from the political power of revealed religion; the no less natural desire to escape the mechanism man conceived to escape the first desire" (p. 116). "Promethean" individuals, authors of the play of their own identity, are quickly dissatisfied with the various parts they have assigned to themselves. This is true whether their part in the theoretical drama is as "natural man," "rational man," "moral man," "equal man," or even "historical man."

In each of his reading-teachings (*leçons*) of the central figures in the liberal tradition, Manent tries to show how this underlying irony threads together the ideas of otherwise unrelated or even antithetical writers. For example, Locke's theory of labor and value, Montesquieu's understanding of the separation of powers, and even Rousseau's rejection of liberal individualism altogether are interpreted as expressions of the same paradox. The results of this strategy of distillation are mixed. Reducing the complexity of political thought to the unfolding of a single problem risks both a loss of distinctiveness in each author and an inadvertent dulling of our sensitivity to the complexity of our present collective memory. History surely does not operate so smoothly. The best chapters of the book, on Constant, Guizot, and Tocqueville, elude the charge of reductionism because the subjects at hand conform to Manent's basic intuition quite naturally. The romantic notion of the historical construction of identity, which is ultimately the source of Manent's own view of the liberal dilemma, is the quiet voice behind the post-Enlightenment liberalism expressed in these thinkers as well. Unsurprisingly, it is with Constant and Tocqueville that Manent's thesis is most informative and most persuasive.

Manent's style, although a jewel of clarity by contemporary French standards, may prove frustrating for many readers. This work is by no means an introductory text, as it is motivated in part by a deep but not fully disclosed antipathy for liberal modernism. The prose is superficially uncomplicated and more or less free from jargon, yet there is a tendency toward abstract language and paradox which leaves one guessing much of the time. Part of this is due to Manent's laudable and altogether humble strategy of "risking [only] a raid between standing armies" (p. xviii) of monumental historiography. He states at the outset he intends to move swiftly through his subjects, and he does that with fair efficacy. There is not much lingering on points, even the excellent ones, of which there are more than a few. Indeed, the contribution this book makes to our understanding of the relationship between liberalism and history is vitiated by the absence of a full explanation of its own insights. Manent prods our collective memory, but he stops short of firmly grasping it.

The Politics of Presence. By Anne Phillips. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 209p. $29.95.

Nancy L. Rosenblum, *Brown University*

The olitics of "presence" (also called the politics of "difference," "identity," or "recognition") has become a familiar element of contemporary theories of justice. Political philosophers focus on the moral justifications for group recognition—historical discrimination, oppression, threats to cultural survival, and so on. They argue that the presence of previously excluded voices in public arenas helps to break the link between social and economic inequality and political participation, assuring fair processes, substantively altered outcomes, and members' self-respect. Why relevant group differences translate into specific rights and institutional reforms is a secondary concern. And the *politics* of the politics of recognition is left out of account altogether.

This is the domain of political scientists, who explore the particular, contextual requirements for stability that mandate consociational democracy and other forms of power sharing. They attend in detail to constitutional formulas and institutional mechanisms for group rights and representation as well as to the processes that produce these arrangements. Political scientists also explore the conditions under which changing the composition of political elites entails not just symbolic presence but the ability to do something with power.

The Politics of Presence is a cross-over book that covers an important middle ground between normative justifications of group rights and empirical studies of the accommodation of groups in practice. Anne Phillips concedes, with some sound reservations, the justice of minority group demands for "recognition." She limits her discussion to the political mechanisms for minority group representation in elected assemblies and, in a welcome move, shows that general norms of political equality are less instructive as guides than theories of political representation. Group representation is built into the political practices of any democracy, she points out, and draws illuminating comparisons between current demands based on gender, race, and ethnicity and the earlier movement to represent labor in European democracies as well as recent measures to include women. The author examines three cases closely: quotas for women, race-conscious districting in the United States, and the challenges of inclusion by women, indigenous peoples, and French Quebecois in Canada.

Advocates of group "presence" have had little to say about the processes by which leaders emerge as representative and what makes them responsive and accountable. Phillips's chief contribution is to focus attention there. Her conceptual distinction between the politics of interest and the politics of presence is most useful in explaining why the latter poses special difficulties.

The approach of radical democrats, proponents of strict accountability, is to rely on party platforms and binding mandates to control wayward representatives. But if the personal characteristics and presumptive shared experience of representatives take precedence over congruity of interests, ideas, or programs, then the "presence" of a member of one's own group suffices as a guarantee of representativeness. How is accountability ensured? Essentialism, or some presumed identity of interest among all members of an identity group, promises a spontaneous and inerrant fit between representatives and their group, but essentialism is implausible. And as critics of minority black electoral districts with "safe seats" have shown, separating groups out and providing mechanisms for guaranteed representation may ensure "presence" but has the unintended consequence of diluting debate and diminishing responsiveness. In short, lacking the *motivation and institutional impetus to ground accountability* in effective advocacy of agreed-upon goals and policies, the politics of presence is nondirective. It allows representatives wide discretion.

Casting about for reasons to see this development in a positive light, Phillips finds support in deliberative accounts of democratic decision making. Deliberation (which currently shares the spotlight in political theory with the politics of presence) is premised on a reiterative process of elucidating and altering initial preferences and opinions as well as on the mutual discovery of new options. Since deliberators must be free to abandon prior instructions and change their minds, a deliberative view of decision making goes some way toward justifying autonomy for representatives. Deliberation also requires decision makers to justify their decisions in terms of "public reasons" mutually acceptable to all who will be bound by them. So another tie-in to the politics of presence is their mutual opposition to interest group pluralism. The politics of presence offers something to deliberative theory, too, Phillips suggests; it provides some basis for believing autonomous deliberators are, in fact, representative.

This is where the author's otherwise sober, measured discussion of group representation falters. There is no reason to imagine that elected assemblies operate on the stringent lines proposed by deliberative theory or that they could. Much of the book is rooted in empirical literature, but on this point Phillips throws aside her own caution to keep political theory in touch with "what is possible or likely" in practical policy. Moreover, if decision making did conform to a deliberative model, representatives would be *less* rather than more responsive to their own group. The idea is to focus decision makers' attention on the common good and to make deliberators accountable to everyone "significantly affected" by decisions, including noncitizens and future generations.

Phillips knows that democracy requires advocacy; indeed, her own position is closer to modified interest group pluralism than to deliberative democracy. Political pluralism is in need of refurbishing, and it stands to benefit more from her analysis than does deliberative theory from her solicitude.

There is a hole at the heart of Phillips's discussion of group representation. Responsiveness and accountability depend in large part on the self-organization of groups, that is, on the concrete voluntary associations formed by members of what is otherwise a diffuse and elusive racial or ethnic "culture" or "community." Associations create the conditions for consultation. They are resources for promoting leaders. Voluntary associations are a means of ascertaining the opinions of "identity group" members about what shared experiences are politically salient, which internal divisions are negotiable and which are not, and how these might translate into policy. Moreover, unless individuals are members of associations as well as identity groups, they remain isolated voters, unaffiliated and ungrounded, vulnerable to pandering and to the arrant opportunism of leaders.

The groups that warrant "presence" are the most likely to be disorganized, and guaranteed representation alone does little to foster associations where they do not exist. That, as much as top-down rights and representation, is the key to effective presence.

Unleashing Rights: Law, Meaning, and the Animal Rights Movement. By Helena Silverstein. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 300p. $39.50.

John Brigham, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

This book is part of the series "Law, Meaning, and Violence," a source of scholarship that shows how to see law in more than instrumental ways. The preoccupation of lawyers with the law's capacity to govern outcomes in courts or the behavior of citizens is understandable. While not as instrumental as lawyers, many political scientists have also been driven by interest in outcomes. This book is grounded in another political science, the transformative effort by Stuart Scheingold in *The Politics of Rights* (1974), more than twenty years ago, and by Michael McCann in *Rights at Work* (1994) to see how law gives meaning to politics.

Silverstein, a professor at Lafayette College, makes it clear from the beginning that this book is about law rather than about whether we should eat meat or wear fur. Not only does she display an old-fashioned concern to avoid bias in her treatment of the animal rights movement, but also her enthusiasm for jurisprudential issues shines through the analysis of movement politics. Her effort deepens the notion of what it means for law to "make things happen."

The book helps explain the constitutive approach to law. In examining the animal rights movement, Silverstein gives us a valuable account of what it means to see law as constitutive. She links her approach to law in society. Her framework takes seriously the notion that law is not just influenced by society, as in the power of movements to change the law. Nor is society simply a receiver of law, as in the effect of high court decisions on police practices. The point of this book is that law has a life beyond courts and lawyers' offices.

For animal rights activists, the law in society is the rights strategies undertaken in the interest of recognizing animals as an oppressed group. The strategies are presented as emerging out of concern for animal welfare, or as Silverstein puts it, "from the discourse of compassion" (p. 28). Her analysis sees intellectuals such as Peter Singer as influential in the shift from compassion to rights. Calls for "animal liberation" in the 1970s evolved into the "animal rights movement" in the 1980s. This movement seeks "a radical change in our treatment of and attitudes toward animals" (p. 33). Silverstein establishes the movement's links to other struggles against oppression and explains the strategic parallels between "speciesism" and racism.

In a detailed description of the movement, Silverstein finds women more active than men and, among activists, high levels of education and considerable wealth. She also presents the philosophical debates within the movement in great detail. This sociological material piqued my interest in comparing this movement with others, like the pro-choice and right-to-life movements. Such comparison would have been especially interesting where important studies are available (e.g., see Kristen Luker, *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood*, 1984). This is already a substantial book, and instead of comparisons Silverstein offers an extensive discussion of the literature in law that examines the nature of rights.

In chapters on "The Political Deployment of Rights" and "Rights Strategically Understood," Silverstein draws on traditional jurisprudence, critical legal studies, and the sociology of law to show what it has meant for animal advocates to turn to rights. As applied to this struggle, her findings run counter to conventional academic wisdom, which presumes rights to stem from individualistic rather than communitarian perspectives. Here, with regard to the rights of animals, Silverstein sees the movement as communicating "the values of sentience, caring, relationship, responsibility, and community" (p. 55). She suggests that animal rights activists have shifted the basis of rights from rationality to sentience, and she explains this shift in a thorough examination of movement literature.

Given the book's strengths in elaborating a framework for constitutive studies of law and its careful examination of the animal rights movement, the limitations in this work are rather trivial. Yet, there are places where the jurisprudential themes could have been engaged more rigorously. Because Silverstein advances this new approach, her book will have a place alongside other pioneering efforts, but in its enterprise and in its style, the book also suggests the work to be done.

As an essential element of the constitutive perspective, Silverstein advocates a "decentered view" of law. By this she means that law is more than "a system of rules established by the governing institutions of society" (p. 2). Law, in the decentered view, "is manifest in the wider spheres of society" and in "cultural conventions that shape and facilitate practical social interaction" (p. 4). I do not think it is necessary to couple a "decentered view" with a constitutive approach. While we should look in society to see the full effects of state law, it would be unfortunate if this became a limit on the scope of research into the constitutive dimension of law. Just as law plays a role in constituting the lives of people in families and in social movements, it is also constitutive with respect to the Supreme Court's place at the top of a legal hierarchy and for the president as commander-in-chief.

In this regard, *Unleashing Rights*, and similar work from anthropologists and political scientists, seems to stand with reference to a constitutive perspective on law, much as impact studies did for early law and society work. The study of social movements is a stage which draws on the insights from legal pluralism and the critiques that have advanced pluralist projects. It appears to be necessary first to describe the way law constitutes some of our more dramatic forms of political expression. Perhaps later we will come to understand the ways in which our view of law empowers the president and the Supreme Court.

Recent Marxian Theory: Class Formation and Social Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. By John F. Sitton. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 358p. $17.95.

Gavin Kitching, *University of New South Wales*

This is an extremely good book. That is to say, it is among that rare group of academic books in which the author actually keeps his promise to the reader and does what he sets out to do. Sitton sets himself the task of examining "recent Marxian theory" to see what, if any, force may remain in the notion of the proletariat as a revolutionary agency. Recent Marxian theory turns out to mean the work of G. A. Cohen, Roemer, Elster, and the so-called analytical Marxism of Erik Olin Wright, Claus Offe, Jurgen Habermas, and Immanuel Wallerstein. After taking the reader carefully through this corpus, Sitton concludes, extremely persuasively, that "the proletariat is no longer a useful abstraction" (p. 247) and indeed that "class formation has been exhausted as a topic and a point of departure for socialist theory" (p. 249).

Yet, this conclusion is, in and of itself, nothing. The real worth of the book resides in the textural journey through which Sitton reaches his conclusion, for of course it is the journey itself which, in part at least, *makes* it persuasive. Sitton is a model traveler and a model guide. He treats each author he examines with scrupulous care; summarizes complex arguments with limpid clarity; is painstaking and exact in quotation and citation; and is judicious, respectful, but forceful in critique and commentary. In short, this is a fine book for teachers and for teaching. Those seeking to give their students an accessible but still sophisticated introduction to the theories of the writers listed above will find Sitton's book of enormous value. Those seeking to instill in their students the habits of careful scholarship and subtle but forceful argumentation will find few better models to set before them than this. Moreover, it is no damning with faint praise to describe a book as invaluable for teaching. On the contrary, the reason there are far too few such books, especially in the fetid world of social theory, is that they are extraordinarily hard to write. Sitton is to be congratulated on his achievement.

And yet, just because it does so faithfully and scrupulously reflect the sources with which it engages, and (more important) just because Sitton clearly shares the most fundamental epistemological and theoretical assumptions of the work he is examining—in short, just because this is a book still set within the paradigm it is examining—it will surely strike a reader not committed to that paradigm as extraordinarily strange.

Consider this. One is committed to the view (and by "one" I mean both Sitton and his set of modern Marxist theorists) that capitalism is, in some sense or other, an "exploitative" and/or "oppressive" and/or "irrational" system and should (therefore) be overthrown or at least fundamentally transformed in some way. In Marx's own work the "agency" supposed to undertake this task was the proletariat, but an analysis of contemporary capitalism tells one that this agency has had its day, no longer constitutes (if it ever did) a coherent social or political force able to undertake this transformation. And one writes a book of 358 pages "demonstrating" this "truth"?

But why? And to whom? That is to say, it is only going to be alarming that the proletariat is not up to its revolutionary task *to people who already want capitalism overthrown*. And to those who do not, the demonstration (no matter how scholarly impeccable) that the old working class has bust its Victorian steam boiler is only going to be a puzzling/redundant/boring exploration of a nonissue. (I can think of many present-day students—including many good ones—in this category of the puzzled and exasperated.)

So, should one not start a book addressed (one assumes) to the nonconverted by trying to *establish* the premise, or premises, of the argument? That is, by establishing, in some way or other, that capitalism "deserves" (morally deserves?) to be overthrown or transformed in favor of something better (morally better?). Because, of course, if you do not believe this, most of what is in this book (and in the texts of Cohen, Habermas, Offe, Wallerstein, and so on, themselves) is going to seem, in an important sense, meaningless.

And here we reach the central (but unstated) assumption both of Sitton and of the authors he reviews, namely, that establishing this moral premise is a question—and *entirely* a question—of adducing "facts" and "explanatory theories" *about capitalism*. But it seems to me that this is self-evidently false. That is, it seems to me there are no facts (past or present) about capitalism—its inequality, its competitiveness, its materialism—that would in themselves justify (morally justify) its overthrow, nor are there any explanations of those facts (whether theories of value or of alienation/reification, or of unequal exchange, or of historical development, or of class structure/relations) which in themselves would do so. And if this is true, what it tells us is that there is more—far more—to the question of acting morally and politically in the world (and the writing of a book can sometimes be an act of both types) than is known of in this Marxist "theorizing."

In short, and to end with a provocative assertion, the central moral and political problem of Marxism today (demonstrated by the silences/absences in *all* the authors Sitton reviews as well as in his own text) is its utterly uncritical allegiance to a morally and epistemologically question-begging realism. That is, to the view that you can speak morally and politically about capitalism by speaking entirely about "out there" rather than by speaking reflexively, that is, about "out there" *and* about your own identity, voice, and values as author. But you cannot. Sitton *almost* sees this (p. 249, paragraph two). But the realist mist has no sooner lifted than it descends again almost immediately, never allowing him to develop the argument or, more exactly, preventing him from seeing (as mists do) that there is an argument needing to be developed.

And PS, this is *not* a "postmodernist" review!

Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. By Quentin Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 477p. $49.95.

David van Mill, *University of Chicago*

Professor Skinner tries to show (1) that his historical approach is the best method for understanding the intentions of an author and (2) that this method allows us to see how Hobbes's work changed over time in response to humanist rhetoric. As one would expect, Skinner tries "to situate Hobbes's theory and practice of civil science within the intellectual context in which it was formed. I am less interested in Hobbes as the author of a philosophical system" (p. 6). To this end Skinner divides the book into two parts. The first section is devoted to an analysis of the use of rhetorical eloquence in Renaissance England. Skinner hopes to show us not only what authors were saying but also what they were *doing* when they wrote their books; following Wittgenstein, he wants to persuade us that "words are also deeds" (p. 8).

Skinner argues that unless we understand Renaissance discourse on the moral sciences, we cannot understand Hobbes's texts: "I am unrepentant in believing that the attempt to gain acquaintance with Hobbes's intellectual world is an undertaking of far greater interest than the attempt to use his texts as a mirror to reflect back at ourselves our current assumptions and prejudices" (p. 15). Note how this differs from Flathman's recent book on Hobbes, in which his intent is to, "wrench [Hobbes] out of his context, to thrust him into ours, to make his texts speak to questions of present philosophical and especially moral and political concern" (*Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened Politics*, p. xxi).

Skinner deserves much credit for his historical knowledge, which undoubtedly is a crucial aid in understanding Hobbes's work. Part I of the text is, therefore, useful because it grounds Hobbes's arguments in the rhetorical humanism of his time. I have to say, however, that I agree with a lot of Skinner's analysis in Part II of the book (where he delves into the specific writings of Hobbes) and did so before I became so familiar with the English school of humanism he so thoroughly details in Part I. The detail in the first part can get a little dry and will be less appealing than Part II to all but the most dedicated Hobbes scholar.

In Part II, Skinner gives us three periods in the intellectual life of Hobbes. In the first, Skinner shows, Hobbes's work was influenced by the humanist culture in England that is so thoroughly described in Part I. In the second period, Hobbes abandoned the humanist rhetoric of the 1630s and in *The*

Elements of Law and *De Cive* tried to show that reason alone can persuade his audience of the moral truths he thinks he has discovered. Most recent commentators have concluded that these early scientific works are a response to epistemological skepticism. Skinner, instead, offers that they were a response to humanist rhetoric. It seems to me that both arguments can be correct; Hobbes was responding to skepticism about what can be *known* about the world and also to skepticism about what can be *said* about good and bad.

In this second period, Hobbes seemed convinced that science does not have to take advantage of verbal and written ornamentation in the name of truth. This is why *De Cive* (the founding text in civil science, according to Hobbes) lacks such literary flourishes: "Philosophy has nothing to do with Rhetoric . . . [or] history . . . much less has it anything to do with poetry" (Hobbes quoted on pp. 262–3). Along the lines of Plato's critique of sophistry, Hobbes argues that rhetoricians use eloquence "separated from a proper knowledge of things" (p. 279). As Skinner notes well, "the final and most deflating thought Hobbes leaves us with [in *De Cive*] is that the figure of the rhetorician is the man most likely to lower us beneath the level of the beasts" (p. 293).

The third period in Hobbes's intellectual journey starts with *Leviathan*. Hobbes made a radical return to his humanist roots and argued that reason needs the aid of rhetoric to be persuasive: "*Leviathan* constitutes a belated but magnificent contribution to the Renaissance art of eloquence" (p. 4). Hobbes reluctantly came to the conclusion that in the moral sciences one needs rhetoric in order to persuade one's audience. According to Skinner, Hobbes slowly realized that the author must enchant the audience with a series of rhetorical skills; in particular, the author must "stir the listeners to their very depths" (p. 133). Hobbes noted that most people will not be persuaded if the conclusions of civil science do not meet their own particular views on morality, and he became pessimistic in his later works about the power of reason to overcome self-interest. Hobbes ultimately recognized the need for rhetoric as a crutch for the truth. While I tend to disagree with the full extent of this argument (made in part previously by David Johnston), it is well argued by Skinner.

In *De Cive*, Hobbes was convinced that reason can show us truth; in *Leviathan* he concluded that reason is only a small power if unaided by rhetoric. In the latter text, Hobbes went as far as to call rhetoric a science because it traces the consequences of speech. As Skinner says, the Hobbes who wrote *Elements of Law* would have thought this an oxymoron. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes suggested that presentational style becomes the main difference between the natural and civil sciences; in the former, reason alone can persuade, in the latter reason and rhetoric must stand together. Hence, Hobbes broke with the methodological unity to which he aspired in *Elements of Law*.

Skinner does an excellent job demonstrating how the philosophical points Hobbes wanted to make in *De Cive* and *Leviathan* are quite similar; the major difference is that they are presented in startlingly different ways. Building on the work of David Johnston, Skinner shows how the main shift in Hobbes's work is in the *presentation* of ideas. Hobbes is not a paradoxical character who at one and the same time condemned and embraced rhetoric; according to Skinner, he simply changed his mind on the subject. The reason Hobbes indulged in rhetorical techniques is that he wanted his work to have an effect on politics. The best way to affect the political world was not to avoid rhetoric (as he said was one of his greatest achievements in *De Cive*) but to use it to the advantage of one's argument. Skinner tells us that Hobbes saw himself as the voice of reason in a sea of passion and turned to rhetoric in the hope that he could, if not fully persuade, at least deride and ridicule his opposition.

This book, along with much that has been written on Hobbes in the last fifteen years, shows that his texts are much more complicated than the traditional view (or the modern rational choice view for that matter) have suggested. The second half of the book, in particular, takes us on a journey through Hobbes's changing views on the relationship between reason and rhetoric, is full of interesting insights, and should be read by everyone interested in Hobbes.

Reading Aristotle's *Ethics*: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political Philosophy.

By Aristide Tessitore. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 155p. $54.50 cloth, $17.95 paper.

Germaine Paulo Walsh, *Texas Lutheran University*

Aristide Tessitore enters into the ongoing debate among students of Aristotle's "political" works by providing a detailed and probing analysis of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As Tessitore discusses in his introduction, scholars are sharply divided as to precisely what, for Aristotle, the happy life entails. Some maintain that Aristotle supports some combination of moral and intellectual virtue (referred to as the "inclusive" position). Others maintain that Aristotle depicts intellectual virtue—specifically, the activity of theoretical contemplation—as being separable from, and even incompatible with, moral virtue (referred to generally as the "exclusive" position). Tessitore defends the exclusive position but, unlike some of its advocates, maintains that Aristotle "subordinates the life of ethical virtue to the philosophic way of life," while simultaneously insisting that the moral life has its own "independent status," its own "intrinsic dignity" (p. 116).

It has become relatively commonplace for scholars to assume that the *Nicomachean Ethics* should be treated as a kind of mishmash of lecture notes, but Tessitore maintains that it should be treated as an integrated whole, and he seeks to illustrate the various "rhetorical" and "pedagogical" concerns which guide Aristotle's procedure. In this regard, Tessitore makes a very strong case. Indeed, his insightful study can hardly fail to add credibility to the systematic approach to the text. Nevertheless, despite the compelling nature of Tessitore's thesis, one wonders whether his interpretation is, in the final analysis, wholly persuasive. That is, there are grounds for concluding, while maintaining the systematic approach advocated by Tessitore, that Aristotle argues in favor of the inclusive rather than the exclusive interpretation.

First, given the attention to detail that characterizes Tessitore's analysis as a whole, it is rather odd that in his discussion of the final part of Aristotle's argument in X.7–8—where he comments on "the gods [exercising] some concern over human affairs" (p. 113)—Tessitore does not even mention the way in which Aristotle introduces this subject. Yet, Aristotle states that we must now judge the theory we have reached about the superiority of contemplative activity in light of the actual deeds or facts (*ta erga*) of life. "If they are in harmony with the deeds," Aristotle remarks, "we must accept them, and if they clash we must assume that they are merely words" (1179a18–23). As Burger argues, in stating that the gods "reward" those human beings who imitate them by devoting themselves to contemplative activity, Aristotle substitutes "an opinion about the gods' rewards for any real deeds," and thereby he suggests that the arguments he has given about the superiority of contemplative activity are "mere speeches" (Ronna Burger, "Wisdom, Philosophy, and Happiness: On Book X of Aristotle's *Eth-*

ics." in J. Cleary and D. Shartin, eds., *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 1992).

In light of the character of Aristotle's closing remarks in X.8, one might conclude that Aristotle argues ironically in X.7–8, that he intends to stimulate critical reflection as to the adequacy of the resolution offered in X.7–8. Although Tessitore's thesis is fundamentally opposed to this view, Tessitore concedes that Aristotle does at times argue ironically in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Specifically, in discussing Aristotle's depiction of magnanimity, Tessitore remarks that Aristotle intends "to engender ironic distance on the part of his reader" (p. 31). Furthermore, Tessitore acknowledges that a chief feature of magnanimity is "an almost godlike aspiration to self-sufficiency" (p. 33) and that the magnanimous person's aspiration toward self-sufficiency invites comparison with that of the contemplator (p. 108). Despite Tessitore's characterization of the X.7–8 depiction of theoretical activity as an "image of philosophic activity" that is "idealized" (p. 106) and as in some sense a "caricature of philosophic activity" (p. 142, n7), he does not raise the possibility that the depictions of contemplative activity and magnanimity may serve similar purposes. Rather, he maintains that the contemplator perfects self-sufficiency, or at least achieves a better approximation of it, than does the magnanimous person. To the contrary, however, one might conclude that in both depictions Aristotle intends "to engender ironic distance." That is, Aristotle illustrates two different ways in which human beings who desire self-sufficiency, while misunderstanding its nature, might seek it. On this point, one notices another disconcerting similarity between the depictions of the magnanimous person and the contemplator: Both lack *friends*, despite Aristotle's repeated arguments about the necessity of friendship in the happy life.

In taking up Aristotle's account of friendship, Tessitore points to the fact that the treatment of friendship turns on "the thorny question of self-love" (p. 90). Yet, Tessitore does not probe too deeply into Aristotle's seemingly "inconsistent" accounts of the nature of the "self." While these various accounts require a degree of exegesis far beyond what can be accomplished here, two especially important points should be mentioned, precisely because they bear directly on Tessitore's thesis. First, when one closely examines the three instances in which Aristotle explicitly comments on the issue of the "true self"—in IX.4, IX.8, and X.7—one notices that the latter two accounts are antithetical, insofar as the true self of IX.8 refers only to the practical intellect, whereas the true self of X.7 refers only to the theoretical intellect. In IX.4, by contrast, Aristotle refers to a third alternative of the true self, that is, as including both the practical and theoretical aspects of the intellect. Furthermore, although he does not explicitly refer to the true self in IX.9, Aristotle's arguments there about the way in which friendship contributes to intellectual perfection are very closely related to this issue, and in IX.9, as in IX.4, his references to the intellectual activity perfected in friendship include both the practical and the theoretical capacities.

Second, in IX.9, Aristotle suggests that the culmination of perceiving and thinking occurs in the context of the shared life of friends, who through "living together" come to have "joint perception" (*sunaisthanesthai*). Aristotle thereby suggests that in friendship at its highest, awareness of one's own existence overlaps, or is extended, so as to include awareness of one's friend's existence. While this point is closely related to Aristotle's argument about the sense in which friends assist each other in contemplating the actions of their neighbors, as Tessitore discusses (p. 93), it goes even farther. That is, Aristotle suggests that friends become intermediaries to self-understanding in such a way that they achieve a kind of moral and intellectual cohesion, which, in the words of Suzanne Stern-Gillet, "enlarges what we would call the natural boundaries of the self" (*Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship*, 1995). With considerations such as these in mind, one might conclude that Aristotle's most definitive account of happiness occurs in IX.9 rather than X.7–8. Nevertheless, whichever interpretation one favors, Tessitore's book is highly recommended. Those who read it will be led, by an astute guide, to grapple with the enduring questions at the heart of Aristotle's political philosophy.

Exploitation. By Alan Wertheimer. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 316p. $45.00 cloth.

Robert E. Goodin, *Australian National University*

Wertheimer rightly warns, right up front, that his is an odd treatment of exploitation. Most examinations are rooted in Marxian economics; Wertheimer's is rooted in bourgeois liberal microeconomics. Most treatments limit themselves (usually by definition) to cases in which the exploitee is made worse off; Wertheimer focuses instead upon cases in which everyone gains but someone is exploited nonetheless. What fascinates Wertheimer is the taking of "unfair advantage" in circumstances of "mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation"—a sort of exploitation which may well be "less bad" than the other but which "raises more interesting theoretical issues" (p. ix).

Many will be spitting chips already. Marxians, feminists, and dependencia theorists seek to *liberate* those who are exploited, focusing on the worst rather than merely the "most interesting" instances of the phenomenon. Whereas Marxians worry about sweated labor, Wertheimer worries about unconscionable contracts for the sale of a freezer (chapter 2) or completion rates of college athletes (chapter 3). Whereas feminists worry about the systematic subjection of women across civil society (home, work, war, you name it), Wertheimer focuses on commercial surrogacy (chapter 4) and sexual exploitation in psychotherapy (chapter 6). Whereas dependencia theorists worry about the exploitable legacies of empire, Wertheimer worries about constitutional niceties of U.S. federalism (chapter 5). While all of Wertheimer's worries are arguably incidents of those other, larger concerns, they are all clearly incidental rather than central to them.

Wertheimer's defense is that those cases simply pose harder problems. "We do not need to be moral rocket scientists to know that it is wrong for A to gain from an action that unjustifiably harms or coerces B" (p. 13). Apparently trivial incidents can sometimes provide crucial leverage for grand new theories: The bending of light around the sun, in itself perhaps a mere oddity, constitutes crucial support for the superiority of Einstein's physics over Newton's. Alas, the cases Wertheimer explores do not lead to any analogously deeper, richer, more all-inclusive analysis. If the point of rocket science is to launch rockets, then Wertheimer's rather fizzle.

Wertheimer's strategy is to focus on cases we intuitively regard as clear instances of exploitation, even though "the exploitee gains from and has voluntarily consented to the transaction or relationship" (p. ix). Bracketing out in this way the harm and coercion ordinarily associated with exploitation, all that is left upon which we can rest a conclusion of exploitation is that "unfair advantage" has somehow been taken. It is on the analysis of that notion of unfair advantage that any new, all-embracing theory of exploitation emerging from this analysis will have to rest.

"Fairness" is, of course, a concept whose applications are every bit as varied as "exploitation" itself. Wertheimer wrestles nobly with various formulations—some bargaining theoretic, others legal—before finally limping to the "tentative conclusion" that "a hypothetical market price . . . is more plausible than others for at least a certain range of cases" (p. 236). Certainly, that soaks up some of the cases of unconscionable contracts, which for Wertheimer provides various litmus tests of "unfair advantage" (p. 33). The tug which charges an extortionate price to haul to safety a ship caught in a storm could not have charged any such price if there were an infinity of other tugs bidding for the contract.

But analysis of unfair advantage in terms of markets, hypothetical or otherwise, clearly leaves out other cases that we would clearly regard as exploitative. Sometimes we think exploitation is involved, not because the price is unfair, but rather because the case involves "pricing the priceless"—the buying and selling of things which should not be marketed at all (the $1 million offered for a single night's infidelity in *Indecent Proposal* seems a more than fair price, if we are prepared to think about it in those terms at all: p. 212). Other times, we think it is exploitative for merchants to take advantage of circumstances which lead to a higher demand and hence, even in the most hypothetically pure market, a higher price for a commodity (such as shovels during a snowstorm, an example central to psychometric studies that Wertheimer quotes, p. 29). Still other times, we think exploitation is involved not because there are too few buyers or sellers, and one has too much power to dictate terms and prices, but because of deeper background conditions (social institutions, structures, and practices) within which market bargaining is set. For example, in Victorian England (and still in much of the Third World) a woman's property passed irretrievably to her husband upon marriage, which made her utterly dependent upon him, and exploitable by him, even supposing (to make this a case of Wertheimer's exploitation) that in such a society she was better off as an exploited wife than as an unmarried spinster. An infinity of suitors bidding for each maiden's hand, each on those same terms, can hardly assuage the exploitation women suffer as a result of those background legal norms. Or, again, how are we to conceive of a "hypothetical market price" in the context of "unconstitutional conditions" imposed by a national government upon grants of power or money to the states (chapter 5)? Trying to imagine what terms of trade a state government could secure if it had an infinity of national governments with whom to bargain is well nigh nonsensical.

Still, Wertheimer only ever promised a partial model, applicable only to "a certain range of cases" (p. 236), and maybe these are all simply outside that range. But if so, these examples serve to show just how restricted that range is. Far from using these nonstandard incidents to build to some larger theory of exploitation that would subsume all the standard cases, Wertheimer has provided a very partial theory that accounts only for a limited range of even those nonstandard cases he discusses.

We could do better with another model, built not on the "unequal bargaining power" analysis of unconscionable contracts (which leads Wertheimer to think in terms of hypothetical prices in ideal markets), but rather on talk of "unconstitutional conditions" imposed in the exercise of government discretion. Suitably generalized, that model suggests there are certain things we should do or not do unconditionally: "Unfair advantage" would consist in playing for advantage (trying to manipulate others by imposing conditions on your own actions) where morality prohibits you from playing for advantage. Certain things (like the "duty of easy rescue" owed by the tug to the ship in the storm) we are morally obliged to do; and being obliged, it would be wrong to offer to do them only upon condition (of payment of money, though it may well be permissible, later, to try to recover one's costs). Other things we are morally permitted to do or not do (offer to bear another woman's child, or stop to aid motorists stranded in a snowstorm); but if we do them at all, there are certain sorts of conditions we cannot impose on our doing them (again, payment of money, beyond perhaps retrospective recovery of costs). Even paradigm cases of unconscionable contracts—selling exorbitantly priced freezers to impoverished ghetto dwellers and such like—might better be analyzed in the more immediate terms of breach of "professional ethics" among business persons of the sort ensconced in the rules of Better Business Bureaus than in any notion of hypothetical prices in ideal markets (though that might be what ultimately underlies Better Business codes).

Disappointed though his readers may be at the absence of any robust larger theory of exploitation emerging from his study, Wertheimer himself will not and should not worry overly much. His forte and true interest lie less in the construction of grand overarching theories than in microanalytics. This book is literally chockablock with hundreds of fine detailed discussions, of a modest, partial, middle-range sort, growing out of particular cases and particular literatures, often of a legal sort. Lawyers and nonlawyers alike will warm to Wertheimer's virtues of never straying *too* far from actual cases, never abstracting to any *very* grand conclusions. If political theorists characteristically hope for more, they often end up delivering far less.

American Politics

The Problem That Won't Go Away: Reforming U.S. Health Care Financing. Edited by Henry J. Aaron. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. 298p. $36.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

License to Steal: Why Fraud Plagues America's Health Care System. By Malcolm K. Sparrow. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. 240p. $55.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Governing Health: The Politics of Health Policy. Carol S. Weissert and William G. Weissert. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 361p. $45.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Richard Himelfarb, *Hofstra University*

A growing senior citizen population, rapidly escalating costs for medical services, and rising numbers of uninsured Americans have focused the attention and energies of politicians and the public alike on the increasing importance of health care policy in the United States. Recently, three books concerning different aspects of health care politics have appeared, each of which merits attention.

The Problem That Won't Go Away is the product of a Brookings Institution conference held shortly after the demise of the Clinton Health Security Plan in 1994. The presentations address two crucial questions: (1) Why did the Clinton plan fail, and (2) what does this portend for the future of health care reform in the United States? The answers provided in this volume give the best snapshot of current thinking on these issues by the nation's foremost experts.

Although the scholars give varying explanations for the Clinton plan's demise, they agree on two important points.

First, the main goals of the plan—controlling health care costs and attaining universal coverage—were laudable and represented sound social policy. (Indeed, it would have been interesting to hear from someone not sharing this view.) Second, while these experts attribute the plan's failure to factors that are both systemic (a weak presidency, fragmented power in Congress) and specific to the Clinton administration (a flawed political strategy and policy development process), they also emphasize the public's increasing hostility toward big government and increased taxes as a reason for its demise. None are sanguine that Americans will change their minds on these issues in the near future.

Those experts addressing the future of health care reform in the latter portion of the book agree with this perspective. Thus, there is a consensus that comprehensive measures like the Clinton plan stand no realistic chance of passage anytime soon. Instead, incremental measures are likely to define policymaking in this area. This point aside, the experts agree on relatively little. Some prefer a larger private sector role and propose the introduction of medical savings accounts, while another argues for incremental steps to achieve universal coverage, such as first extending health insurance to all children. Yet a third emphasizes the need to control health care costs through increased use of managed care.

Although each of the proposals is discussed in detail, information concerning their financing is sketchy, particularly the degree to which the federal government, individuals, or employers will have to pay more or less. In addition, the relative benefits and costs of the different proposals are difficult to assess because, unlike the articles addressing the failure of the Clinton plan, these are not followed by comments of conference discussants. Such responses would have made it easier to evaluate the merits of each plan. Despite these shortcomings, *The Problem That Won't Go Away* offers thoughtful, articulate analyses of a public policy issue likely to remain on the political front-burner for the foreseeable future.

Malcolm K. Sparrow's *License to Steal* is a well-written, surprisingly accessible discussion of a largely ignored but arguably significant policy issue. According to conventional wisdom, about 10% of all health care spending in the United States is lost due to fraud. While the public believes that this is the chief source of rapidly rising health care costs, experts disagree, arguing that other factors, particularly the increasing cost of medical technology, are to blame. The most provocative aspect of Sparrow's book is his implicit suggestion that the public's position may contain more wisdom than is typically acknowledged.

Sparrow begins by making the point that in any industry fraud control is inherently difficult and depressing. Such efforts slow down the productivity of claims processing, while managers are loth to admit the presence of fraud for fear of being labelled incompetent. More important, Sparrow points out that fraud control is a dynamic, not static, pursuit. That is, criminals think creatively and adapt continuously. As a result, fraud detection is an ongoing cat-and-mouse game rather than a problem that can be definitively solved once and for all.

Furthermore, Sparrow argues that fraud may be more endemic to health care than other industries. Third-party payments give beneficiaries little incentive to complain when they believe fraud is being perpetrated. At the same time, in a society that reveres the medical profession, prosecutors are intimidated by their lack of expertise in health issues; judges grant physicians accused of fraud the benefit of the doubt; and doctors remain vigilant in protecting their own from outside investigation. The result is a degree of health care fraud that has not been systematically measured but which anecdotal evidence and limited studies of state programs imply is considerably higher than 10%.

Sparrow disputes the belief that increased automation in processing health care claims will reduce the degree of fraud. Electronic systems may provide more speed and efficiency, but they are useless when the incoming claims themselves are false. Only human beings can discern things that seem suspicious but do not appear on any standard list of fraud indicators.

Similarly, Sparrow takes issue with those who believe that managed care can eliminate incentives to commit fraud. Instead, he argues, familiar methods of fraud are merely replaced by less familiar ones. While managed care reduces the ability of front-line health care providers (such as physicians) to commit fraud, it provides middle-level intermediaries, in particular managed care organizations, a plethora of ways to engage in fraudulent activities. Thus, in contrast to fee-for-service plans, in which the chief victims of fraud are payers (governments and employers), in managed care plans the chief victims are likely to be patients who do not receive adequate care or are denied care to which they are entitled.

Ultimately, Sparrow's work conveys two lessons that policymakers would be wise to heed. First, before we can attack the problem of health care fraud, we must be willing to commit the resources necessary to measure its prevalence. As he points out, "adequate investments in controls will *never* be made while the facts about the true nature and scope of health care fraud remain unknown" (p. 214). Second, there is no substitute for human beings when it comes to fraud detection. Because fraud control is dynamic, criminals inevitably will find ways to circumvent even the most elaborate electronic detection systems. Ultimately, only human beings are capable of detecting many of the fraudulent practices employed by a constantly innovating group of criminals.

Carol and William Weissert's *Governing Health* bills itself as "a comprehensive synthesis of political science research on the institutions of government and the policy process, and an extensive review of the policies that have governed health care for a generation or more" (p. 4). Part I focuses on documenting change in the nation's institutions over time with respect to health care. We learn that Congress remains the most powerful player in health care policy, but its influence has declined as power in the institution has become increasingly decentralized and fragmented. Interest groups are said to be powerful actors in health care, arguably second only to Congress, although their effectiveness is likely to be greatest on legislation pertaining to nonsalient, narrow, and specialist issues. By contrast, the power of the presidency has weakened over time. The Weisserts argue that "the president clearly has the trappings of power but that power must be negotiated carefully, not wielded at will" (p. 96). As in other policy areas, the president is most influential in setting the agenda, but his power declines as Congress considers legislation.

Part II describes the policy process as it pertains to health care. The Weisserts (as do a number of the experts in *The Problem That Won't Go Away*) agree that comprehensive health reform efforts in the United States almost inevitably meet defeat due to the constraints of the political system, previously discussed. They demonstrate convincingly, however, that health reform does occur in this country albeit in more "moderate bursts." After a process of what Kingdon (*Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, 1984) called "softening up," such policies win acceptance as elites and the public come to recognize the need for proposed reforms. (Examples they cite include the Prospective Payment System and Resource-Based Relative Value Scale adopted by the Medicare system as well as nursing home reform.) Thus, while the authors view health policymaking as "eclectic, dynamic and evolving," they also print out that it has "an inexorable quality" (p. 315). Eventually, they conclude, health reform in the United States does arrive at what is "cost-effective, prioritized, and constrained" (p. 315). Extrapolating from this model of policymaking, the Weisserts argue that many of the health care reforms likely to occur in the next ten years are probably already on the agenda. These include taxing health insurance premiums, means testing for Medicare, malpractice reform, and capping health spending as a percentage of the gross national product and public budget.

My sole criticism of *Governing Health* is its failure to explicate more fully the role played by public opinion in health care reform. In the last ten years, three major efforts—catastrophic care, the Clinton plan, and the GOP Medicare reforms of 1995—suffered ignominious political defeat. Arguably, they met with disaster in significant part because their advocates never persuaded the public that the benefit of each outweighed the costs to them as individuals. The legacy of these episodes appears to be a heightened public skepticism toward major health reform. I would have been interested to read the authors' explanation as to why these efforts have proven unpersuasive to the public and whether such occurrences are distinct to health care policymaking or generalizable to other policy areas.

Nevertheless, *Governing Health* is an important piece of scholarship. It connects policymaking in the increasingly important sphere of health politics to the literature of political science. As such, it is likely to be of interest both to political scientists (especially those unfamiliar with health policy) and policy specialists outside the discipline.

In sum, all three books convey important information about a policy area likely to remain critical in years to come. As such, it is hoped they will inspire further scholarly interest in this most relevant issue.

Strong Presidents: A Theory of Leadership. By Philip Abbott. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996. 281p. $40.00 cloth, $20.00 paper.

Richard J. Ellis, *Willamette University*

Phillip Abbott's newest book, *Strong Presidents*, is a fresh and often fascinating examination of a neglected topic: how presidents wrestle with the public image of their important predecessors. Building upon the work of such literary critics as Howard Bloom and W. Jackson Bate, Abbott argues that presidents, much like poets, suffer from "the anxiety of influence." That is, they feel themselves in the shadow of the great presidents of the past. Abbott suggests several possible responses to the problem of "belatedness." Presidents may accept their inferior status, as when President Gerald Ford confessed he was a Ford not a Lincoln, or they may avert their gaze altogether, ignoring the strong presidents who came before them. Others, however, are driven to imitate and even to transcend the greatness achieved by their predecessors, and it is these presidents who most interest Abbott. These belated presidents, Abbott argues, are deeply ambivalent toward the strong presidents of the past: On the outside (what Abbott calls an "exoteric" reading) they seek to imitate their strong predecessors, but on the inside (the "esoteric" reading) they burn with jealousy and hostility toward the presidents who achieved the greatness that may be denied to them. This ambivalence, Abbott argues, leads the belated president systematically to misread—or, as Abbott insists on rendering it, (mis)read—the achievements and texts of past presidents.

These intriguing ideas are certainly worth sustained historical investigation, but as an historical or empirical study this book disappoints. A large part of the problem is Abbott's unfortunate decision to tell the story through the eyes of an imaginary "belated president." At a stylistic level, this narrative device quickly wears out its welcome and tries the patience of even the most sympathetic reader. Countless paragraphs begin: The belated president knows/thinks/sees/finds/concludes/wonders/realizes/considers/ponders/understands/hesitates/surveys . . . , and on and on. In fact, it is Abbott who knows, thinks, and sees these things, so why the elaborate and awkward pretense? More important, this rhetorical device is ill-suited for, and consistently gets in the way of, investigating the central question of how real presidents have defined themselves in response to their actual predecessors. To evaluate the theory of belatedness that Abbott sketches, we do not need to know how some mythical president would relate to Lincoln; rather, we need to know how Lincoln defined himself in relation to his predecessors and how subsequent presidents have contended with the image of Lincoln. Had Abbott dropped this distracting narrative device, he would have written a much more compelling and focused historical study.

Abbott's "esoteric readings" often take us deep into the psyche of individual presidents in an effort to uncover their hidden intent. Some of these deep readings are penetrating and persuasive, others are perhaps less so. But by delving into presidential psychodynamics Abbott often ends up slighting presidential followers. Comparisons with past presidents not only are made in the fevered, ambitious imaginations of presidents but also are publicly expressed expectations of followers. For President Truman, for instance, as Alonzo Hamby (*Beyond the New Deal: Harry S Truman and American Liberalism*, 1973) has shown, invidious comparisons with Franklin Roosevelt were imposed upon him by others. The problem of belatedness is not only a psychological problem but also a shared social or political problem. If the aim is to build "a theory of leadership," as Abbott's subtitle indicates, then that theory must put followers at its center.

Abbott's historical perspective is welcome. His imaginary belated president looks back to Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Hoover, and FDR as well as to the more recent presidencies of Kennedy and Nixon. And yet, oddly, historical time matters little if at all in Abbott's theory. What matters instead is the past president's stature, fixed and immobile. The shadow cast by these great presidents never seems to wane—Washington's shadow appears to be as imposing and tormenting for Bill Clinton as it was for John Adams or indeed for Abbott's imaginary belated president. This transhistorical dialogue may be right for poets, but is it for presidents? I suspect that if we wish to understand how presidents define themselves in response to their predecessors, then we need to pay much closer attention to their place in political time, to borrow Stephen Skowronek's phrase (*The Politics Presidents Make*, 1993). William Leuchtenburg's *In the Shadow of FDR* (1983) is a model here. Also fruitful, as Abbott himself suggests in his conclusion, would be a comparative study of those presidents—John Adams, Madison, Van Buren, Andrew Johnson, Taft, Truman, and Bush—who immediately followed "great" or at least highly popular presidents of their own party.

In spanning the boundaries between literary theory and political science, and specifically in introducing the concept of belatedness to students of the presidency, Abbott has made an important contribution to the field of presidential studies. The book's occasional brilliance illuminates a topic heretofore covered mostly in darkness, and yet it is an erratic light that we are offered. This undisciplined book is overwritten and underedited. Political scientists and historians will justly feel that Abbott pays insufficient attention to evaluating the theory against historical evidence in a systematic manner. In the end we are left with an intriguing and unconventional set of concepts but an uncertain sense of how important these concepts are in understanding the behavior of U.S. presidents. We certainly do not have anything approaching the "theory of leadership" Abbott promises us in the subtitle. An imaginary belated reviewer could be forgiven for concluding that while this is a good book there is a greater book on this rich subject still to be written.

Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nominating Campaigns. By Clifford W. Brown, Jr., Linda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 184p. $54.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Candice J. Nelson, *American University*

While PAC contributions to federal candidates have long received attention from political scientists, individual contributors have received much less attention from the scholarly community. *Serious Money* attempts to rectify this oversight by examining individual contributors to presidential campaigns. Brown, Powell, and Wilcox define "serious money" as contributions between $201 and $1,000, in the aggregate, to presidential candidates. Through a random sample of contributors in this range in the 1988 elections and a panel study of 1988 contributors who were resolicited during the 1992 presidential election, the authors examine the methods presidential campaigns use to solicit serious contributions and the responsiveness of potential contributors to those solicitations.

The authors begin with "the assumption that the dynamics of campaign finance center around two sets of decisions: the strategic decisions of campaigns to target potential contributors, and the personal decisions by those targeted to give or not to give" (p. 10). After a brief but useful discussion of how the Federal Election Campaign Act changed the solicitation of funds for presidential campaigns, namely, by increasing the importance of direct-mail solicitation because of matching funds, and by changing the nature of personal solicitation from fewer contributors who could give large sums to larger numbers for contributors who would contribute the maximum $1,000 allowed under the law, the authors turn to their findings.

Brown, Powell, and Wilcox find that there is a relatively well-defined set of contributors in elections in the United States—"an established pool of habitual givers" (p. 30)—and they are solicited in two ways: personally, by the candidate or other contributors to the candidate's campaign, or impersonally, through direct mail and telemarketing. While neither of these findings will be of any surprise to campaign fundraisers, they do present a solid summary of the contributor base and solicitation methods to those unfamiliar with campaign fundraising.

The heart of the findings lies in the description of the resources candidates bring to soliciting funds and the responsiveness of contributors to campaign solicitations. Adapting Robert Salibury's typology ("An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* [February 1969]:1–32) of the benefits received from interest group participation in political campaigns, the authors argue that political candidates can offer potential contributors purposive, solidary, or material benefits in exchange for contributions. Brown, Powell, and Wilcox find that those seeking solidary or material benefits are most responsive to personal solicitations, while those seeking purposive benefits are most responsive to impersonal solicitations through direct mail and telemarketing. They conclude that personal solicitation networks dominate in most presidential campaigns, though candidates with strong ideological identifications can successfully solicit contributions through direct mail and telemarketing.

Serious Money provides a good descriptive account of the mechanics of presidential fundraising: how the money is raised, what types of contributors are most responsive to different solicitation techniques, and the demographic characteristics of contributors in this pool. The authors present an interesting analysis of the resources presidential candidates offer to potential contributors: ties to in-state constituencies; ties to national party activists; ties to legislative leaders; strong ethnic, religious, or other social identities; and well-identified ideological positions. The authors fail to explore in any detail, however, what contributors expect in return. Throughout the book, Brown, Powell, and Wilcox allude to the normative questions raised by the exchange of campaign contributions for political access, but they do not explore the consequences of this exchange. For example, in discussing personal solicitation networks, they raise the probability that some political contributions are made to presidential candidates solely on the basis of who asks for the contribution, not the personal qualities or issue positions of the candidate. The authors go on to say that if this is so, then "there are serious implications for democratic theory" (p. 62). Yet, these implications are not discussed in the main body of the book and are only briefly discussed in the concluding chapter. One general finding of the research is that most solicitation is done by personal networks and that more contributors give money to campaigns to influence policy or to influence the outcome of the election than for any other reason. Given the present concern over the role of "interested money" in campaigns, an elaboration of the implications of the findings would have increased the contribution of this work.

In their discussions of future research, Brown, Powell, and Wilcox suggest comparing the contributors in their study to those who give soft money to the national party committees, the truly "serious money" contributors. Indeed, it would be interesting to compare the motives of those who contribute less than $200, those in the Brown, Powell, and Wilcox sample, and those who contribute tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars.

While *Serious Money* does not comprehensively address the normative implications of contributing money to presidential campaigns in exchange for the benefits derived, it does provide a solid first look at contributors to presidential campaigns, their motivations for giving, and the methods by which their contributions are sought. For students of campaign finance interested in individual contributors, *Serious Money* is a serious contribution to the literature.

Extraordinary Politics: How Protest and Dissent Are Changing American Democracy. By Charles C. Euchner. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 290p. $69.00 cloth, $21.95 paper.

David S. Meyer, *CUNY/City College*

Our discipline has fallen down on the job of understanding the causes and effects of political protest movements in the United States. Political scientists have produced several important case studies of particular movements, but for the most part they have left the study of protest in America to others. As a result, larger questions about the relationship of protest to U.S. political institutions, public policy, and more conventional political activity have gotten short shrift. The lack of a comprehensive text that draws a coherent synthesis from the range of case studies, Charles Euchner reports, led him to try to make sense of a large but largely unfocused literature and to attempt to figure out what it means about American democracy.

This book is an effort to introduce and interpret the role of protest movements in U.S. politics, bracketed by anecdotes of the Czech dissident turned president, Vaclav Havel. Episodically imprisoned during the last two decades of the cold war, Havel claims that the protest movements in the United States offered inspiration and a model for democratic dissenters in much more difficult circumstances. Havel's example suggests the wide-ranging effects of protest politics in America and should lead us to look more carefully at dramatic dissent in the United States.

Euchner charges that conventional politics, that is, what is outlined in a traditional American politics text, represents only part of what influences policy and governance in the United States. He uses the term "extraordinary politics" as a sort of residual category, meant to capture citizen activities other than voting, campaign activity, litigation, or lobbying. More conventional politics garners most scholarly attention for obvious reasons: academic legitimacy, easily boundable topics and fields of studies, and readily available data. Euchner is surely right to point out that political scientists have too often dismissed as background noise some of the most interesting (and perhaps influential) political phenomena of the past few decades. He suggests that extraordinary politics emerges as an alternative for those who have lost faith or access to more conventional political means, and it flourishes when institutional means of democratic deliberation break down.

The argument about the relationship between protest and democracy appears in the first and last chapters. The six chapters in the middle are Euchner's efforts to bring to bear a wide range of sources on critical issues in the study of protest politics: protest cycles, mobilization, political organization, strategy, tactics, and outcomes. In each chapter Euchner identifies a few critical problems, then reviews a very wide range of sources that speak to, or around, them. The author has read widely and has made an admirable attempt to draw insight from academic work in a variety of fields. He presents literature reviews without offering much in the way of guidance or an original synthesis to a reader trying to make sense of conflicting perspectives. In the chapter on motivations for action, for example, Euchner offers a thumbnail review of rational choice perspectives, a visit to "status and culture," then seven pages on psychological perspectives that include appearances by Freud, Jung, Laswell, Weber, Maslow, Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Sennett. The reader here gets little more than a sampling of different tastes, rather than a forceful argument about motivation.

Similarly, it is hard not to admire the author's effort to find insights about political protest that would hold true about, say, both the civil rights and antiabortion movements. Most scholars look at one movement per study and avoid the challenge of larger syntheses. Euchner eschews the thorough treatment of a single case study or the overarching simplification inevitable in a single comprehensive theory, preferring to draw selectively from many cases and many theories. Unfortunately, readers familiar with the scholarship on particular movements featured here only in brief summary are likely to find fault with Euchner's abbreviated presentation.

Of course, the study of protest movements presents a raft of definitional and methodological challenges. The civil rights movement, to cite the most studied example, mobilized through a range of different forms over most of the past century. Sometimes relatively conventional political activities, such as litigation by interest groups or electoral efforts, comprised the most visible face of the movement; at other times electoral efforts were accompanied by lobbying, nonviolent civil disobedience, and urban riots. Partisans disagreed with one another about goals, strategy, and tactics, and political authorities made different choices about just who comprised what movement. Elected officials calling for reform in voter registration, for example, generally did not credit dissidents in the streets with forcing them to act; yet, only the most careless analyst would ignore the effect of disruption outside political institutions on motivating reformers to work within them. Euchner is right to call for scholars to confront the real complexity of protest politics rather than simply cut out a wedge that provides convenient data.

At the end, Euchner leaves readers with a number of critical questions. First, if protest has become a more common form of expressing claims, as he suggests, then we need to know why and what kinds of protest. Other studies have found that while mass demonstrations are more common, they are also much less disruptive than in past decades. Second, we need to understand why, in contrast to Euchner's general theory, those who engage in protest politics are actually *more* likely to engage in conventional politics as well. Why, for example, did members of Congress, who certainly have other ways of making claims, choose to get arrested in front of the South African embassy to protest apartheid? Third, what factors explain the rise and fall of campaigns on particular issues. Are antiabortion activists, for example, likely to mobilize more forcefully after favorable or unfavorable court decisions? Finally, when activists such as Vaclav Havel or Representative John Lewis (formerly a leader of the civil rights group SNCC) enter institutional politics, what happens to their effectiveness? These questions should animate research in American politics, and we can thank Charles Euchner for posing them.

Senators on the Campaign Trail: The Politics of Representation. By Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996. 375p. $22.95.

Thomas A. Kazee, *Davidson College*

Few political scientists have been as resourceful or successful as Richard Fenno in demonstrating the connections between elections and policymaking. He has argued, for example, that to understand Congress in Washington requires an awareness of how House and Senate members behave at home. This emphasis was apparent in his nearly two-decades-old classic, *Homestyle* (1978), and in more recent individual studies of five U.S. Senators. Central to Fenno's approach is the importance of the political career; in his series of books on senators, he contends that the campaigning governing campaigning sequence influences decisions about campaign strategy, policy behavior in Washington, and ambitions to seek higher office.

In *Senators on the Campaign Trail,* Fenno extends his earlier work by observing eleven Senate candidates who, from 1976 to 1992, ran in eighteen different elections. Five were challengers' campaigns (one lost), one was a losing open seat effort, and twelve involved incumbents running for reelection (three lost). The methodology is vintage Fenno: "Soak and poke" has become "drop in/drop out, tag along/hang around" (p. 4). His participant-observer approach has its limitations, to be sure, but part of the magic of a Fenno book is converting the skeptic. Though the uninitiated reader may wonder about replicability and generalizability in this collection of seemingly idiosyncratic stories, somewhere along the way the pieces begin to fit together, and a clearer picture of politics emerges. The key to all this is Fenno's ability to distill meaning, to see patterns and connections, and to weave them together into a coherent whole. It is perhaps as much art as science, but it works, and our understanding of Congress and the democratic process is much enriched by his efforts.

Fundamentally, this book is about the politics of representation and how campaigns establish legislator-constituent relationships. To understand this relationship we must understand that "representation is, at bottom, a home relationship" (p. 277). Campaigns, therefore, matter; they are not merely a hurdle to be cleared before legislators get to the "real" policymaking business of Congress. A dominant theme of the book, moreover, is that this representational relationship is *negotiated* during election campaigns: "Candidates want support, and they offer responsiveness; citizens want responsiveness, and they offer support" (p. 78). Fenno argues compellingly that this negotiation is insufficiently appreciated by political scientists, who do not spend enough time studying the dynamics of campaigns and the strategic calculations of candidates. He demonstrates, for example, that three Senate campaigns in Iowa—Dick Clark in 1978, John Culver in 1980, and Tom Harkin in 1984—had different outcomes at least partially because Clark and Culver (who lost) were less successful in negotiating an electorally rewarding fit with their constituencies than was Harkin (who won). Harkin, though ideologically similar to Clark and Culver, cultivated a highly personal representational style that insulated him from negative campaigning and potential policy vulnerabilities.

Once in Washington, the business of policymaking is profoundly influenced by campaigns. Senator David Pryor's "one of us" representational style, for example, encouraged his Arkansas constituents to see him as a senator who looked out for the little guy. Consistent with that perception, he advanced a populist policy agenda that included frequent attacks on large institutions and bureaucracies. Fenno concludes that Pryor's policy career was a natural product of his relationship with the constituency: "It was not the substantive policy that concerned him as much as it was the point of contact between policy maker and citizen" (p. 302).

The book demonstrates also that the goals of candidates vary according to the career stage at which they take place. To win election the first time requires primarily that a candidate negotiate recognition and qualification. Some candidates, such as Paul Tsongas in Massachusetts, develop sufficient recognition and, ultimately, are seen by constituents as possessing the essential qualifications for service. Others, such as New Jersey's Richard Leone, are well known but are never able to make the qualification connection with voters. To win reelection requires a different sort of negotiation. Successful candidates learn that the first campaign (and term in office) may have created "only the most tenuous of citizen connections" (p. 123). Wyche Fowler's losing reelection campaign in Georgia may have resulted, Fenno suggests, from overconfidence. After his first upset win, he underestimated the need to make a personal and firmly grounded connection with constituents. Finally, the reelection campaigns of legislator seeking third or subsequent terms aim to establish durable and trusting legislator-constituent relationships. How does a Senate incumbent, such as David Pryor or Claiborne Pell, become an institution? "The long answer is when a solid majority of your constituents feel they know you, know enough about you to trust you, and are not much interested in learning more" (p. 324). Challengers, Fenno argues, face a nearly impossible task when constituents are so comfortable with incumbents that they are unreceptive to the challengers' campaigns, however negative and/or well financed.

As with any study based on a relatively small number of cases, some of Fenno's conclusions may reflect characteristics of particular contexts rather than a phenomenon generalizable to all Senate elections. The remarkably trusting constituent relationships negotiated by Pryor and Pell, for example, developed in relatively homogeneous and small states; could a senator in a much larger and diverse state nurture such positive connections? One might also suggest that Fenno's assessments of campaign strategy—mistakes as well as masterstrokes—remind us that hindsight is acute. An election campaign, like a war, may be fought in a fog, and today's apparently well-conceived strategic decision may be tomorrow's foolish miscalculation. In a related vein, the negotiation process Fenno describes may be less discrete and tangible than his narratives suggest. Such negotiations take place under conditions of considerable uncertainty; only on election night will a candidate know if his or her attempt to connect with the constituency was successful.

Such concerns pale, however, in light of the substantial contribution *Senators on the Campaign Trail* makes to our understanding of U.S. politics. The book is full of sophisticated insights and plain good sense, from Fenno's observation that negative campaigning erodes the representational connection to his musings about the role media play in linking legislators and constituents. In sum, in this book students of politics can learn much about Senate elections and, more important, representative democracy.

Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the Sovereignty of the People. By Matthew J. Franck. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. 279p. $35.00.

Frank Guliuzza III, *Weber State University*

Robert Bork failed to secure confirmation to the Supreme Court in no small part because he could not persuade most Americans that, despite their fears to the contrary, he was indeed a friend of individual rights and liberties. Bork never successfully made the case that he stood ready to protect perhaps the most cherished individual liberty available in a constitutional republic: The right to self-government (that one man or woman can help shape public policy by stepping into the ballot box secure in the knowledge that his or her vote will count for something). It is a freedom that Bork maintained has been abated substantially in an era when the Supreme Court has redefined its job description from protectors of the Constitution, generally, to guardians of those who are in a kind of shootout with the popularly elected branches representing often treacherous and evil political majorities.

Several years after Bork's failed nomination, Matthew Franck, associate professor of political science at Radford University, advances a similar argument. In fact, it is quite likely that Franck, in his fine new book, *Against the Imperial Judiciary*, makes Bork's case far more successfully than did Bork when before the U.S. Senate. I am not at all certain, however, that his audience will be much wider or more sympathetic than was Bork's.

The book is about "the extent to which the Supreme Court of the United States, considered in light of the principles of its origins, may be said to have a legitimate share of the authority to govern" (p. 1). Franck looks critically at the origins and theoretical foundations of the text, and early adjudication of the Constitution, to evaluate three propositions: Proposition One is "judicial supremacy" (or finality)—that the Court, and the Court exclusively, has final say over the meaning of the Constitution. Proposition Two is "statesmanship"—that the justices should be prudent leaders and use constitutional rulings to fill vacuums left by the political branches. Proposition Three is "natural law"—that constitutional decisions can be grounded in natural law/higher law and be used to justify unenumerated rights (p. 3).

With respect to the three propositions, Franck offers several conclusions. First, they are interrelated and hierarchical. Proposition Two, statesmanship, depends upon Proposition One, finality. Proposition Three, natural law, depends upon Proposition Two, statesmanship (pp. 3–5). Second, if one looks carefully at the Senate confirmation hearings of recent nominees to the Court, one will discover that questions are put frequently to the nominees in such a way to suggest that the propositions are nearly ubiquitously accepted (pp. 5–19). Third, the historical evidence—a careful analysis of the theoretical foundations of the text and the early adjudication of the Constitution—will not support any of the propositions (p. 20).

The book is divided into three parts. In Part One, Franck challenges using the term "statesmanship" as even appropriate to describe the judiciary (p. 21). He also challenges the historical support for judicial supremacy (pp. 91, 105). In Part Two, Franck claims that, to the extent the justices have engaged in the practice of using natural law to justify judicial policymaking, they are attempting to establish a justice that is not ordained by the Constitution or supported by their predecessors on the Marshall Court (p. 108). In Part Three, Franck introduces the problem of "the two sovereignties"—the sovereignty of law (or right, or reason, or justice), which is generally associated with judicial power, and the sovereignty of men and their elected representatives. He maintains that the framers envisioned a constitutionalism where by the sovereign people, represented by their legislatures, are responsible for the regime's success. Judges are entrusted with the preservation of constitutions. As such, they are empowered to enforce standards that the sovereign people have not set in writing (p. 175). Finally, in his conclusion, Franck articulates why he believes a constitution is worth preserving. If, he notes, it is well designed and amendable, it provides a durability that makes the threat of social revolution recede. An imperial judiciary threatens the stability provided by a constitution (p. 209).

In many respects, this is an excellent book. Franck subjects the contemporary claims for judicial finality, statesmanship, and natural law to rigorous historical analysis and finds them wanting. His examination of the origins of judicial authority are precise, and his exegeses of Supreme Court decisions are careful and provocative. Too, Franck weaves many of the important arguments advanced by contemporary constitutional historians and theorists into his text.

Yet, quite apart from the negative response Franck will receive from many who disagree either with his analysis of the origins of judicial power or with his conclusions regarding the perpetuation of judicial hegemony, there are reasons this book will have limited persuasive power. For example, while Franck does recognize and, when necessary, respond to quite a few of the important participants in the interpretive debate, he is not nearly so thorough when identifying allies in opposition to judicial supremacy (John Agresto, Louis Fisher, Susan Burgess, and Earl Maltz are a few who come to mind).

Furthermore, Franck applauds the evolution the interpretive debate has sustained from, beginning in the 1950s, a conversation that focused on the preferences for judicial activism or judicial restraint to the more fruitful disputations that emerged in the 1980s—the exchanges between interpretivists and noninterpretivists and, eventually, originalists and nonoriginalists (p. 2). I am not at all sure whether this scholarly evolution is as critical as he suggests. Granted, it has put more intricate arguments on the table, but, ultimately, these elevated arguments are supporting what? They are employed to justify and legitimize either an *active* judiciary or one that should be *restrained*. One need not denigrate contemporary constitutional theory to observe that the bottom line is still found in the basic questions: How can we square judicial authority with democracy? What arguments warrant an active or restricted judiciary? Does judicial review translate into judicial finality, and, if the Court does not have the last say when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, who does? Even though these "antiquated" polemics may not be in vogue among constitutional theorists, they are still important to other scholars, jurists, legislative and executive policymakers, and the public at large. So, as with Bork, there are some substantial limits to Franck's audience. He is communicating primarily, if not exclusively, to a narrow group of constitutional scholars.

In fact, his audience may even be more limited than that. Franck chose to challenge the claims to heightened judicial power by placing them into an historical context. One cannot make a legitimate claim for judicial supremacy and statesmanship, Franck argues, by appealing to the framers or to seminal jurists (e.g., Marshall and Story). Even if Franck wins the historical debate, however, nonoriginalists will simply say (and have said repeatedly to other originalists): "Fine. Then I will not build my case for judicial activism on the foundation or original intent." Thus, Franck is preaching to the converted. His argument will resonate most fully, if not exclusively, with those who embrace an original-intent-based judicial philosophy.

Despite these critical observations, the book is a splendid and a significant contribution to the interpretive debate. Franck argues forcefully against an imperial judiciary and supplies substantial evidence to those who are persuaded by an appeal to the framers. My hope is that he, like Bork, does not find the audience either to be too hostile or simply too circumscribed.

Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality. By Thomas Gais. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 336p. $39.50.

Daniel M. Shea, *University of Akron*

It is rare to find a book that affords a truly fresh perspective on the role of special interest groups in the financing of U.S. elections. It is also uncommon to find a theoretically rigorous essay confronting a topic usually grounded in empirical terms. Thomas Gais's recent work, *Improper Influence*, scores high on both counts and deserves close attention from students of collective action, campaign finance law, and the U.S. political process more generally.

The rationale behind campaign finance reform in the early 1970s was to reduce, if not eliminate, the corrupting influence of large contributors. It was assumed that hefty contributions meant hefty leverage when it came to formulating public policy. The idea was to bring small donors into the electoral process—to make the system more equitable. The result, according to Gais, has been precisely the opposite.

One truly impressive aspect of this book is the way in which Gais systematically dissects the logical inconsistencies behind FEC reforms. He draws his deductive brawn from Olson's (1965) collective action dilemma. There are, Gais suggests, keen differences between groups affiliated with institutions and those that are not. Concerning PACs, those connected to a large organization have a number of advantages—including greater access to patrons, the ability to offer a wide array of selective incentives, existing networks of experts, and the ability to organize into "nested groups" to remind members of their responsibilities. So, by forcing groups to look to small contributors, by eliminating access to patrons, and by raising the costs of organization, FEC regulations produce a highly biased system, one that magnifies the number and weight of institutionally anchored groups, such as business and labor PACs. On the short end of the stick are PACs associated with independent collective-action groups, such as those concerned with civil rights, the environment, and the poor and disadvantaged as we as those usually represented by third-party advocates. What is more, the current system does little to develop a stable, independent, and self-sustaining organization that truly extends the institutional base of politics. "A campaign finance system that enforces a dependency on small contributors cannot produce an egalitarian system of group representation," Gais writes, "since the ability of groups to mobilize small contributors is itself unequally distributed" (p. 3).

Just one of the novel arguments Gais makes is how truly *small* the PAC system is—hardly a recurrent theme in most scholarly and journalistic accounts. For instance, groups organized around nonprofit occupations have a median annual revenue about 70 times as large as that of their PAC counterparts. This is true because membership associations confront weaker institutional constraints in mobilizing resources and organizing for political action. "It is therefore not true that the weakness of citizens groups in the PAC system reflects gaps or bias in the American interest group system as a whole" (p. 75).

One of the obstacles Gais has to overcome in this innovative book is the "so what question." Just because independent PACs suffer under FEC rules, does that imply they suffer when it comes to policy outputs? Put a bit differently, is there a link between PAC campaign assistance and the decisions of lawmakers, or are membership associations the real players in the policy process? Perhaps collective-action groups understand that administrative lobbying, litigation, and legislative lobbying are where the action is and forgo the difficulties of establishing a PAC. To these and other related questions Gais's answer is less certain. He admits that the link between contributions and legislative vote choice is weak, but he suggests electoral activity matters when the policy area is complex and competitive and when allegiance and attention are up for grabs. This makes a good deal of intuitive sense, but the data brought to bear on this topic are a bit unconvincing. Relying primarily upon data from Jack Walker's 1980 and 1985 surveys of membership associations, Gais finds a modest difference between the actual number of citizens' groups that have PACs and the predicted number—based upon perceptual data concerning the conflict nature of the policy area each group confronts (Table 4.5). But he does admit that citizen groups tend to face stable, partisan alignments. And while he may be correct that "even if campaign contributions have only a contingent or marginal impact at the level of individual groups, the aggregate distribution of money from large numbers of PACs is important" (p. 99), this seems hardly a justification for storming the gates of the FEC. It also seems to contradict a statement made later: "The amount of money [PACs] control is minuscule compared to the amounts spent on all forms of interest group representation and advocacy" (p. 179).

Nevertheless, another way to think about the effect of institutional barriers to independent PAC formation is the amount of attention and personal involvement legislators invest in issues, not necessarily how they vote. By comparing the policy concerns of groups with affiliated PACs to the concerns of groups that do not (for a number of policy areas), Gais demonstrates that the policy interests of groups with PACs represent more conservative positions and are more oriented to economic policies. He further argues contributions enhance the salience of groups concerns—as well as encourage sympathetic members of Congress to initiate helpful legislation. This one-two punch (a greater number of PACs concerned with economic issues and the assumption that contributions help set the agenda, if not sway votes) has considerable merit. But without the smoking gun tying contributions to policy outputs, Gais is forced to conclude that the actual effects of these differences on legislative and electoral institutions are suggestive.

His strategy to reduce the collective action obstacle endemic in FEC regulations is multifaceted: Eliminate (or significantly increase) the maximum size of individual contributions to PACs (so that patrons may play a larger role in nonaligned groups); allow membership associations to withhold selective incentives conditioned on support of the affiliated PAC; eliminate contribution limits to candidates; relax tax laws limiting electoral activities of nonprofit organizations and provide tax credits for individual contributions to PACs, parties, or candidates—including a substantial deduction for large contributions. The net effect, he writes, would be to widen the range of contributor coalitions, particularly among citizen interest groups. While this may be so, many would be concerned that once the flood-gates were opened, the disparity currently found in the PAC system would seem moderate. In other words, conceivably the gap appropriately mirrors grassroots capabilities, and opening the system would upset the equilibrium (albeit imperfect) *in favor* of institutionalized groups. How strong were collective action groups, particularly juxtaposed business interests, prior to the 1970s, when patrons were unencumbered? His retort that corporations restrict their role in elections not simply because the FEC requires them to do so, but because they find that funds are better spent elsewhere, is well taken—if not altogether satisfactory.

Gais is correct to note that his fresh perspective will garner minimal support among current reformers, who are pushing to lower contribution limits, not eliminate them. But this book is worth careful attention because it is intuitive, carefully constructed, and once again highlights the limits of progressive-minded reforms. There will be little doubt in the reader's mind that the system is biased in favor of economic interests. The questions is, do we really want to risk reforming the reforms—again?

The Population Ecology of Interest Representation. By Virginia Gray and David Lowery. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 304p. $44.50.

Jeffrey M. Berry, *Tufts University*

At the beginning of this rigorous and pathbreaking book, Virginia Gray and David Lowery pose a riddle about rabbits. In England the population of rabbits is rather modest, but when some of the animals were introduced into Australia they began to multiply like, well rabbits. The population expanded into the millions and became such pests and did so much damage to the environment that the government inoculated the species with a deadly and highly contagious disease. The English rabbits and the Australian rabbits were genetically identical. What, then, explained the countries' different experiences with the animals? The answer, biologists specializing in population ecology tell us, is that the carrying capacity for rabbits was greater in Australia, where there was more food and fewer predators.

Does population ecology have anything to teach us about interest groups? Gray and Lowery make a convincing case that it does. They are not the first social scientists to use this theory, which has long been a tool of organizational analysts. They are, however, the first political scientists to apply the theory successfully to interest groups. By focusing on the 50 states rather than on Washington, they are able to compare the effect of a number of different environmental variable on the relative populations of interest groups. They are most interested in how such factors influence the density and diversity of interest groups within a political system.

Gray and Lowery correctly note that what scholars know about interest group mobilization comes largely from their understanding of how individual organizations are formed. Political scientists have emphasized the process by which entrepreneurs attempt to organize a constituency, as well as the kinds of incentives leaders need to offer to convince potential members to respond with financial support. As valuable as this literature is, it overlooks the carrying capacity of any given environment to support lobbying organizations.

The authors turn to the central framework of population ecology, the Energy-Stability-Area (or ESA) theory of biodiversity, to test their model. They believe that in the political world the analogue to area is the latent constituency within an environment. Energy is operationally defined in a number of different ways, but these measures generally reflect the amount of governmental activity in various markets. Gray and Lowery conclude, however, that stability has no satisfactory analogue. Their model works well, and they find that the growth rates for interest groups in the states are related to "long-term changes in the sizes of latent constituencies and the resources of government activity" (p. 157).

Another core concept of this theory is that of an ecological niche. Species adapt to a particular habitat in a way that furthers their prospects for survival. This notion has particular relevance to current work on interest groups and issue networks. Gray and Lowery's concern is with the ability of individual organizations to develop a niche where they have exclusive access to the legislative committees and bureaucratic agency responsible for the policies affecting the group. In terms of competition for members, the authors find extensive partitioning in interest group communities. It appears as though many groups are able to define themselves in such a way that they come to represent a highly distinct constituency. This niche adaptation is a function of internal, organizational needs of the group and has much less to do with its interface with government. Gray and Lowery argue that this finding contradicts the beliefs of formal theorists, who "often assume that officials design the jurisdictions of legislative committees so as to extract rents, and that this relationship then determines the structure of interest communities" (p. 195).

After their analysis of the ESA model and other aspects of population ecology theory, the authors turn to examining the policy consequences of varying levels of interest-group density and diversity in the 50 states. In one such effort they take up the common assumption that the growth in the number of interest groups has made it more difficult for legislatures to get anything done. Their data show that in states with relatively dense interest-group populations, the legislatures are generally less productive. Their key measure of legislative productivity is the proportion of all bills introduced that are ultimately enacted, but one wonders if this was the best approach. By this method a state legislature that passes a high proportion of relatively minor legislation but ignores the most important and controversial bills would be considered more productive than one that ignores the more minor bills and passes a small number of difficult but important legislation.

Gary and Lowery's most significant findings come out of their tests examining the relationship of interest-group growth to economic performance. In *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (1982) Mancur Olson claimed that an expanding number of interest groups slows economic growth. In Olson's logic, more groups mean more inefficient trade restrictions, subsidies, and regulatory schemes protecting a particular industry from competition. What Gray and Lowery find, however, is that interest-group density is *positively* associated with economic growth in the 50 states. They turn Olson's logic on its head by suggesting that the growth of state economies stimulates the growth in the number of groups. As resources become more abundant, the species multiply.

What is particularly striking about this excellent book is the theoretical richness that underlies the empirical investigation every step of the way. This unusually imaginative work succeeds in positioning population ecology at the center of interest-group scholarship, and it is sure to influence the field for many years to come.

Participation in Congress. By Richard L. Hall. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996. 293p. $35.50

E. Scott Adler, *University of Colorado*

Richard Hall has undertaken a tremendous task in his book on legislative participation in Congress. Not only does he seek to explain when and why legislators play an active role in policymaking, but also he challenges many of the long-held beliefs about the existence of congressional norms. Furthermore, the conclusions of Hall's study implicitly question a number of the core assumptions and methods of theoretical construction that many positive theorists have used to build their models of legislative structure. Fortunately, Hall's effort reveals that he is up to the challenge.

Hall's principal objective is to design a model of member participation in the formation and deliberation of legislation and then test hypotheses drawn from this model using data from the subcommittee, committee, and floor stages of the legislative process. His work in this respect is thorough and quite convincing. Hall employs an impressive array of data on both the formal and informal actions of House members (e.g., votes or offering amendments versus building coalitions or interacting with colleagues) to provide a comprehensive picture of what he refers to as legislators' "interest intensity." At the core of Hall's inquiry is why members participate at all in the forging and passage of specific measures if they are under no specific institutional obligation to do so. To answer this he offers three possible interests that a rational legislator would have in exhausting finite resources on the passage of particular enactments: the electoral connection (serving the needs of constituents or a subset thereof), a personal policy interest in a particular issue arena, or furthering the president's agenda.

Hall finds that on the whole participation rates by legislators on any given bill are rather low—only about half the subcommittee members participate in any way, and the rates drop precipitously for committee and floor deliberation. There is support for each of the three motivating factors, and, as Hall initially posits, the extent of their influence on participation varies according to the institutional arena. For example, personal policy interests exhibit the strongest effect on the behind-the-scenes activity of members during subcommittee and committee deliberations, but they are also a significant motive in committee markup of legislation. Similarly, constituency interests have a large effect on legislative activity, but this factor is strongest for more public conduct during markup and floor consideration. Finally, pursuing the legislative agenda of the president, Hall finds, is most common at the subcommittee and committee level. In part, these findings should be heartening to anyone concerned that responsiveness to constituent concerns in policymaking has withered with the rise of careerism and institutionalization in Congress.

While Hall teaches us plenty about the participatory motives of members, I do have one relatively minor quibble with the suggestion that legislators may be compelled to pursue the president's agenda. Investing in fairly distant political carrots in exchange for carrying the president's legislative water seems a rather weak catalyst for most members to exhaust their scarce legislative resources. In fact, Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins (*Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, 1993) might plausibly suggest that members have a more direct institutional motivation (plum committee assignments, garnering leadership support for one's own policy interests, and so forth) to support the party caucus and leaders rather than the president. This would seem even more likely to be the case in an era of strengthened caucus management of chamber agendas.

Nonetheless, just knowing the role that these motivations play in the actions of members would be significant findings in and of themselves. Yet, Hall additionally questions the extent to which institutional position and seniority shape members' legislative pursuits. His findings cast new light on an aspect of congressional behavior—norms—that scholars have largely declared dead since the reforms of the 1970s. Hall's contention is that these folkways *never actually existed*, and conduct that gave the appearance of norms was merely a manifestation of rational decisions on the part of individual members. For instance, he confirms that freshmen participate less at all stages of the policy process, but he attributes this to the institutional constraints they face (higher information and transaction costs) rather than socially imposed expectations of behavior. To support this contention Hall demonstrates that recent transfers to committees (another group with high management costs) *also* participate less than the average member, and senior committee members (a group with presumably very low costs) are no more likely to get into the fray on the floor than are their House colleagues. On the issue of specialization and deference, Hall finds only weak evidence to show that such a norm exists at the subcommittee and committee level, and he finds no support for the expectation of mutual noninterference during floor deliberation.

Since Hall challenges the existence of norms in any congressional period—pre- or postreform—he is compelled to question whether his findings for the early 1980s are not simply an artifact of the modern-day extinction of these behavioral expectations, as many have claimed. Hall does this by comparing participation data for the same committee twenty years apart (Education and Labor for 1961–62 and 1981–82). His findings dispel the contention not only that there has been a disappearance of some conduct often attributed to norms—freshmen participated less than other members in the 1960s and *continued to do so in the 1980s*—but also that folkways, like deference, never existed in the prereform Congress to begin with.

Later Hall tests whether many of these institutionally based findings for the 1980s are applicable under the heightened partisanship of the 1990s or in the Senate. In the Democratic 103rd Congress (1993–94) he finds that most members still do not participate in any significant way, and, again, members with lower informational and transaction costs are more likely participants in policy deliberation than others. Once more, normative behavioral expectations are highly suspect; seniority does not encourage greater activity, and there is no evidence of deference among subcommittees. In the Senate, Hall similarly observes that participation is sporadic and that subcommittee members and leaders participate at higher rates than others, but this frequency is at even lower levels than the House. Unfortunately, Hall is unable to examine data for the Republican 104th Congress, but he speculates that little has changed. With considerable alterations in the policy process, including greater leadership involvement in committee activities, extension of this study to the more current congresses begs to be done (Hall and McKissick have subsequently conducted some of this research).

Considering the weight of Hall's findings it would be imprudent not to reflect on what this examination of participation in policymaking tells us with respect to new institutional models of legislative structure. Hall does address this briefly at the end of the book; moreover, it is nearly impossible to remove his inferences in this study from what he has argued previously about such theories of congressional organization (see Richard Hall, "Empiricism and Progress in Positive Theories of Legislative Institutions," in *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*, ed. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 1995). Specifically, Hall has taken issue with the generalizations that positive theorists have made about the mapping of the policymaking process. He has expressed the sense that in the formulation of many formal models of legislative structure positive theorists, to paraphrase Fiorina, have not appropriately abstracted and captured the most important features of the empirical situation and, hence, have constructed an overstylized policymaking process. Theories based on unrealistic characterizations of congressional policymaking, Hall asserts, lead to unrealistic predictions.

Hall maintains that theorists who concentrate on the structures and actions of chambers, parties, or committees are missing the critical locus for policy decision making. He contends that policies do not emanate from the actions of an entire House chamber, a full committee room, or even a packed subcommittee parlor; rather, they originate from a handful of legislators with specific policy or constituency interests. Hall demonstrates that for half the bills he examined in the floor study the active participants had significantly greater bias with respect to constituency interests and personal policy preferences. The actors most diligent in policymaking are in many instances unrepresentative of the preferences and interests of the chamber, committee, or even subcommittee.

Moreover, Hall has insisted that empiricism should take on a more informative role in the construction of positive theories. While he has not used his empirical findings to this end here (and in all fairness this was clearly not the intention of his work), the question remains as to how one might incorporate Hall's discoveries concerning participation in policymaking for *better* theories of congressional organization. Presumably (at least for Fiorina) it would be up to Hall at this point to demonstrate that features of the policymaking process he has emphasized—formation and deliberation of legislation by a small group of highly interested legislators—are theoretically the most important structural features in this aspect of congressional action (Morris Fiorina, "Afterword," in *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*, ed. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 1995).

Despite this prescription for applying Hall's findings concerning participation in policy decision making, *Participation in Congress* greatly advances our understanding of the motivations of legislators. This book will be critical for any scholar studying the congressional policy process for many years to come. Furthermore, Hall has highlighted an important aspect of policy preferences that has been overlooked in much of the research on congressional decision making: Preferences not only have "direction" but, perhaps more important, they have "force." That is, the influential component of members' behavior is not necessarily their disposition for or against a bill, it is their willingness to use scarce resources to go to bat for their convictions. In this respect Hall's study has illuminated many of the critical issues commonly neglected when examining congressional participation, while at the same it skillfully questions some of the methods and assumptions that political scientists have employed in the study of congressional structure and policymaking.

New Deal Justice: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson. By Jeffrey D. Hockett. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 322p. $67.50 cloth, $24.95 paper.

William Lasser, *Clemson University*

Jeffrey D. Hockett's interesting study of the three leading lights of the Roosevelt Court is not really about "New Deal Justice"; the title, as the author admits, is subtly misleading. Given the three justices' very marked jurisprudential philosophies, Hockett writes, "the book's title is not a reference to a shared ideal of constitutional justice toward which Roosevelt's appointees strove. Rather, each man was a 'New Deal justice' who illustrated one of several distinct jurisprudential tendencies compatible with the reform politics of the 1930s" (p. 12). Thus, this book tells us more about Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson than it does about either the New Deal or the Supreme Court.

That these three men approached constitutional questions differently is not surprising. As Hockett points out, they came to the New Deal from diverse backgrounds, and each saw the central problems of the 1930s and 1940s from the vantage point of his own past. As long as the central questions occupying the Court concerned economic policy, all three could agree with Roosevelt that the Constitution needed to grow to accommodate the challenges of the modern world. When the Court turned its attention to civil rights and civil liberties, however, they—like so many of the nonjudicial New Dealers—went their separate ways.

Black and Frankfurter, of course, have inspired a virtual industry of scholarship (Hockett lists sixteen full-length books devoted to one or both of them, not to mention countless essays and articles). Scholars have paid far less attention to Jackson, who served as solicitor general and attorney general before joining the Court, and who led the U.S. prosecution team at Nuremberg while a justice. Hockett does a commendable job of steering a course through the crowded channels of Black and Frankfurter scholarship, but he is clearly at his best in the more open waters of Jackson's jurisprudence.

Hockett sees Black's constitutional jurisprudence as profoundly antihierarchical, a philosophy rooted in the justice's early populism. Black saw the Court as an essential bulwark against exploitation of society's less fortunate groups. "Tyrannical governments," he wrote in a 1960 law review essay, "had immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform and who resisted tyranny" (p. 96). Black's opposition to hierarchy helps explain his near-absolutist views on freedom of speech and press, as well as his passionate efforts to incorporate the Bill of Rights en masse. But Black did not "invariably pursue and render antihierarchical rulings," as Hockett admits; because he tied his rulings very closely to the constitutional text and to the original intent of the framers, he upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment; refused to extend the Fourth Amendment to cover wiretaps; and opposed the Court's decisions establishing a right to privacy. Black's insistence on tying his decisions to the Constitution, according to Hockett, reflects less a fear of judicial abstraction than a belief in the inherent antihierarchical tendencies of the Constitution itself. Although strict constructionism would lead to some conservative results, it would make it more difficult for "the reactionaries" to do the "wrong thing" when they "recapture the raw power of the Court" (p. 127).

By contrast, Hockett views Frankfurter's constitutional philosophy as "the logical outgrowth of a view of society and politics that emphasized the danger of abstract thinking in an age of interdependence and regarded the judiciary as prone to abstraction" (p. 169). Thus, in general, Frankfurter was deferential to the decisions of administrative and political officers, upholding (for example) compulsory flag salutes in the public schools and urging his colleagues to stay out of the reapportionment controversy. Here, again, the record is mixed, however, as Hockett must admit. Frankfurter ruled against the government in cases involving the Establishment Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and civil rights.

While Black and Frankfurter were grounded in the populist and progressive responses to industrialization, Jackson, according to Hockett, "shared in the court-centered thought patterns of the pre-industrial legal community" (p. 215). These thought patterns, which Hockett traces to the early-nineteenth-century jurist James Kent, were dominated by a concern about "the tendency of political majorities to overstate their interests and to neglect the concerns of minorities" (p. 242). Jackson expressed this concern most eloquently in the flag-salute case: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," he wrote, "it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein" (*West Virginia* v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S., 624, at 641–2[1943]).

In sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom, Hockett denies that the Nuremburg trials were a turning point in Jackson's jurisprudential career. While acknowledging that his opinions show a "change in tone" after the trials, Hockett stresses the long-term consistency of the justice's philosophy. He continued to manifest a belief in the need for a strong judiciary, tempered by the nuanced, fact-based pragmatism of the country lawyer he had been before he came to Washington.

Hockett's chapters on Jackson underscores the need for a full-length, scholarly biography of the justice, one that emphasizes not only his years on the Court but also his New Deal career, his relationship with Roosevelt, and his experiences at Nuremburg. As a whole, *New Deal Justice* makes plain the importance of understanding the cultural and historical backgrounds not only of Supreme Court justices but of political figures in general. Although the book would have benefited from a more thorough analysis of the interrelationships among its three subjects, Hockett has added a significant piece to the puzzle of the mid-twentieth-century court.

Crosstalk: Citizens, Candidates, and the Media in a Presidential Campaign. By Marion R. Just, Ann N. Crigler, Dean E. Alger, Timothy E. Cook, Montague Kern, and Darrell M. West. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 264p. $46.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Audrey A. Haynes, *Georgia State University*

Anyone conducting research in media and politics knows the difficulties that abound in the endeavor. Studies in this area require large quantities of resources—particularly time, effort, and skill. Fortunately, by the formation of what amounts to a brain trust, the authors of *Crosstalk* have marshaled their resources to provide an exemplary study of the process by which candidates, the media, and citizens interact and influence one another and ultimately determine the outcome of presidential campaigns.

The basic argument set forth in *Crosstalk* is that presidential campaigns matter because the interactions of the candidates, the news media, and the public combine to construct candidate images and the meaning of the campaign in a dynamic process that varies across time and space. Each participant can both constrain or lead other participants through a dynamic discourse that sets priorities and expectations which can have important consequences for governance.

This argument is explored by the authors in a series of well-organized and easily read chapters. The initial chapters artfully present their theory of construction and detail the design of the study. The authors then systematically discuss, first, citizen knowledge of the campaign, the origins of this information, and the portions of this information that appear to matter to individuals in creating their considerations; second, the information disseminated by the candidates through their ads; and, third, the media information and images provided to the public. The book ends with an exploration of how citizens use this information and a thorough review of the constructionist model of voting and its implications.

A major contribution of this study is the authors' ability to bring together various elements of the political campaign—the candidates, the media, and the public—under one theoretical umbrella. The constructionist perspective points to the process of building and creating meaning, given the informational building blocks provided the media and candidates themselves. The individual's personal information environment (PIE) is an important factor in the considerations that one makes using this information. The PIE can be thought of as the foundation upon which the construct is to be made. These PIEs can vary because not all citizens have access to the same level of information, nor do all individuals have the same ability or desire to take in this information. The theory points to a more active role for citizens as they assess and construct candidate images, but the authors also note the critical nature of the information environment in which citizens make these considerations.

In the process of testing their theory, the authors make some major contributions to studies of campaigns and the media and confirm a number of findings from previous studies. This is important, given the relative scarcity of comprehensive media studies. Their study is longitudinal, exploring the 1992 presidential campaign from January to November. They take a multimethod approach, using content analysis of candidate ads as well as information about when and where they were run; a content analysis of campaign news in four media markets, which included metropolitan newspapers and local television news broadcasts, in addition to the nightly news shows of the four major networks; and in-depth interviews, focus groups, and surveys of the public in the designated media markets. Their addition of local TV news to the mix of informational resources is truly important since this area has been virtually unexplored. In particular, the study examines different kinds of people in different information environments and demonstrates quite effectively the implications of these differences for political behavior.

While *Crosstalk* offers a plethora of interesting results, some stand out more than others. For example, it was found that in 1992 people entered the campaign with a clear idea of the issues they would like to see addressed and an idea of how they thought the campaign should be conducted. Yet, this public concern is not enough to keep an issue on the agenda if candidates and the media choose to ignore it. Thus, it is the interaction of all three—citizens, media, and candidates—that builds the campaign discourse.

Just and others found that candidates tend to run highly integrated campaigns centering on a single message and bringing together issues with the candidate's character. This is another important contribution of the book—further discussion of the idea that a candidate's personal qualities are intrinsically related to policy. It is suggested that candidate messages are inextricably about both issues and character at the same time. The public uses issue information to infer character information and vice versa, while candidates gravitate toward issues that amplify their self-presentation as they emphasize aspects of their past and their personality that bolster their policy concerns.

As to the nature and availability of campaign information, the authors suggest that while in some sense the news media's presentation of political information is homogeneous—often the same events and players are focused upon—there are differences in the tone and availability of the coverage. Media outlets that produce more journalist-initiated stories tend to contain more negative coverage. The size of the media market can affect the amount of coverage available to consumers. Local coverage amount is influenced by such factors as the candidates' attention to the locale, the timing of the primary in that or a nearby state, and the extent of candidate advertising in the media market. So candidates can influence the availability of information about themselves. Moreover, one's locale can determine one's access to political information and thus one's considerations about the candidates and the meaning of the campaign.

Notable also is the finding that all three kinds of media put the greatest emphasis on the candidates' personal qualities and their chances for election. Issue positions come in third. Early in the campaign, issues are more prominent, but they take a back seat when the race becomes more heated. Yet, rather than completely upstaging issue coverage, the campaign process stories generally share the stage. Thus, the public never sees issues completely disappear from the news media's campaign coverage.

This brief review does not do justice to the many interesting findings in this study. It is recommended to those interested in the media, campaigns, voting behavior, public opinion, and political psychology. It works hard to mount a serious and comprehensive effort to explain the role of information and the process by which it is created and used in the election context. It is difficult to find major shortcomings in this study. Some might question the generalizability of the results based on the study of one campaign examined in four locales, but this is a criticism that can be leveled at most media studies, few of which are as comprehensive as this one. Overall, *Crosstalk* advances our knowledge of the dynamic process of political communication and its implications for democracy.

Federalism and Rights. Edited by Ellis Katz and G. Alan Tarr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 208p. $57.50 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Michael Esler, *Ohio Wesleyan University*

One promise of the recent discovery of state constitutional law by state courts, the so-called judicial federalism, is that states would take a more active role in protecting rights. This volume represents a timely addition to the literature on federalism and rights as well as on the new judicial federalism. The nine essays were first presented at an international conference on federalism and rights, sponsored by the Center for the Study of Federalism, in November 1992. An interdisciplinary effort, six of the essays were written by political scientists, two by sitting judges, two by academic lawyers, and one by a university president who also was an author of the Florida Constitution.

The book is organized into three sections: there are three theoretical essays, four on federalism and rights in the United States, and two on federalism and rights outside the United States, namely, in the European Community and Canada. There is a fine line between the first two sections, as the theoretical essays draw heavily on the American experience for their examples, and the essays on the United States are quite theoretical. What emerges, then, is a theoretically rich volume that is heavily oriented toward the relationship between federalism and rights in the United States.

The two aims of the editors are, first, to investigate federalism's effect on rights in mature federal democracies such as the United States and, second, to offer guidance to newly emerging democracies that are contemplating federal arrangements for their own governments. The volume certainly succeeds in the former. The essays on American federalism are thoughtful and even. They pursue similar themes while providing different perspectives on these themes. As a result, the essays complement one another nicely.

One theme of these essays is the potentially enhanced role for states in protecting rights during the era of the new judicial federalism. Symbolically, the era began with Justice William Brennan's now famous call for state courts to rely on their own constitutions to further rights to counter retrenchments by the Burger Court. The rules governing federal-state judicial relations are complex (but described well in Judge Dorothy Toth Beasley's essay). In essence, state courts must respect the level of rights protection mandated by federal courts for most rights that are found in both state and federal constitutions. State courts are free to provide protection for rights beyond the level required by federal law, however, as long as there is an "independent and adequate" basis for doing so in state law. By the end of the Warren Court era most state courts deferred to federal law when protecting rights. They were unable to go below the floor established by the federal courts and generally unwilling to go above. State law was left to atrophy. With the rise of the more conservative post–Warren Supreme Court, and the attendant lowering of national standards for protecting rights, state judges and scholars alike began to consider whether state law might be used to expand rights.

Given these developments, one would have expected greater attention to the relationship between federalism and rights among public law scholars. Yet, these essays, particularly the essay by Professor Gary Jacobsohn, note the general ambivalence of scholars toward the idea that federalism might serve to protect rights, even in the wake of the new judicial federalism. To be sure, the era has spawned a sizable literature. Most of it focuses on the extent to which state courts use state law to further rights or speaks to how and why state judges should develop their own state constitutions. These essays are unique in that they are more theoretical than much of the extant literature, and they focus on the effect that federalism has on rights, as opposed to the more common, and narrow, focus on the effect that state court decisions have on rights. This alone recommends this volume. But that is not all.

These essays provide strong critical arguments for and against the claim that federalism promotes rights. The introductory chapter by the editors, and Professor A. E. Dick Howard's essay, lay out the arguments most systematically. There is general agreement, however, among all the authors that the states have performed poorly in protecting rights throughout American history. State policies that led directly to the creation of the Constitution, the states' performance in protecting criminal defendant rights, and especially the states' record on race relations loom large over these essays. In combination with the arguments that the United States has become more integrated, its population more mobile, and its outlook more national, the brief for the claim that the states should not be expected to play a leading role in protecting rights seems to carry the day. This conclusion is most strongly conveyed by President Talbot D'Alemberte's essay. Arguably, this volume understates, if only slightly, the role of the states in promoting rights in recent decades. As the literature on the new judicial federalism amply demonstrates, state judges have been increasingly involved in protecting rights. Perhaps an essay that featured some of these developments might have offered a more positive outlook.

While these essays express pessimism about the possibility that the states will become more committed to protecting rights in the future than they have in the past, they do not concede the argument that federalism plays no role in the protection of rights. In fact, they argue that federalism has always played a significant role in the protection of rights through the structure of government created by it. The essays by professors Jacobsohn, Daniel Elazar, Jean Yarbrough, and Michael Zuckert are particularly effective in expressing this idea. They do so by specifying different types of rights and different conceptions of federalism to demonstrate the important role played by federalism in protecting rights in the United States. For instance, by creating different levels of government, federalism provides multiple points of access for citizen participation, thereby facilitating public freedom and democracy. And in dispersing power among the federal and state governments, federalism promotes negative freedom against the power of a consolidated government. Moreover, if we conceive of federalism as a system whereby states retain significant independent power but the federal government serves as a check against the abuse of rights by the states, then federalism is consistent with the protection of public and private rights. These and similar arguments are sophisticated and thus will be of interest to theorists and public law scholars alike.

The essays on federalism and rights in the European Community, by Judge Koen Lenaerts, and Canada, by Professor Irwin Cotler, are informative in offering points of comparison to the U.S. experience with federalism. Neither these essays, however, nor those on the United States, give much attention to how the types of federalism that exist in the European Community, Canada, and the United States might be applied to other settings, such as newly developing democracies. In light of the emphasis given to the history and social context of the different types of federalism analyzed in these essays, one is left to wonder just what newly developing democracies might adapt from these examples. Still, this volume makes an important contribution to the literature on federalism and rights, particularly as they operate in the United States.

The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism. By Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 266p. $29.95.

Gary J. Schmitt, *Nitze School of Advanced International Studies*

Although more and more is written each year on subjects related to intelligence, the scholarly quality of these works continues to be mixed. In part, this remains the case because concrete data and reliable sources are still difficult to come by. Decades often pass before enough material is available to do serious assessments of particular intelligence topics. For example, only in recent years, in the aftermath of new material being declassified from British and U.S. archives, have studies and histories begun to appear which integrate in a serious fashion the role Allied intelligence played (and did not play) in the strategic decisions and campaigns of World War II.

Slowly, the intelligence picture from the cold war's early years also has begun to take shape. Partial access to the state archives of some former communist regimes, combined with the U.S. government's release of material related to its codebreaking of Soviet intelligence communications from the late 1940s and 1950s, has helped clarify, for instance, the charges of espionage directed at Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Alger Hiss, and others. Using newly declassified files and transcripts of FBI wiretaps, Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh have, with *The Amerasia Spy Case*, "re-opened" the first important "spy" case of the Cold War. In doing so, they have provided the most definitive account to date of both the case itself and its place in the domestic political turmoil over anticommunism which followed.

Amerasia was a left-wing journal covering Asian affairs, and its editor, Philip Jaffe, was described by a friend as "a sort of super fellow-traveler of the American Communist Party." In 1945, British and U.S. intelligence officials noticed that classified material from the Office of Strategic Services had made its way into the magazine's pages. Upon investigation (by means of break-ins, surveillance, and phone taps), counterintelligence officers learned that Jaffe had thousands of pages of government documents. These included numerous top-secret reports, a good portion of which seemed to have come from persons within the Department of State.

In addition, in an apparent bit of happenstance, government surveillance recorded a Soviet agent's attempt to recruit Jaffe for intelligence work—a prospect in which he showed more than mild interest. Concerned by that possibility, and worried that those under investigation were becoming aware of being watched, the people in charge of the investigation decided to wrap it up. In early June 1945, the FBI arrested six individuals: Jaffe, his assistant, another journalist, and three government employees believed to be Jaffe's principal sources for government documents. All three government employees worked at the Department of State in Asian affairs.

In the end, only two of those arrested were fined, and no one served any time in jail. As Klehr and Radosh detail, old-style political wheeling and dealing, bureaucratic incompetence, foreign policy concerns, possible pay-offs, and the lack of a clear legal basis for much of the evidence gathered (and, hence, its inadmissibility in court) combined to produce little in the way of actual prosecutions.

The substantive heart of the book, however, is not about the government's failure to get convictions but about how its effort was interpreted politically. For many liberals, the case was viewed as a government program to gag opposition to its pro-Nationalist China policy by a form of prosecutorial redbaiting. Not privy to either the quantity or quality of classified material handed over to *Amerasia*, establishment journalists such as Drew Pearson condemned the arrests as a heavy-handed attempt by the administration to stop leaks of material it found politically embarrassing. For many on the right, however, the paltry results in the courtroom smelled of a cover-up designed to protect officials within the Department of State and the Truman administration who had showed a bit too much sympathy for policies friendly to Moscow and Mao. Two subsequent congressional investigations of the case—both largely whitewashes—only fueled more suspicions. Connecting the dots in persuasive fashion, Klehr and Radosh then track how the case and those suspicions helped generate Senator Joseph McCarthy's claims about communists in the ranks of the Department of State and, in turn, the political and cultural pathologies associated with McCarthyism.

The Amerasia Spy Case, in short, is not really about espionage. Nevertheless, the authors, each having coauthored other works on related topics (Radosh, *The Rosenberg File: The Search for the Truth*, 1983; Klehr, *The Secret World of American Communism*, 1995), provide a good if somewhat untidy overview of the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of the case.

What is missing in their account, however, is analysis of why, in this particular instance, low politics and demagoguery ruled the day. Saying, as the authors do, that the case had no heroes, while certainly true, is not sufficient to explain why the everyday workings of the government and the political system were open to the kind of manipulation that occurred.

That said, Klehr and Radosh provide an estimable account of what was in fact a small spy case but which, they convincingly argue, had large consequences. As such, *The Amerasia Spy Case* provides an important window onto the formative first days of the politics of the Cold War.

Massachusetts Congregationalist Political Thought: 1760–1790. By Dale S. Kuehne. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996. 181p. $37.50.

The Politics of Revelation and Reason: Religion and Civic Life in the New Nation. By John G. West, Jr. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. 307p. $35.00.

Carson Holloway, *Northern Illinois University*

John West examines the arguments surrounding "evangelical," or traditional Protestant, political activism in the United States from 1800 to 1835 with a view to enlightening the contemporary political debate about religion's role in our public life. The same questions with which we grapple today—whether and how religion should play a part in our politics, the advantages and dangers of religious political activism—were debated in the nation's youth, and West hopes that by examining the same controversies, but without the same direct interest in their outcome, we will be better able to discern the real merits of the arguments (p. ix).

West wants to convey to the extreme proponents and opponents of religion's role in politics an appreciation for the more moderate wisdom of the founders, who, on his account, understood that faith-inspired political activism is simultaneously desirable and in need of restraint. For them, religion had a legitimate public role insofar as it supported the morality upon which republican government depends, that is, self-restraint of selfish appetites with a view to the common good and respect for the rights of others; but that role was limited by the need to protect religious liberty, or "the right of all sects to worship as their consciences dictate" (p. 73). Thus, a mean needs to be struck according to which believers are active in politics as defenders of republican morality without going too far and violating religious freedom by imposing their theological beliefs on others. Achieving this mean, West believes, was made possible by the founders' conviction that reason and revelation largely agree on moral truth, which belief created a "common ground" on which those motivated by religion could persuade their secular fellow citizens without appealing to theological doctrines which the latter did not share (pp. 74–5).

West recounts the political battles in which evangelicals became involved, paying particular attention to their efforts to end Sunday mail delivery and to defend the Cherokees against Georgia's attempt to force them from their land. He concludes that both the evangelicals and their opponents contributed something to the working of the founders' plan. On the one hand, evangelical political activity, and especially that on behalf of Cherokee rights, demonstrated religious idealism's unique ability to stand firm in defense of republican morality. It did so, moreover, without threatening religious liberty, for evangelicals based their arguments both on revelation, as when they warned that God punishes iniquitous nations, and on reason, as when they pointed, for example, to the right to property articulated in the *Declaration of Independence.* On the other hand, this moderation was in part due to their opponents' (actually unjustified and opportunistic) charges that evangelicals were seeking to impose their theology on others, which forced the faithful to prove their critics wrong by making their case in terms acceptable to believers and nonbelievers alike (p. 211).

One difficulty is the book's problematic presentation of the founders' understanding of religious liberty as incompatible with an established church. None of the founders, he claims, wished the government to promote any particular religious belief or to "interfere with the religious opinions of the citizens" at all (p. 73). He points to Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," which held that "Religion is wholly exempt" from the "cognizance" of "Civil Society," as providing a good summary of the founders' thought on the subject (p. 74). But for this claim to be fully persuasive, West would have to explain why the founders' Constitution, by applying the First Amendment only to the national government, tacitly allowed states to go so far in interfering with citizens' religious opinions as to establish state churches.

A further difficulty arises with West's characterization of Pope Gregory XVI's condemnation of the "freedom to publish any writings whatever and disseminate them to the people" as a "forthright attack on the principles of American republicanism" (pp. 104–5). West defends John Witherspoon's call for prohibitions on profane and blasphemous speech as in harmony with the founding generation's ethos, because both recognized a distinction between "liberty and licentiousness" (p. 29). Yet, it is not clear how Pope Gregory here departs from the founders more than Witherspoon does. For the pope rejects not the freedom to publish and disseminate writings, but only the unlimited freedom to publish and disseminate any writings whatsoever. That is, the pope, no less than Witherspoon, rejects not liberty but license.

Despite such difficulties the book succeeds in finding grounds on which religious political activists and their opponents can be partially reconciled. It demonstrates to the latter—by its account of evangelical efforts to alleviate poverty, reform prisons, help the disabled, and defend the rights of Native Americans—the truth of Tocqueville's insight that religion is needed to make democracy compatible with human freedom and dignity. It shows the former—by its account of the evangelicals' confidence in and recourse to the power of reason to advance moral claims—that it is possible and prudent to make their case by means of arguments accessible to believer and nonbeliever alike.

According to Dale Kuehne, the "stalemate" among those who dispute over whether the founding was decisively influenced by Locke (Pangle, Hamowy, Dworetz), participatory republicanism (Bailyn, Pocock, Wood), the Scottish Enlightenment (Wills), or Protestant Christianity (Shain, Diggins, Heimert, Hart) continues unresolved because thus far most scholars, tending to study only the thought of the national elite, have made overly broad generalizations on the basis of overly narrow research (pp. 11, 14). Thus, his study of the political thought of Massachusetts Congregationalist ministers from 1760 to 1790 is animated by the conviction—shared by such commentators as Joyce Appleby, Donald Lutz, and M.E. Bradford—that a complete understanding of the founding requires knowledge of the thought not only of such prominent national politicians as Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison but also of the less well-known but more religious political activists in the states.

The author first sketches the Puritan intellectual background of the Congregationalist ministers' ideas. The Puritans understood themselves to be in a covenant with God, according to which obedience would be rewarded with earthly prosperity and the reformation of Europe, and disobedience with death. Government, moreover, was believed to play an important part in promoting the keeping of the covenant. With a view to this end citizenship was restricted to church members, and the government took an active role in promoting virtue and piety (p. 44).

This vision of spiritual statecraft was difficult to sustain in practice, however. The second generation of Puritans in Massachusetts proved less pious than the first, and a new colonial charter was finally promulgated, one which ended ecclesiastical tests for citizenship and assigned to government more worldly purposes (p. 54). The effects of these changes are clearly shown in Kuehne's examination of the thought of the Puritans' Congregationalist successors. The consensus of the ministers was that "the central concern of government is the promotion of liberty," understood apparently as freedom of conscience and security in one's life and property (p. 125). The ministers continued to believe, however, that "the most important factor in a healthy polity was the Christian religion" (p. 145). Thus, Kuehne concludes that Reformed Christianity was the primary influence on their thought. Although the clergy were "close to a point of transition," their "deepest commitments" were still to "their Calvinist roots" and not to "Enlightenment traditions" (p. 144).

Although it is true that the political importance of piety and virtue had a place in the Congregationalist clergy's thought no less than in that of their Puritan forebears, it is also true that it had a radically different place. For the Puritans the purpose of politics was to promote the virtuous and pious behavior that fulfilled the covenant (p. 44). But the sermons surveyed by Kuehne suggest that for the Congregationalists the purpose of politics was to protect the safety and liberty of the citizens and that government's role in encouraging virtue and piety was understood as useful to those ends (see pp. 93, 97, 100, 122, 134). Perhaps, despite the difference of ends, Congregationalist and Puritan political thought remained compatible insofar as both held that government should promote virtue and piety. But the extent of this compatibility depended on whether the kind of piety and virtue necessary to maintain a liberal political order was the same as that necessary to fulfill a covenant with a righteous God. Kuehne seems unaware of this decisive question, and as a result he fails to recognize the radical nature of Congregationalist political thought's departure from Puritan political thought.

Kuehne unaccountably fails to return explicitly in his "Epilogue" to the broad concerns raised in his "Introduction." It thus remains unclear how his argument that Reformed Christianity was the decisive influence on the Congregationalists' political thought deepens our understanding of the character of the founding itself. He only remarks that "more study is needed to understand the full nature of the influence of Reformed thought at the founding" (p. 151). Thus, the reader is left unsure how or whether Kuehne's study helps to resolve, as he originally seemed to imply it would, the deadlock among the various interpretations of the political theory of the founding.

The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority: Realignment, Dealignment, and Electoral Change from Franklin Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. By David G. Lawrence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 251p. $65.00.

The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections. By William G. Mayer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 214p. $65.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Byron E. Shafer, *Oxford University*

Both of these books begin with the same basic puzzle. What is it that changed in American electoral politicking as the New Deal era ebbed, so as to yield such noticeably different outcomes? And how should we describe the resulting politics, so as to restore some integrated way of understanding it? Both books also proceed by the same basic method. Each not only relies on data from the American National Election Studies but also turns particularly to neglected elements within these data, resurrecting some frequently overlooked items while recalculating old favorites in new and illuminating ways. As a result, both books share two cardinal virtues: questions big enough to be worth asking, and explicit, empirical, systematic answers.

Where they differ is in the central conceptual notions through which they address these puzzles and to which they apply their data. In *The Divided Democrats*, William Mayer begins with the problem of a majority party that has had difficulty winning recent presidential elections, the very ones, presumably, best suited to reflecting its majority. Mayer organizes his inquiry around the question—a grand and recurrent one—of whether there is an inherent *structural* difference between the two great U.S. political parties, large enough that it may serve as an underlying explanation for these recent difficulties. But he cuts into the argument through one of the main explanatory options, namely, party reform.

In this alternative argument, a reformed presidential nominating process magnifies internal party conflict, and conflictual nominations then contribute to defeat at the general election. In two forceful substantive chapters, Mayer maintains instead that reformed rules for delegate allocation neither automatically exaggerate nor prolong discord and, even then, that divisive primary contests do not obviously make *any* independent contribution to unhappy outcomes in November. His attack on this second point, arguing that the relationship between divisiveness at the primary and defeat at the general level is entirely spurious, is so well executed that it is likely to shift the character of this particular debate.

"Shift" but not settle, for it is the essence of large and running debates that there will always be a retort. Evidence which defeats the argument that allocation rules magnify conflict cannot simultaneously address the possibility that different rules differentially advantage *political elites* in managing whatever conflict does arise. Just as evidence which defeats—in this reading, annihilates—the argument that divisive primaries shape the November outcome cannot simultaneously address the question of whether different nominating mechanics might differentially constrain the *registering* of existing divisions.

In any case, the reason these reform arguments fail to perform, and hence the main positive contribution of the book, is presented and elaborated in the next three substantive chapters. The first two argue that the Democratic Party is (by comparison to the Republicans) an inherently more conflictual body, containing both a broader array of social groups and a wider dispersion of political opinions, and it has been so for all the years after 1968. Evidence for this derives largely from the plethora of seven-point scales and feeling thermometers the ANES has long offered, but which analysts have rightfully downplayed, doubting that the general public carries preformed seven-point responses in its head, much less that these could have much intersubjective reliability. Mayer, however, focuses on the *standard deviations* of responses to these items, a much safer approach. And here the message is overwhelming. The Democrats are more divided than the Republicans on 107 of 116 policy items and on 99 of 127 feeling thermometers, more divided than the general public as a whole (!) on 75 and 73 of these, respectively.

The data do let the analyst down on one major part of the argument. Mayer also attempts to compare factional positions within the parties, and available variables make this possible—and enlightening—for the Democrats. But a GOP without corporate executives, small business people, or evangelical Protestants, as these data force it to be, is simply not a Republican party that can be said to have passed or failed any factional test. Likewise, these differences do not say anything about their own lasting character, and hence about how much of the overall difference is due to being the *larger* party, rather than to being specifically the Democratic Party. Indeed, there is some evidence in these very measures that when the Republican Party finally began to grow in terms of mass adherents, in the 1980s, it also became more internally diverse.

Those are, however, peripheral limits on a powerful central argument, one which receives a final—and extremely creative—elaboration in a chapter on whether the Democrats could deal with the problems of diversity by forgetting about any central "vision" and retreating to the old-fashioned logrolling approach. The conclusion here is no. Too few members treat narrow group concerns as all-consuming; too many nonmembers find group appeals inherently off-putting.

In *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority*, David Lawrence comes at what is basically the same grand problem—what has happened to this putative majority party?—through the concept of realignment and its derivative notion, dealignment. The data are the same as well, that succession of postwar ANES surveys, and so is the creative application. Lawrence also relies heavily on those seven-point scales, and he makes especially strong use of the open-ended questions by which respondents offer their likes and dislikes about parties and candidates.

Yet, where Mayer unifies this approach through one central theme, that of comparative diversity, Lawrence tests a broad range of contributory themes, including a changing class structure, the rise of race as a political issue, the perceptual problems inherent in ideology, and the place of prosperity and its attendant discontents. Several of the resulting subanalyses merit particular attention: the section highlighting the *shift* of foreign affairs from a Democratic to a Republican asset; the chapter on the sudden rise and quick ebb of race as a dominating partisan matter; the teasing out of the role of prosperity and *its* attendant partisan shifts; even the simple extension of original realignment statistics in the manner of Walter Dean Burnham.

Like Mayer but more severely, however, Lawrence is handicapped by the nature of his data—by what is and is not asked, in what format, and when. These data force him to argue, for example, that Jimmy Carter suffered a McGovern hangover, in which the Democrats remained ideologically stigmatized by the general public, but that Ronald Reagan relieved them of this disadvantage by taking the GOP off to the right. Yet, these findings, while provocative, also risk being an artifact of the presence under Carter of *items* on busing, marijuana, criminal rights, and urban riots, coupled with their absence under Reagan, who gets only a more equivocal item on abortion as a substitute.

The real problem, however, is in adding up these subanalyses to get a larger answer to the organizing question. Lawrence does not shrink from doing his sums, and the penultimate conclusion is convincing. On the one hand, realignment theory, despite its more pointed implications, proves finally unhelpful; indeed, the fact of two "minirealignments" in this period, which do conform to the original model but do not bring any of its associated characteristics, suggests that no further help can be expected. On the other hand, dealignment, the chosen alternative, either possesses no obvious implications to test or predicts a kind of volatility which is patently missing.

In the end, the two books leave the reader at very different points. Lawrence has developed a picture of the modern world through careful exegesis of a sequence of contributions to its current shape. But the use of realignment and dealignment as his lenses means that he must finally accept the conclusion that any search for patterning at a higher level of abstraction is, in principle, suitable only for an earlier era. In our time, even careful analysis of multiple possible influences leaves only a residuum: two minirealignments between 1946 and 1970, giving rise to at least four and probably five distinct periods in postwar American politics to date. And even then, this residuum will not stretch to the mass partisan attachments below, which offer nowhere near this picture of twists and turns, or to the divided government above—split partisan control of national government—which receives no attention in either these overall conclusions or in the elements that lead up to them.

Mayer offers almost the opposite trajectory. He has focused his analysis on one major lens, in the form of partisan diversity, and he makes it illuminate a variety of concerns. It cannot cast much light on how we got to where we are, since an argument portraying the Democrats as inherently more diverse cannot itself reveal how they left a period when this (more diverse) party reliably won its contests for a period in which its fortunes are reliably problematic. Presumably, the rise of some of those very issues to which Lawrence attends, along with whatever dynamic causes such issues to rise and fall, is the explanation here. Yet, the current situation (and the current dilemma) of Mayer's Democrats comes ever so sharply into focus. So, as a result, do the obstacles—substantive and structural, not procedural, obstacles—that they must surmount in order to escape their predicament. If it is possible to do so by conscious effort, then some new vision that will reunite the elements of a diverse party seems the only practical solution to a puzzle so skillfully extracted and described.

The Irony of Reform: Roots of American Political Disenchantment. By G. Calvin Mackensie. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 224p. $61.50 cloth, $18.95 paper.

William Lunch, *Oregon State University*

G. Calvin Mackensie has written a volume that Charles Merriam or V. O. Key would like, if they were still with us, but that William Riker probably would not. That is because the book reflects the methodologically eclectic, accessible, reformist tradition that once dominated political science but which is now—as even a cursory perusal of the pages of this journal will reveal—almost banished from the discipline. And communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni or Jean Elshtain will like this book, but libertarians, such as James Buchanan, will be unhappy with it. As these examples may suggest, Mackensie has written—and very well—a work which speaks to important contemporary political questions and has the potential to be controversial, even among popular audiences, which is quite unusual in our discipline now.

Mackensie's thesis is that "something powerful and complex and not a little mysterious [has] happened in America . . . the politics of the last decade of the twentieth century barely resembled the politics of the postwar period. If a revolution had occurred . . . the changes would not have been much more dramatic" (pp. xiii–xiv). And yet, the author points out, despite all the changes—perhaps because of them—Americans are now profoundly unhappy with their government and political institutions. These are vitally important developments, without a doubt. And Mackensie has synthesized a great deal of history and social science research on our national social and political life since World War II. The topics covered will be familiar to most political scientists, though Mackensie's interpretation differs from those offered by a number of others who have written on political changes in the postwar era (particularly the 1960s and 1970s), including Theodore Lowi, Robert Dahl, Samuel Huntington, David Ricci, and myself. Mackensie weaves together changes in the social and economic fabric of the United States; alterations in politics (that is, the electorate; interest groups; campaigns and campaign rules, particularly in presidential elections; and campaign communication, particularly television); in Congress; the presidency; and the courts. So far, so good, if also quite familiar.

But Mackensie denies that there was any "popular consensus" in support of the changes and claims they were "without ideological underpinnings, and without intent" (p. 3). Yet, as he shows in the chapter on "The Politics the Reformers Made," changes in presidential election procedures were driven by antiwar, antiestablishment activist Democrats after their party's debacle in 1968. Those, such as Austin Ranney, who were present at the creation of the new delegate selection rules may have had second thoughts—Ranney's exquisite "mea culpa" in *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction* is sobering—but there can be no doubt that the activists involved had elaborate ideological as well as procedural goals in mind. James Q. Wilson had shown us as much years earlier in *The Amateur Democrat.* It can be argued, as Aaron Wildavsky did repeatedly, that the institutional and policy changes of the 1960s were counterproductive, but they were fully intended. Mackensie implies that when he says "no one planned this revolution" (p. 35), what he means is that no central ideological purpose or goal was articulated. But the thread running through most of the changes he describes is a thrust in favor of greater equality, whether for African Americans, women, the poor, or other weak groups. Mackensie is right when he suggests that specific institutional changes, such as "sunshine" rules in Congress, may have been counterproductive for their sponsors. But miscalculation does not imply lack of intent.

One possible reason for Mackensie's denial that the developments since the mid-1960s had a central thrust or purpose is to make more palatable his proposals for institutional change, some of which would be quite radical. After all, if no one planned the revolution, and it happened rather absent-mindedly, few would have a stake in maintaining it. But enlarging the House and Senate substantially and allowing the president to appoint 20% of the members (p. 185) is hardly a minor proposal, nor is eliminating the filibuster in the Senate (p. 188) or banning interest group contributions to campaigns (p. 194). The thrust of all these proposed institutional changes is to strengthen "the whole" against "the parts" of the political system, to use the author's phrase. That is, they would make central government action easier on major policy issues, so communitarians will applaud, but libertarians will be critical.

But Mackensie is realistic; he recognizes that his proposals for change are unlikely to be adopted. And while it is possible to congratulate him for boldness and for taking on real-world institutional problems that reach far beyond the empty statistical manipulation that is so characteristic of political science now, it would be unrealistic not to recognize that those who have gained from the political changes of the past thirty years—from lobbyists on K Street to embattled affirmative action officers—will hardly roll over and play dead for any of the proposals made in this book.

These limitations do not detract from the value of the work. Mackensie has synthesized a great deal of U.S. history and research over a number of decades, and he writes very well. Political scientists will find *The Irony of Reform* a pleasure to read and very stimulating, even if they do not agree with everything they read. It is a book any serious student of the interaction among U.S. culture, recent history, and contemporary politics will want to read, preferably on a quiet day before the fire, with the word processor switched on.

Farm and Factory: Workers in the Midwest, 1880–1990. By Daniel Nelson. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995. 258p. $29.95.

David Plotke, *New School for Social Research*

Regions are making a comeback as analytical and empirical reference points. One reason is their function as centers of economic growth. Another is their significance as arenas where a degree of decentralization allows political actors to develop relations that cut across jurisdictions without becoming fully national. (For example, county and state agencies develop a regional environmental program.) Regions are also a good lens for exploring claims about political culture because regional differences can be examined while holding national institutions constant.

Daniel Nelson's study sheds a good deal of historical light on one part of the United States that almost everyone recognizes as a region. Nelson analyzes the historical development of occupations and industries in the Midwest from the late nineteenth century to the present, and he assesses the political forms most closely linked to those activities.

By "Midwest" Nelson means Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa (p. vii). He claims that these states have long constituted a region with common economic and social configurations and shared political experiences (p. 201). In this region agriculture and industry formed two largely separate paths to material prosperity. These paths were marked out in the early twentieth century, by which time a distinctive Midwest had taken shape (p. 62). In the first third of this century, the region was a center of technical and social innovation. In that dynamic process, the decisions of executives and managers were crucial. In the second third of this century, public actors played a large role, along with the new labor movement built in the 1930s (pp. 113, 133).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the forms of growth and economic and social integration that were built in the 1930s and 1940s came apart. Industrial relations that had been relatively stable and consensual became turbulent because of labor unrest and vigorous management efforts to undermine unions (pp. 176–87). Thus, the golden age of midwestern prosperity only fully benefited a single generation of workers. Economic instability and weak unions made insecurity a defining feature of the decades after the 1960s for urban workers (p. 193).

This story is not unfamiliar, but Nelson tells it well. His book is a valuable source for anyone concerned with regional and national tendencies in labor relations and economic change over the last century. It is readable, and its judgments of important episodes are reasonable. As a regional economic history, *Farm and Factory* is generally quite successful.

The ambitions of the book go beyond this. Nelson wants to account for the distinctive regional character of the Midwest and to illuminate its politics. In each case he does better at narrating than explaining. He is much clearer about the economic attributes of the Midwest than about how those attributes shaped the region as a distinct economic and social entity. (It would have been useful to compare his regional data more systematically with national trends.)

In Nelson's account of regional politics, two features stand out over time. One is the political separation between farmers and urban workers (as well as their social separation, which has had ethnic and racial elements). The other is the uneasy relation between urban workers and the Democratic Party; workers rarely gained as powerful and direct a political role as union leaders and the more activist currents among workers believed they should. Nelson does not make very clear why these patterns persisted or whether this durability had mainly regional causes.

A hundred years after the emergence of a distinctive industrial Midwest, the damage of the economic and social changes of the 1970s and 1980s has not been repaired in the region as a whole. Service work has risen to prominence. Given the prior industrial character of the Midwest, the changes have been very dramatic; in the 1970s, employment in business services and health grew by more than 80%, as against a one-percent increase in manufacturing employment. Yet, Nelson argues, the leading areas of service growth in the Midwest are unlikely to produce overall economic dynamism in a way that could repeat earlier experiences with industrial and agricultural change (pp. 202–4).

The transition to a less industrial and agricultural economy, then, has not been very dynamic in the Midwest. This points to a central question Nelson raises but does not pursue as much as one may wish. Why was the Midwest a major site of economic and social innovation at several points and not others? It was a center of economic and organizational change early in the twentieth century; three decades later, mass production, demand-oriented economic policies, and national recognition of unions came together in a creative model that led to wider and more durable prosperity than the region had ever seen. In the 1960s and later, however, the Midwest seems to have stagnated. It participates in national economic and social tendencies without defining them or capturing a large part of whatever gains are involved.

What occurred within the Midwest during its decades of innovation and prosperity to create economic and political barriers to renewal? Or should the lack of recent innovation and the failure to achieve a broad renewal be attributed to external factors? Nelson's book does not answer these questions in a satisfactory way, but its solid and interesting historical account makes it highly useful for people concerned with such issues.

The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. By Duane M. Oldfield. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 230p. $27.95.

Matthew C. Moen, *University of Maine*

For two decades, scholars have chronicled the rise and institutionalization of the Christian Right in American politics, as well as examined its fractures and future. *The Right and the Righteous* is the most systematic treatment in the literature of the Christian Right's (imperfect) incorporation into the national Republican Party, although some of its findings are sketched out already in previous work. Oldfield's book is based on personal interviews with dozens of elite and mass activists in the 1980s and 1990s; attendance at various state GOP caucuses, Republican national conventions, and at annual meetings of the National Religious Broadcasters; and interpretation of an extensive original and secondary literature. The different research strategies and accompanying findings are nicely integrated into the text.

The heart of the book is a chronological explanation of the Christian Right's gradual assimilation into the Republican Party, from about 1980 through 1994, through the theoretical prism of "exit, voice, and loyalty" developed by Albert Hirschman. This is the first concerted effort to bring that theoretical perspective to bear on the Christian Right, and it offers readers a variety of useful insights. The "exit" dimension in the Christian Right involves its regular (but mostly idle) threats to leave the GOP if the party does not embrace its social conservatism. Oldfield demonstrates how that threat becomes less credible over time; he provides a welcome corrective to those who predict the Christian Right's departure from the GOP (e.g., Theodore Lowi, *The End of the Republican Era*, 1995). While they are not always pleased with the Republican Party, Oldfield notes that religious conservatives are increasingly embedded in its organizational structure. They cannot transfer their allegiance to the more liberal and secular Democratic Party, and they cannot easily mount a third-party campaign given the system of electoral rules. Religious conservatives could "exit" in the sense of eschewing politics, but that course would assist the cause of their political opponents, and it would undo years of work by elite leaders to mobilize a mass constituency.

The "loyalty" option, a place in the book where Oldfield draws upon previous work to do some of his own theorizing (pp. 84–6), also causes the Christian Right problems. Its supporters on average are more religious than GOP regulars, and most of them lack a long-standing record of party service, causing them to be viewed suspiciously. To demonstrate their loyalty, and to win a place at the table of national party politics, religious conservatives support many candidates for whom they lack genuine enthusiasm, such as George Bush in 1992. Elite leaders also mute their criticism of party leaders and stress their willingness to be team players. Yet, that approach is viewed with skepticism by loyal supporters, who worry about the erosion of orthodoxy and who point to the lack of reciprocity from party regulars.

Finally, the "voice" option, such as voting in primaries in order to change the party product (p. 80), provides the Christian Right a set of problems but also opportunities. It is the option pursued by the Christian Coalition—be good citizens within the Republican Party, try to deliver votes, downplay sectarian language, and promote more secular approaches to public policy, such as the mostly economic "Contract with America." It requires some compromise of religious principles, loss of intensity among followers, and loss of distinctiveness as a social movement. Yet, the "voice" option offers religious conservatives the opportunity to exercise influence within a major national party. According to Oldfield, it is the only realistic option, and chapter 6, "A Voice Within," discusses this course of action in the early and mid-1990s.

Oldfield has a good eye for ambiguity and complexity in the relationship between the Christian Right and the GOP. He is very diligent in outlining the opportunities and costs of the "exit, loyalty, or voice" strategies. He describes that theoretical perspective in chapter 3 and nicely integrates it in subsequent chapters, except for chapter 5, on Pat Robertson's presidential candidacy, where it would have been beneficial.

Even so, chapter 5 is a strong point of the book. It is a useful account of Robertson's 1988 presidential bid, based on interviews with the campaign's chief strategists and on extensive research into the early primaries and caucuses. Many words have been written about Robertson's candidacy, but only a few authors (e.g., Allen Hertzke, *Echoes of Discontent*, 1993) have provided an informed discussion of strategy, message, tactics, and outcomes. Oldfield is particularly good at explaining the gradual evolution of Robertson's campaign and its fundamental success despite a third-place finish (it shaped the Republican agenda and mobilized networks of new voters).

In contrast to later chapters, the opening chapters of the book are not particularly helpful, at least to scholars of the Christian Right. The first chapter covers familiar ground on the theological divisions between neoevangelicals, fundamentalists, and pentecostals/charismatics. It also cites the growth of religiously conservative churches in recent decades and the corresponding decline of the mainline Protestant churches. Chapter 2 discusses the inapplicability of the status politics paradigm for explaining activism by religious conservatives, the religiosity of the American people, and the mobilization of religious conservatives following government intrusion into their institutions. These chapters could have been abbreviated.

Yet, Oldfield has produced a useful addition to the literature. He contributes to our understanding of the Christian Right's "up-and-down" relationship with the GOP. He describes the movement's evolving character, reinforcing themes prevalent in the literature, such as greater sophistication and more mainstream approaches to politics. The book provides a benchmark for interpreting events in the GOP in future election cycles. It is recommended reading for scholars of the Christian Right, the Republican Party, or the conservative movement in general.

Hollywood's America: Social and Political Themes in Motion Pictures. By Stephen Powers, David J. Rothman, and Stanley Rothman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 298p. $75.00 cloth. $22.95 paper.

Blackface, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot. By Michael Rogin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. 339p. $24.95.

Richard M. Merelman, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

These two books are important chapters in their authors' long-term investigations into U.S. political culture. As an oddly matched pair, they demonstrate there is far more to the recent "renaissance" in the study of political culture than the controversies over postmaterialism and social capital. One can only hope these two books receive their fair share of attention.

Rogin offers a multilayered consideration of blackface and the minstrelsy tradition in U.S. films, with particular emphasis on Al Jolson and his seminal *The Jazz Singer.* Heavily indebted to recent cultural theory, Rogin presents a complex interpretation that interweaves historical, psychoanalytic, economic, technological, sociological, and political arguments. Given the range of his analysis, it is not surprising that the reader has to leap deftly to keep up. The effort, however, is worthwhile; indeed, even when Rogin is at his most problematic, he offers more insight than most writers on U.S. politics and culture.

Rogin's basic thesis is that blackface roles in film helped transform immigrant Jews into assimilated Americans. But Jewish success in appropriating blackface roles reinforced black subordination, for it prevented blacks from speaking for themselves. Because whites could play at being black, blacks could not define their own public reality. Even after the blackface musical disappeared in the 1930s its legacy influenced postwar racial "problem films," comedies, and musicals. As a result, Hollywood still does not provide much cultural support for black empowerment.

This argument is sufficiently controversial that it may obscure the most stimulating implications of Rogin's analysis, which go beyond blackface. Because the cultural traditions of Europe could not sustain themselves in America, Rogin suggests that popular entertainment essentially *became* American culture. As a result, artifice, pretense, and personal invention are central components of U.S. political culture. Obviously, culture as entertainment and self-invention is quite different from traditional European political cultures, which root citizens in value, class, ethnic, or territorial configurations.

Yet, all this is based on at least one bedrock American historical reality: racial subordination, which for Rogin is the American equivalent of Original Sin. Blackface mime helped whites remove the threat that *real* black voices might have presented to white domination. Thus, U.S. political culture crystallized racial domination within the center of U.S. politics.

These larger implications—which I have drawn out from Rogin—depend partly for their truth on the strength of Rogin's analysis of blackface film. On this subject I have many reservations. Rogin plunges into his analysis without offering a clear or coherent statement of how culture works in politics and society. Therefore, the reader must reconstruct Rogin's theoretical assumptions, as I have attempted to do. Moreover, as Rogin admits, as early as the 1930s Hollywood was turning out westerns, gangster films, high society musicals (Astaire and Rogers), melodramas, and comedies galore. In the postwar period, film noir and anticommunist visions of America entered the Hollywood tradition. The large and growing range of genres problematizes the singular influence of blackface.

While Rogin's own interpretations of blackface are consistently stimulating, they cannot substitute for evidence about how Americans responded to the films. Certainly, most audiences could not have seen blackface in Rogin's complex, poststructuralist terms. Ultimately, we must rely on Rogin's own logic of argument to gauge the strength of his analysis. Unfortunately, this logic is often obscure, buried under layers of mystifying jargon, unconvincing assumptions, and speculative assertions.

Moreover, Rogin never effectively explains why the racial "other" in blackface should have been the ticket to Americanization for Jewish immigrants. Why should playing the "lowest" ingratiate Jews with the "best" white Americans? Rogin appreciates and illuminates the tragic interplay of Jew and black in U.S. culture, but he does not quite explain it.

In contrast to Rogin, Powers, Rothman, and Rothman offer an explicit theory of Hollywood's political role—an elite theory, which foregrounds the power of institutional leadership in U.S. politics. Their analysis of the filmmaking elite relies on interviews in 1982 with 96 writers, producers, and directors of the 50 top-grossing films of the preceding 17 years, coupled with an unprecedentedly comprehensive content analysis of 159 popular films from 1946 to 1990 and another 25 from 1990 to 1994.

The authors provide evidence that in 1982 filmmakers were far more politically liberal, alienated, and supportive of "expressive individualism" (the "free expression and satisfaction of individual desires in the pursuit of the good life") than were most ordinary Americans and virtually all other social and political elites. In addition, the content analysis reveals increasing proportions of films critical of established policy and military authorities, traditional religion, and the rich. (Curiously, no data are reported about film depictions of specifically political institutions.) Readers who have followed the culture wars of the last decade will not find these data surprising.

But what sets *Hollywood's America* apart from other mainstream social science studies of popular culture is its use of elite theory for explanatory purposes. The authors contend that liberal, antiauthority trends in film do not reflect changing public tastes but, rather, changes within the film industry itself, especially the demise of the studio system, the end of film censorship, the rise of television, the coming of independent producers, and the emergence of new film rating systems. These factors have combined to shift power within the industry toward more liberal, alienated, and expressively individualistic factions, whose films spring from their own quite jaundiced view of American life.

Sustaining this argument empirically would require that overtime data on the film elite's attitudes be compared with shifts in film content. A single cross-sectional elite sample (with only a 64% response rate) is not sufficient to establish the argument. After all, at an earlier (pre-1982) period, there may have been sizable gaps between film content and elite attitudes, gaps attributable to external political forces unconsidered by the authors. For example, the "proauthority" films of the 1950s may have had something to do with the anticommunist attacks on Hollywood in that period, rather than filmmakers' social views, which may well have been quite liberal even then. In short, contra Powers, Rothman, and Rothman, the filmmaking elite does not operate in a political void.

Moreover, the content analysis, though generally persuasive, contains some troubling anomalies. For example, what might Powers, Rothman, and Rothman have to say about the recent, hugely successful *Apollo 13*, which lauds military astronauts and NASA officials in terms as resoundingly patriotic as any in a John Wayne epic? Lacunae of this sort—along with questionable qualitative observations by the authors—exaggerate the antiauthority shift in film content over time.

The argument also encounters theoretical problems. Since the authors report no findings on audience responses to the films in their sample, the extent of elite influence on the public is at best conjectural. Moreover, if film elites are as powerful as the authors assume and elite theory requires, why is this fact not reflected in public opinion? Should not a powerful film elite be able to turn the public toward its own ideological direction? According to the authors, public opinion in the United States *rejects* the antiauthority, liberal ideology of the filmmaking elite and their films. What kind of power, then, do filmmakers have? Indeed, why call them an elite at all?

In an appendix to this study David Rothman attacks film theorists, including Michael Rogin, for a multitude of sins. The most important of these alleged failings is the poststructuralist assumption that film does not represent society but actually defines it; that traditional social science methods are useless in the analysis of films; and that U.S. films constitute a conservative defense of repression in America, all of which views are at sharp variance with Powers, Rothman, and Rothman. I agree with the methodological critique, but it is wrong to accuse Rogin of treating films as defining U.S. society. The opposite is in fact true: Rogin's entire argument is based on the historical reality of slavery and racial subordination, which gave rise to the ideological masks of blackface. Moreover, as *Hollywood's America* demonstrates, conventional social science methods do not assure objectivity in the analysis of political culture. Nor are such methods able to achieve poststructuralism's creative and subtle—though speculative—interpretations of culture and politics. Rogin and Powers, Rothman, and Rothman have much to learn from one another; meanwhile, those interested in political culture can learn much from the conversation *between* these two books. Both books deserve to be read and pondered.

Drawing the Line: Legislative Ethics in the States. By Alan Rosenthal. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. 268p. $40.00.

Gerald Benjamin, *SUNY, New Paltz*

"Sit down," the Speaker gestured. (A bad sign. She stayed behind her desk.) "I've been looking over your mileage. Don't you car-pool with a couple of other members?" "Sure," the freshman legislator said. "But I thought everyone just billed for the mileage, whoever drives. It's a way for making up for the pay being so low." "No," the Speaker responded. "We bill for actual expenses. It's better that way: for the legislature: for our majority: and for you." A small lesson in ethics from a leader to a member, delivered early and effectively—before a scandal broke, before a problem became a crisis. This kind of leadership, willing to set and enforce ethical standards by example and action, is one of Alan Rosenthal's principal recommendations for dealing with the burgeoning concern for the perceived decline of ethical behavior in American state legislatures.

Formal actions that codify ethical standards—laws, rules, regulations—can be some help, Rosenthal acknowledges. After initial skepticism, for example, he came to see merit in statutes barring lawmakers from taking even a "single cup of coffee" from lobbyists. Such laws, the author now thinks, work to reduce members' sense of obligation to lobbyists and may help alter the "capitol culture" in the states in salutary ways.

But there is a serious downside to this approach. Laws tend to proliferate, creating complexity and often leaving members defensive and uncertain about what is required of them. Under such conditions, the focus inexorably shifts from internalized consensual standards of behavior to enforcement of detailed codes, with a predictable diminution of the reputation of the legislative process each time an offense, however small, is discovered.

Rosenthal is one of the foremost advocates for legislatures among American political scientists of this generation. This fine book is the most recent manifestation of his worry that we are making it harder and harder for our representative institutions to function effectively. "There are signs today," Rosenthal writes, "that the institutional fabric of the legislature is unraveling" (p. 6). Increasingly, he thinks, institutional life and behavioral standards are being defined not within but outside legislatures, most often by unsympathetic critics in the media who barely understand the houses they cover.

But as Rosenthal also notes, legislators themselves share some of the blame for the condition of our state representative bodies. For leaders preoccupied to a greater degree than ever with campaign politics and the retention of power, effective policymaking and guardianship of the legislature's institutional stakes become distinctly secondary. This results in law making at its worst—government as one more tool for raising campaign funds and gaining partisan advantage.

If anything, Rosenthal understates the problem. What we are witnessing is hypertechno-democracy consuming representative government. The qualities required for legislatures to work are interpersonal trust, civility, and a willingness to find common ground. All of these are poisoned by the instruments of political change that have become dominant in an era of entrenched incumbency bolstered by big, inside money: relentless, continuous personal attack politics; uncompromising position taking; and the use of the criminal indictment to build some careers and destroy others.

In this paralyzing political environment, Rosenthal proposes that legislators and their leaders repair to three self-imposed standards to recapture the initiative and preserve representative institutions: a heightened sensitivity to appearance to satisfy the press and public; a recommitment to fairness and collegiality with one another; and a renewed acceptance of responsibility for the legislative bodies in which they serve. Only this, he argues, accompanied by a serious sustained effort to educate society about what legislatures do and why they are valuable, will work to overcome near stasis in representative assemblies peopled by members growing too fearful of potential scandal to do what they must to govern well.

Properly chastened, the freshman member called in that day by the Speaker played it straight on expenses for the rest of his time in the legislature. The state, the legislature, and the party benefited from his service for more than a decade. A distinguished later career in private life was built on the reputation he acquired and the friends he made in the capitol. But it may not have come out so well for him if there had not been a leader willing to insist on adherence to ethical standards of behavior in matters both large and small while she was in the chair.

Rosenthal tells us that what is most needed is model leadership to assure ethical behavior and put our state legislatures right, far more than model laws. If it has not yet done so, the Twentieth Century Fund, the sponsor of this research, ought to send copies of the book to legislative leaders in state capitols and Washington, too. Even where taking even a single cup of coffee is barred by law, there are still (I trust!) no rules against legislators receiving and chewing on some solid food for thought.

Transforming Democracy: Legislative Campaign Committees and Political Parties. By Daniel M. Shea. Albany: State University of New York Press, in cooperation with the Center for Party Development, 1995. 238p. $16.95.

John Frendreis, *Loyola University Chicago*

The development of state legislative campaign committees has been much discussed but seldom studied systematically. With the exception of Gierzyński's *Legislative Party Campaign Committees in the American States* (1992), previous work touching on these new campaign actors has been confined to either speculation or limited analyses in one or a handful of states. *Transforming Democracy* represents an important addition to this literature, providing a broadly based analysis of state legislative campaign committees that is both descriptive and theoretical.

Shea's central theoretical goal is to understand the place of legislative campaign committees in the evolving world of political parties. He challenges the position most commonly advanced in contemporary party scholarship that these committees represent functional adaptations by the parties to a changing electoral environment. Using data from a number of settings, he presents analyses which indicate that state legislative campaign committees are largely disconnected from traditional state and county party organizations, both structurally and programatically. Rather, he finds that they are controlled by legislative leaders and that the professional staffs of these committees only sporadically interact with leaders of traditional state and local party organizations. Moreover, Shea suggests that campaign committees pursue a very narrow goal of maximizing seats in individual legislative chambers, which he argues is not "party-like," compared to the broader goals and activities of traditional party organizations.

The book's most definitive finding is that the legislative caucus committees are both more developed and more independent of traditional party organizations in states where the legislature is more professionalized. The conclusion Shea draws is that the creation and activities of campaign committees are connected to the more powerful electoral impulses of legislators in more professional legislatures, not the needs of traditional party organizations to adapt to a changing electoral environment. This conclusion is based upon two sets of evidence, the correlation of legislative campaign committee variables with legislative professionalism and reports by state and county party officials of limited connections with legislative campaign committees.

The data Shea has collected represent both a strength and a limitation. In addition to information on the campaign committees, the central components of Shea's data are surveys of 50 state party organizations in 39 states and of more than 150 county chairs in 4 states. This is supplemented by an intensive case study of New York state, where Shea once worked for one of the state legislative campaign committees. Given gaps in the data and differences in the units of analysis (depending on the hypotheses being tested), the coverage of the data can vary widely, from 50 states to a single state. Nevertheless, the author's willingness to use as much information as possible to assess his various hypotheses is a strength. In many areas, such as the evaluation of the relationship between state party organizations and the legislative campaign committees, the analysis presented is the most broadly based and generalizable work to date.

While this book is a substantial addition to the literature, Shea recognizes that it is a starting point for additional research rather than a definitive treatment. In the concluding chapter he identifies a number of research questions left unanswered (and sometimes raised) by his analysis. These include the ultimate effects of legislative campaign committees upon the health of traditional party organizations, the relationship between these committees and candidates, and the effect of these committees on subsequent behavior by legislators once legislative sessions begin. Indeed, even in the area of core concern in this book, the structural and programatic relationship between state and county party organizations and the legislative campaign committees, the results presented are certain to stimulate additional work to broaden the geographic coverage and further develop some of the hypotheses. For example, while it is clear from Shea's analysis that legislative campaign committees are generally creatures of the legislative chamber caucus leaders rather than the state party leadership, Shea's basic interpretation of this is that the campaign committees are not really part of the evolving state and local party systems. Other scholars are likely to question this, arguing, at a minimum, that the relationship between the committees and other party organizations is variable and a function of other attributes, such as leadership orientations, legal structures, local history and culture, and attributes of the party and electoral systems.

It is also possible to overestimate the importance of state legislative campaign committees, particularly when viewing them from the perspectives of party officials and of the committees themselves. Given the widespread view that electoral politics increasingly centers on candidates, an additional step that needs to be taken is to understand how candidates and legislators view these new electoral actors. Additional research is needed that more clearly describes the maze of interactions among candidates, traditional party organizations, campaign committees, and other actors, such as PACs and campaign consultants.

This book will challenge other party scholars to respond to and expand upon its findings. In addition, beyond stimulating further research, *Transforming Democracy* provides scholars with a benchmark of information regarding state legislative campaign committees. It should be part of every party scholar's professional library and, beyond that, should be read by anyone interested in the continuing evolution of electoral politics in the United States.

Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy. By Gordon Silverstein. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 276p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Edward Keynes, *Pennsylvania State University*

"There is an imbalance of powers in the making of American foreign policy," writes Gordon Silverstein, "instigated by presidents of both parties, acquiesced to by legislators of both parties, and influenced and legitimated by a series of court decisions . . . since the world wars" (p. 221). Prior to the 1940s, Silverstein argues, various presidents interpreted their powers over foreign affairs broadly but did not attempt to justify their conduct in terms of a constitutional theory of plenary or inherent presidential authority. Congress, the president, and the Supreme Court accepted the necessity for exercising extraordinary power in the face of national emergencies and war. Yet, they shared a consensus on constitutional limitations, which applied to the national government's exercise of power in both domestic and foreign affairs. Both domains of national policy were governed by a single, balanced Constitution, which rested on the vertical (federalism) and horizontal (separation of powers) fragmentation of power.

Beginning with World War II and continuing through the cold war, virtually every president justified executive conduct in terms of constitutional prerogative, the authority to act, in the absence of constitutional and statutory limitations, in order to protect the nation's security. While earlier presidents (Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy) restricted their rhetoric and conduct to foreign affairs, later presidents (Johnson and Nixon) extended their arguments and actions to domestic affairs, arguing that, in a threatening world, there is little practical distinction between the two realms. During the last fifty years or so the exception has become the norm, a norm of executive prerogative, accepted by all three branches of the national government.

As Silverstein correctly observes, constitutional construction, commentary, and practice have experienced a remarkable evolution. Until World War I, the Supreme Court focused on the vertical division of power, maintaining that national authority was constitutionally limited in both foreign and domestic affairs. The president, Congress, and the Supreme Court treated occasional excesses of presidential power (e.g., Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase and the Barbary Wars, Polk's foray into territory disputed with Mexico, and Lincoln's early conduct of the Civil War) as temporary emergencies. These national political actors did not seek to justify their actions by developing a new constitutional theory. During this century, especially since 1945, all three branches have predicated executive conduct on the theory of a bifurcated constitution: limitations in domestic policy and inherent executive power in the external realm (derived from an expansive and, according to Silverstein, mistaken reading of *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright*, 1936). Since the early 1970s, Silverstein notes, the Supreme Court has legitimated a new, expansive theory of executive prerogative that encompasses both foreign and domestic policy related to national security.

Although Congress has attempted to restrain presidential prerogative (e.g., the War Powers Resolution, the National Emergencies Act, the Intelligence Oversight Act, and the Trade Reform Act), beginning with the Vietnam War it has actually increased the executive's authority with frequent and broad delegations of power. Silverstein claims that Congress has, in effect, traded its authority to control foreign policy for day-to-day influence over policy outcomes. But informal influence, he concludes correctly, is not a substitute for formal authority. As a result, Congress has aided and abetted the imbalance of powers.

Congress's statutory approach also has given the Rehnquist Court an opportunity to legitimate claims of executive prerogative. Broad statutory language and delegations of power have encouraged the justices to read executive authority expansively. Absent clear, explicit statutory limitations, the courts have interpreted congressional silence and/or ambiguity to imply deference to presidential claims of prerogative. Furthermore, under Burger and Rehnquist, the Court vitiated the legislative veto (*INS* v. *Chadha*, 1983), which Silverstein views as a useful and pragmatic tool of control. If Congress wants to reclaim its authority, he argues, it can do so by delegating authority more precisely and by imposing clear limits on the exercise of executive power. Where Congress has clear textual authority and positive incentives (as in trade and tariff policy), it has demonstrated its ability to reclaim legislative authority. The truth is, Silverstein argues persuasively, there are powerful negative incentives—the avoidance of responsibility for policy failures, the compulsion to support the president in crises, and the fear of electoral reprisal—that militate against Congress reclaiming its authority and reestablishing a balanced governmental system that protects both security and liberty.

If neither Congress nor the Supreme Court is willing or able to restrain executive prerogative, then who has an interest in restoring the balance? Remarkably, Silverstein claims, the president has a positive incentive to share power with Congress and "force Congress to take a measure of responsibility in foreign policy" (p. 203). Noting that presidents since World War II have made a "profound error" by asserting and acting on "a prerogative reading of the Constitution," he concludes that by involving Congress in the decision-making process, "the president actually will be able to conserve power, build a better reputation, and insulate the administration from some of the more hazardous risks of prerogative power . . . in foreign affairs" (p. 203). Despite Silverstein's persuasive argument, one wonders whether post–cold war presidents will have the foresight to take the long view rather than seek short-term advantage.

Imbalance of Powers is a cogently argued, well-written analysis of the origins and evolution of presidential prerogative, the erosion of balanced authority in foreign and domestic affairs, and the attendant dangers to national security and domestic liberty. While one can interpret the conduct of Jefferson, Polk, Lincoln, and Wilson differently, Silverstein makes an effective case for interpreting presidential rhetoric and conduct since World War II as the apotheosis of prerogative. Clearly, recent legislation and judicial decisions have aided and legitimized the chief executive's claims. Given Silverstein's impressive evidence, however, skepticism about the president's willingness to relinquish authority is not unjustified.

Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics. By Steven M. Teles. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. 230p. $29.95.

Charles Barrilleaux, *Florida State University*

Steven Teles is distressed with the current state of welfare policy and politics in the United States. His analysis is the product of a self-acknowledged liberal ideological stance, albeit one tempered by the influence of Martha Derthick, Lawrence Mead, and Aaron Wildavsky, among others. This is not a dispassionate policy study; it conveys the author's strong beliefs in the necessity of redistribution and his "disgust with the character of the . . . welfare system and . . . the political system" (p. 167).

Teles' argument is clearly presented and straightforward: The majority of Americans have for some time preferred a work-based welfare system over the present system, which provides disincentives and even exacts penalties for working, yet the AFDC system has resisted all meaningful attempts to be reconstructed to match public demands. Successful social policy relies on the presence of a broad consensus among the public. AFDC has long been a focus of "dissensus," which began to rise in the late 1930s when the original ADC program first was divided among the "deserving" and the "undeserving" poor, the latter group constituted principally of women who bore children out of wedlock or who were deserted. This dissensus has been solidified and institutionalized by the positions taken by contending conservative and liberal elites whose visions of appropriate paths for welfare policy are often defined rigidly and reflect neither public opinion nor the public interest. In Teles' view, welfare politics have been driven by the views of contesting elites rather than by close reading of public opinion. Elite dissensus, he argues, led to gridlock in Congress, the use of the courts to harden the differences between welfare rights supporters and opponents, and, ultimately, to the institutionalization of the irrational system of welfare that currently is in place.

The evidence for Teles' analysis comes from national public opinion surveys, analysis of court cases, readings of congressional proceedings, secondary analysis of existing policy histories, and interviews. His interpretation of public opinion data, a key component of his argument, is problematic. Most observers would be hard pressed to argue that the current welfare system closely mirrors what the public wants. Teles, however, reads public opinion as being more clear than others might, and he interprets national data as showing support for a work-based system of support in which government acts in league with the private sector to provide the training and jobs needed to move individuals from the dole to the work force. There are at least two problems with this reading of the evidence. First, Teles does not square these apparent demands for public involvement in the labor market with well-documented public antipathy for current, not to mention added, taxation. Second, and possibly more critically, Teles underestimates the importance of state-level decisions and opinion in welfare policymaking. Given the role of the states, it is not clear that national opinion, even if data demonstrate unambiguous support for a different public role in assuring income support, is the appropriate focus for understanding welfare policymaking. Analysis of state-specific data (which are not available for all states) might provide a different view of what the public wants or is willing to support. The link between public opinion and policymaking in the states is clear: More liberal state governments enact more liberal public policies. U.S. senators from more liberal states support more liberal policies. Elected representatives are accountable to those who elect them: They cannot be expected reasonably to respond to some national voice that exists solely in presidential politics. So, when Teles attributes the failure of three of the Senate's most liberal members—including two from conservative states—to support the Family Assistance Program in a critical Senate committee vote in 1969 to their failure to "comprehend that the real alternative . . . was . . . something much worse" (p. 93), it is conceivable that these members, rather than failing to see the policy implications of their actions, were responding to electorally relevant state-level political soundings. If political elites are in fact responding to demands generated by state publics, a plausible but untested rival explanation to that presented, the elite politics model of welfare policymaking presented by Teles is weakened. Where Teles does consider state-level factors in welfare reform, he focuses on anecdotal evidence about the actions of a few state political elites, as in his explanation for the failure and direction of welfare policy under the Clinton administration (prior to the Welfare Reform Act of 1996). Even there, he fails to consider systematically the effects of different state publics, and different opinion distributions among those publics, on elite action. Teles' argument would be aided considerably by integrating these subnational policy and electoral concerns with the national forces that receive the greatest attention in this research.

Teles' solution to the welfare problem calls for discarding AFDC in favor of a guarantee of work for all able-bodied citizens. This, he argues, is more attuned to public preferences for work as a basis of support and with prevailing cultural norms. He acknowledges the political difficulties of discarding the existing system, calling welfare the "greatest symbol of the lack of imagination, will and courage of the . . . parties" (p. 176). While he is forceful in arguing for the benefits of such a scheme, discussion of its possible costs and financial and political hurdles is brief. In effect, he is rejecting the incremental and fragmented system of decision making that has long cursed and blessed the United States. Finding a solution to the welfare problem will also solve a number of other policy dilemmas, but it may lead to a number of unintended problems.

Despite this criticism, there is much to recommend the book, the author's first. Teles integrates considerations of political theory and public policy well and attempts to bolster his arguments with appropriate data. The book provides a concise and insightful political history of U.S. national welfare policymaking since 1935 that should be of value to readers wishing to familiarize themselves with past policymaking in this domain as they seek to understand the current welfare reform debate. Teles' discussion of the politics and implications of the national government's use of waivers in lieu of making decisions about the contours of welfare is a real contribution, inasmuch as this important aspect of policymaking has been given short shrift in much existing work. Furthermore, the notion of dissensus politics developed here is interesting and bears additional consideration.

Comparative Politics

Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective. Edited by Hans A. G. M. Bekke, James L. Perry, and Theo A. J. Tooken. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 360p. $19.95.

Bert A. Rockman, *University of Pittsburgh*

This book is the result of an international conference held at Leiden and Rotterdam in October 1991. Its purpose is to extend comparative knowledge of civil service systems, and it seeks to do so by examining (1) the possibilities of a comparative research program, (2) the history and structure of civil service systems, (3) the contextual and legitimating characteristics of civil service systems, (4) the relationship between civil service systems and institutional arrangements as well as the extent of civil service institutionalization, and (5) the nature of change and transformation in civil service systems. Finally, the editors conclude with an effort to identify common themes, stipulate propositions derived from the preceding chapters, and identify a future research agenda.

The holy trinity of public administration consists of personnel, programs, and budgets. This book focuses on the first, on the premise that civil service systems mediate the mobilization of human resources in the service of the state. In view of this important role, it follows that one should want to know why civil service systems developed, why they developed differently, and what differences these different developmental patterns make for the practices of government. Furthermore, answers to these first questions may lead to grasping better the causal mechanisms of change and, therefore, the prospects of reform. A central issue in this regard is whether public administration can be reformed directly or whether it is so imbedded into the political fabric that alterations of that fabric are necessary, if not sufficient, to produce successful reform. The editors seem to conclude, despite the semidissenting voice of one contributor (E. Philip Morgan), that constituted arrangements tend to imbed civil service systems. Indeed, the idea that civil service systems are imbedded in developmental history, constitutional arrangements, and political institutions is a central theme of the book.

Edited volumes such as this have something in common with buffet-style meals. A lot is served. Not all of it is likely to be digested. What gets attended to is apt to be a function of consumers' diverse tastes and preferences.

One virtue of this book is that its offerings are of uncommonly high quality, so it is difficult to ignore any of them. Yet, one frustration a reader carries away is that not many of the observations or propositions are self-evidently testable. These often are pitched at a level of the sort that flourished in the realm of organizational sociology in decades past.

B. Guy Peters, in his essay on theory and methodology, notes "that much of the current malaise [in comparative public administration] is a function of the apparent absence of widely accepted and easily operationalizable dependent variables" (p. 17). He could easily have added to that formulation independent and intervening variables as well. The problem that Peters points to is reinforced by Eugene McGregor and Paul Solano, who observe that data mapping may be more feasible than data acquisition. In fact, there is only one data-based chapter in the book, that of Christopher Hood, who tries to test whether conventional explanations for the spread of new public management (NPM) are accurate. Also from an operational perspective, Hal Rainey notes poignantly how little direct information exists in public opinion data on the civil service itself. Most survey questions seeking to elicit the public's confidence in government or the executive conflate stimuli. In drawing their conclusions, the editors seem to have settled on the necessity (and possibly even the virtues) of qualitative methodology in the comparative study of civil service systems.

One thing is certainly clear: There is not much that is in this field. But this may be a function of the questions asked and their scope. And since many such questions have to do with the formation of states, constitutions, and institutional arrangements, they tend to lend themselves to very broad and very important, but unfortunately not always particularly operational, formulations.

Patricia Ingraham stresses the importance of two ways of viewing the civil service. One she calls the governance tradition, emphasizing the role of civil servants as legitimate guardians of the state. The other she terms the management tradition, emphasizing the role of civil servants as efficient managers. This distinction likely has something to do with the readiness or resistance to adopt management changes within the NPM syndrome. Notably, she argues that the principal English-speaking countries have been especially likely to adopt such changes. In these countries as well, the civil service track has been definitively separated from the politics track. "Families" of nations seem to have been especially likely to adopt similar reforms, although this interpretation, as noted, is challenged by Hood.

John Halligan views the Australian experience in public management reform as being dependent upon networks (especially within the Anglo countries) to generate diffusion and borrowing of innovations and, as a federal system, also from within Australia itself. Yet, Halligan points out that one motivation for civil service system reform in Australia was to allow top executive positions to come under the control of the government. One might say, therefore, that politics provides motive for "reform," while conditions provide opportunity, and fashion often provides the modalities that reform takes.

This is a book with many rich individual chapters. Among those not already mentioned are the contributions of Joseph Raadschelders and Mark Rutgers, on the evolution of civil service systems; William Hojnacki, on the dilemma of civil service politicization; Michael Hill and Desi Gillespie, on the social control of civil service systems; and E. Philip Morgan, on civil service systems in developing countries. These were particularly insightful.

Overall, this is a volume of considerable breadth, and it would be especially useful to any prospective doctoral student working in the vineyards of comparative bureaucracy. Through the sum of its chapters, the book poses all the complex tensions between democracy and bureaucracy, merit and representativeness, institutionalization and change, politicization and neutrality, accountability and efficiency, and privatization and responsibility. Its net effect may be to succeed less in setting a comparative research agenda than in setting forth so many of the complex issues inherent in defining what the role of the civil service should be, especially during a time in which by most measures the state itself is shrinking.

Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. By Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1996. 287p. $44.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Terry Lynn Karl, *Stanford University*

The appearance of more than 50 new democracies since 1974 has focused attention on why democracies arise and whether they will endure. Answers provided by scholars tend to fall into two categories: a structural emphasis and a process orientation. Following the tradition pioneered by Seymour Martin Lipset ("Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53[March 1959]), the former treat democracy as an outcome determined by prior conditions, most often the attainment of a "requisite" level of social and economic development, and attribute consolidation largely to success in producing sustained economic growth. The latter approach, expressed most notably by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions* (1986), interprets democratization as a highly uncertain process involving elite fragmentation, contingent conflicts, unpredictable (and often erroneous) strategic calculations, unintended consequences, and sequential patterns. Within this framework, scholars (e.g., Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23[1990]:1–21) claim that polities undergoing regime change from autocracy do so by a variety of means; these can be clustered into identifiable "modes of transition," which to an important extent determine whether democracy (of some type) will emerge and whether it will be consolidated.

Negotiating Democracy falls into this second category. Casper and Taylor focus on two central questions: Why do some countries succeed in installing democracy after authoritarian rule while others do not? Why do some new democracies move toward consolidation while others either stall or collapse? Using an ambitious research design exploiting game theoretic language and material from twenty-four cases (six from four subsamples in Asia, Africa, Latin America, southern Europe, and central East Europe), they argue that different combinations of three interacting factors—the preferences of "Defender" and "Challenger" elites, cues from "the Mass Public," and specific strategies adopted by agents of the old regime—determine the success or failure of democratic installation and its subsequent consolidation.

Based on these three initial factors, the authors specify three modal paths that produce different regime outcomes. (1) "Extreme conflict" is characterized by the diverging preferences of defenders and challengers, the defender's dismissal of cues from the mass public, and the refusal of defenders to bargain, which results in continued authoritarian rule. (2) "Compromise" is characterized by converging preferences of defenders and challengers, the defender's acquiescence to cues from the mass public, and the defender's adoption of a facilitator strategy, which results in the installation of democracy. (3) "Intense negotiation" is characterized by diverging preferences of defenders and challengers, cues that are only reluctantly heeded by defenders, and defender strategies that are ultimately facilitating, which leads not just to installing but consolidating democracy. In their view, the best examples of countries following the first path are Angola, Bolivia, Kenya, Myanmar, and Romania; the second path includes Brazil, Nigeria, Sudan, and Turkey; the third and most successful path is exemplified in their sample by Argentina, Chile, Greece, Poland, South Korea, Spain, and Uruguay. They observe that the other cases (Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Liberia, the Philippines, Poland, Uganda) differ in some respects from these modal paths, but consider that even these exceptions can be largely understood in terms of the trilogy of variables.

The most compelling findings of this study support Dankwart Rustow's seminal argument ("Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 3 [1970]:337–63) that enduring democracy is most often the result not of elite consensus or a mass civic culture but of difficult negotiations between contending actors with widely divergent passions and interests who view each other with considerable suspicion and even hostility—even if the authors do not explicitly recognize that they have reached the same conclusion as Rustow. In elaborating this claim, Casper and Taylor emphasize the role not only of elites but also of mass publics. This is an important corrective to a tendency in the democratization literature to stress exclusively the need for an elite consensus, although the authors focus primarily on the cues that elites take from the mass public rather than on the actions of subordinate and previously excluded groups. Furthermore, the authors make an interesting and original distinction within the regime choice process between an initial "sorting out" and a subsequent "deal cutting" phase that could prove useful to analysts of regime change in different settings.

But what most distinguishes this discussion of the genesis of democracy from that of other scholars who emphasize strategic interactions is its reformulation of modal paths in game-theoretic terms that hinge, most importantly, on the correct specification of actors and their preferences. Herein lies the rub. The fundamental characteristic of regime transition is uncertainty. The actors who matter tend to change quickly; the resources they bring to bear in a negotiating process may not be known in advance; their alliances can be unpredictable; and the consequences of their decisions are often unanticipated. Most important, in this context of high uncertainty the preferences of actors change very fast—sometimes overnight! Where the political logic of transition dictates that some defenders will become challengers, that some defenders and challengers will remain outside the game, and that those who prefer authoritarian rule one day will support "controlled democracy" (or even democracy) the next, an argument built on a prior and fixed specification of who are the defenders and challengers and what are their preferences is bound to run into trouble.

This is first apparent in the stylized description of regime choice as a three-actor game in which a defender, a challenger, and the mass public interact to determine the outcome. Despite the authors' recognition that defenders and challengers may not be a single actor but a coalition, they fail to capture one of the central and most dynamic features of most regime transitions: the division between hardliners and softliners *within* the camp of the defenders and between maximalists and minimalists within the challengers. This causes them to misidentify the actors on a number of occasions and, consequently, to misspecify the dynamics of the game that determine a specific regime path. In their discussion of the Hungarian case, for example, only the hardline faction of the Communist Party is considered "the defender," while the reformist faction *within the same party* is categorized as "the challenger." But the same actor cannot simultaneously play both roles. In fact, the reformist faction had come out on top prior to a regime transition and subsequently played the defender role in the ensuing negotiations.

The determination of preferences is an even more serious problem, especially when it comes to differentiating between those defenders who want authoritarian rule and those who favor controlled democracy. Why should Chile's Pinochet, for example, be classified as intransigently authoritarian, despite the fact that he always claimed to be working toward an eventual (if controlled) democracy and even permitted an honest plebiscite to be held, while the Uruguayan military, which showed no greater enthusiasm for democracy and refused to hold a plebiscite, is characterized as having preferences more convergent with those of its democratic opponents? This way of imputing preferences without reliable and comparable evidence leads to some manifest anomalies. I doubt if any independent observer would conclude that the elites of Liberia, Nigeria, and the Sudan had more convergent preferences about democracy than those of Greece, Hungary, and Argentina! Such bizarre scoring may result from insufficient attention to the critical factor of timing. Sometimes the authors assign preferences and subsequent strategies based on the situation before the transition begins; in other cases, it is the lines of cleavage that emerge during the actual transition that seem to count; and, occasionally, the outcome seems to have been used to reveal what actor preferences must have been present.

Finally, because the only path to the consolidating of democracy supposedly involves "intense and difficult negotiations among actors with widely diverging preferences" (p. 244), Casper and Taylor conclude that all successful cases must have gone through such a process. But in a number of their successful cases (e.g., Argentina, Greece, and Portugal), authoritarian rule simply collapsed, and no such negotiations between defenders and challengers ever took place. Evidently, there are other important modal paths to democracy.

Muslim Politics. By Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 235p. $39.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.

John L. Esposito, *Georgetown University*

Given the proliferation of studies on political Islam, the challenge in recent years has been to determine which publications are more than a duplication of previous works. In *Muslim Politics*, James Piscatori and Dale Eickelman have produced a distinctive study that underscores and demonstrates the dynamics and diversity of Islam and the Muslim experience. They bring diverse disciplinary approaches and area studies foci; the result is an interdisciplinary study which is conceptually rigorous, global in perspective, and remarkably well documented.

The volume's six chapters take the reader from the basic discussion of "What Is Muslim Politics?" to a survey and analysis of the role of religion in modernization and the effect of Islam in Muslim politics. The authors define Muslim politics as the competition and contest over both interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions that produce and sustain them, played out within an underlying framework, which though subject to nuances of context is common to all Muslims. Examples are drawn from past and current contexts to demonstrate the diversity of the process.

The authors provide an excellent discussion of the nature and development of religious traditions as well as the presuppositions and defects of modernization theory. Both serve as a needed counterweight for those who view religion and "fundamentalism," in this case Islam, as necessarily backward and thus a political threat that is antithetical to modernization and development.

Aligning themselves with those who would argue that Islam has become the primary language of politics, the authors also emphasize the multiplicity of interpretations within shifting contexts and evolving meanings and usages of symbols, values, and traditions. This is due both to a diversity of interpreters (the traditional ulama and the "new" religious intellectuals) and diverse political and cultural contexts. The authors prove their contentions in their discussions of doctrine as political action and the use of Islam in setting boundaries.

Eickelman and Piscatori do an especially effective job in demonstrating the secular bias and defects of modernization theory exemplified by the artificial constructs of modernity and tradition, arguing that indeed tradition can be an effective force for evolutionary and revolutionary change. Critical to understanding this process is an appreciation of the fact that Islamic tradition on any given issue often presents several opinions or multiple perspectives which make tradition "much more plastic" and capable of supporting change. This process, "the invention of tradition," they contend, has occurred down through the ages. It has been enhanced in recent years by the effect of mass (higher) education and mass communications, which have produced a new generation of Islamists.

A central issue in contemporary Muslim politics is the relationship of Islam to state and society. Eickelman and Piscatori align themselves with those who maintain that, contrary to the beliefs of Islamists, religion and politics are in fact separate. While some have dated the separation to the ninth century, the authors argue that this separation effectively occurred with the death of the Prophet in 632. While religion and politics are functionally separate spheres, the authors contend, they do intersect and overlap when states and religious actors use or manipulate sacred symbols. One wonders, however, whether a "both . . . and" rather than the "either ... or" interpretations of both the authors and Islamists regarding the relationship of religion to politics would not be closer to the historical experience.

The Islamic community and Muslim politics have been shaped significantly by family and ethnic issues. The book dispels the simple stereotypes of the media and many academic studies regarding the status of women and the family that fail to see the diversity of the Muslim experience, past and present. Drawing on a wealth of comparative examples, the authors present a nuanced analysis of a complex reality, placing it within the context of traditional and modern beliefs and issues.

A major accomplishment is the authors' demystification of Islamic movements. While some lump all Islamic movements together, maintain that there are no moderates, or that they should all be treated as a threat, Piscatori and Eickelman portray a multifaceted phenomenon given to accommodation and opposition, protest and bargaining. They effectively demonstrate that the nature, specific agenda, tactics, and goals of Islamists are diverse and changing, evolutionary and revolutionary, rooted in specific sociohistorical contexts and causes. They perceptively argue that, while extremist organizations exist, understanding the dynamics of most Islamist politics is best achieved by appreciating the two interconnected sides of protest and bargaining.

Muslim politics is both national and transnational. The actors, organizations, movements, and institutions of transnational Islam operate effectively across the Muslim world. While some portray a pan-Islamic global threat, Eickelman and Piscatori in a masterful analysis demonstrate the coexistence of a unitarian ideal with the acceptance of a pluralist reality. Transnational Islam is embodied in international organizations (the Organization of the Islamic Conference and World Muslim League), international publications, and a transnational consciousness, reinforced by mass communications, all of which has reinforced consciousness of and responses to international issues from Palestine and Afghanistan to Bosnia, the Rushdie Affair and Chechnya.

Muslim Politics is must reading for scholars of religion, comparative politics, and the modern Muslim world. Its unique strengths, the breadth of its methodological and comparative coverage and documentation, may limit its attractiveness to nonspecialist audiences (students, journalists, and policymakers). This does not detract, however, from the uniqueness of *Muslim Politics* and its significant contribution to scholarship.

Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua. By Mark Everingham. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. 218p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Alfred G. Cuzán, *University of West Florida*

This book is a detailed examination of the probable motivations and actions taken by key Nicaraguan political players who in 1977–79 entered a cross-class alliance to overthrow the nearly fifty-year-old Somoza regime. The main focus is on the business and professional elites who, in what turned out to be a terrible miscalculation, threw their political and financial support behind a hard core of professional revolutionaries, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The central question of the book is "how and why did some economic elites become collaborators with the Sandinistas in toppling the Somoza dynasty" (p. 4).

This question is important because a number of authors (e.g., Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*, 1992) argue that revolution against dictatorship is impossible without a multiclass coalition *and* that such alliances come into being only against dictatorships of the patrimonial or sultanistic type, in which the state is autonomous from the economic elites. Although Everingham agrees on the necessity of a cross-class coalition, he rejects the notion that it is "the behavior of the dictator which weakens its [sic] own political structures and facilitates revolutionary situations" (p. 29). Neither is he persuaded by a Marxist explanation that locates the cause of elite desertion in conflicts of interests between class factions. This is because "the struggle between the Somocista clique and some businessmen associated with two private banking groups was waged more on political grounds than over pure economic interests" (p. 40).

Everingham wades through a tangled web of business and familial relationships in Somoza's Nicaragua, delineating the evolution over three decades of the country's ownership structure. The thrust of the analysis is to show that Nicaragua's economic elites, though benefiting from Somoza's economic policies, were divided, politically weak, and frustrated about having to play second fiddle to the Somozas. It was this long-simmering resentment of political impotence, brought to a boil during conditions of political mobilization, Everingham argues, that motivated Nicaragua's economic elites to cooperate with the Sandinistas in overthrowing the dictatorship.

Next, drawing on secondary sources and about two dozen interviews, Everingham recounts the familiar story of how the Somoza regime fell. It began with the 1972 earthquake, the political aftershocks of which undermined the very foundations of the dynasty. A series of events over less than five years, including the Sandinista seizure of hostages in 1974, the assassination of *La Prensa's* publisher and editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, in 1978, and the outfoxing of the Carter administration and Nicaraguan moderates by the Sandinistas culminated in pitched battles in the country's main cities, Somoza's flight, the crumbling of the National Guard, and the installation of a regime dominated by Marxist-Leninists. All this is retold by Everingham in fine detail, albeit with important omissions, notably the roles played by the Catholic Church, on the one hand, and Fidel Castro, on the other.

Even though Everingham attempts to account for the postrevolutionary falling out between the economic elites and the FSLN, and the latter's 1990 electoral defeat, the Sandinista decade is sanitized. Of the Sandinistas' enriching themselves while in office, their campaigns of repression against human rights activists, union organizers, and the Catholic Church, and their war against the Miskito Indians, Everingham says nothing. Moreover, the Bibliography is heavily weighted in favor of pro-Sandinista authors, both Nicaraguan and North American. Absent are Humberto Belli, Jaime Chamorro, Pablo Antonio Cuadra, Lino Hernandez, Edgar Macias, and Jaime Morales, all participants in the events leading up to or flowing from the revolution.

Even more problematic is Everingham's attempt to use El Salvador as a foil, "invoked to illuminate the structural features of the Nicaraguan upper class and corresponding elite relations that led to cooperation between capitalists and the FSLN, instead of a clash between an intransigent landed class and guerrillas acting on behalf of the peasantry, as in the case of El Salvador" (p. 8). Without much evidence, Everingham asserts that "dictatorship in El Salvador took the form of the bureaucracy acting on behalf of a unified landed class that had completely penetrated the state apparatus" (pp. 75–6). The military, too, is portrayed as subordinate to a politically hegemonic economic elite.

This interpretation of El Salvador is, at the very least, debatable. As early as the late 1940s, reformist and even radical factions emerged within the Salvadoran military, whose ideological center gravitated leftward in the next three decades, to a position somewhere between the economic elite and a new political player, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Dissident military officers contested the fraudulent 1972 and 1977 elections and vigorously protested the results. In 1980, following a coup by junior officers, a civilian-military junta expropriated large estates of the landed elite, a policy Everingham belittles because it was a scaled down version of an earlier proposal (p. 102).

Thus, Nicaragua and El Salvador differed not just in the structure of their economic elites, as Everingham claims, but in the structure of the state as well. In Nicaragua the elites were divided but the state unified; in El Salvador, the reverse was true. These differences complicate the comparison between the two cases, which needs to be taken into account.

All this said, Everingham's book is helpful for understanding what drove Nicaragua's economic elites to turn against a dictator with whom they could at least do business in favor of revolutionaries whose ideology and international alliances should have left little doubt that their ultimate objective, tactical concessions aside, was to do away with business altogether. Political behavior is not wholly reducible to cold calculation of economic or class interests. Particularly in revolutionary situations, political passion plays the principal role.

Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective. By Edward Gibson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 274p. $48.50.

Alberto Ciria, *Simon Fraser University*

Edward Gibson has written a most interesting book on conservatism in Argentina and, subsidiarily, in Latin America. In this author's estimation, the work has three major objectives. First, develop concepts and ideas for a comparative study of conservative parties in Latin America (starting with Argentina as a case study), together with the relationships between them and democratic politics. In the Weberian tradition, Gibson defines conservative parties as those that "represent and are supported by the socially privileged strata of society" (p. xiii), namely, their core constituencies.

Second, present historical patterns of conservative party development in Argentina in an attempt to explain why such parties did not manage to come to power through voters' majorities in free elections, a situation that many observers see as a major theme in Argentine history and political science since at least 1912 and the electoral reforms established by the Sáenz Peña law. Radicals or Peronists were the usual winners over conservative forces in successive elections; the conservatives tried to negotiate with the state, and with time they became special interlocutors and advisors of military regimes.

Third, study factors promoting or hindering the development of conservative parties in Latin America, using the Argentine experience as a starting point. For the last two objectives, particular emphasis is placed on the interaction among core constituencies, party leaders, and the state as an analytical concern.

The seven chapters are quite different in content and scope. Varied levels of analysis coexist, not always peacefully, as in some quite generic comparisons between Argentina and other Latin American countries. The organization of *Class and Conservative Parties*, therefore, needs to be explained in some detail.

Chapter 1 presents as a starting point an analytical framework for defining conservative parties in terms of their relationship to society (Gibson does not take into consideration the ideological features, a matter that surely will become polemical among specialists). Gibson has important things to say on the activities of conservative parties under democratic regimes in civil society, the state, and political society as well as on their contributions to political stability in certain Latin American countries, a topic that requires further discussion at more concrete levels.

Chapter 2 is perhaps the most provocative, if a bit too schematic, in the whole book, with its emphasis on regional cleavages as the key explanation for the failures of conservative party formation in Argentina and for the fragmentation of existing conservative party organizations along provincial lines. In essence, this is a continuation of the well-known topic of the "two Argentinas," the littoral and the interior, that historians, economists, and sociologists have elaborated upon.

Chapter 3 deals with relationships between conservative groupings and the military regime from 1979 to 1982, and it explores the failures of the generals in developing a viable "political engineering" (p. 75) and a dialogue with civil society. Of particular interest are the reasons presented by Gibson for the inability of conservative political leadership to influence events leading to the new civilian-led regime, a rather unique instance in Latin America.

Chapter 4 shifts the focus to the political/technocratic biography of Alvaro Alsogaray, Argentina's best-known spokesman for liberalism (in the classical sense). He founded the conservative UCEDE (*Unión del Centro Democrático*) in 1982 and had been a leading technocrat in civilian and military regimes, from Juan Perón's first presidential term to Carlos S. Menem's ongoing second term.

Chapter 5 is the story of UCEDE as an example of conservative party-building in the Buenos Aires region, 1983–1989, from an institutional and organizational perspective. (The period since 1989 requires additional research to make more explicit the reasons for its comparatively swift emergence and sudden electoral demise).

Chapter 6 is a good introduction to the activities of conservative parties and groupings during the first presidency of Menem (1989–95). At some future time it will have to be updated to include the events of Menem's second term (1995–99), to try to determine whether certain political occurrences will become trends or will simply remain in the anecdotal category. As this chapter stands now, the author may be too close to his material for a definitive elaboration of theoretical-practical arguments.

Chapter 7 is a kind of appendix dealing with some problems of conservative party development in Latin America, but its level of generalization and the absence of further background information make it the least useful in the book, despite the importance of the topic in any discussion of democratization in Latin America.

The contribution of *Class and Conservative Parties* to the study of contemporary Argentina is very positive. On the one hand, it attempts—even if not always in a thorough way—a comparative treatment linking Argentina with other Latin American countries, a commendable route that should be pursued by today's scholars. On the other hand, it joins important historical works on conservatism in Argentina (Natalio Botana, *El orden conservador: La política argentina entre 1880 y 1916*, 1977; Richard J. Walter, *The Province of Buenos Aires and Argentine Politics, 1912–1943*, 1985) and, at the same time, presents new debates on an old question (or, better, a series of interrelated questions) of permanent relevance: Why has conservatism failed, up to the present, to acquire power through legitimate/electoral means.

The book is clearly written and in general conveys the author's meanings without excessive jargon. My own preferences tend to underline the analyses in chapters 2 and 3 because they deal with fundamental questions for historians and social scientists: the reasons for conservatism's fragmentation in modern Argentina and the relationship between conservative parties and leaders vis-à-vis the last military dictatorship (1976–83).

There are, however, certain areas or points that need to be addressed. For instance, one is the relationships between conservative parties and the so-called Argentine *oligarquía*, or landed elites, particularly in the socioeconomic domain; another is the relationships between major foreign powers (historically Great Britain, and the United States after World War II) and the local conservative elites, both provincial and in the Buenos Aires region.

Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions. By Stephen E. Hanson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 258p. $45.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Alfred B. Evans, Jr., *California State University, Fresno*

This book views the history of Soviet Marxism-Leninism from a unique perspective. In a novel adaptation of a familiar typology authored by Max Weber, Hanson delineates contrasting traditional, rational, and charismatic conceptions of time. He argues that Marx's theory envisioned the possibility of transcending the constraints imposed on industrial society by the modern, abstract, and linear view of time. According to Hanson, Marx saw proletarian revolutionary action as "the charismatic force capable of conquering time" (p. 42), but Marx arrived at a "synthesis of charismatic and rational time orientations" (p. 46), in the sense that in the Marxian analysis the proletariat would have to work within time to overcome the limitations posed by time. The reader's assessment of the conclusions of Hanson's book will depend primarily on whether s/he is convinced of the accuracy of Hanson's description of a "charismatic-rational" orientation toward time as central to Marx's theory. It is true that Marx expected the consequences of the proletarian revolution to include the intensification of the productivity of labor and the abolition of the distinction between labor time and leisure time. The revolution would make it possible for the proletariat to transcend the dictatorship of the clock.

Hanson sees the years between the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 and the end of the NEP in 1929 as the period of creation of political institutions which attempted to apply the Marxian theoretical framework. During that "political cycle," the version of Marxism which triumphed in the Soviet Union was Lenin's conception of the party of professional revolutionaries as "the collective charismatic agent that would master time within the boundaries of time" (p. 79). After Lenin's death, Soviet Marxism entered a debate over the form of the socioeconomic institutions to be created in order to resolve crucial contradictions in Lenin's thought. Hanson argues that "the history of the struggle for power [in the USSR] in the 1920s parallels the similar struggle between right, left, and center tendencies in the Second International after the deaths of the theoretical founders of the Marxist movement, Marx and Engels" (p. 104). In Hanson's view, during the 1920s the left tendency was represented by Leon Trotsky, the center by Grigorii Zinoviev, and the right by Nikolai Bukharin. The theoretical synthesis that emerged victorious was that shaped by the winner in the power struggle, Joseph Stalin. According to Hanson, "there *is* a consistent core to the intellectual and political tradition leading from Marx to Lenin and Stalin," consisting of the "common acceptance of the charismatic-rational conception of time—the idea that time is a force ultimately to be transcended through revolutionary action but that revolutionary action itself, in order to be effective within the realm of mundane history, must be time-disciplined" (pp. 131–2). Perhaps the most convincing part of Hanson's analysis explores Stalin's speeches of the First Five-Year Plan and Valentin Kataev's novel, *Time, Forward!*, written during that period.

After Stalin's death, Soviet Marxists again split into three camps, according to Hanson. The right wing was led by Georgi Malenkov, the left by Nikita Khrushchev, and the orthodox center by Leonid Brezhnev. After the years of enforcement of theoretical orthodoxy under Brezhnev, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the final period of development of Marxism-Leninism, in which *perestroika* offered another attempt at institutionalizing the "charismatic-rational" conception of time, which, though ultimately unsuccessful, continued the heroic effort at "the realization of a mass cultural norm of permanent, disciplined revolutionary time transcendence in Soviet society" (p. 189). With the failure of Gorbachev's program of reform the Soviet system collapsed.

This book has exceptional merits. For those who may think that nothing new and worthwhile can be said about the history of Soviet Marxism, Hanson's work demonstrates that such an assumption is mistaken. Furthermore, Hanson cogently argues that ideological theory was important for the shaping of institutions and policies in the Soviet Union, and that such theory was characterized by controversies and revisions until the demise of the Soviet regime. The author has presented a strikingly original interpretation of the history of Soviet Marxism, and it deserves the attention of anyone interested in the development of ideological theory and political and economic institutions in the USSR.

At times, however, this reviewer felt that Hanson forced all the ideas and political trends reviewed in his work into the procrustean bed of his framework of interpretation. His approach requires him to read every Marxist theoretician and Soviet leader as preoccupied with an orientation toward time. That approach works better for some figures than others. In any case, the reader should be aware that Hanson accentuates only one aspect of the thinking of each theoretician on whom he focuses. Thus it is possible for Hanson to conclude that there was a direct line of theoretical continuity from Marx through Lenin to Stalin. It should be realized, however, that if in some sense all three of those figures accepted a "charismatic-rational conception of time," they also differed with respect to many other issues.

I quibble with the author on a number of fairly minor points. Hanson accepts the widely disseminated assumption that an "ideal of the commune-state" is expressed in at least part of Lenin's essay *The State and Revolution* (p. 97), but this reviewer presented extensive textual evidence in an article in *Slavic Review* in 1987 in order to demonstrate that in fact the details of the model of organization of society in *The State and Revolution* call consistently for the establishment of a centralized system of authority. Lenin endorsed anarchistic and communalist impulses only as forces for destroying the old order, not forces for constructing the new order. Hanson's interpretation of Brezhnev's concept of "developed socialism" is not particularly successful, since the author accepts the usual interpretation that with that concept Brezhnev was simply imposing orthodoxy in the defense of the Stalinist socioeconomic institutions, though the more perceptive analyses of ideology and policies of the Brezhnev period have revealed that "developed socialism" justified a significant reorientation of economic strategy and that, with all its admitted limitations, the Brezhnev leadership did permit considerable ideological innovation, stimulated by Soviet social scientists. The reviewer would also disagree with Hanson's argument (pp. 195–6) that Gorbachev's *perestroika* and "new thinking" only justified the destruction of existing domestic institutions and foreign policy, without articulating a vision of new institutions and policies. Though Gorbachev's vision ultimately proved a failure and was fraught with ambiguities and contradictions, it did have its own basic logic as a conception of the manner in which Soviet institutions were to be revitalized and the USSR's relationship with the West was to be transformed.

In conclusion, this reviewer would like to salute Hanson for his boldness and originality. It is encouraging to see the emergence of a talented new scholar in the fields of political science and Russian studies. We may look forward eagerly to the publication of new works by this author.

Trying to Make Law Matter: Legal Reform and Labor Law in the Soviet Union. By Kathryn Hendley. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 265p. $39.50.

Linda J. Cook, *Brown University*

Kathryn Hendley shows that, despite protective legislation, Soviet workers could be easily and arbitrarily dismissed or transferred by management. On the face of it this may hardly seem surprising. We know that Soviet authorities in the Brezhnev era regularly abused their own laws in trials of dissidents and that judges were subject to political pressures in deciding some cases. But these were generally cases of high political salience. They tell us little about how the law worked in the more mundane cases that involved ordinary people. In fact, workers did seem to have substantial legal protections against dismissal: The laws were straightforward, the published records of higher court decisions showed that these courts vigorously defended workers' rights, and Western scholars, relying mainly on such records, accepted this view (e.g., see Blair A. Ruble, *Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970's*, 1981; David Granick, *Job Rights in the Soviet Union: Their Consequences*, 1987). Hendley chose these laws as a "best possible" case to study the effectiveness of the Soviet legal system through the kind of genuine fieldwork that has recently become possible in Russia. Her book provides compelling evidence that contempt for the law penetrated to the lowest levels of the factories and courts, and it is a cogent assessment of what must change in order to make law matter in post–Soviet Russia.

Hendley's case study is based on extensive interviews and written records from eight enterprises and two district courts in or near Moscow, and it covers the period 1983–89. She has used well her access to Russian institutions and individuals, providing materials that vividly reveal actors' mindsets and motivations as well as many telling details, for example, enterprises' haphazard record-keeping on dismissals and the propensity of judges to regard workers who appealed their dismissals as "troublemakers." Hendley's research revealed a consistent pattern: Management dismissed workers, often arbitrarily, while going through the motions of complying with the law. Enterprise trade unions routinely gave their consent to these dismissals. Workers who went to court to protest generally went without counsel, were confronted with a long paper trail presented by the enterprise's counsel and barely scrutinized by the court, and lost. In many of these cases, genuine enforcement of the law would have led to the worker's reinstatement. But courts and judges, lacking autonomy, time, a professional ethic, or commitment to justice, simply deferred to the more powerful claimant as long as s/he had gone through the formalities.

Hendley's book makes several important contributions to our knowledge. First, it is a ground-breaking study of how Soviet law really worked. It revises both official claims and resulting Western misconceptions about workers' rights in the Brezhnev period, and it illustrates just how deep and pervasive was the lack of legal culture. Second, in framing her study, Hendley places her case within a comparative context, examining at a general level the features of effective legal systems (in her terms, systems in which law "matters reciprocally," that is, for both political elites and citizens [p. 3]) and counterposing key features of the coercive Soviet legal system. Hers is the first such effort at broad conceptualization, as opposed to description, of the Soviet system, and her comparisons highlight many of the problems intrinsic to creating a fair legal system, such as equality of access and judicial independence. Hendley also provides eloquent testimony to the complete disjuncture between Gorbachev's efficiency-enhancing policies and realities in the factory: The managers she interviewed did not so much sabotage the policies as simply remain ignorant, even of those being touted in the press and by scholars.

Hendley ends with a discussion of whether the "rule of law" can develop in Russia. Invoking Weber and European history, she argues that the demand for law must come from society, specifically, from a differentiating society with a growing middle class that wants and needs the stability and predictability law provides. Removing political controls and even passing legislation and creating legal institutions will not accomplish much unless a powerful societal constituency wants legality. Hendley's is a sophisticated and valuable structural argument about the conditions which could promote legality. It is disappointing, though, that her basis of comparison for the Soviet system and projections for its future are nearly all based on American and West European experience. It would have made sense to pay more attention to earlier democratizing countries that have had authoritarian governments abusive of law, such as those of southern Europe and Latin America, and to examine their success or failure in creating effective legal systems.

Hendley's study does have some limitations. While there is much to recommend employment dismissals as the basis for her case study, there is reason to question whether courts' treatment of these cases was typical or broadly generalizable. For one thing, the plaintiffs—management and worker—were always unequal in power. For another, dismissals of workers by labor-hoarding managers were rare, perhaps leading judges to their admitted low regard of those few singled out. Courts may have worked somewhat better with other types of civil suits which were more commonly litigated, with plaintiffs on a more equal footing and obvious sources of judicial prejudice absent. Hendley also fails to explain the disparity between the published case records from higher courts suggesting strong defense of workers' rights and the record of abuses she observed at the local level. Was the published record purposely selected and censored to maintain the myth of workers' rights, or were the higher, often appellate and Supreme, courts actually protesting abuses in lower courts? The answer is important for the book's argument about the Soviet system and its judiciary.

Trying to Make Law Matter is a highly significant and engagingly written book on a subject of enormous importance—the pervasive contempt for legality in the Soviet system and the prospects for its development in present-day Russia. It should be read by specialists on contemporary Russia and will also be of interest to those in the fields of comparative labor politics, comparative law, and postsocialist transitions.

The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan. By Steven J. Hood. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1997. 181p. $49.95.

Peter R. Moody, Jr., *University of Notre Dame*

Taiwan was long ignored by students of comparative politics. What attention it did attract came from China specialists, who tended to regard the island as an uninteresting substitute for the real thing. During the 1980s, students of political economy began to take seriously the ruling regime's claim to an economic miracle: Taiwan had achieved remarkable growth, while the income gap between rich and poor had narrowed. More recently, as Taiwan has become more democratic, studies of its political system have come into fashion.

The ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT) boasts of a political miracle to match the economic one. Steven Hood does not go this far, although the process he traces does give some cause for wonder. The KMT was a Leninist party and ruled Taiwan as a police state; yet, in a very short time the harsh authoritarian system had become genuinely democratic, without social upheaval, without a change in formal political institutions (or only incremental changes, adopted through regular legal processes), and with the KMT remaining in control of the state—even with a considerable overlap of the ruling personnel.

Hood's focus on the role of the KMT in this transformation is, therefore, most appropriate. The opposition certainly pushed for change, but the decisions resulting in the transformation, which included allowing greater scope for opposition activity, were made within the ruling party, especially by its top leadership.

Hood's argument is a little complicated, as is the situation he seeks to explain. As a Leninist party (dominated, moreover, by newcomers to the island after 1945, the "mainlanders"), the KMT was itself an obstacle to democratization. Yet, the policies it adopted promoted social and economic development, conditions propitious to democracy. And, Hood argues, the Taiwan experience suggests that the more recent wave of democratization studies does not give sufficient attention to the older theme of democracy's prerequisites. To enhance its chances of survival on the island in the face of pressure from the mainland, the KMT emphasized technocracy rather than ideology in the recruitment of party and state cadres. The loss of international support during the 1970s led the regime to sink deeper roots into the island, with widespread recruitment of native Taiwanese to political and administrative office. When the Taiwanese technocrat Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency in 1988, he appealed to public opinion to consolidate his hold over power while using the authoritarian instruments in the party and the state to defend himself from conservative critics, meaning that these critics found it expedient to attack him on democratic grounds. The effect was to delegitimate any alternative to democracy.

Hood believes that Edwin Winckler and another eminent scholar do not take the KMT's Leninism seriously enough (pp. 22, 3). The KMT was certainly Leninist in structure and organization, but to show that the regime itself was Leninist, as Hood seems to believe, requires more detailed and systematic examination of the relations between the party and the state, the military, the economy, and other political and social institutions than the book provides, and I do not think such an attempt would be successful. Yet, Hood concedes that even if Taiwan were Leninist, it was not totalitarian, so the difference here may be a semantic one.

Hood may not adequately consider a few things. One is the role of competitive elections to local office, which were held from the earliest days of the regime's establishment. Political parties were not allowed to field candidates against the KMT, but individuals could run on their own against the KMT candidate. As Bruce Jacobs has pointed out, this forced the KMT to recruit persons palatable to the local population, diluting the party's Leninist character. Eventually, the KMT became more a "catch-all" party than a Leninist core of professional revolutionaries.

Hood also may underplay the role of China in Taiwan's political development. He mostly treats it as a point of political contention in the Lee Teng-hui era, when independence or rejoining China was the major issue, at least in rhetoric. To one familiar with the island's earlier experience, it is surprising that the issue should be debated at all, since the policy of one China was a key element in KMT ideology.

Common perception to the contrary, however, the KMT did not legitimate its dictatorship over Taiwan through party founder Sun Yat-sen's theory of political tutelage (whereby the KMT would monopolize political power while training the benighted multitudes to meet the responsibilities of democratic self-government). Rather, the official period of tutelage came to an end in 1947 and 1948, and the deviations from democracy on Taiwan were justified by the "communist rebellion" and the on-going civil war. While the regime claimed to be the legitimate government of all China, the fact was that it controlled only tiny little Taiwan. Especially given the regime's dependence upon the United States, its superior claim to represent China came to be articulated in terms of democracy. That is, the KMT stood for a democratic China and departed from democracy only because of the state of emergency. As the threat waned and a generation came and went, autocracy was more difficult to justify, and the regime had become to a degree a captive of its own rhetoric. The China factor may limit the extent to which the Taiwan experience can be applied elsewhere.

Hood devotes considerable attention to the defects of Taiwan's democracy, particularly the spread of corruption and the increasingly close relationship between politics and crime. He argues convincingly that the enlarged role of the legislature contributed to a decline in the influence of the KMT's central party machinery. As noted above, the KMT wanted to assure the local vote and attempted to accommodate as many local factions as possible, either allocating nominations among the factions in one election or alternating representation from one election to the next. As it happens, the declining influence of the party organization coincided with the rising influence of elective office, and the factions and candidates often were left to fend for themselves, struggling for control over local nominations, sometimes through primary elections, and paying their own way. There was no more buffer for local factional conflict and individual candidates, who had to pay the expense of seeking office and court the favor of various fat cats (or "golden cows," as they are called). A certain corruption was endemic to Taiwanese politics, but democratization has made it more acute; and the need of politicians to balance both popular pressures and special interests may mean that growth on Taiwan will become considerably less "equitable" than it has been. This is certainly not to question that Taiwan's democracy is a vast humanitarian and political improvement over the previous police state, but it may be that democracy, at least initially, has come at the expense of a certain amount of "good government."

On another plane, a democratic Taiwan cannot but be an independent Taiwan, if not in name then certainly in fact. Since the government is directly responsible to the people of Taiwan and no one else, it cannot convincingly claim to be the government of all China, nor can it plausibly argue that it is subject to some overarching sovereignty of Peking. The mainland did not like the KMT claiming to be the true government of China, but it likes even less the idea of an independent Taiwan. This tacit abandonment of the one-China position increases the odds of violent confrontation with the mainland.

Given the troubles generated by Taiwan's democratization, Hood's analysis suggests that democracy is not the unproblematic concept that some contemporary political science "discourse" verges on implying. In the post–cold war era, Americans often treat the U.S. version of democracy as if it were a standard against which other attempts should be measured (and I wonder if this is not Hood's tacit standard), but at the same time constantly find many, many problems with their own system. Idealism aside, "actually existing" democracy is a political system like any other, with the various limitations inherent in that genus.

Hood's work includes various minor factual errors and eccentricities of Chinese romanization ("Zhiang Zemin"), most of which could have been avoided with more care in the editing. Hood has written a valuable book, certainly for those who want to understand politics on Taiwan and also for students of empirical political theory. Its value lies less in revealing valid generalizations than in pointing to the limitations of the generalizations others have asserted.

Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. By Mark P. Jones. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. 246p. $32.95.

John M. Carey, *University of Rochester*

As Mark P. Jones points out in this new book, most analyses on the effects of electoral laws on political party systems have drawn on the experience, and the data, of the longstanding European democracies. There is an irony here, in that students of comparative political regimes have concluded that parliamentary systems are more flexible than presidential systems in accommodating a diverse array of party configurations. That is, parliamentarism can perform well whether or not the party system is highly fragmented, under single-party majority cabinets or coalitions. Presidentialism has performed far better when the party system is less fragmented and when the chief executive's party holds a majority or near majority in the legislature. When presidents face fragmented or opposition partisan majorities, levels of interbranch conflict are higher, deadlock over policy more frequent, and the incidence of one side or the other supporting extraconstitutional means of resolving conflicts more common. Given that electoral rules have a large influence on party system fragmentation, they are especially important to how presidential democracy works and even to whether it survives. Electoral systems analysis, then, ought to focus on the presidential cases. This is precisely Jones's project.

There is good reason comparative electoral studies have traditionally ignored presidential systems. Most are located in Latin America, and many have histories punctuated with authoritarian interregna and periods of limited democracy in which electoral rules were manipulated to the advantage or disadvantage of specific parties. Since the late 1970s, however, reasonably open and competitive elections have been on the rise throughout the region, so Jones has a substantial base of data with which to work. Moreover, he complements his national electoral data nicely with data from Argentina's 23 provincial governments. This both allows him to test for the robustness of his cross-national results and provides a nice primer on the increasingly important area of subnational politics for those interested in Latin American federalism.

The book is compact and well organized, with the central purpose remaining clear throughout all chapters. Having early established the claim that broad partisan support in the legislature is essential to the performance of presidentialism, Jones sets out to determine which elements of electoral law determine whether presidents regularly enjoy such support. Jones sets the target threshold at 45% of legislative seats rather than an absolute majority, in part because the loose party discipline associated with most presidential systems means that working coalitions in the legislature can be malleable on the margin. The key is to avoid intractable conflict between the branches.

The results underscore the importance of examining the presidential systems separately from parliamentary ones. The usual suspects in studies of comparative electoral systems—magnitude of (i.e., how many legislators elected from each), electoral districts, and the electoral formula (e.g., divisor versus quota system) used in legislative elections—have no substantial effect on party system fragmentation or average levels of partisan support for the president. Rather, in the Latin American cases, it is the manner in which the *president* is elected that has a spillover effect on the legislative party system and so shapes the levels of partisan support chief executives find in congress.

The key elements of electoral law for Jones, then, are whether presidents are chosen by plurality rule or by majority runoff, and whether the presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently or on different schedules. The first choice has generated some unintended consequences during the most recent wave of democratic transitions in Latin America, Jones suggests, precisely because those designing electoral laws have misunderstood their effects. The divided three-way contest in 1970 in Chile that produced Salvador Allende's ill-fated presidency is seen by many as an example of the dangers of plurality rule (although, in fact, the election was not technically held under plurality rule). In order to avoid the possibility of producing presidents who lack majority support, seven Latin American countries have switched to the majority runoff formula over the past twenty years. Although runoffs, by definition, guarantee that the winner receives a majority in the final round, they also decrease the hurdle for success in the first round considerably and so encourage more candidates to enter the race, thus fragmenting the vote among more candidates in presidential contests under the majority system. This effect, in turn, is compounded by the fact that, where legislative elections are concurrent, they are invariably held on the same day as the *first* round of presidential balloting, rather than with the runoff. The result is that runoff systems do not generate presidents with strong majority mandates, as intended. Instead, they tend to produce presidents with relatively narrow support coalitions and weak support in congress. In the extreme cases, Jones notes, where the runner-up in the first round of balloting goes on to win the presidency, his support is even weaker and his relations with the legislature even more conflictual. In the case of Peru's Alberto Fujimori and Guatemala's Jorge Serrano, prolonged battles with congress ended in presidential coups against the other branch.

Comparative politics has acknowledged that presidentialism and multipartism are, in Scott Mainwaring's words, a "difficult combination" ("Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies* 26:198–228). Jones begins at this insight and then departs in a different direction from most. Rather than call for the redesign of constitutions, as do Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela in their case for parliamentarism (*The Failure of Presidential Government*, 1994), Jones regards it as more feasible to engineer electoral laws in order to avoid feckless presidencies in the first place. In this sense, he appears to be swimming in the same current as institutional designers rather than most political scientists, and not just those in Latin America. Most of the new political systems set up over the past eight years in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have established elected presidencies with substantial political power. Although many of these systems are not purely presidential, the interaction of the electoral rules for the executive and the legislature have serious influence on the nature of their party systems and, we can expect, on regime performance. Jones's book on electoral rules in presidential democracies, therefore, should be of interest to students of comparative electoral systems and institutional design generally, as well as being the definitive account of the effects of electoral rules on party systems in Latin America.

The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989. By Jeffrey Kopstein. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 246p. $39.95.

Laurence McFalls, *Université de Montréal*

"We pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us." Refreshingly, Jeffrey Kopstein does not trot out this well-worn cliché to denounce, again, the inability of East European state socialist regimes to legitimate themselves through economic performance. Instead, he makes the theoretically more original and empirically more plausible argument that economic decline was a paradoxical source of political stability, if not of outright legitimacy, in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and presumably elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Kopstein does not state his argument in exactly these terms, but at the end of his analytic history of central economic policymaking and of its local implementation in the GDR, it is clear that he has taken the familiar story of the irrationalities of central planning and of bureaucratic and shop-floor resistance to reform and turned it into a fascinating interpretation of the peculiar rationality of communist rule.

Although he insightfully addresses a broad range of theoretical issues of (post)communist studies and comparative politics as a whole, Kopstein frames his study as a critique of the technocratic theory of communist rule, which in the 1960s and 1970s grew out of modernization theory and its prediction of functional convergence in societies with a complex division of labor. The GDR's high level of industrialization and its leadership's use of technocratic language having led Western scholars almost uniformly to accept the theory's validity there, Kopstein treats East Germany as a critical case for technocratic theory. In the first part of his study (chapters 1 through 3), he examines economic policymaking from "the top down" and demonstrates that the technocratic imperatives of economic rationality never governed the planning or the administration of production in the GDR. Drawing extensively on newly available planning commission and party archives, Kopstein quickly disposes of the myth that if anyone could make a Soviet-style planned economy work, it was the diligent Prussians and Saxons of the GDR. To the contrary, attempts in the late 1940s and early 1950s to impose Taylorist techniques, piece work, or Stakhanovite norms met with the mature and egalitarian East German working class's shop floor resistance, its steady westward migration, and its active rebellion on June 17, 1953. Thus, East German policymakers from the beginning to the end of the GDR faced and recognized insurmountable structural constraints: low productivity, little labor discipline, and a perpetually tight labor market. These labor constraints coupled with bureaucratic resistance—not to a potential loss of power but to complex, unpredictable tasks—ultimately scuttled the one more or less sincere but inconsistent attempt at technocratic reform in GDR history, party leader Walter Ulbricht's introduction in 1963 of a market-inspired New Economic System. Ulbricht's successor, Erich Honecker, despite his constant references to the "main task" of production and to the scientific-technical revolution, understood little about economics but did recognize the political necessity of retaining worker docility through social spending and consumer goods subsidization. The so-called unity of social and economic policy that he introduced upon accession to power in 1971 bought acquiescence but cost, as planning chief Gerhard Schürer warned immediately with the wisdom of Cassandra, an unsustainable state debt, which left the GDR virtually bankrupt by the early 1980s. While Western credits and the machinations of hard-currency procurer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski kept the GDR afloat a few more years, even Honecker, it would appear from Kopstein's reports on final Politburo meetings, was resigned to the GDR's demise in 1989.

In the second and more unusual part of the book (chapters 4 through 7), Kopstein looks at economic management from "the bottom up," or, more accurately, from the middle both up and down, that is, from the perspective of the regional and district party secretaries responsible for implementing policy and plans, and he shows how production degenerated into an economically ineffective but politically quite rational "campaign economy." Using the technocratic model of Jerry Hough's *The Soviet Prefects* (1969) as a theoretical counterpoint and drawing on published personal testimonials as well as archival sources, Kopstein demonstrates that the party secretaries were not administrative coordinators between Berlin and the provinces but political operators concerned less with production than with the reproduction of party authority. In addressing problems of local plan fulfillment and production supply, of motivating labor on the shop floor, or of housing stock and consumer goods, party secretaries did not seek solutions—these were beyond their capacities in any case—but tried to look like they were. The purpose of economic campaigns, be they to discover hidden reserves or to spur greater productivity through "socialist competition," was not to promote economic efficiency but to lend the impression that party secretaries were the appropriate decision-making authorities. Kopstein describes the campaign economy as a form of political theater that "helped to prevent alternative ways of conceiving the GDR's economic problems" (p. 152).

Thus, Kopstein arrives at his study's most original conclusion: The party secretaries and the party as a whole actually had a political interest in the perpetuation of economic crisis. As his book's title perfectly summarizes, politics in the GDR really were about economic decline in the sense that the political system's reproduction depended on its inability technocratically to master material production! Given the structural constraints of labor resistance and centralized planning, it was politically more rational for local and central party leaders to engage in economically ineffective and ultimately doomed ritual than to pursue economically rational policies that would have promptly provoked revolutionary labor unrest or deprived the GDR of its socialist raison d'être. Such a system could assure the relative stability of the GDR from 1953 until the economy went irretrievably bankrupt and the political ritual could no longer retain even a veneer of credibility.

Kopstein's political economic analysis can make sense of much of the history of the GDR: the repeated use of ineffective campaigns to augment labor productivity; the half-heartedness of reform efforts; the economic irresponsibility but political necessity of Honecker's social policy; the failure of the regime to put up resistance to its final collapse. Kopstein is necessarily right to insist that the GDR's survival ultimately depended on the regime's ability to assure the conditions for its material reproduction, but his analysis also shows that the regime did not survive as long as it did by living on economically borrowed time alone. Political illusion (whereby workers pretended to work, pretended to be paid, and pretended to respect party secretaries' authority) stabilized the regime as well. Thus, while Kopstein's book convincingly identifies the political and economic structural parameters that determined the GDR's fate, it also calls out for a deeper, culturalist analysis of the "political theater" that perpetuated party rule during forty years of economic folly.

Mobile Capital and Latin American Development. By James E. Mahon, Jr. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. 212p. $45.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.

Richard Stahler-Sholk, *Pitzer College*

The Mexican peso crisis and the antics of the Salinas family have rekindled popular interest in the capital movements of

Latin America's rich and famous, a fascination fueled by the punditry of Jorge Castaneda (*The Mexican Shock*, 1995) and Andres Oppenheimer (*Bordering on Chaos*, 1996). Just in time, we are rescued from the chattering classes by Jim Mahon's thoughtful and tightly argued scholarship on the relation between capital flight and the general Latin American shift from inward-oriented to neoliberal development strategies.

Mahon challenges the conventional wisdom that capital flight can be simply attributed to postwar Latin American development strategies of protectionism and the fiscal excesses of populist leaders. He does so by first revisiting the East Asia/Latin America comparison, which has been used to dismiss dependency theory and tout the virtues of export-oriented industrialization. Going beyond the commonly cited specificities of East Asia (the nature of Japanese colonialism, patterns of Cold War U.S. aid, and distribution of income and land), Mahon argues that Latin American NICs were more closed on trade but open on capital account than the Asian "tigers" and that Latin American elites have more internationally oriented consumption and asset preferences. These structural conditions in the region, combined with international factors (such as increased procyclical lending to middle-income countries in the 1970s), contributed to exchange market volatility and capital flight in the 1980s. Given the disastrous effect of that "lost decade," this is an important call to reconsider the notion of structural dependence before celebrating Latin America's dramatic opening to world market forces.

The interregional comparison is complemented by a detailed examination of six Latin American countries that experienced more capital flight (Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela) or less (Brazil, Chile, Colombia) in the early 1980s. Mahon finds that the countries with less flight had imposed earlier exchange policy reforms and controls in response to recurring foreign exchange crises. He develops a nuanced explanation of this policy difference by comparing export product concentration and ownership structure, class relations, and political power of export elites.

This thorough examination of the causes of capital flight is followed by a more speculative discussion of the effects of private capital outflow in ushering in neoliberal policies after 1982. Three heuristically useful alternative explanations for the neoliberal sea-change are presented: ideological influences and political learning, the role of the IMF and similar agents, and mobile capital. The latter factor is divided into (1) a political economy explanation stressing transnational capitalist alliances and (2) an economic argument that capital flight extended the debt crisis, which necessitated state policies to attract increasingly scarce capital.

Mahon leans toward this last causal path, but the conclusion might be different if one were to look beyond the outflow of private national capital to include the interaction of various capital flows (including cross-conditionality among international creditors) which together constrained policy choices. Also, Sylvia Maxfield (*Governing Capital*, 1990) shows the effect of international financial integration in rearranging the alliance strategies of domestic capitalists.

This book highlights the growing power of mobile capital to discipline governments, with problematical implications for democracy. In an evocative metaphor, Mahon challenges the neoliberal enthusiasm for "mobile capital as a kind of virtual senate, guarding property against arbitrary presidents and popular passions" (p. 26). The new ideology of market opening celebrates capital flight as "a way that private savers had placed the national patrimony beyond the reach of a grasping and corrupt political class" (p. 152).

The helter-skelter retreat of state intervention in the economy has undermined state capacity and legitimacy, while the cross-class effect of economic adjustment measures disrupts existing patterns of state-society relations. As Roberts and others have noted (Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case," *World Politics* October 1995, pp. 82–116), neoliberal programs are increasingly implemented by autocratic leaders employing a new populist discourse. They claim technocratic adherence to policies benefiting all the people, supposedly transcending organized political interest, while building centralized clientelist networks in the guise of targeted social compensation programs.

Paradoxically, advocates of economic liberalization also want effective political institutions to protect property rights and the rule of law. Hence recent World Bank, IMF, and USAID attention to "policy dialogue" with debtors about "good governance." Yet, as Mahon perceptively notes, this assumes that "by efficiently aggregating private decisions, the market represents the 'public interest' better than does the political realm. . . . Leaving aside the political problems with this assumption, we cannot take it to imply that the market will necessarily promote the creation of new political institutions. The same people and firms that can move asset markets may rationally prefer the informal political access they often enjoy" (p. 180). Recent comparative work by Grindle (*Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa*, 1996) supports this skeptical interpretation of political institutionalization in the wake of the neoliberal onslaught.

The Mexican case illustrates this indeterminacy. Economic reforms undermined the PRI's corporatist structures: With real wages down 70% from their 1978 peak, the ruling party's labor sector (CTM) has not dared to hold a May Day rally since the December 1994 peso devaluation. Independent civic organizing fueled the growth of electoral opposition on the left (PRD) and right (PAN), testing the limits of electoral reform. Efforts of technocrat Zedillo to decentralize a presidentialist system have only strengthened the hand of regional party bosses.

It is interesting to consider the lessons of *mobile capital* in light of the 1990s repatriation of flight capital—combined with the resurgence of foreign direct and, increasingly, portfolio investment—to Latin America. This last component in particular accentuates the volatility and lack of democratic accountability about which Mahon warns. A revealing "Emerging Markets" memorandum circulated in January 1995 by Chase Manhattan Bank, one of the creditors in the Mexican loan bailout, suggests that the Mexican government would need to eliminate the Zapatista rebels and carefully consider whether to recognize opposition electoral victories in order to restore investor confidence. A few weeks later, the government launched a military offensive aimed at capturing rebel leaders.

The overall picture of capital outflows and inflows over the last twenty years suggests that capital, having properly "disciplined" governments, is now returning to enjoy low labor costs, fire-sale privatizations, and other new prerogatives. Challenges to the new bargain will have to come from independent organizing efforts from below.

Mobile Capital offers an outstanding study of capital flight, along with thought-provoking reflections on the political implications of neoliberalism.

The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms. By Bo Rothstein. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. 231p. $59.95.

Christine Ingebritsen, *University of Washington*

The study of social democratic welfare states has evolved from tracing the historical development of model political economies (F. G. Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare*, 1985; Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, *Modern Welfare States*, 1989; Gösta Esping-Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, 1985; Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets*, 1985; John Stephens, *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism*, 1979; Tim Tilton, *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy*, 1990) to examining the crisis of social democracy (Staffan Marklund, *Paradise Lost?*, 1988; Jonas Pontusson, *The Limits of Social Democracy*, 1992). The most recent publications in comparative welfare policy analyze the politics of reform and retrenchment (Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," *World Politics*, January 1996, pp. 143–79). For scholars interested in understanding the political and institutional challenges of Swedish policy reform, *The Social Democratic State* is an important and timely contribution to the literature. Bo Rothstein asks: "What limits does a social democratic government labor under, and what possibilities does it enjoy, in using the state to implement large-scale social change" (p. 9)? Informed by Weber and Marx, Rothstein documents the limits and capacities of state-led reforms during the period of Social Democratic hegemony in Sweden (1932–76). The implications of his study have a much broader application to more recent efforts to reform the welfare state, however. Rothstein's volume is an appropriate Swedish companion to the detailed, theoretical analysis of social policy reform in the United States and Great Britain by Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment* (Cambridge University Press, 1994). Yet, according to Rothstein, it is not the legacy of policies that structures the reform process but the organizational characteristics of the agencies that implement social policies. *The Social Democratic State* is a valuable resource for teaching and research that combines theoretical insights from Scandinavian organizational theory (J. G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, 1989) and the "new institutionalist" approaches in comparative politics (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics*, 1992; M. Weir, *Politics and Jobs*, 1992).

Rothstein analyzes two policies central to the Swedish model: active labor market policy and comprehensive school reform. He traces the program content, personnel, and funding of the agencies responsible for implementing the policies, AMS (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, the National Labor Market Board) and SÖ (Skolöverstyrelsen, the National Board of Education). Rothstein contrasts the success of active labor market policy with the failure of comprehensive school reform in Sweden. In a rich and detailed account of social democratic intentions and policy results, he provides one of the most clearly articulated descriptions of Swedish active labor market policy. He also isolates important differences in how the government directed the two agencies to implement reforms (the goals and the means). Rothstein argues that the members of the National Labor Market Board and the National Board of Education were operating in two separate organizational cultures, or "two different worlds" (p. 169), each with distinct capacities to respond to reform initiatives.

With the exception of Pontusson's *The Limits of Social Democracy* (1992), which also focuses exclusively on changes in Swedish policies, prominent contributions to the contemporary literature on social democracy attribute policy differences to institutional variations at the national level (Katzenstein 1985; Gary Mucciaroni, *The Political Failure of Employment Policy, 1945–1982*, 1992; F. W. Scharpf, *Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy*, 1991). Rothstein's microanalysis of policies embedded in distinct political-institutional structures *within* the Swedish state is novel precisely because it refutes an assumed homogeneity in the relationship between state institutions and policies in Sweden.

What is missing from Rothstein's analysis? The Swedish political economy is embedded in another form of hierarchy that is not discussed in the book: changes in the international political economy. For example, as Sweden prepared to enter the European Union, numerous economic and social policies were subject to reform. The speed and depth of Swedish implementation of these reforms (including agricultural policy, capital regulations, and labor market policy) run counter to Rothstein's analysis, which suggests that political actors engage entirely separate institutional arrangements and predicts different outcomes. While Rothstein's case studies are, indeed, more sheltered from the forces of global capitalism and regional integration, other areas of policy reform may not replicate the patterns he so carefully describes in *The Social Democratic State.*

Despite the absence of the international dimension in Rothstein's book, it is required reading for Scandinavian scholars, comparativists interested in the politics of reform, and policy analysts. The leadership of Sweden's Social Democratic Party would be well advised to read the Rothstein volume for valuable advice on the institutional conditions for successful policy reform.

States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies. Edited by Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 332p. $55.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Christa Altenstetter, *City University of New York and Queens College*

In this edited volume Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol have assembled a series of original contributions asking two basic questions: What effect did ideas and knowledge have on policymaking and the responses of state bureaucracies to the consequences of industrialization and urbanization, such as the problems associated with the loss of the breadwinner, illness, industrial work and accidents, child labor, and public health in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century? And how did ideas gain access to public policymakers? The answers to these questions go far to explain the rise of the welfare state in advanced industrial societies in Western Europe and North America. Among the contributors are Ira Katznelson, Anson Rabinbach, Björn Wittrock, Peter Wagner, Van Rossem, Libby Schweber, John R. Sutton, Stein Kuhnle, and Sheldon Garon.

If there is one widely accepted interpretation that is fundamentally questioned by all contributors, it is the explanation that class conflict primarily explains the development of the welfare state in industrial societies. As this volume so vividly demonstrates, the theme stated in the title encompasses an array of complex connections among ideas, politics, interests, and institutions that are heavily intertwined with class conflict but go beyond it. All contributors convincingly show that academic discourse and research in universities and other scientific institutions worked their way into reform proposals and had a major bearing on the political debates about specific problems and the final policy choices governments made on the basis of class conflict.

This volume stands out from previous comparative analyses of the welfare state and the origins of social policy for three reasons. First, it places the emergence of the welfare state into a longer historical context, not only demonstrating the existence of an infinite variety of organizational roots of various insurance schemes and practices prior to the Bismarck era of the 1880s (usually treated as the beginning of modern social policies) but also showing persuasively how initial policy choices remained substantially in place over time and structured successive debates about new reform proposals.

Societies differed in the strength or weakness of the role assigned to state institutions. Whether weak or strong, their influence was long lasting but not uniform and was manifested differently in regard to pensions for old age, insurance for illness or industrial work and accidents, public health, or child labor. Similarly, the balance of power between state and private institutions was not the same for all social programs, even in one and the same society.

Second, the contributions combine traditional analyses ("bureaucratizing state apparatuses," "official actors," "political parties," "state and federal courts," and the "new uses of knowledge") with a study of the influence of policy intellectuals, the knowledge community, knowledge-bearing elites, and knowledge-generating institutions on reformist legislation and public policymaking. The parallels to modern political phenomena, described as policy communities, policy networks, and the role of epistemic communities, are striking. Unlike these modern versions, however, among "policy thinkers" civil servants were the dominant force in transferring ideas into politics and practice. Being trained in the same academic disciplines and cognitive, analytical, and normative skills, they helped to place academic agenda items on the public agenda and applied them to the analysis of social problems. Outside academia they continued to practice the exclusionary style of academic discourse and followed the "orthodox schools of thought" to which they were exposed at the university. By doing so, they sometimes broadened, sometimes confused, the political debates that were centered around class conflict.

Third, thanks to the selection of a single policy issue and its in-depth analysis in two countries, all chapters are richly comparative. As a sequel to *Bringing the State Back In* (Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 1985), which constituted a turning point in American political science, this book is a complex account of the development of the welfare state in Europe and North America. Because considerable historical knowledge on the part of the reader is assumed, there is a danger that the reader who is not historically knowledgeable may prefer preconceived theoretical interpretations, which often camouflage ideological positions, instead of the nuanced arguments presented in these contributions.

Each chapter has extensive footnotes, insightful explanatory notes, and references to a rich non-English-language as well as English-language literature, reestablishing the international nature of genuine scholarship and lifting it out of an often misguided parochialism that looks at the world solely through English-language sources. To say it positively, this volume as well as its precursors are definitely decisive steps forward, pointing toward a balanced understanding of what is and should be considered good political science and/or sociology. *Bringing the State Back In* was a welcome corrective to a tendency in the political science community to neglect the particular historical path of societies in favor of theory-rich studies that often lack common sense about human experiences. The book under review is not a "new" historical-comparative analysis, just as the "new" institutionalism never really was new. It reestablishes a welcome balance after decades in which both had fallen into neglect by a good many political scientists.

Ira Katznelson's argument that "knowledge about what" should receive priority over the issue of "knowledge for what" is persuasive. Pathbreaking innovations in the relationship of state institutions, markets, and societies are taking place everywhere. Revolutionary changes in the production, transfer, and use of new knowledge entail a shift of basic research from university to industrial research and innovation in globalizing and regionalizing worlds. Describing the nature and scope of transformation processes and how these interface with other processes at the international, regional, national, and local level is essential before positing theories about them.

As a comparative history of social knowledge and social policies in several societies, this volume underemphasizes the specific political settings in which these transformations were taking place. A stronger case also could have been made about the exclusion of the working class and women from the triangle of knowledge-generating institutions, knowledge-bearing elites, and public policy everywhere. Furthermore, one may wish that the authors had stressed more forcefully the gatekeeping role of these knowledge generators, distributors, and users operating through closed old-boy networks. They were elitist and, in most instances, authoritarian and oppressive, even in liberal and democratic societies, and above all they were sexist. Until fairly recently women were excluded from the circulation of educated professional elites, from university to civil service positions.

This book is not just for specialists. All students of the welfare state, comparative public policy, American and comparative politics, and the sociology of knowledge should read this volume or some portions of it in order to understand better the development of states, social knowledge, and the origins of modern social policies and how these interactive processes have actually occurred.

The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics. By Eduardo Silva. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 272p. $59.00.

Paul E. Sigmund, *Princeton University*

This is a revisionist treatment of economic policymaking in Chile. It argues that economic elites had far more to do with the policies of the military government than is believed in the conventional view, which centers on the imposition of a radical market opening by an authoritarian government and an insulated group of technocrats, the so-called Chicago boys. It examines the role of Chilean businessmen and landowners, especially the large conglomerates, before the 1973 coup and in three distinct periods of policymaking, gradualist (1973–75), radical (1975–82), and pragmatic (1983–88) neoliberalism. Silva maintains that "access to and influence over economic policy" by the members of the "dominant capitalist coalition" (p. 11) explain both their continuing support for Pinochet and the maintenance of the neoliberal model after democratization. He also argues that because of their need to maintain good relations with business elites, the post-Pinochet center-left governments have merely carried out a process of "deepening of a neo-liberal approach to social equity and welfare statism—an outcome that indicates that the Chilean model may not be the best for resolving the problem of economic growth with social equity" (p. 12).

While the author admits that state structures, economic ideas, and international factors affected economic policy, his focus on economic elites tends to a certain reductionism in explaining Chilean politics. Thus, Allende was overthrown when those elites decide in 1972 that negotiation would not work and undertook to "orchestrate the economic and political destabilization of the Allende government" (p. 53), an explanation that ignores such factors as runaway inflation and the violence and polarization encouraged by the government. The policy of gradual economic opening adopted after the 1973 coup is described as the product of a "fragile, tension-laden, jerry-built coalition" (p. 69) of the leaders of the Edwards and BHC conglomerates and associations of businessmen and landowners, which made sure that the changes proposed by the Chicago boys would only be implemented gradually.

The 1975 shift to full-scale radical neoliberalism is linked to the triumph over domestic producers of the "internationally oriented conglomerates with a heavy concentration in liquid assets" (p. 97). The increase in oil prices, the drop in the price of copper, the bureaucratic victories of the Chicago boys, and the expansion of Pinochet's power are mentioned, but the analysis focuses on the changes in the pattern of ownership of the big conglomerates. Most of those changes took place after the shift in policy, but because the conglomerates, especially the Cruzat-Larrain and BHC groups, benefited from them, they are seen as having "wrestled control over policymaking from the gradualists" (p. 128)—a statement that clearly overstates their influence at a time when policy was made by a personalist dictator and a few of his advisors.

Skipping over the important neoliberal reforms in social policy in 1979–81, the book then concentrates on the relation of the economic elites and the Pinochet government during and after the crash of 1982–83. It argues that after a period of resistance, Pinochet adopted a more flexible policy of "pragmatic" neoliberalism involving a floating exchange rate and increased protectionism, especially in agriculture, because of the threat that the private sector might join the newly formed opposition coalition, the Democratic Alliance. It is true that between 1983 and 1985, as part of the effort to turn the economy around, policies and personnel were more directly related to business groups. Yet, they had never threatened to join the opposition, and by 1986 the Chicago boys were back in control of economic policy, albeit with more input from economic elites. Moreover, because of the government rescue operation involving the takeover of a number of banks and conglomerates, as well as the jailing of one of their heads and the bailout of *El Mercurio*, Pinochet *increased* his power over the private sector once the crisis was over—for example, at one point simply ordering the firing of the editor of *El Mercurio* after he wrote a critical article.

The mid-1980s is also important in Silva's view because at this time the opposition Democratic Alliance and its successor Concertacion coalition entered into a "tacit conservative compact" (p. 217)—whatever that is—with the economic elite to maintain neoliberal economic policy after democratization. This meant, in Silva's view, that only "mildly reformist" policies could be adopted by the center-left governments of the 1990s. To this day, "Chilean capitalists only tolerate democracy because the economic model is not threatened by social democratic policies, even in a mild form, and because their constitutional privileges remain intact" (p. 24).

It is true that because of the opposition of the nine (now eight) appointed senators, there is a conservative majority in the Chilean senate that prevents changes in the labor and electoral laws. That situation will change in 1998, however, and those "constitutional privileges" will cease. The market-oriented policies of the present government will continue, not because of a tacit pact but because they work. Although, as Silva notes, income distribution has not improved and organized labor is much weaker than it was under Allende, since democratization wages have increased 4% a year, the percentage of Chileans in poverty has declined from 40% to 25%, inflation and unemployment are under 6%, and social expenditures comprise 70% of the budget. Expenditure on education is now nearly 5% of GNP and is projected to rise to 8%, while the economy continues to grow at more than 7% a year, and the savings rate, fostered by a privatized social security system, has now reached 28% (President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, speech to U.S. Congress, February 27, 1997). Whether this can be described as social democratic, mild or otherwise, is a matter of definition, but it has certainly gone a long way toward "resolving the problem of economic growth with social equity."

This is a comprehensive, clearly argued, and provocative study that is filled with tables and analyses of the relation of economic groups to one another and to the government. It is especially useful in understanding the complex interactions of the 1982–85 period. If we ask whom the "dominant capitalist coalition" dominated, however, the answer is that from 1975 to 1990 Chilean capitalists played by Pinochet's rules, not he by theirs.

Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru. By Susan C. Stokes, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 183p. $45.00 cloth, $17.00 paper.

Carol Graham, *Brookings Institution*

Susan Stokes provides a carefully researched, well-written, and insightfully analyzed study of the changing political behavior of the poor of Peru. Her central question is whether hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, is at work in Peru: To what extent does the dominant discourse and perception of the state govern the political behavior of the poor, and how does this affect their capacity and propensity to act collectively? She conducts a detailed analysis of popular perceptions and voter behavior in a "typical" Lima shantytown, Independencia, from 1980 to 1986, as the basis for her conclusions. Stokes places her study in the context of the literature on revolutionary movements. She focuses in particular on James Scott's observation that what looks like mental domination may be nothing more than the weak cagily appealing to the ideals of dominant ideology as a means to extract material benefit.

The main strength of the book is the careful analysis and sophisticated portrayal of the poor's political behavior as influenced by many and often competing influences. Stokes describes Lima's urban poor as playing two distinct but interrelated political roles: radicals and clients. These roles emerge from two very different historical trends. The first is a strongly conservative influence, which prior to 1970 was pervasive in elite discourse, the education system, and the church and which contributed to attitudes of deference, passivity, and dependence on the part of the poor. Such attitudes even prevailed within the primary "revolutionary" party in Peru, the APRA: There was an implicit hierarchy within the party, with those of working class origins deferring to those of professional ranks. This culture of poverty easily lent itself to clientelistic political relations with the state: The receipt of material benefits, such as housing, were seen as charitable support from "patrons" in the state bureaucracy, usually in reward for good behavior. The second tendency strongly contradicts the first and emerged during the Velasco years, in which the state, the education system, and even some elements of the church emphasized the role of the state as a catalyst for social mobilization. While the Velasco regime failed in its attempt to create an "inclusionary" corporatist state, a failure which was more evident among the urban poor than in the union movement, the regime's policies sparked an uncontrolled popular mobilization that was a driving force in the transition to civilian rule and then influenced popular and political behavior for the subsequent decade.

Perceptions of the state, propensity to mobilize collectively, and voting behavior were influenced by both these trends, with education and affiliation with organized labor being the most important factors determining "radical" versus "clientelistic" behavior, although they were not always mutually exclusive. Radicals were more likely to be skeptical of the state's intentions and to adopt a confrontational stance in bargaining for public benefits. Not surprisingly, the very poorest were less likely to display "radical" behavior than were those in middle income categories (of the poor), as they were more likely to be preoccupied with survival rather than politics. Some wealthier members of the community, meanwhile, maintained conservative political outlooks and perceived ties to professional or white-collar elites, which dissuaded their propensity to identify with the collective cause of the poor. Nevertheless, voting behavior among the poor in the early and mid-1980s demonstrated a strong and unprecedented shift to the left.

Stokes concludes that the coexistence of these dual modalities of behavior results from the military regime's failure to implement its strategy of inclusionary corporatism and to build a lasting base of support among the poor. This failure was structural as much as a result of blundered tactics: The urban poor were organized by geographic area and by community, which did not provide the same kind of base for corporatism as did organized labor, upon which the state depended for productive purposes. Stokes questions Scott's assumption that the poor's behavior is driven by survival objectives and stresses the role of the traditional hegemony of dependence and clientelism, as well as the counterhegemony of social mobilization propounded by the state itself during the Velasco years, in determining the outlook and behavior of the poor.

This may be the primary weakness of the book. Clearly, these dual forces had a role in determining the behavior of the poor, but they do not adequately explain the dramatic rise of support for the left in the early 1980s and, more important, its dramatic fall in the early 1990s. Stokes does not give sufficient attention to the role of economic trends. While she highlights the role of Sendero Luminoso in her postscript, she only mentions hyperinflation and dramatic economic collapse in passing. The poor's view of the state, of the utility of mobilizing collectively, and of politics in general was strongly influenced by the dramatic erosion of living standards in the 1980s. Stokes herself notes that women were less likely to engage in "radical" political organization than were men and that women were more likely to seek a free meal for their children from a soup kitchen instead. Yet, she fails to note that this also reflects structural trends in poverty, which in turn influence political behavior. Female-headed households are much more likely to be in extreme poverty, for example. And after the 1990 stabilization price shocks, women were critical in organizing social safety nets for Peru's urban poor, via communal kitchens and other feeding programs. The scope and strength of autonomous popular (and primarily female-led) organizations, which were able to provide essential benefits during severe economic crisis at a time when traditional parties, unions, and the state seemed virtually helpless, changed political perceptions and voting behavior in Peru as much as the two previous trends that Stokes identifies. Since 1990, traditional political parties and actors—including the left—have been replaced by widespread support for independents (most of whom are *not* linked to President Fujimori).

While this does not necessarily contradict Stokes's analysis, it highlights another critical factor: economic trends and changes in poverty. In the same way that the politics of the 1980s reflected the move toward collective social mobilization of the 1970s, the politics of the 1990s reflects the perceived failure of that movement to prevent a dramatic erosion of living standards. Political support in the 1990s overwhelmingly goes to independent political actors who demonstrate effective performance, with or without the support of an increasingly obsolete state apparatus. The extent to which this trend erodes both the hegemony and counterhegemony that Stokes describes remains to be seen. Regardless, Stokes has contributed to our understanding of the factors that influence the political behavior of the poor, in Peru and in many other countries. She should be commended for a job well done.

Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade. By Randall W. Stone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 283p. $39.50.

Philip G. Roeder, *University of California, San Diego*

Randall Stone provides a theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich study of the constraints on Soviet-bloc trading relations imposed by the structure of command economies. This book speaks not only to international relations specialists concerned with rigorous analysis of political economy and two-level bargaining processes but also to area specialists seeking a description of Eastern bloc trade negotiations prior to 1991. Masterfully linking theory and case study, Stone provides a provocative analysis that challenges a number of prevailing views about Soviet–East European relations and describes a record of pervasive Soviet bargaining failure.

Stone's theoretical synthesis in the introduction and conclusion carefully draws together a model of the principal-agent relations that existed within the Soviet command economy and a model of bargaining among representatives of the Soviet Union and the East European communist countries. Stone's principal theoretical contribution is this domestic-international link. He claims that domestic economic structures weakened the position of the Soviet Union in intrabloc negotiations; specifically, Soviet leaders were unable to make credible commitments to their satellite counterparts or to monitor the implementation of agreements by satellite governments, and lower-level Soviet negotiators were unable to show resolve in talks with their East European counterparts or to link issues in mutually beneficial agreements.

Stone's empirical work, drawing on extensive interviews and archival materials, traces negotiations within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON). First, he examines the bilateral terms of trade, specifically: Why did the Soviet Union continue to subsidize the energy it provided Eastern Europe and to accept overpriced, low-quality machinery in exchange? Stone argues that it was not a policy choice, but bargaining failure. Second, he turns to negotiations within CMEA to promote multilateral integration, including the Comprehensive Program of 1971, the Long-Term Target Program of 1978 and 1979, the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress proposed in 1985, and the diffuse proposals for restructuring the socialist market under perestroika. Why did one Soviet initiative after another fail at the stage of implementation after CMEA members had reached agreement on broad principles? Again, according to Stone, it was bargaining failure; Soviet negotiators were unable to show resolve, make credible commitments, link issues, or monitor implementation.

Skeptics may dispute Stone's conclusions but are less likely to question the quality of his analysis and research. Indeed, his careful study has set the terms for debate and an agenda for further research. First, can analysis of intergovernmental trade talks be extracted from the larger political context? The set of negotiations that Stone considers took place within a larger political relationship in the Soviet bloc that was hierarchical. Stone makes clear that Soviet leaders insisted they could impose their views on satellites, set the agenda for the CMEA talks, and, perhaps most important, decide which trade issues would be declared "political" and resolved in arenas other than the CMEA. Perhaps the important question is why a regional hegemon would permit any issues to be resolved in an arena such as the CMEA rather than in an arena where it is more likely to have its way.

Second, without further theoretical focus to narrow the possible influences on outcomes, is the framework of the bargaining *process* used by Stone indeterminate in its predictions? Stone accurately specifies the relationship between the domestic constraints on the intrabloc bargaining that he studies, but without explanation he simply ignores other constraints suggested by his model that should have had exactly opposite effects. Stone's model may actually lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union should have prevailed in negotiations. For example, in a contest of resolve, the party with alternative offers in hand is more likely to prevail. In this the Soviet Union had a clear advantage, since there were many domestic suppliers of the goods being traded among bloc members. Another example: Divisions on one side of the bargaining table are likely to weaken its position. In this the Soviet Union also had an advantage. Stone claims that Soviet negotiators were handicapped by departmental divisions within the Soviet command economy, but these paled by comparison with the divisions among the separate command economies of Eastern Europe. Although Stone slips into a verbal shorthand that makes Eastern Europe seem to be a unified actor, these divisions permitted the Soviet Union to play one against another. Much of the bargaining between the Soviet Union and individual satellite states that Stone studies may have been competition among the East Europeans for the all-valuable Soviet subsidy. In this competition the Soviets could force East European negotiators to reveal their true preferences and could get the satellites to come to terms by threatening each with the alternative offers of the others.

Finally, was each outcome that Stone describes the result of a policy choice in the Kremlin rather than a bargaining outcome on Kalinin Street (CMEA)? Several of the most important outcomes that Stone ascribes to intergovernmental bargaining, such as the subsidy for energy and the priority given to quota fulfillment over quality, were common inside the Soviet command economy, where East European leaders exercised little if any influence over outcomes. While Stone demonstrates carefully that the Soviets did not vary the magnitude of their energy subsidy in order to extract short-term political advantage in Eastern Europe, he does not address the question of whether Soviet leaders saw the subsidy as a necessary price for larger political objectives. Indeed, many readers may suspect that Stone has begun with a false premise—that the Soviet Union failed in its bargaining with Eastern Europe and was unable to use its political resources to political effect. If the overarching objective of Soviet leaders was to tie Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, then bargaining over the terms of trade within the Soviet bloc was exactly what they sought to create. They wanted their satellites scrambling for this valuable asset rather than looking for more lucrative trade opportunities in the West.

Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957–1990. By Rudolf L. Tökés. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 544p. $64.25 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Michael H. Bernhard, *Pennsylvania State University*

This book is a thickly descriptive interpretative account of Hungarian politics from the failed revolution of 1956 to the transition to democracy in 1989–90. It is based on a wealth of sources, including recently accessible party and state documents, interviews with many of the country's significant politicians, the growing body of insider accounts and memoirs, and the secondary literature on Hungary in both English and Hungarian. Tökés seems to have ferreted out nearly every source that bears on his topic.

The first of the book's three parts establishes the legacy of the 1956 revolution, including the reform course established by Hungary's leader, János Kádár, beginning in 1961. It traces the emergence of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) following Soviet intervention and its slow slide from the "vanguard" force of post-Stalinist reform to what Tökés describes as a "rearguard." Specifically, he shows how in the face of increased difficulties in steering the political and economic system in the 1980s the HSWP began to withdraw from direct intervention in politics. This account of the party's internal life contains a great deal of new material on factional and personal struggles within the party. This part of the book also includes a discussion of the centerpiece of Hungarian reform, the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), and how its partial market measures left the Hungarian economy of the 1980s stagnant. The section closes with an overview of social change during the reform period. Unlike many of his colleagues, Tökés argues that Hungary experienced significant socioeconomic modernization during this period. He puts strong emphasis on the emergence of a highly differentiated social structure, including a highly competent and independent middle sector, whose elite began to abandon the party in its retreat from difficult political issues in favor of employment in the newly empowered state.

The second part is devoted to the main actors of the transition process of 1989–90, the party-state elite and the opposition. The discussion of the Hungarian opposition is the best concise account to appear in English to date. The author traces the evolution of the democratic opposition centered in Budapest around the samizdat publication *Beszélö*, the provincial nationalist opposition which benefited from the toleration and even support of elements within the party-state, and the reform intelligentsia within the party itself. The inclusion of the last may strike some observers as controversial, but Tökés convincingly argues that the spirit of reform was not dead within the HSWP and that these internal critics played a significant role in the process.

The last section examines Hungary's withdrawal from authoritarianism and the beginnings of democracy. It begins with a discussion of the removal of János Kádár as First Secretary of the HSWP and his replacement by Károly Grósz. It then discusses how Grósz was effectively isolated and replaced by a trio of reformist politicians—Reszö Nyers, Imre Pozsgay, and Miklós Németh. It next turns to the roundtable negotiations that preceded the founding democratic elections of 1990. This process was unique in Hungary in that there was an Opposition Roundtable, where the democratic and nationalist opposition agreed to negotiate jointly with the party-state authorities. This section concludes with an account of the elections of 1990 and the victory by the Hungarian Democratic Forum led by József Antall.

Throughout this detailed and thorough narrative Tökés makes a very powerful argument on the conservative nature of the Hungarian transition. He points out how the intelligentsia and white-collar strata had begun to disassociate their interests from the HSWP by transferring allegiance to the state or by acquiring private property under the provisions of the last phase of the NEM. He then argues that the transition was negotiated by the reform, critical, and nationalist intelligentsia in a way that preserved the socioeconomic position of the upper white-collar strata of Hungarian society. This analysis is carried through in the book's conclusion to include the Antall government, which despite its anticommunist campaign rhetoric never attempted to break the power of Hungary's red and green barons, the nomenklatura-based management of state-owned factories and of agricultural cooperatives. This thesis represents a radical break from the prevailing wisdom on democratization in East Central Europe. Rather than presenting Hungary's negotiated revolution as a profound social, economic, and political transformation, Tökés argues that the process has been marked by a powerful continuity. The elite has maintained its position of power despite system change.

Tökés has written a fine book. It is splendidly argued, meticulously documented, and written with a wry sense of humor. Still, specialists will disagree with parts of his interpretation. For instance, his assessment of the democratic opposition is too harsh. He claims it was interested only in change in the system rather than a change of system (p. 206). Yet, earlier in that very chapter he highlights the programmatic statement published in *Beszélö* in 1987 which called for parliamentary democracy (pp. 200–1). Similarly, his account of the growth of civil society seems to concentrate more on what Elemér Hankiss has called Hungary's "second society" rather than on civil society as it is understood in most of the literature on democratization. The book also could have been improved by more elaborate explication of some of the tables, particularly those in the chapter on social change.

Ultimately, reservations of this type are minor. The book is a major achievement. It clearly stands as the standard English-language account of democratic transition in Hungary. It is a must for Eastern European specialists as well as those interested in postcommunism and democratization in the late twentieth century.

International Relations

Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies. By Hayward R. Alker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 464p. $69.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Nicholas Onuf, *Florida International University*

By assembling in this volume two decades of wide-ranging scholarship, Hayward Alker means to tell a story about himself. The genre is familiar. It is the search for one's roots, the disavowal of youthful certainties for the recovered wisdom of distant forebears. Alker's version is important because of his stature and compelling because of his irrepressible enthusiasm for intellectual adventure and the astonishing range of his learning.

Alker started his professional life as a positivist who put methodology first. He learned his craft from Karl Deutsch and Harold Lasswell, two of the greatest positivist scholars ever, at a time when positivism held its highest prestige among social scientists and conferred scientific respectability on new fields of study. Alker continues to put methodology first and to insist on the rigors of formalization and the demands of operationalization wherever possible. He is no longer a positivist.

Alker's story is one of repeated forays into a world that science has left behind or cordoned off. In his words, they are voyages of rediscovery. Most of these voyages have taken him into the past. In an introductory chapter, he identifies the sources of his discontent and the mission he assigned himself: "adapting the logically informed analytical-empirical philosophies of research to humanistic, dialectical-hermeneutic purposes" (p. 7, emphasis deleted). He then previews the book chapter by chapter.

Alker recounts his voyages chronologically—not in the order he took them but in the order that the materials inspiring his methodological reconsiderations first appeared. Chapter 1 goes back to Thucydides, chapter 2 to Aristotle. The latter recounts Alker's latest voyage, and he wrote it specifically for the book. Previously published papers, dating from 1977 to 1992, make up eight chapters. A second paper from 1977 was previously unpublished and little noticed. Two more recent papers, also unpublished but widely circulated, yield the book's concluding chapters. Alker seems not to have revised any of these papers substantially, although footnotes provide some updating and link recurring themes.

Some chapters develop specific formal-dialectical methods and take them voyaging only in a limited, even deceptive, sense. Alker's return to Thucydides in chapter 1 is confined to that warhorse of realist analysis, the Melian Dialogue. Formalizing the dialogue as claim and counterclaim, Alker duly concludes that Thucydides had dramatic and not just scientific intentions. Alker's opinion to the contrary, few realists have ever thought otherwise. Alker's formal treatment of the Melian Dialogue gets its dramatic thrust not from Thucydides but from the dialogue Alker has imagined between scientifically oriented realists and himself.

Alker's rediscovery of Aristotle is not only the latest of his voyages but also the most revelatory. For the reader, none is more exciting. Alker enlists Martha Nussbaum as a guide and begins with Aristotle's methodological writings. These attend to "instruments of knowledge—logic, language or discourse"

(p. 73) and authorize a view of science more encompassing than today's emphasis on the universal truths of nature. Alker then proceeds to identify three Aristotles—the ethical, the systematic, and the cosmological—and establish the significance of each for contemporary scholarship, including his own. It is a masterful exposition.

Chapter 3 reports on the use of computational techniques "to discover mimetic plot structure in a powerful religious-political text" (p. 137), namely, the "Jesus story" as Arnold Toynbee schematized it. The affective meaning in this story may indeed tell us something about our civilizational legacy without making it relevant to international studies, even under Alker's exceptionally broad definition. By contrast, the subject of chapter 4—Renaissance humanism—is, as Alker shows, directly germane to the field's underpinnings even if few scholars have recognized it as such. Alker himself fully grasped the relevance of the "humanistic moment" for the field, and for himself, only upon reading Stephen Toulmin's *Cosmopolis* (1990).

Chapter 4 is the volume's centerpiece. Originally Alker's 1992 Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, it follows J. G. A. Pocock in styling Machiavelli as a civic humanist. Alker gives most of his attention, however, to Bartolomé de Las Casas, Spanish cleric and historian of the New World, who overcame his background as scholastic and imperial minion to embody "many of the most admirable aspects of humanistic modernity" (p. 167). In Las Casas, Alker found a voyager much like himself.

Not only has Alker abandoned the contemporary scholasticism of positivist social science. In 1551, Las Casas debated Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, "leading Spanish 'humanist' of his day" (p. 170n.), over the moral status of the New World's original peoples. With Robert Keohane standing in for Sepúlveda and Alker for Las Casas, we might consider Keohane's ISA Presidential Address of 1988 and Alker's 1992 speech as turns in a debate as important for the humanistic moment in international studies as Alker finds the earlier debate for another such moment. In "rescuing 'reason' from the 'rationalists'" (title, chapter 6, written 1990), Alker already had Keohane's 1988 speech very much in mind.

Dating from 1977, chapter 5 takes a cue from cybernetics to return to G. W. Leibniz. The occasion for doing so is a needlessly obscure, poorly documented discussion of power and its conceptualization. On Alker's highly selective reading, Leibniz was something of a humanist. More plausibly, Leibniz's philosophical system belongs in the tradition of dogmatic scholasticism that had turned humanists away from Aristotle and made it necessary for Alker, a number of years after writing this chapter, to rediscover Aristotle for himself.

Chapter 6 is a vigorous review of Giambattista Vico's "historical hermeneutics" (p. 209), mediated by Hayden White and applied to Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Jürgen Habermas. The next chapter attempts to read George Orwell's *1984* through Lasswellian eyes. Less about Orwell than Lasswell, the result is a fitting tribute to Alker's teacher, whose work is "grounded in the same tradition of critical and constructive humanism as Orwell's" (p. 257). Regrettably, the volume has no comparable tribute to Deutsch, despite passing remarks on the emancipatory and humanistic commitments underlying Deutsch's positivist science (pp. 3, 93n., 332n.).

The next two chapters make journeys not into the past but into the world of fairy tales, broadly conceived to include world histories, allegedly great books, and even abstract models of human interaction. As narrative structures, fairy tales lend themselves to investigation through a variety of formal analytic techniques and experimental games. Chapter 10 connects "emancipatory empiricism" to peace research by offering twelve guidelines (p. 337). Not so much "epistemological" (p. 338) as methodological, they refurbish the positivist homestead rather more than they equip peace researchers for voyaging.

Chapter 11, written in 1986 but never published, debates "the presumption of anarchy in world politics" (chapter title), a presumption forcefully stated by Kenneth Oye and others in a special issue of *World Politics* (1985). Alker makes his case by examining Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian traditions of international thought, but he actually goes back only to Hobbes and then too briefly. For the other traditions (if indeed they are traditions at all) he depends too much on Hedley Bull for guidance. Only after Alker makes the journey back to Grotius and Kant on his own will he be able to sort out the Aristotelian and humanist elements in their work and fit those elements together for his own purposes.

In the book's last chapter, Alker sympathetically reviews the work of several other scholars whose deliberations on the current state of international studies have led them more or less self-consciously back to Aristotle. The common theme that Alker identifies in this work is a sensitivity to the place of intentionality, practical reason, and judgment in human affairs. Alker's discussion of practical reason could not be more lucid or helpful. His enjoyment of others' travel stories is infectious. Indeed, vicarious voyagers may find the zest and courage that shines through this extraordinary book all the reason they need to venture out on their own.

Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. By Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 295p. $15.00.

Richard T. Cupitt, *University of Georgia*

They mean to alarm. Allison and colleagues describe in detail the degradation of the vast formerly Soviet nuclear weapons infrastructure, particularly the physical controls and social safeguards that prevented the theft, sale, diversion, or other forms of transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies. They emphasize how easy it is for terrorists, organized crime syndicates, religious cults, and other groups to create and deploy horrific weapons with access to these items. They make a strong case that the U.S. government, especially Congress, pays insufficient attention to this "most serious direct threat to U.S. vital interests today and for the foreseeable future" (p. 7). From this perspective, chance, more than the fitful policies and underfunded programs, has kept the United States, Russia, or other countries from being targets of a nuclear catastrophe.

Researchers at the Center for Science and International Affairs have made the fate of the Soviet nuclear arsenal a focus of their work since 1991. For the authors, this volume addresses the major remaining challenge: how to secure the nuclear weapons and materials now largely consolidated in Russia. The authors provide an excellent overview of the nuclear weapons infrastructure in Russia throughout the main text and in a very useful appendix. They also review the various programs the United States has adopted to meet this challenge. This well-documented study provides scholars, students, policymakers, and concerned citizens with a wealth of information on the issues.

The authors propose many changes in U.S. programs embedded in three broad policy prescriptions. First, the Clinton administration must increase its efforts to raise the alarm, mainly to gain more support for existing programs from the Russian government, Congress, and the governments of other industrial powers. Begrudging behavior by these actors, the authors claim, has hindered efforts to devise technically feasible solutions to immediate problems of material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A programs). Second, the United States has to revamp its projects to address more constructively the interests of Minatom and other Russian agencies in control of nuclear items. Third, the United States and Russia must agree on a long-term means of managing fissile materials. The authors point to the promise, and sometimes the success, of various Nunn-Lugar projects, most "lab-to-lab" projects, and fissile material transfers or purchases (i.e., Project Sapphire and the Russian highly enriched uranium deal) as models on which to build an accelerated and expanded policy of ensuring the safety of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

The Russian MPC&A problems represent a serious threat to national, regional, and global security. Nonetheless, the authors overstate the risk of a nuclear incident. Violating the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, for example, would undermine the objectives of most politically motivated groups, such as successionist movements. We may require a little hyperbole, however, to attract the attention the problem deserves, given the press of other problems facing policymakers, especially Russian leaders. Without the preparatory steps suggested in this volume and elsewhere, even a nuclear catastrophe may not prompt more than minimal action (witness the muted global response to the issues raised by the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway). From a scholarly viewpoint, this perspective does bring forth some excellent research puzzles: If the threat from "nuclear smuggling" and "loose nukes" is great, how and why have we avoided a catastrophe so far? How and why do governments ignore such signal security events and risks?

The authors also overestimate the capacity of the United States to accelerate its programs. Slowly, U.S. programs are having a positive effect. As the U.S. national laboratories have developed more "lab-to-lab" projects with their counterpart Russian institutions, they have helped improve security at key sites and provide new hope for key technical experts. The U.S. Enrichment Corporation finally agreed to purchase 18 tons of HEU this year and 114 tons over the next four years. Accelerating these and other programs, even with increased funding, would probably tax the limits of both the public and private sector. The issues involved are often highly technical and require extensive programs of specialized training to integrate new personnel into an expanded program effectively. This does not mean it should not be done; I am just less optimistic that it is feasible as a near-term solution.

Perhaps the most important point made is that the Russian government and Minatom in particular do not share the same sense of urgency as Allison and colleagues regarding this issue. Clearly, programs designed to increase the economic and political benefits of cooperation that accrue to Minatom (and Minister Mikhailov in particular) and related agencies will likely improve the situation. Moreover, hearings at the duma in November 1996 produced a consensus that shortages of funds for wages and technical facilities cast new doubts about the safety of Russian nuclear facilities. This will likely foster more cooperative action on MPC&A issues. Moreover, the recent suicide of Vladimir Nechai, director of the Chelyabinsk-70 laboratory, symbolizes the deep sense of desperation facing many in the Russian nuclear infrastructure and may spark needed changes.

Regarding the military threat these problems pose for Russia (and for the other industrial states), however, the authors simply conclude that the Russian government is not acting "commensurate with its interests" (pp. 149–50). Many Russians do not agree. In the first ever national security concept paper released by the Yeltsin government, in June 1996, proliferation is on the lowest tier of military threats facing Russia. From one perspective, for example, should Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or groups they sponsor gain access to nuclear materials, Russia is not likely to be the primary target. While Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and other governments have assistance and technical programs that relate to these problems, the book does not explore them (to be sure, they are low-profile activities). This raises more interesting research puzzles: Why do states evaluate the threat so differently? Or, if they see the threat as great, then why have Russia and other countries not done more to alleviate this problem?

One possible answer is that the world is depending on the United States to solve this problem. If the alarm raised here goes unheeded, then the world may have to wait a long time for the United States and other governments to take sufficient steps to allay the threat. The world will be a much more hazardous place as a result.

Understanding Attitudes about War: Modeling Moral Judgments. By Gregory Bunk, Donald Sechtest, and Howard Tamshiro. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. 237p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Philip E. Tetlock, *Ohio State University*

If this book had been as methodologically sophisticated as it is philosophically insightful, it might well have stood as a landmark contribution to the literature. That said, the book still falls in the must-read category for all serious students of attitudes toward war and interstate relations. Drawing on a synoptic overview of key ethical stances toward war— universal pacifism, variants of legalism and just war theory, variants of realism and neorealism, the ethos of the moral crusade—the authors proceed to develop a survey instrument that assesses the key perceptual preconditions for using force within each of these schools of thought. In some cases these preconditions are quite elaborate. Advocates of just war theories invoke such evaluative criteria as the legal legitimacy of the authorities making the decision, the necessity of self-defense, the use of proportionate means that minimize civilian casualties, the exhaustion of all possible peaceful methods of averting violent conflict, and the justness of the underlying intent in going to war. In other cases, the preconditions are starkly simplistic, such as the duty of moral crusaders to punish and destroy infidels, heretics, and class enemies who have dared to offend the crusaders' conception of the morally perfect society.

The authors administered their instrument to a heterogeneous elite sample that included members of Congress, diplomats, military officers, journalists, parish priests, and the hierarchy of the American Catholic Church. Given the serious practical problems in achieving an adequate response rate from most of these groups as well as the serious conceptual problems in defining the sampling universe from which these groups were drawn, it is not clear in what sense the sample can be said to be representative of anything of demonstrable political significance. But it is clear that the authors succeeded in pulling together a sample of thoughtful, sometimes influential, people of quite diverse points of view.

And it is clear that careful analysis of the correlational patterns in the data yields provocative and testable hypotheses for future work.

Perhaps most significant is the authors' claim to have identified "two basic moral sensibilities" that are central to the thought of educated people about war—sensibilities that often clash. On the one hand, we find concerns for implementing the golden rule and universalizing moral concerns to the point where human life takes on equal value even if the human happens to have been born behind the wrong border or at the wrong moment in a relationship between two collectivities. On the other hand, there is the contending force of in-group loyalty which demands that one place greater value on the claims of in-group authorities and that ideally one learn to despise those whose loyalties lie elsewhere, dehumanizing them to the point where their lives count for virtually nothing. Relatively few respondents in this study go all the way in the dehumanizing direction. When these basic psychopolitical orientations clash, attitudes tend to cluster around the strict just war position (the tendency to extend moral protection to all) and around variants of the expediency position (the tendency to give much greater weight to the lives and values of in-group members, with the magnitude of the effects depending on the degree of threat posed by the out-group). By most historical standards, this is not a bloodthirsty sample of humanity.

Perhaps the most significant limitation of the research reported here is its inability to identify any determinants of judgment that respondents do not care to acknowledge either to themselves or to others. To paraphrase a much quoted aphorism from Wittgenstein, the limits of our methodology are the limits of our world. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that the overwhelmingly decisive determinant of support for the use of U.S. force abroad is whether U.S. interests—strategic or economic—have been engaged. But many people feel that endorsing that sentiment is a tad crass. Or, to shift from a social desirability argument to a cognitive access argument, many people may simply not appreciate the relative importance of particular cues in shaping their judgments of when interstate violence is or is not justified. Their official policy may correspond only loosely to the actual policy that they endorse in specific conflict scenarios.

The best way to "model modern attitudes" under these circumstances is to wed the inferential strengths of survey research with those of experimental work on social cognition. In principle, it should be possible to present randomly selected subgroups of respondents with factorially manipulated sets of cues in which they are asked whether they support use of military force when certain conditions are satisfied and others are not. If we find that comparisons across experimental conditions reveal much greater support for intervention among those respondents who believe that U.S. interests are engaged than among those who do not so believe, we have strong evidence that interests are important determinants of policy, regardless of what people say about the reasons for their judgments. The logic of experimental control (everything else has been held constant) and random assignment of subjects to conditions (which minimizes systematic extraneous sources of variance) renders most alternative explanations implausible.

Moreover, if we find that most people deny using interests as an important basis for making decisions on the use of force, notwithstanding the experimental evidence that they are relying heavily on that consideration, then we can pose the natural next order of questions: Are the self-reported judgment strategies biased by social desirability concerns? Do people like to endorse high-sounding moral sentiments but quickly abandon them as soon as confronted by a complex situation in which they suppose it is impossible to unmask their true policy agenda? Or have people actually deceived themselves? Are the "theories" people construct for the causes of their own judgments systematically wrong? Do people lack access to the "true reasons" for their policy stand—a cognitive variant of false consciousness?

Ultimately the authors may be shown to have been right in their appraisal of elite American attitudes toward war, but before drawing that conclusion we should insist upon better evidence.

Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty. By Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck. University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1995. 200p. $28.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.

Janice E. Thomson, *University of Washington*

Fowler and Bunck begin by contrasting contemporary academics' pronouncements of the demise of sovereignty with its continued, even heightened relevance in international relations practice, and they suggest that "it is thus perhaps appropriate to reexamine the relevance and application of sovereignty to modern international affairs" (pp. 3–4). After examining a range of theoretical, conceptual, and definitional issues concerning state sovereignty, the authors do an empirical analysis of some historical and contemporary cases in world politics in which sovereignty was at issue. Their conclusion: "Reports of its demise notwithstanding, sovereignty appears to us to be prospering, not declining, as the twentieth century draws to a close. It still serves as an indispensable component of international politics" (pp. 163–4).

The first two chapters present a discussion of the theoretical, legal, and practical meanings of sovereignty and the sovereign state, covering familiar ground from Bodin to Hinsley to James to Jackson and Rosberg, as well as case law, the League of Nations and UN charters, and international law texts. Fowler and Bunck argue that, while territory, people, and a government are fundamental elements of state sovereignty, and the conventional requirements of internal supremacy and external independence are crucial, the number of anomalous cases suggests there is still more to sovereign statehood. In essence, they conclude that sovereign statehood is what sovereign states say it is: Acceptance into the club of sovereign states "may be derived from a strong showing of de facto or de jure independence, or ideally both, but it is ultimately the international community that determines whether a particular political entity qualifies as a sovereign state" (p. 62).

In chapter 3 the authors lay the groundwork for their empirical analysis by describing what they see as the two predominant approaches to sovereignty: the chunk and basket approaches. According to the first, sovereignty is absolute; a state either has it or does not. In contrast, the basket approach takes sovereignty as "something variable that may be augmented or diminished" (p. 64). What Fowler and Bunck propose to do is test whether these two approaches (with chunk sovereignty denoting sovereign states and basket sovereignty defining the specific rights and duties attendant to that status) are complementary or fundamentally at odds.

In their empirical analysis, the authors do case studies entailing the resolution of conflicts over sovereignty, including right of passage, territorial leases, international servitudes, military occupations, condominiums, and treatment of national minorities. Their conclusion: "In our view a fair reading of the evidence lays to rest the notion that the chunk and basket schools of thought may accurately be thought of as complementary rather than as in opposition" (p. 82). Furthermore, the basket approach "may be gaining the upper hand" among both international relations scholars and practitioners (p. 124).

Fowler and Bunck then turn to a discussion of the debate between sovereignty's critics and defenders, the result of which, they claim, is further evidence for the continuing relevance of sovereignty. In conclusion, they examine the relationship between sovereignty and some contemporary issues (e.g., human rights, pollution) whose resolution is conventionally viewed as being incompatible with state sovereignty. They claim that these issues actually are more likely to be resolved by political entities which "can control their territories and commit their peoples," and keep their promises—in short, sovereign states (p. 162).

Scholars who have devoted much attention to the question of sovereignty will probably not find in this book anything new or insightful. Yet, it is not clear that the book is intended for such readers (and I doubt that international relations scholars will find helpful the numerous metaphors, including "a slippery mass of intertwined ropes heaped in the dark, damp hold of a ship" [p. 19] as a metaphor for international relations). It may be that those who are unfamiliar with the now decade-old debates about sovereignty in the international relations field will find this a useful introduction to the central issues surrounding the theory and practice of sovereignty. Surely, part of the problem is timeliness: Much of the most interesting and productive work in this literature was published after this book was written. But Fowler and Bunck either do not consider a number of important works (e.g., Krasner's *Structural Conflict*, 1985) or cite a piece without exploring or explaining the author's arguments concerning sovereignty (e.g., Spruyt's *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, 1994). And it is surprising to find that, in their discussion of the "Marxist" critique of sovereignty, they rely heavily on an American Bar Association publication.

Perhaps more to the point, I was not persuaded by the authors' (central?) argument that the absolute and variable conceptualizations of sovereignty are not complementary. Having read this book, I remain comfortable with a perspective which maintains an analytical distinction between constitutive sovereignty (being sovereign) and functional sovereignty (exercising sovereignty). In short, it is not clear to me that invoking the chunk-basket metaphor contributes to theorizing sovereignty nor that the cases examined constitute a systematic test of the relative power of the purportedly conflicting approaches. It seems to me that most if not all the cases analyzed suggest that "states in such relationships are regularly considered either to be sovereign or to be well on the road to eventual, and perhaps inevitable, sovereign statehood" (p. 123).

While I agree with Fowler and Bunck's ultimate argument that state sovereignty is and will continue to be central to international relations theory and practice, the authors provide no clues as to why this should be so other than to say that politicians find it useful. While the authors are, in my view, correct in this assessment, the question remains as to why it is useful to pretend that Panama is a sovereign state just like the United States.

Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. By Mervyn Frost. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 251p. $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Ethics and Statecraft: The Moral Dimension of International Affairs. Edited by Cathal J. Nolan. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 235p. $65.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Richard Price, *University of Minnesota*

Ethics and Statecraft, edited by Cathal Nolan, is one of those all too rare volumes that consists of a coherent set of essays nicely framed by the editor's introductory essay. As Nolan notes, the essays (some of which have appeared previously) are unusually concentrated on historical/political biography, based on the contention that the foundation of ethics is human agency (p. 1). The essays center around an assessment of the motivations of leaders facing moral dilemmas, from Bismarck to Shevardnadze, each author being duly chastised by an ethic of scholarship to empathize as much as possible with the complex historical circumstances confronting leaders to avoid arriving at unfair indictments.

The book does a service to the debate on international ethics by providing empirical support to break down what often became in the "realist-idealist/liberal" debates an overly facile distinction between morality and power. In the essays by contributors, leaders that are often depicted as hard-headed realists are shown to be wrestling with and often motivated by moral concerns, while supposed idealists such as Woodrow Wilson and Dag Hammarskjöld are shown to be anything but insensitive to the demands of power. In a piece reprinted from 1962, Arthur Link characterizes Wilson's policies as a "higher realism," a representative formulation for the essays that is followed explicitly by Carl Hodge to describe Adenauer's policies of German rearmament and commitment to Europe.

The essays cohere nicely because they demonstrate the complexity and ambiguity surrounding moral dilemmas faced by political leaders, and because they share an emphasis on history and biography. The price of the focus on detail and turn from more ambitious theoretical pretensions is the potential analytical power of the book. In the end, each leader in the essays is portrayed as a moral realist (or a realistic moralist). In the process of dissolving the sterile versions of abstract categories, such as power and morality, analytic distinctions threaten to recede altogether in favor of the chosen mode of historical biography.

The analytic distinction that the essays do retain as a replacement for the dichotomy of power and morality is a distinction between acting out of conviction as opposed to packaging in moral language policies taken in response to changing circumstances. While this distinction can serve as a useful touchstone, the authors might have furthered their claims by following other contemporary analysts of international morality, such as Lumsdaine or McElroy, by grounding a more substantive conception of instrumental action, lest it become an empty category, like the "interests" of some rationalist theory. Acting for instrumental reasons need not preclude a role for moral concerns if one can show how the latter structures the contexts of action.

The emphasis in the volume is on the importance of context as opposed to the relevance of theory, whether it be in Jackson's rejection of the abstract principles of moral philosophy in favor of situational ethics as an empirical inquiry, or in Nolan's pointed indictment of the "profoundly flawed" and "arcane methodologies" of political science. While those criticisms rightly point to some of the shortcomings of undue philosophical abstraction or methodological fetishes, not all sophisticated theoretical approaches in political science suffer from the same liabilities. For example, while the contributions of Nolan's book are confined to the details of the fascinating and invariably well-written case studies, contemporary constructivist work on morality explores the relationship among agency, identity, and structure in ways that show how interests are created out of a matrix of power and morality that creates the conditions of contemporary notions of moral subjectivity and argument.

It is to such concerns that Mervyn Frost's book, *Ethics in International Relations*, offers a major theoretical contribution to the study of international ethics. Filling in the theoretical lacuna left by Nolan's volume, Frost shows in convincing fashion how any account of international relations inescapably involves substantive normative theory. As he demonstrates, even a preliminary description of, let alone explanation for, the situation in the former Yugoslavia requires rather sophisticated normative judgments by social scientists (pp. 35–9). This vignette embodies one of the great strengths of this book, namely, the ease with which Frost brings the reader along through the frequent use of judiciously chosen examples and illustrations that readily bring the theoretical arguments to life.

Giving more power to the arguments broached by Nolan's volume, Frost effectively shows that the realist argument (states merely use justifications to act as if they were moral) fails because it ignores how states and individuals are embedded in a system of rules. The "morality as mere justification" position "assumes power can exist independently of ideas ... the political power of a power wielder consists in part of a norm-constituted relationship between him and his audience/followers. If they did not adhere to these ideas he would not be a leader" (p. 65).

Akin to contemporary constructivist criticisms of rationalist theory's contrast between interests and ideas, Frost attacks the realist thesis that might is more fundamental than right as untenable because might and right "are not conceptually and practically distinct in the way they need to be to maintain this position.... Power always exists within a practice which is partially constituted by certain normative ideas" (pp. 62–3). Frost's formulation that political power consists in part of a norm-constituted relationship is well argued, though it seems implausible for violently repressive regimes: It does not seem to matter what Iraqi "followers" think of Saddam Hussein—the relation is one of pure terror, for which his statement that "power is thus based on cooperation according to norms" (p. 66) seems too strong.

Implicit in Frost's criticisms of realism is the need to identify the constitutive social norms that provide the premises for argumentation. Frost contends that identifying the existence of an area of agreement between people—a "domain of discourse"—gives us a basis from which we might construct an argument toward a substantive normative theory (p. 75). Frost contends that "all normative issues in world politics today refer, either directly or indirectly, to the state, interstate relations and the role of individuals as citizens of states." He then encapsulates all the normative questions into one central question: "What in general is a good reason for action by or with regard to states?"

Frost's central claim is that the only background theory that can justify both major conflicting categories of settled norms—sovereignty and human rights—is his constitutive theory of individuality. He takes the Hegelian position of embedding the constitution of individuality in a hierarchy of institutions, and he thus moves from the family, civil society, and state to the importance of the society of states in constituting individuality. He makes his case by emphasizing in Hegelian fashion the importance of recognition: "Within the autonomous state all individuals are constituted as free citizens, but for their citizenship to be fully actualized their state needs to be recognized by other states as autonomous" (p. 151). While Frost provides useful and subtle refinements on the practice of recognition, he does not fill out the pressing normative question: What should be the criteria in terms of which states recognize one another? Given the centrality of this issue today, and the fact that his central criticism of international relations theory is that it does not engage in explicit normative theorizing, it was disappointing that Frost refrained from such an exercise.

Frost applies the skeletal version of his theory to two hard cases: the justification of unconventional violence and Bosnia. Here the Hegelian roots of Frost's theory come to the fore. He argues that indiscriminate murder is not justifiable because it cannot attain the free recognition of free men for a cause but instead aims at coercion. If other methods short of killing do not convince a large number of people of the justice of the cause being put by the saboteur, then Frost argues that we have a prima facie reason for believing the case must be a weak one (p. 181). Some of the difficulties implied by this position are that it sidesteps how difficult it may be to express support in various societies, and it seems based on the unwarranted assumption that all good reasons are supported by a majority.

In the end Frost provides a sensible theoretical grounding for the different international legitimacy accorded to movements such as Solidarity and the ANC as opposed to the Red Army Faction or Serbian nationalists. He largely agrees with Western policy toward intervening in Bosnia, arguing that at the end of the day the necessary relationships must be established by the actors themselves. This seems sensible as far as it goes, but it skirts the central question to the point of begging it: What if outside force is needed to establish the "framework conditions within which the institutions of reciprocal recognition may grow" (p. 211)?

Frost's is one of those rare works which is ambitious theoretically and provides responses to some pressing concrete problems, all the while opening up fruitful areas for further thought. As such, the book (which is reworked from a version published by Cambridge in 1986) stands in my mind as one of the most important recent works on ethics and world affairs. The ambitious nature of Frost's theoretical effort will no doubt provide much fodder for criticism, but in his case such attention will be a virtue, given the wide applicability of his theory and the possibilities for its extension and amendment as an area for rich future work.

Frost's work (as indeed was the case with Hegel's) will no doubt draw some charges of conservatism because of the centrality of the state in his theory, even despite his repeated provisos to the contrary, driven by a concern to maintain a critical edge to his argument. Among many issues that arise here, Frost's argument raises the question of the relationship between the empirical and prescriptive. Is there a tension between his criticism of international relations theories, which are ultimately premised upon description or explanation (he implies such exercises are not logically necessary for prescription), and his constitutive theory, which in the end is a criticism of realism that rises or falls based on an empirical account of the existence and content of international norms? It is curious in this regard that Frost does not engage authors such as Terry Nardin or Dorothy Jones, who have made comparable arguments about the normative content of international life. In the end, Frost's book suggests that projects which situate our contemporary moral constellations in broad context may best reveal what are the possibilities (and limitations) for change.

The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification. By Mary N. Hampton. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1996. 192p. $55.00.

Mark R. Brawley, *McGill University*

This book traces the evolution of the relationship between the United States and Germany in the postwar period, but it should appeal to a wider audience than those simply interested in that relationship. Hampton builds off the work of Judith Goldstein and John Ikenberry to address a number of questions concerning the role of ideas in international relations, the socialization of great powers, and intraalliance politics. The resulting evidence and accounts touch on a number of important extraalliance outcomes and theoretical issues.

The arguments are reminiscent of those made by J. G. Ruggie ("International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36(Spring 1982):195–231). Whereas Ruggie was concerned with economic issues, Hampton focuses largely on security issues. Like Ruggie, Hampton is not taking realist arguments head on but elaborating how structural factors leave states with plenty of room to maneuver. As Ruggie argued, international regimes are shaped by a social purpose which cannot be deduced from the systemic structure. Hampton takes a similar approach in saying that the speed and manner in which West Germany entered the Western alliance were not entirely due to the bipolar structure; instead, they reflected a combination of the American approach taken (which in turn was shaped by principles developed by Woodrow Wilson and by the post–World War I experience) and the skillful exploitation of the situation by German leaders (especially Adenauer). In terms of policy prescriptions, the Wilsonian impulse refers to "an operationalized set of beliefs based on historical lessons." Paramount among these were a rejection of traditional balance-of-power policies and the need to reintegrate West Germany into the Western community of states. Moreover, these beliefs found an institutional base within the Department of State.

The argument runs along different levels. First, there is a generational angle. American leaders in the 1940s and early 1950s were imbued with the Wilsonian impulse, largely because of their direct and indirect experiences. All had observed the failure of European balance-of-power politics to preserve the peace at least once (if not twice), and many had been present during the Versailles negotiations and therefore had a first-hand view of Wilson's failure to get his policies installed. (The best example here was John Foster Dulles, who was an assistant to Colonel House during the peace talks.) To ensure against a third repetition, these leaders implemented what Hampton calls the "Versailles remedial." West Germany would not be treated harshly so that it could be rehabilitated—and socialized into the ways of Western liberal democracies.

Second, Wilson's principles demanded that such things be done. Scholars have noted that the postwar international economy was constructed around the principles of collective participation and voluntary collaboration, and the United States implemented such principles via multilateral institutions. These same observations hold for the United Nations and, as Hampton illustrates, for Western security arrangements as well. To follow along the lines established by Ruggie and Ikenberry, the structure of the international system may have given the opportunity for the United States to lead in the construction of a security community, but the U.S. leaders chose to construct a security community around the Wilsonian notions of collective security (for the community members), voluntary participation, and high levels of institutionalization.

Third, Hampton argues that the Wilsonian ideas outlived the generation with direct experience of the post–World War I settlement. Because the ideas had become strongly embedded within the Department of State, they were passed on to later generations. (John J. McCloy is an excellent example of such later Wilsonians.) Younger generations had other experiences, and the one commonly stressed in studies of U.S. security policies during the cold war is the appeasement of Hitler. Hampton's prime example of the effect of the Munich analogy comes with John F. Kennedy, whose foreign policy beliefs undoubtedly were shaped by the failure of appeasement. By considering the ways in which Kennedy's attitudes were moderated by McCloy and others from the Department of State, Hampton illustrates how the Wilsonian ideas played a persistent role in American policies. As Hampton points out in the conclusion, the Wilsonian ideas are still powerful, as seen in the way they most recently resurfaced in Bush's calls for a "New World Order."

Although the lessons from Versailles and Munich were not directly competitive, since one was about the way to approach Germany and the other was about how to deal with the Soviet Union, operationalizing the two simultaneously could only be awkward. The tension between the two approaches grew in the 1970s and the 1980s. In that sense, the story unfolds much more like a romantic triangle; given the West Germans' position on issues such as German unification, the West German–Soviet relationship was set—and any changes in U.S.–Soviet relations tended to have ramifications for the U.S.–West German relationship (and vice versa). Hampton recognizes how American self-restraint toward its allies mattered not only inside the alliance but also for relations with external rivals. And as mentioned above, the skill of West German leaders allowed them to play a prominent role in the rebuilding of Western Europe. The Wilsonian impulse created the political space, but it took an Adenauer to exploit the opportunity fully. Hampton compares Adenauer to Talleyrand, and the comparison rings truer than one might expect. Hampton would surely argue that Adenauer's role has not been fully appreciated.

There are numerous reasons to recommend this book. By touching on the themes of inter-state community building and the triangular relationship among Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Hampton is well placed to raise important issues about the future of the Western alliance. People who ask whether NATO will survive, and wish to understand the role it could play in the future, should read this book to understand why a security community may persist long after external threats decline. The book is also obviously relevant to debates about bringing East European countries into the Western security and economic structures—in terms of both socializing them into the Western way of doing things and underlining the East Europeans' desire to keep Germany in a structure that is just as likely to restrain that country as themselves. The work is also relevant for those engaging in debates about Russia's future treatment; if one is interested in understanding how Russia could be brought into a security community, why not look at post-1945 Germany? The situation is necessarily different, but insights can be gained nonetheless.

More broadly, Hampton contributes to our understanding of the way ideas influence the interaction of states (though the way in which ideas are institutionalized remains a bit unclear), underlines how much scholars from international political economy and security studies can learn from one another, and shows how it took many factors for German unification to occur peacefully.

Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. By Paul K. Huth. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 288p. $47.50.

Thomas C. Walker, *Rutgers University*

Lecturing at Oxford in 1907, Lord Curzon proclaimed that "frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace." Despite Curzon's proclamation, territorial issues have been largely ignored by political scientists exploring the causes of war. Recent works by Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (*Territorial Changes and International Conflict*, 1992) and by John Vasquez (*The War Puzzle*, 1994), however, have sparked a revival in the study of territorial conflict. Paul Huth's new book is a welcome contribution to our understanding of how and why some territorial disputes escalate to war.

Huth provides a detailed empirical examination of the origins, evolution, and termination of 129 territorial disputes that took place from 1950 to 1990. This book, however, is much more than data and the empirical descriptions of these disputes. One of Huth's major contributions is his attempt to integrate domestic political variables within a traditional realist framework. Huth's "modified realist model" attempts to capture both the domestic and international factors that influence a state's security policy. In this model, decision makers seek to maximize their chances of staying in power while pursuing national security goals in an anarchic international system. This effort to integrate domestic and international factors is especially important for our understanding of territorial disputes. Huth points out that it is not only the strategic and economic importance of territory but also the fact that decision makers have very few incentives in the domestic realm to resolve these disputes; any attempt to do so will likely invite serious domestic opposition. Furthermore, by engaging in aggressive confrontations over territory, decision makers can divert public attention from domestic ills and political opposition. Given these incentives and constraints, Huth makes it clear how domestic politics can work to initiate, exacerbate, and perpetuate territorial disputes. While it has become trendy to point out how domestic political factors can influence foreign policy outcomes, rare are the efforts to test their influence systematically. Here is where Huth's book is especially noteworthy.

Huth draws from the realist and the modified realist models to derive numerous hypotheses that test the relative importance of international and domestic factors associated with territorial disputes. This review concentrates on the most theoretically interesting hypotheses. Recognizing that most neighboring states live peacefully next to one another, Huth first asks why some engage in embittered, long-standing disputes over territory. He compares the 129 territorial disputes between neighboring states with 129 randomly selected pairs of neighbors not involved in territorial disputes. Huth finds that strategic territories and those rich in natural resources are among the most prone to conflict. More surprising is his examination of cases in which state boundaries divide ethnic groups. He finds that "ethnic conflict and self-determination claims are not a principal cause of territorial disputes between states" (p. 82).

When Huth turns to the question of whether a territorial dispute is likely to experience high or low levels of violent conflict, he begins to unravel the complex interplay between domestic and international influences on foreign policy. When democratic states challenge a boundary they tend to avoid escalation in a dispute far more frequently than do nondemocracies. In only one case, India against Portugal over Goa, did a democratic challenger choose to escalate a territorial dispute. Another finding is that military position, measured by a state's national military capabilities, has little effect on a state's decision to initiate a territorial dispute (i.e., many small powers often lodge protests over borders with major powers), but military position weighs very heavily in escalation (i.e., small states rarely choose to escalate a dispute with major powers). In disputing territory, domestic audiences are more likely advocates of harsh words than costly actions.

In spite of decision makers' domestic incentives to perpetuate a territorial conflict, many territorial disputes end peacefully. Of Huth's 129 cases, 41% were resolved through compromise or conciliation. The conditions most associated with these resolutions would not surprise any dyed-in-the-wool realist. Decision makers tend to resolve territorial disputes when they are faced with more pressing security concerns. For instance, leaders will seek settlements after suffering military defeat at the hands of their neighbor; when they come to share common security interests with their neighbor; or when they are involved in multiple disputes with other neighbors and securing an agreement would strengthen their position in these other conflicts. What is perhaps most surprising in the chapter on settlements is the relative unimportance of common ethnicity. Huth finds that the "presence of minority groups along the border with ethnic ties to the general population of the challenger did not have a strong effect on the likelihood of a compromise settlement" (p. 151). This supports Huth's earlier finding that boundaries separating ethnic groups are no more prone to dispute initiation than other boundaries. Together, these findings call into question those who predict an onslaught of ethnic violence in the post–Cold War world.

Although Huth contributes a great deal to our understanding of domestic factors in the making of foreign policy, there are times when his effort to integrate domestic political concerns with realist national security interests creates some conceptual confusion. Among Huth's variables measuring the domestic context are unsettled territorial disputes, prior history of militarized disputes, and prior loss of territory for the challenger. All these variables could also be used within a traditional realist framework. This leads Huth to conclude that "to protect themselves domestically leaders should act like realists in assessing when to escalate disputes and when to avoid conflict . . . it is good for domestic politics for foreign policy leaders to think and act like realists in many ways" (p. 185). If this is the case, then why flee from the parsimony of a realist framework in the first place? Huth's answer, of course, is that at certain times decision makers become more concerned with boosting their domestic standing than with prudent management of territorial disputes. One way of achieving such a boost is to initiate or escalate an international conflict. The decision of the Argentine junta to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982 is the arch-example of the diversionary theory of war initiation. Huth's research design, however, fails to link the timing of the dispute to the domestic political situation in the challenging state. Rather than exploring the peaks and valleys of decision makers' political fortunes, Huth assumes that leaders will uniformly use territorial disputes "to build internal support by appealing to nationalism" (p. 59). Yet, the need to build domestic support in this manner is most keenly felt in periods of political instability. Had Huth distinguished periods of popularity and calm from periods of economic crisis and active political opposition, he could have identified those situations in which decision makers had the greatest domestic incentives to initiate and escalate territorial disputes. Then we could have better understood the full extent to which domestic politics contributes to the evolution of territorial conflict.

Despite its questionable handling of some of the domestic political variables, this book is a glowing example of how to do balanced research. In theoretical terms, Huth uses realism up to a point and then offers his own modified realist model that draws on how domestic politics can influence foreign policy. In methodological terms, the work is neatly balanced between large-n and case studies. Dry correlation coefficients are almost always accompanied by rich historical examples that clarify the relationship in question. In empirical terms, Huth uses many existing data sets, ranging from Correlates of War to Polity II, and then collects his own data on 129 territorial disputes. Rather than simply listing his cases in an appendix, Huth provides us with micro case studies of each dispute. This allows easy access to his data and encourages others to use the data to pursue related research questions. This balance makes *Standing Your Ground* an essential book for graduate courses and a challenging but rewarding book for advanced undergraduates.

Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation. By Karen Litfin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 257p. $47.50 cloth, $17.50 paper.

Paul Wapner, *American University*

Epistemic community theory significantly contributes to our understanding of international regimes. It argues that power and interests are not the only determinants of international cooperation; shared understandings about the nature of complex problems also account for regime formation, maintenance, and development. Epistemic communities are coalitions of scientists and policymakers—generally transnational in scope—who share ideas about the cause-and-effect quality of a given issue. As this community grows into a critical mass, its consensus becomes key to its ability to participate in and shape the international policy process. Its shared understandings can change state interests, often in the direction of international cooperation.

From a normative perspective, epistemic community theory holds out a certain form of hope for those concerned with international cooperation. It suggests that scientific knowledge can cut through much of the conflict associated with international politics and foster cooperation. According to modern understanding, science is "above" politics and can rationalize the pursuit of interests, the wielding of power, and even the conceptualization of the good insofar as it is more of a technical practice than a value-laden one. Science's role in international politics, then, can be seen as good news in that transnational issues are increasingly knowledge-based problems amenable to technical expert advice. As recent international agreements on trade, environment, and technology seem to suggest, when there is a broad consensus among professionals about the character of a certain problem, international accords soon follow.

Karen Litfin's sophisticated and elegant book reminds us that international cooperation is not so simple and that, from a broader perspective, science will not "save the day." Yes, scientific consensus is important for motivating policymakers to pursue cooperative activities, but neither science nor knowledge consensus themselves drive international cooperation. Rather, scientific insight is always embedded in, and mediated by, social formations that refract understanding in a particular way. Scientific issues are "framed," to use Litfin's language, and this framing is critical to how issues are perceived and acted upon. Science cannot be extracted from politics: There is a political dimension to how science is understood by the public and how science proceeds in a collective setting. The engine behind international regimes associated with knowledge-based problems, then, is the political dimension of how issues get framed and the resonance of those frames with a broader public.

Litfin makes her case by emphasizing the role of discourse in world politics. Discourse refers to linguistic practices that are embedded in social relations and hence produce certain narratives about how the world works. The word *discourse* is used to remind readers that knowledge is never separate from power; narratives determine the boundaries of what can and cannot be thought and hence acted upon. To use the language of social science, discourse structures human life. As Litfin's book underlines, discourse creates the milieu within which policy decisions and international agreements are made.

While no one in particular creates discourse, politically active people deliberately promote certain renderings of the world. To the degree that their interpretations become influential, they shape the way issues are understood and transposed into policy. Social activists, politically motivated scientists, business leaders, and socially conscientious government officials are among those who put a spin on scientific information in the act of translating it into language accessible to decision makers and the general public. Litfin calls this group of actors "knowledge brokers" because they do not produce information but package it in ways that advance their own normative agendas.

Litfin explicates the role of knowledge brokers in the formation of international cooperation by tracing the development and evolution of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol of 1987 and its subsequent amendments are often considered the best international environmental treaties on record insofar as they represent a successful forging of agreement among powerful actors with conflicting interests on a genuinely global issue. Indeed, presently, most ozone-depleting substances are banned in the industrialized North, and southern states are expected to ban them by 2006. Litfin tracks the events leading up to the ban. The story she relates is easily the most careful and most detailed I have read (one could justify reading the book simply to learn the empirical facts about the negotiations).

The most striking aspect of the story is that international agreement came amid much scientific uncertainty—a point that fits and supports Litfin's analysis. Prior to 1987, when the international community made its first commitment to reducing ozone-depleting substances, scientists were only partially confident in their knowledge of the mechanics of ozone depletion. They put forward hypotheses about it without measurable evidence of depletion or of increased radiation reaching the earth. Moreover, they collectively chose to ignore the ozone hole over the Antarctic—arguably the most compelling empirical fact justifying concern—in their 1986 assessment (that became the informational base for negotiations) because it was larger than their models had predicted and had yet to be explained. The international community chose to move forward nonetheless, and it is Litfin's analysis of this decision that lends credibility to her thesis.

Litfin shows how key players in the negotiations, low-level government officials, staff at policy research institutes, and members of activist organizations throughout the world worked to frame existing scientific evidence in a way that encouraged preventive action. These knowledge brokers interpreted scientific understanding through a normative perspective that understood the risks associated with ozone depletion (that were well known) as outweighing the costs of waiting for definitive scientific confirmation. Their actions were key to promoting the so-called precautionary principle—the idea that, in the face of scientific uncertainty, policymakers should act to prevent harm rather than wait until damage occurs. The precautionary principle replaced an antiregulatory orientation that, in its strictest formulation, objected to action and, in its looser formulation, called for postponing action until verifiable proof of ozone depletion was in hand.

A central point of *Ozone Discourses* is that the precautionary principle was a social construction that depended not only on existing scientific knowledge but also on discursive strategies that included "extra-scientific" considerations. In other words, the precautionary principle was not mandated by science itself, and thus the Montreal Protocol was not simply the triumph of science but the coalescence of various worldviews, political commitments, material interests, and certain scientific understandings. Scientific information, like all types of knowledge, is inscripted by interpretation. Ozone depletion is not simply a physical event but a discursive phenomenon representing a contest among certain knowledge claims. Much of Litfin's book is the story of how such a contest played out with regard to international negotiations about ozone depletion.

The power of *Ozone Discourses* is that it puts politics squarely back into regime analysis. Traditional regime theory, in either its interest-based (e.g., game-theoretic analyses) or power-based (e.g., hegemonic stability theory) incarnation, sees regime formation, maintenance, and evolution as a matter of bargaining or coercion. States have given interests, and politics begins, as it were, as states try to realize those interests. Epistemic community theory rightly qualifies such understanding by stressing the influence of ideas on policy. It recognizes that state interests are not fixed and that they change as state officials come to subscribe to new understandings about given problems and adopt new self-understandings. The result of this corrective, however, is that politics shrinks in significance as knowledge disarms conflicting interests and rationalizes identity. Using epistemic community theory as a point of departure, Litfin's book attempts to resuscitate politics, although on a level of analysis different from traditional regime theory. If epistemic community theory champions the influence of knowledge consensus and its ability to cut through much political conflict, then Litfin problematizes it, showing that the meaning of such consensus for policy is a matter of interpretation and struggle. For Litfin, politics is about the structuration of the world through discourse—the practice by which narratives are written and course through human affairs. *Ozone Discourses* demonstrates that a sensitivity to this level of political activity is essential for understanding the Montreal Protocol, much international environmental policy, and world politics in general.

Scholars of international relations theory will find this book a gem. It provides a clear explication of how insights into discourse matter for the study of international relations and locates such concern in the context of traditional schools of thought. For those interested in international environmental politics, the book provides keen insight into the conjunctions of science, environmental commitment, policy, and politics, and it thus raises the level of sophistication among contemporary studies grappling with international environmental affairs.

From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam. By Timothy J. Lomperis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 440p. $55.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Herbert K. Tillema, *University of Missouri-Columbia*

The late twentieth century has witnessed numerous national insurrections that have challenged independent or colonial authority, sometimes successfully, in the name of a "people's war" and/or popular liberation. How-to manuals have been penned by some successful practitioners of the art, including China's Mao Zedong, Indonesia's Nasutian, Cyprus' Grivas, Cuba's Che Guevara, and Vo Nguyen Giap, military leader of the campaign against French rule in Indochina during the first phase of the Vietnam War in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Related commentaries upon these manuals, upon particular wars of liberation, and upon revolutionary war generally contribute to a weighty body of literature that is significant both to public policy and political theory. There is as yet no one universally accepted prescriptive or explanatory theory of revolutionary war, however.

According to popular American interpretation, the Vietnam War is a conspicuous instance of a people's war, and understanding its proper lessons may provide the basis for better dealing with such conflicts in the future. American domestic politics has been and still is riven by disagreement about exactly what lessons to derive from the Vietnam experience. *From People's War to People's Rule* is organized upon the premise of comparing the Vietnam War to other people's wars of the post–World War II era, ostensibly in order to see its lessons more clearly. In the end, however, Lomperis argues that the Vietnam War, at least during the period of the greatest U.S. involvement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, has little in common with other recent revolutionary insurrections and ought not to be evaluated as a true people's war. Thus, Vietnam offers few direct lessons for dealing with future populist revolutionary upheavals.

The book intermingles several themes. These include: lessons to be drawn from the Vietnam War experience, especially for U.S. foreign policy; similarities and differences among Vietnam and other post–World War II radical insurgencies; conditions for revolutionary success; and the optimum level of foreign intervention to forestall or promote revolutionary success. The result is a complicated volume that is not easily or quickly read but one that contributes to both historical interpretation and political theory.

Read one way, the book represents an exercise in historical comparison and interpretation. The Vietnam narrative (chapter 4), encompassing the period 1945–75, condenses Lomperis' previous book on Vietnam, *The War Everyone Lost* (1984). It reflects documentation available in the early 1980s. Seven additional revolutionary conflicts ostensibly representing people's wars are concisely summarized, based primarily upon secondary materials. These include the Chinese Civil War (1920–49), the Greek Civil War (1941–49), the Philippines Insurgency (1946–56), the Malayan Emergency (1948–60), the Cambodian and Laotian conflicts ending in 1975, and the Shining Path movement in Peru during the 1980s. A notable difference between Vietnam and the other cases is the extent to which Vietnamese insurgents and allies relied from an early date upon conventional military strategies as well as guerrilla tactics. It does not conform to most models of a people's war, not even that of Vietnam's own General Giap.

Lomperis also offers a framework for assessing revolutionary movements and their prospects based upon a theory of political legitimacy. This is defined generally (p. 5) as in contemporary political science: "The justification upon which [political] authority is based and rule rendered 'rightful.'" Revolutionary insurgencies are assumed to demonstrate and/or to constitute crises in national political legitimacy. Systematic findings gained from the case studies in light of this framework include some commonalties not necessarily emphasized by alternative perspectives upon recent revolutions. Particularly interesting findings include the conspicuous importance of World War II events in shaping the destiny of each postwar insurgency and the conspicuous role of foreign intervention, including but not necessarily limited to military intervention, on behalf of each successful insurgency.

A novel feature of the theoretical framework is also one of its most controversial features. Lomperis differentiates three "levels" of legitimacy supposedly representing different intensities of revolutionary commitment: legitimacy of interest, legitimacy of opportunity, and legitimacy of belief. The distinction is prominently employed within each case study. Most readers will agree that revolutionary commitment varies from place to place and time to time and that these differences may be consequential. Not all will agree that interest, opportunity, and belief appropriately designate discrete categories of revolutionary commitment. The author appears to employ the distinction partly in order to support preference for psychological explanations that take cognizance of individuals' beliefs as opposed to more objective or rational explanations that weigh merely calculated interests and opportunities.

From People's War to People's Rule is recommended reading for at least two purposes. The first is to revise interpretation of why the United States "failed" in Vietnam. An early but still popular explanation, represented by, among others, Halberstam's *Making of a Quagmire* and Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake,* blames failure primarily upon American incomprehension of a people's war. If Lomperis is correct and Vietnam was not a people's war, then the explanation by Halberstam, Fitzgerald, and others is highly questionable. The second is to advance the theory of revolution. The principal theoretical questions addressed here, including what conditions contribute to revolutionary success and how much foreign intervention is optimal to affect outcomes, retain interest and practical significance in the post–Cold War era. Lomperis does not claim to offer a fully developed theory of revolution. He answers principal theoretical questions tentatively, even diffidently. Nonetheless, herein lies an uncommon collection of ideas about contemporary revolution that ought to be taken into account in designing further research.

When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations during the Suez and Falklands Crises. By Louise Richardson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. 278p. $45.00.

Alan C. Lamborn, *Colorado State University*

Louise Richardson uses her excellent analysis of U.S.–British relations during the Suez and Falklands crises to explore a question of considerable practical and theoretical significance: "What happens when a weaker ally goes off on its own in pursuit of interests at variance with those of the great power" (p. 2)? The problem, as she observes, is that many existing theoretical perspectives cannot simultaneously explain the outcomes in both cases. Classical statecraft would expect the stronger ally to prevail, which fits Suez (where Eisenhower's preferences prevailed) but not the Falklands (where Thatcher's preferences ultimately dominated U.S. policy). Neorealism's emphasis on system structure would lead one to expect alliance leaders to have more tolerance for defection during periods of tight bipolarity than when the system is loosening, but the opposite occurred in these cases. Scholars who stress regime type would expect democracies to be less prone to demand consent from weaker allies, but the two cases produce quite different outcomes with no significant variation in regime type.

Research programs that stress two-level games, bureaucratic politics, transnational ties, and the effect of cognition on the probability of misunderstanding come closer to identifying crucial pieces of these cases, but even these approaches do not produce consistent explanations of the outcomes. Misunderstandings there certainly were (especially in the Suez case), but the principal reasons that Neustadt suggested in *Alliance Politics* (1970) for the misunderstandings in Suez were still present in the 1980s, when misunderstandings played a far smaller role. Similarly, while infighting among U.S. policymakers and transnational connections between U.S. and British bureaucracies played a major role in the Falklands crisis, Thatcher suppressed any differences among British policymakers. Moreover, with the exception of the effect on British interpretations of U.S. policy of the subtle but significant differences in Dulles' and Eisenhower's preferences and the consistency with which they stated their positions, there are no important examples of bureaucratic politics or lower-level transnational connections in the Suez case.

It is rare that two cases can so effectively reveal the limitations of so many different theoretical perspectives. As Richardson's scholarly and extremely well-written reconstruction of the historical record shows, alliance politics involves a set of dynamically interconnected political processes: interstate bargaining between the top policymakers representing each country, coalition building among policy factions within each country, the connections between each set of policymakers and their respective bureaucracies, and transnational relations between the subnational organizations in each country. Whether or not bureaucratic politics or transnational relations figure prominently depended on the preferences and the resolve of the executive. During the Suez crisis, both executives closed off not only dissent from policymaking factions but also contacts between their military and intelligence bureaucracies up until the time at which the United States forced a cease-fire and extracted a British commitment to withdraw. With the agreement to withdraw in hand but not yet announced, Eisenhower then initiated a very precise and coordinated attempt to save the Conservative government (but not Eden personally) that required close transnational contacts among the bureaucracies responsible for providing financial help and oil deliveries. In the Falklands case, it was Reagan's indifference that ignited the struggle among Weinberger, Haig, and Kirkpatrick for control of U.S. policy and liberated Weinberger to take advantage of the transnational relations between the U.S. and British military bureaucracies to facilitate his policy objectives.

Although Richardson does not put it in these terms, her careful and sophisticated analysis contributes to a growing set of insights by scholars around the discipline which suggest that far too many of our theories are inductively generated insights about the patterns that characterize politics under restrictive sets of empirical conditions. Put differently, the perspectives she examines focus on empirically restrictive subparts of more general theoretical relationships. In both the Suez and Falkland cases, the importance of two-level games, bureaucratic politics, and transnational relations was part of the outcome, not part of the explanation.

That observation suggests that both academics and policymakers might benefit by stressing theoretical approaches to policy choice and bargaining that are less tied to restrictive empirical assumptions than the ones reviewed by Richardson. For instance, since the key actors' preferences remained stable throughout these cases and the outcomes were clearly the result of variations in the compatibility of their preferences, relative power positions, and resolve, it would seem that Richardson's analysis is closer to a rational-choice, game-theoretic account of coalition building than it is to any of the approaches she reviews. Indeed, about the only change she would need to make in the theoretical structure of her argument—and it would be wise to make it whether or not she is comfortable with rational choice approaches—is in her treatment of power. In yet another example of one of the most perplexing mysteries in political science (how very smart and well-trained scholars can continue to ignore the insights of the social power literature), Richardson treats power as if it were an attribute of states and neglects to examine how it varies across different issues and actors. The suggestion that the United States had more power to manage alliance relations during the Suez than the Falklands crisis—in the 1950s the United States could "rely solely on the preponderance of its power to . . . prevail" (p. 1); "in 1956 the United States had unrivaled power" (p. 203)—struggles with the claim that Britain was capable of carrying out the Suez operation without U.S. help but needed it in the Falklands. Moreover, even the notion that the British had the power to prevail over Egypt does not seem to take into account their financial and energy vulnerability. As these cases demonstrate once again, the sources of power vary with the scope and domain of the influence attempt.

Add an increased sensitivity to issues involving power to the care with which the rest of the linked coalition-building processes are covered in *When Allies Differ*, and Richardson's analysis produces a clear and insightful interpretation not only of these cases but also of the value of some of the field's more widely discussed theoretical perspectives.

The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador. By William Stanley. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996. 328p. $59.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Ken Johnson, *Eastern Kentucky University*

Stanley's book is a welcome addition to the literature on state-sponsored violence. Over the years, scholars and journalists have produced several explanations for the terror and carnage of death squads, disappearances, and torture that litter the Latin American political landscape. In his detailed case study of El Salvador, Stanley rejects both modernization-based views that tend not to question the basic premise of the state's legitimate monopoly of the use of force (pp. 12, 17–20) and Marxist-based views of the state as an instrument of class domination (pp. 12, 20–28). Instead, he takes a micropolitical approach to understanding state violence, looking at politics within the state. His basic argument is that the Salvadoran state (and others which use violence as a means of maintaining power) are best understood as "protection rackets," wherein various elites within the state use coercion and manipulate threats to extort money, legitimacy, power, and compliance from other elites in their struggle for power over state institutions and resources (pp. 8, 13).

In the first chapter, Stanley lays out his theoretical framework, which rests on three sets of variables. First is the ideology and perceptions of strategic elites who make the most important decisions in government. In El Salvador, three sets are particularly pertinent: the military/security elites, the economic elites, and the U.S. government elites, particularly those in the Department of State and intelligence services. Examples of ideologies that mold elite perceptions include National Security Doctrines, neoliberalism (monetarism), and, of course, anticommunism (pp. 31–5).

Second is intrastate rivalries, both within elite groups, such as the military, the economic elite, the intellectual elite, and even the revolutionary elite, and among these various groups (pp. 35–8). Although much of the literature on the civil war tends to characterize the relationship between the Salvadoran military and economic elite as a kind of political alliance, Stanley argues convincingly that it was much more complex and contentious. Professional, bureaucratic, social, and even personal rivalries among factions within the military provided opportunities and incentives to extort compliance from others by creating threats, for example, from communist subversion, terrorism, and so forth (p. 136). Hardline conservative elites, opposed to economic or political reform, established a literal "protection racket" in which military elites legitimized their power and political role by manipulating fear among reformers through the use of violence.

Third is international forces. Increasing economic interdependence, the development of dense issue networks that bring the influence of NGOs and IGOs to bear on domestic politics, and U.S. foreign policy all have played roles in either encouraging or hindering state violence (pp. 39–40). In El Salvador, state violence was prevalent primarily because of the political weaknesses of the military and economic elites: their inability to maintain institutional cohesiveness and integrity; the lack of a coherent and compelling ideological vision or program with which to garner legitimacy from the masses; and their susceptibility (especially the military's) to external influence, particularly the U.S. Department of State.

Stanley's historical overview of the political developments that led to revolutionary violence in the 1980s (chapters 2–4) is a rather standard treatment and does not provide much new information or interpretation. The real value of the book is in explaining the confused and rapidly changing period of the 1980s (chapters 5–6). Through such primary research as recently declassified Department of State documents and numerous interviews with participants and close observers in El Salvador, Stanley provides considerable insight into the dynamics of the protection racket during both El Salvador's descent into revolution during 1979 and 1980 and its later emergence into peace and democratization in 1992.

According to Stanley, revolutionary violence in El Salvador was not inevitable. He essentially argues that hardline elites, opposed to any accommodation with the left, purposely sought to foment the appearance of a revolutionary threat through the use of state violence (death squads, kidnapping, bombing, assassination). Stanley believes that revolutionary opposition during the 1980s did not so much threaten the survival of the state as afford an opportunity for the security forces to increase vastly the scale of violence necessary to maintain and even enlarge the protection racket. He cites the testimony of former security and military officers who admitted later that many of the kidnappings of the wealthy were in fact committed by the security forces posing as Marxist guerrillas. In this way, they not only doubled their extortion receipts (first ransom payments, then salaries and fees to protect frightened oligarchs) but also continued to convince the oligarchy that the military and security forces were needed in the fight against terrorism and subversion (p. 118). The protection racket thus enriched individual officers and barracks commanders, strengthened the legitimacy of the military and security institutions, inhibited bargaining by reformers (both on the left and the right), and kept aid flowing from the United States. In short, the strategic elites in control of the state had a vested interest in maintaining and manipulating external threats to the state from below.

Just as the need to maintain and enlarge the protection racket helps explain the escalation of violence during the 1980s, the breakdown of the racket helps explain the transition to peace in the 1990s. As Stanley explains in the final chapter, the breakdown occurred for three major reasons. First, it became apparent that the Salvadoran military was incapable of defeating the FMLN (pp. 220–31). Second, changes within the economic elite made their traditional reliance on the military for political stability superfluous. They created their own successful political party (ARENA) and other organizations that gave them a degree of institutional and ideological autonomy from the military that they never before enjoyed (pp. 233–42). Third, the U.S. administration began losing interest in sustaining a military stalemate, which made the prospect of defeating the left even grimmer. For these reasons, the elites in charge of the state became willing (were forced?) to sign a peace accord ending El Salvador's long period of violence. Moreover, Stanley believes the peace accords signed in 1992 produced institutional changes that make the reemergence of a protection racket unlikely. Key among these are the separation of domestic security functions from military defense and judicial reform that lessens military legal impunity (pp. 249–66). As has been increasingly recognized among comparativists, institutional design matters.

Despite Stanley's commendable efforts to weave together the convoluted plots and subplots into a coherent narrative, readers unfamiliar with El Salvador's complex and confusing political dynamics of the early 1980s may quickly become mired in the details of the palace intrigues among the many actors. Nonetheless, *The Protection Racket State* is well worth reading for the lessons it provides on power politics, lessons which have obvious applicability to other countries in which corruption and violence among state elites is the norm.

Economic Development: Social Order and World Politics. By Erich Weede. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 204p. $47.50.

Will H. Moore, *University of California, Riverside*

Erich Weede's scholarship stands out for his determined use of regression models to probe empirically issues concerning conflict, inequality, and development. Unfortunately, this book does not provide any such analyses. Its other main weakness is the dearth of new theory: It strings together a variety of theoretical work that will be familiar to students who read the rational choice literature on development. Yet, the book does exhibit another Weede hallmark which would be applauded by Harry Eckstein: Beginning with well-known methodological individualist assumptions, Weede presses his argument for all it is worth and gives no quarter. With those comments as introduction, I briefly review the book's contents and then discuss specific strengths and weaknesses.

The book addresses economic development, democracy, and international conflict. Weede relies primarily on public choice theory, especially Mancur Olson's work on distributional coalitions. The Preface offers an interesting "intellectual biography" in which Weede traces his thinking on these topics from his teenage years through the present. The first two chapters lay out the public choice theoretical framework, and chapters 4 and 6 address the rise of the West and the West versus Asia in the late twentieth century. Chapter 5 deals with dependency theory, and chapter 7 discusses war and peace. The concluding chapter qualifies the "democratic peace" literature. I briefly review each in turn.

After a brief introductory chapter, chapters 2 and 3 review familiar public choice theorizing about rational decision making, markets, public goods, rent seeking, and government. The main thrust is that individually rational behavior produces rent-seeking behavior, especially in democracies, and rent-seeking behavior is inefficient and leads to economic decline. The material reviewed in these chapters will be familiar to scholars who have read the public choice literature.

Chapters 4 and 6 address the rise and decline of the West, respectively. The core argument in chapter 4 is that interstate rivalry served as "a functional equivalent to constitutional limitations of governmental authority" and provided the political space for the development of property rights and, thus, economic development (p. 44). In chapter 6 Weede contends that rent-seeking behavior produces distributional coalitions which have led to state intervention in the economy, inefficiency, and economic decline in the West. East Asian governments, in contrast, resist such behavior and have pursued policies that expose corporations to international competition. The key difference, Weede contends, is democracy: "not the level of democracy . . . but democratic permissiveness toward distributional coalitions and the welfare state" (p. 102). Weede relies on extant theory and evidence to make and illustrate his argument.

Chapter 5 examines dependency theory. Weede briefly reviews three major strains and then contrasts their claims with the evidence from previously published cross-national statistical analyses (many of which he has conducted). Having demonstrated that the theory's claims are not substantiated in these studies, Weede suggests that the Third World is poor because of excessive rent seeking. Again, he relies on extant theory and evidence to make and illustrate his argument.

Chapter 7, "War and Peace in the Contemporary World," is the most interesting because it (1) extends public choice theory to a new area of inquiry and (2) offers a revision of realism. Weede rejects the unitary actor assumption and blends the security dilemma, domestic coalition building, groupthink, and the systemic balance of power to explain why nation-states go to war. In doing so he offers a rival to Waltz's structural theory of realism.

The concluding chapter contends that trade leads to economic growth, which in turn promotes democracy, and democracies do not war with one another. Yet, Weede's concern with rent-seeking behavior leads him to suggest that it will undermine free trade, economic growth, and—ultimately—democracy. As such, Weede anticipates that distributional coalitions will undermine Kant's "democratic peace." By focusing on rent seeking, Weede tosses a significant dose of pessimism on this literature.

The book's strength is its extension of Olson's theory of distributional coalitions to the study of war and Weede's revision of realist theory. Its weaknesses are the lack of original theory (though this is mitigated by the imaginative blending of extant theory in chapter 7) and the lack of systematic empirical work. The second weakness is surprising. In the place of systematic empirical work Weede substitutes citations to extant empirical work, a risky practice that one expects of a Samuel Huntington but not of an Erich Weede.

Weede has written an interesting little book. Whether it is worth reading depends a bit upon what one wants. Those interested in understanding the connections among Weede's seemingly disparate research agendas will gain the most. He cites 32 of his own studies (the next most cited scholars are Volker Bornschier, 9; Samuel Huntington, 5; and Mancur Olson, 5), and I did not appreciate the linkages among them prior to reading it. Unfortunately, much of what is contained in chapters 4–6 will be deja vu for those who read Weede's work. Chapter 8 will be of interest to those involved in the "democratic peace" cottage industry. Finally, those interested in the continuing development of realist theory ought to read chapter 7. Unfortunately, given the insularity of most realist scholars, Weede's book is unlikely to receive much attention among that group. While I often find myself disagreeing with Weede's contentions, I am invariably provoked, and the provocative payoff is in chapter 7. It is hoped that I am mistaken about the realists, for that part of the book is novel and makes a contribution that warrants debate.

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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



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
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
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
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
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
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





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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





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

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